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The history of capitalism is abundant in agonizing fluctuations1. The 
intellectual nemesis of capitalism, Karl Marx, in his theory of cyclical growth 
posited that the phenomenon of recurring periods of prosperity and crisis is 
congenital with the functioning of a capitalist system2 given that economic 
downturns serve a rejuvenating function for capital stock3. This is the idea that 
recessions constitute an essential regulating device of the capitalist edifice4, in 
the sense that they weed out unproductive segments of the market and bring 
about the seed of future economic growth. This idea is not confined to Marxian 
theory5, but reemerges in other foundational texts of economic thought6.  
However, in Marx’s view every new period of economic growth 
following a contraction is less likely to restore the socioeconomic damage 
caused by the latter and therefore every new recession leaves an indelible mark 
on the system with the result being that in the long run capitalism will have lost 
its capacity to recover from a downturn7. According to Marx, capitalism is thus 
wasteful and inefficient and should be replaced by a more rational system: 
socialism. 
But focusing on the traditionally critical to capitalism Marxian theory 
could be deemed a biased approach. Therefore, it is worth looking at what a 
proponent of capitalism said about economic downturns: Joseph Schumpeter. 
Schumpeter saw capitalism’s secret of success lying in a process that takes place 
during recession periods. His theory on the capitalist order is epitomized in his 
axiom of ‘creative destruction’ that postulates that economic contraction 
nurtures new consumer goods, new methods of production and new forms of 
industrial organization that, functioning as capitalism’s engines, destroy the old 
technological edifice and reallocate property rights, thus securing a new era of 
economic growth8.  
                                                
1 Joseph Schumpeter, The Instability of Capitalism, 38 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 361, 363 
2 PAUL BLACKLEDGE & NEIL DAVIDSON, ALASDAIR MCINTYRE’S ENGAGEMENT WITH MARXISM: 
SELECTED WRITINGS 1953-1974 (2008), 7 
3 KARL MARX, CAPITAL VOL. I [1867] (1967), 453, 628; CAPITAL VOL. II (1967), 170, 186, 255, 489; 
CAPITAL VOL. III (1967), 249 
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Therefore, both a polemicist and a sympathizer of capitalism taught us 
that crises are a crucial source of vitality for a capitalist system and that we 
should be expecting them9. There is no doubt that such times of contraction are 
associated with a lot of suffering. This suffering, however, could well be 
Socratic birth-pangs, i.e. the painful puzzlement that is congenital to the process 
of discovering the truth10. What I mean is that the economic misery and the 
societal damage that we experience after the 2008 financial meltdown have also 
triggered a worldwide self-examination about what went wrong and how we are 
going to prevent such calamity from happening again in the future. 
To the majority of participants in the debate on the causes and the 
remedies of the crisis, the chain of events leading to the post-2008 collapse came 
as a bombshell. The element of surprise pertains not to the mid-September 2008 
stock market crash or to the immediately preceding problem of the run on the 
shadow banking system, but predominantly to the formation of a bubble in the 
US housing market and in Eurozone’s sovereign debt. As it will be discussed 
later on (Section 5.3. of Chapter One), according to the neoclassical economics’ 
orthodoxy firms and individuals cannot err regarding the price of an asset in an 
efficient market; that means that a bubble cannot occur11.  
In my opinion, what should worry us the most about this crisis is 
exactly the fact that we were surprised; that we weren’t expecting it. This means 
that we have put so much faith in our capitalist system and to the functionality 
of our markets’ regulation that we’ve turned a blind eye to past events, such as 
the dotcom bubble of 2000 or the stock market crash of 1987, but also to the fact 
that the major Western economies have in essence been in a stagnation mode 
since at least the oil spikes of the 1970s. It seems that we fail to identify that 
beyond the coincidental reasons for this economic crash lies a structural 
pathology in the way capitalism is reproducing itself and in the way our markets 
are regulated. 
The post-2008 period has been marked by an unprecedented production 
of law-and-economics scholarship bearing on the crisis. Most papers focus only 
on the immediate causes of the crisis by undertaking an in-depth analysis of the 
subprime mortgage meltdown or of the sovereign debt crisis. The objective of 
those papers is to identify, which market failures emerged during these crisis 
years, so as to promote the regulatory changes that will fix exactly these 
problems. In this respect, these papers fail to view beyond the incidental reasons 
for this crisis, so as to help address the more deeply rooted anomalies that have 
emerged by the ‘financialization’ of capitalism that over the past four decades 
                                                
9 CURTIS MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL 
ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008), 27 
10 See PLATO’S THEAETETUS, 1500-d (Francis MacDonald Cornford, transl.) (1985) 
11 The skepticism against bubbles is founded on the belief that markets are efficient mechanisms for 
aggregating and processing information and thus prices are supposed to reflect assets’ fundamental 
intrinsic value. This skepticism is epitomized in Eugene Fama’s statement ‘The word “bubble” drives me 
nuts’; see Interview with Eugene Fama, Nov. 2, 2007, The Region (Federal Reserve Bank of 




has contributed to the aforementioned state of stagnation and to a heightened 
cyclicality of the economy that has produced numerous economic bubbles 
during the same period12.  
Nevertheless, given that the analysis employed in these papers is akin to 
the fundamentals of mainstream economics, their approach easily came to be 
seen as providing a roadmap to regulatory authorities and governments 
worldwide as to the legal responses that should be produced. As a consequence, 
the regulatory reforms we’ve seen so far and those that are currently planned can 
be characterized as short-sighted; they do not address the structural pathologies 
of capitalism. By ‘structural pathologies’ here, I mean mainly the inability that 
capitalism has shown since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 
early 1970s to produce high and sustainable rates of economic growth that 
would help unemployment go down and  sovereign debt levels to be viable.  
Accordingly, this study aspires to trace these structural pathologies and 
look beyond what happened in the years immediately preceding the current 
recession. It uses the events surrounding the recent US housing bubble and the 
ongoing European sovereign debt crisis only as a starting point in order to trace 
the roots of the problem that are to be found in the global institutional 
environment that gradually emerged after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement in the 1970s. From the vast array of institutions comprising the post-
Bretton Woods institutional setting, this study focuses on the institutions of 
corporate governance and seeks more specifically to show how the corporate 
apparatus shares the blame for the persistent stagnation that does not allow 
investors to gain confidence again in the markets and that does not allow states 
to improve their debt-to-GDP ratios. 
 
 
2. Should corporate governance be fixed in the post-2008 world? 
  
As mentioned above, this study looks upon corporate governance as one 
of the contributory factors to the persistence of the crisis. Thus, first of all this 
study takes issue with those approaches that view the post-2008 meltdown as not 
having exposed a failure in the institutions of corporate governance13. Moreover, 
it takes issue with the more conventional approach, which posits that corporate 
governance needs to be fixed only in relation to financial institutions and 
perhaps only in so far as the issue of risk management is concerned. Indeed, a 
quick look at the academic literature and the press after the 2008 crash will 
reveal that there is one broad area of corporate governance that has been mainly 
                                                
12 The Japanese asset price bubble of the 1980s, the dotcom bubble of the 1990s and the global real estate 
bubble of the 2000s, to name but a few of the bubbles that have burst over the past decades.  
13 See John Coates’s IV Testimony at the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
within the scope of the Hearing: Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving 
Corporate Governance (Jul. 29, 2009). Available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=c754606c-
0b95-4139-a38a-63e63b4b3fa9&Witness_ID=49f23bdb-ae69-42a8-a6d5-82d7fb82502a 
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put on trial: defective risk management14. The larger part of this critical 
approach to the pre-crisis corporate governance failures relates specifically to 
the governance of financial institutions, i.e. banks (investment and commercial), 
insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds etc., and to their insufficient 
risk management systems that allowed collateralized debt obligations  and credit 
default swaps to flood their balance sheets. General corporate law has largely 
escaped criticism and hence the view has been developed that we only need to 
repair prudential regulation or the suis generis governance of financial 
institutions. 
 A focus on the governance problems of financial corporations is prima 
facie justified, as much of the failed bets, whose consequences spilled over to 
the real economy emanated from speculation within this type of firms. However, 
I would argue again that this viewpoint is short-sighted and unduly constrains 
the scope of the positive and normative discussion on corporate governance that 
should be done.  
Focusing exclusively on the failures and the necessary reforms in the 
governance of firms of the financial sector is again a stance that ignores the 
pathology of the ‘financialization’ of capitalism. As this term has been given 
many definitions in literature15, what I mean by using it in this context is the fact 
that over the last decades financial-like motives have been dominant in non-
financial (industrial) corporations (‘NFCs’) as well16 and that the latter have 
increasingly been seeking to profit through financial channels (e.g. through the 
use of financial derivatives) rather than through trade or commodities 
production17. The graph in Figure 1 below shows how the ratio of financial 
assets to real assets has been growing within US NFCs in the years 1952-2003 
(i.e. before the financial bets in the US housing market surged). To a certain 
extent, it could be noted that financial investment has been replacing physical 
                                                
14 See e.g. Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 96 
FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS 61; Melanie Roldier, Reasonable Risk, WALL ST. & TECH., (Dec. 31, 2008), 
at 15; William Lang & Julapa Jagliani, The Mortgage and Financial Crises: The Role of Credit Risk 
Management and Corporate Governance, 38 ATLANTIC ECONOMIC JOURNAL 123; Kevin Dowd, Moral 
Hazard and the Financial Crisis, 29 CATO JOURNAL 141; Stephen Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise 
Risk Management, 34 THE JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW 967; James Crotty, Structural Causes of the 
Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’, 33 CAMBRIDGE 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 563; Viral Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 
CRITICAL REVIEW 195; Michelle Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: the Role of Enterprise Risk 
Management in the Economic Crisis, 5 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY LAW 47; Joe Nocera, 
Risk Mismanagement, N.Y TIMES MAG. , (Jan. 4, 2009), at 46; Michel Crouhy, Risk Management 
Failures During the Financial Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES 
AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE (R. KOLB, ED.) (2010), 283; DOUGLAS HUBBARD, THE FAILURES OF RISK 
MANAGEMENT: WHAT’S BROKEN AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009) 
15 See James Crotty, The Neoliberal Paradox: The Impact of Destructive Product Market Competition 
and ‘Modern’Financial Markets on Nonfinancial Corporation Performance in the Neoliberal Era, in 
FINANCIALIZATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (G. EPSTEIN, ED.) (2005), 77 (defining financialization as 
the rise of financial investment and incomes from such investment); Julie Froud et al., Shareholder value 
and financialization: consultancy promises, management moves, 29 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 80 (viewing 
financialization as the growing importance of shareholder value in economic decisions) 
16 Gerald Epstein, Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy, in FINANCIALIZATION AND 
THE WORLD ECONOMY (G. EPSTEIN, ED.) (2005), 3 
17 Greta Krippner, The Financialization of the American Economy, 3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REVIEW 173, 174  
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investment18; apart from the implications that this has for the risk gearing of 
NFCs’ balance sheets, it is also a proxy for reduced physical capital 
accumulation, which is traditionally one of the foremost engines of economic 
growth. At the same time statistical evidence indicates that the profits of US 
NFCs from financial investments increased from 15% in the 1950s to around 
50% in 200119 and these are correlations that also hold true for non-US NFCs20. 
In light of the above, it is logical to assume that because of the 
increasing engagement of NFCs in financial markets much of the speculation in 
financial instruments, to which the current crisis is conventionally causally 
linked, has taken place within NFCs, so that many of the governance problems 
that are thought to have tolerated, encouraged or directly caused these 
irresponsible speculative practices are also problems of NFCs. In addition to 
this, since NFCs have been increasingly divesting from real assets, it is logical 
to assume that the persistent low rates of economic growth that are currently 
blamed for not allowing states to improve their debt-to-GDP ratios may be 
partly attributable to the reduced capital accumulation that takes place inside 
NFCs, which are not subject to some special form of regulation, but to general 
corporate law. 
 Therefore, since a legal field is normally thought to be -by virtue of its 
imperfections- abetting the observed irregularities that its subjects are 
committing, corporate law, which regulates the behavior of NFCs, purports to 
share the blame for the economic crisis and thus a reform in corporate 
governance is needed that goes beyond mere changes in the suis generis21 
governance of financial institutions. After all, since recent empirical studies 
show that on average financial institutions are not worse governed than NFCs22 
it follows that if a case is made about reforming the former’s governance then as 
a matter of principle the latter’s governance should be reformed as well.  
 
                                                
18 Engelbert Stockhammer, Financialization and the Slowdown of Accumulation, 28 CAMBRIDGE 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 719, 719 
19 See Crotty, supra note 15 
20 Stockhammer, supra note 18, 730 
21 John Farrar, The Global Financial Crisis and the Governance of Financial Institutions, 24 
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW 227, 230 
22 Renée Adams, Governance and the Financial Crisis, ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 248/2009, 8ff.. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1398583  




Figure 1 - The Financialization of US Non-Financial Corporations, 1952-2003 
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table B. 102 
 
Nevertheless, the argumentation above is only intended to convince 
those that are focused on the immediate causes of the post-2008 crisis that there 
is merit in a study, which grapples with the failures of corporate law and 
governance and which thus implicitly calls for their reform. Those few that were 
worried even before 2008 on the route that the ‘New Economy’s’ institutions 
had taken understand that since the corporate apparatus lies at the heart of the 




3. Outline of the study 
 
3.1. Outline of Chapter One: The Great Reversal in Corporate Governance 
and the Great Reversal in Shareholdership 
 
Chapter One introduces this study’s foundational hypothesis: the shift 
in the institutional logics of corporate governance towards shareholder value 
(‘Great Reversal in Corporate Governance’) coupled with shareholdership’s 
increasing short-termism (‘Great Reversal in Shareholdership’) have 
cumulatively contributed to the low rates of GDP growth that are observed in 
the major Western economies since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system 
in the early 1970s  (‘First Hypothesis’).  
The unraveling of the thread of the causality links between the two 
Great Reversals and the low rates of economic growth in the post-Bretton 
Woods era is reserved for the final section of Chapter One (Section 7). Sections 
1-6 explore the international political economy of the shareholder value 
orientation in corporate governance and of shareholder short-termism and 
through a timeline story starting from the late 1940s and ending in the late 2000s 
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present the wide array of legal and extra-legal institutions that gradually brought 
about these two great reversals. 
 Sections 1-2 analyze the institutions of macroeconomic policymaking 
in the major Western economies from the end of World War II up to the early 
1970s, when the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates broke down. In 
these two sections the Keynesian foundations of these institutions are 
emphasized and the intensive use of capital controls by states is underlined. The 
latter was an arrangement that contributed to relatively weak capital markets, 
which were thus not in a position to influence corporate governance 
significantly.  
Section 3 moves on in time and focuses on the stage of the 
deconstruction of the post-War institutions during the 1970s. The political 
economy of this decade indicates that there is a series of successive causality 
links between the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement, the oil spikes, 
the high inflation rates and the demise of the capital controls in the major 
Western economies.  
While this general causality analysis on the capital decontrol movement 
is valid for most OECD countries, in Section 4 I choose to specifically refer to 
the politics and economics of the capital account liberalization efforts in the US, 
the UK, Germany and France, in order to illustrate my argument that the 
stagflation and the monetary chaos of the 1970s effectively forced the 
‘financialization’ of the economy. Additionally, special allusion is made to the 
birth of the European Monetary Union as a response to the fall of the Bretton 
Woods arrangements and to the liberalization of the capital movements at the 
EU level that this monetary union required.   
The reason why I devote so much attention in Sections 3-4 to the capital 
account liberalization movement of the 1970s and the 1980s is because the free 
movement of capital gave rise to a competition between states to attract funds 
into their capital markets. Within the scope of this race states lowered the 
brokerage commissions for stock exchange transactions; this made the 
secondary sales of stocks cheaper for shareholders and thus widened the margin 
to profit from short-term fluctuations in the share price, contributing to one of 
the two great reversals: the Great Reversal in Shareholdership.  
After having alleged that the capital account liberalization movement of 
the 1970s and the 1980s is one of the reasons that contributed to the unlocking 
of the impatience gene in the shareholder community, I move on in Section 5 to 
argue that there is a causal link between the inflation of the 1970s and the rise to 
dominance in the intellectual sphere of neoclassical economics. This provides 
me with the opportunity to present the intellectual substructure of the post-
Bretton Woods era and further explain how the neoclassical ideology provided 
input legitimacy to the commercial banking deregulation movement in the US 
that allowed US banks to enter the securities business for the first time since the 
Great Depression, thus contributing to the burgeoning of capital markets in the 
post-Bretton Woods world. The growth of the capital markets is a point of 
special interest for the purposes of my analysis because it is identified as one of 
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the reasons why firms reoriented towards shareholder value and thus why the 
Great Reversal in Corporate Governance occurred. 
With the basic tenets of neoclassical economics in mind, I then present 
in Section 6 the development within the niche of (neoclassical) financial 
economics of the agency theory that revolutionized the institutional logics23 of 
corporate governance and became the catalyst force behind the Great Reversal 
in Corporate Governance. Simultaneously, I show how the theoretical 
shareholder value construct of the agency theory penetrated the minds of the 
managers of the real world with the help of the leveraged buy-out frenzy of the 
1980s in the US and with the increasing presence of US institutional investors in 
foreign jurisdictions. 
Once the presentation of the legal and extra-legal institutions that 
brought about the two great reversals is complete through Sections 1-6 (see 
Figures 9-10 for an overview), Section 7, the final part of Chapter One, attempts 
to document with the use of numerical data the causation chain of the First 
Hypothesis, i.e. the causality links between the Great Reversals in Corporate 
Governance and Shareholdership and the low rates of economic growth 
observed in the post-Bretton Woods era (Figure 2).  
The unraveling of the (causality) thread of the First Hypothesis starts 
with a table comparing the rates of economic growth during the post-War and 
the post-Bretton Woods era in the major Western economies; the table exposes 
the slowdown in the rates of GDP growth during the latter period. The 
justification that the First Hypothesis offers for this slowdown is the slower rates 
of growth of (business) capital accumulation during the post-Bretton Woods era, 
a trend, which implies that corporations have been retaining less of their profits 
for reinvestment and have been distributing more of them to their shareholders. 
To back this, I present numerical data exposing the slower rates of growth of 
capital accumulation and the lower retention ratios and higher equity payout 
ratios for NFCs in the post-Bretton Woods period.  
 
                                                
23 In New Institutional social theory the term ‘institutional logics’ refers to ‘historically-variant sets of 
assumptions, beliefs, values and rules by which individuals […] interpret organizational reality and what 
constitutes appropriate behavior’; Patricia Thornton & William Ocasio, Institutional Logics and the 
Historical Contingency of Power in Organizations: Executive Succession in the Higher Education 





Figure 2 - The Causality Chain of the First Hypothesis 
 
The final part of Section 7 is reserved for the presentation of additional 
empirical data that back Chapter One’s foundational assertion about the advent 
of the Great Reversal of Shareholdership. Firstly, I show through graphs the 
decreasing significance of equity as a net source of finance of fixed capital 
formation and treat this as a proxy of the fact that shareholders have increasingly 
become short-termists, as they do not allow the time for their funds to turn into 
fixed investments and return to them as profits. Secondly, I present three trend 
lines that show that in the Western world’s largest stock exchanges the average 
holding period of stock has been reducing over the past decades. 
 
3.2. Outline of Chapter Two: The Post-Keynesian theory of the firm 
 
Chapter Two reinforces the First Hypothesis by attempting to back the 
causal connection between the two great reversals and the increase in NFCs’ 
equity payout ratios. Section 7 (7.1-7.4) of Chapter One explains the causal 
connection between high equity payout ratios and low retention ratios (by 
indicating that the retention ratio is always inversely related to the payout ratio) 
as well as the causal connection between lower retention ratios and reduced rates 
of capital accumulation. The only causal connection of the First Hypothesis’s 
causality chain that is loosely documented in Chapter One is the one between 
the two great reversals and high equity payout ratios (see Figure 2). Chapter 
Two fills in this gap by having recourse to the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm 
and by offering a simplified model of short-termist shareholdership’s influence 
on the corporation’s distribution patterns (Figure 3). 
The Post-Keynesian theory is an alternative to the neoclassical theory of 
the firm and purports to be better equipped to explain the mechanics inside those 
big listed corporations that matter for overall capital accumulation in an 
economy. The Post-Keynesian theory of the firm starts with the more realistic 
assumption, verified by business history, that the objective of a corporation is to 
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grow (rather than profit) and is based on the more realistic (Keynesian) 
assumption about rationality, i.e. the fundamental uncertainty. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Chapter’s Two addition to the First Hypothesis 
 
 
3.3. Outline of Chapter Three: Corporate law and the Great Reversal in 
Corporate Governance 
 
Chapter Three puts forward the assumption that corporate law has been 
an accomplice for the reorientation of corporate governance towards shareholder 
value and thus that it indirectly shares the blame for the low rates of capital 
accumulation that have thrown the major Western economies in a stagnation 
mode over the past decades (‘Second Hypothesis’). In other words, the Second 
Hypothesis seeks to expand the First Hypothesis’s causality chain by adding 
corporate law as a contributing factor to the chain reaction that ultimately led to 
low rates of GDP growth in the post-Bretton Woods era. The Second Hypothesis 
is only concerned with the impact that corporate law had on the Great Reversal 
in Corporate Governance (Figure 4); corporate law’s relationship to the Great 
Reversal in Shareholdership is an issue touched upon by the Third Hypothesis, 
which is developed in Chapter Four. 
Chapter Three’s scope exposes the limitations of this study’s legal part, 
as it focuses on the impact of only one niche of business law on the Great 
Reversal in Corporate Governance. A discourse on the influence that 
developments in other crucial business law areas, such as in securities and 
investment funds regulation, had had on the priorities that managers set is 
excluded from this study, as the latter strives to expose corporate law’s impact 
on the priorities that managers set (see Sections 1 and 2 above). Nevertheless, 
especially through Chapter One (see Figures 9-10) this study does acknowledge 
that there indeed are several legal institutions other than corporate law that have 
contributed to the rise of shareholder value (see also Introduction, 4.2.2. on the 
institutional complementarity concept that this study espouses); it chooses 
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though not to analyze them, as it seeks to make a contribution to the field of 




Figure 4 – The Causality Chain of the Second Hypothesis 
 
For the Second Hypothesis to appear plausible, the relationship of 
developments in corporate law to the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance 
must be established. Scientifically though, it would be a mistake in this case to 
claim the existence of a relationship that amounts to the degree of causation; the 
impact that a legal reform has on the behavior of organizations cannot be 
measured with precision with the exception perhaps of reforms in the field of tax 
law. The task though of providing at least some indications that such a linkage 
between corporate law and the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance may 
exist is taken seriously in Chapter Three that responds to this challenge by 
introducing the post-Bretton Woods shareholder value index (‘PBWSV’). This 
is an index that shows the progress that the corporate laws of the five Western 
jurisdictions, whose capital accumulation rates are presented in Section 7.2 of 
Chapter One (France, Germany, The Netherlands, UK, US), have made at the 
shareholder value level during the post-Bretton Woods era. 
The PBWSV is built in three steps. Firstly, I identify the criteria 
according, to which a type of rule belonging to the niche of corporate law would 
be classified as relevant for shareholder value. There is one theoretical criterion, 
i.e. whether a certain type of corporate law rule can theoretically contribute in 
the reduction of what the agency theory of the firm calls ‘residual loss’, and one 
empirical criterion, i.e. whether the rights offered by a certain type of corporate 
law rule are used by shareholder activists to promote their interests inside the 
firm. Once these types of corporate law rules have been identified, I turn them 
into the PBWSV’s variables and I quantify them. Without going into detail here 
regarding the exact rating methodology that I use, a jurisdiction scores points on 
the PBWSV if it has the aforestated rules in place and does not score if it does 
not have them. This index is ‘dynamic’, in the sense that it identifies what the 
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Therefore, the PBWSV shows how each jurisdiction’s corporate law scored 
from a shareholder value perspective at the time of the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods arrangements in 1973 and then how this score changed over the years 
until 2007, the year before the ongoing crisis officially started.  
Eventually, out of the index a trend line emerges illustrating the 
incremental move of each of these jurisdictions’ corporate law towards 
shareholder value. This trend line functions as an indication that there is merit in 
the Second Hypothesis.  
 
3.4. Outline of Chapter Four: Corporate Law and the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership 
 
Developments in the field of corporate law may have a more obvious 
effect on the orientation of corporations towards shareholder value, but it is 
difficult to conceive of corporate law reforms that can be described as something 
more than a mere ‘nudge’ to shareholders24, when the issue discussed is the 
reforms’ impact on the time-horizons of shareholders. While Chapter Three 
proves that it is feasible to construct an index that quantifies corporate rules with 
regard to their shareholder value-friendliness, it is impossible to draw an 
accurate index quantifying the impact that corporate rules have on shareholders’ 
myopia; that would require to estimate the exact time, by which 
shareholdership’s horizons are shortened, as a result of the introduction, 
abolition or amendment of a certain corporate law provision. 
In fact, Chapter Four does not contend that corporate law has been one 
of the initiators of (or even contributing factors to) the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership. It asserts that corporate law reforms that were intended to 
merely help this legal niche adjust to the era of ‘financialization’ have escalated 
the divestment of structurally long-termist institutional investors from equity 
positions and have preserved the trend towards shareholder short-termism that 
other institutions have directly caused (‘Third Hypothesis’). In other words, the 
Third Hypothesis does not contend that corporate law has caused equity’s short-
termism, but that it has made the latter more acute and has prevented 
corporations from engaging in shareholder eugenics and crafting their 
shareholder base so as to attract more long-termist shareholders. 
Chapter Three starts with a brief presentation of the contribution that 
other niches of business law, such as pension funds regulation and accounting 
rules, have had to the Great Reversal in Shareholdership. Then the discourse 
grapples with the attempt to back the Third Hypothesis. This is done by ‘cherry 
picking’ legal developments generating bias in favor of short-termism in the five 
Western jurisdictions (France, Germany, The Netherlands, UK, US), whose 
capital accumulation rates and movement towards shareholder value were 
studied in Chapters One and Three respectively. As far as the four EU 
jurisdictions of the sample are concerned, this time instead of studying corporate 
                                                
24 See RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH 
AND HAPPINESS (2008) 
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law developments that took place at the national level, reforms that took place at 
the EU level are studied.  
 
3.5. Outline of Chapter Five: The path towards Long Governance 
 
In the final chapter I attempt to structure a new normative doctrine for 
corporate law and governance: Long Governance. The three hypotheses 
introduced by this study, and particularly the First Hypothesis, function as the 
ratio legis for this new doctrine. Of the two ‘stagnation-generating’ factors 
identified in the framework of the First Hypothesis, i.e. shareholder value and 
short-termism, Long Governance aspires to overturn the latter and therefore 
contribute to an amelioration of the business capital accumulation dynamics in 
the Western economies. 
Long Governance aspires to represent an intermediate ‘third way’ in the 
fundamental debate of corporate governance, i.e. the shareholder value vs. 
stakeholder value debate, and thus Chapter Five begins by a presentation of the 
shareholder value/stakeholder value dichotomy. 
Like the shareholder value and the stakeholder value approaches, Long 
Governance may be viewed both as a management theory and as a legal concept. 
As a management theory, Long Governance calls management to set as a 
benchmark for its actions the long-run interests of all the shareholders who hold, 
have held or will hold stock in the firm. This is an approach that in practice will 
require managers to take at the same time under account the interests of other 
stakeholders as well, since in the long-term shareholders as a class benefit from 
the protection of other stakeholders. As a legal concept, Long Governance 
attempts to answer two normative questions: (i) to whom ought directors owe 
their duties; and (ii) how should the powers inside the corporation be distributed. 
With regard to the former question Long Governance suggests that in the 
ordinary course of business directors should focus on the maximization of long-
term corporate welfare, while in the framework of change-in-control 
transactions it advances the discharge of directorial duties to the benefit of the 
firm’s existing non-arbitrageur shareholders. With regard to the latter question 
Long Governance advocates that shareholders should be divided into classes on 
the basis of their time-horizons, so that more powers are distributed to the class 
of long-termist investors; but in order for that to happen Long Governance 
acknowledges that first the pool of long-termist shareholders, which will 
represent that class, should overall be enlarged. 
Finally, Chapter Five drawing on the Third Hypothesis and the various 
legal rules that were identified there as sustaining short-termism in corporate 
governance summarizes the regulatory agenda of Long Governance and makes 
suggestions as to the legal reforms that should be promoted in order for the 
negative business accumulation dynamics to be reversed. 
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4. Embedding the study in the corporate governance literature 
 
4.1. An overview of the comparative corporate governance literature 
 
As it becomes evident from the outline of the study, the latter discusses 
corporate governance in several jurisdictions; it is, therefore, comparative in 
nature. In addition to this, it approaches corporate governance from more than 
one viewpoint; while Chapter One approaches corporate governance from an 
international political economy perspective, Chapter Two analyzes it from the 
viewpoint of (micro)economics, while Chapters Three and Four focus on 
corporate governance’s legal aspects. This study, therefore, commits to a view 
of corporate governance that is holistic, interdisciplinary, historical and 
international in its scope. Thus, analytically it comes close to an emerging 
school of thought in social sciences called ‘Comparative Institutional Analysis’ 
25. Within this school of thought there is a cohort of papers on comparative 
corporate governance, which has developed into a separate niche and draws on 
insights from law, economics, sociology, organizational studies and political 
economy. The current study aspires to be part of this niche and consequently it 
is necessary to identify how it relates to the literature that has been produced 
within this sub-field so far.  
I view comparative corporate governance literature to date to be 
consisting of four sub-groups.  
The first sub-group attempts in an outright way to provide a taxonomy 
of the corporate governance systems around the world. Depending on the 
dimension of the analysis the two typologies that are more commonly offered 
for corporate governance systems are: outsider vs. insider systems26 and market-
oriented vs. bank-oriented systems27.  
Outsider systems are usually also market-oriented and are thus 
characterized by developed securities markets. Equity is provided by dispersed 
and uncommitted shareholders with the result being the separation of ownership 
and control in listed corporations, while managers are disciplined by the 
damoclean sword of an active market for corporate control and by a well-
embedded in the corporate culture shareholder value orientation. The influence 
of dispersed equity capital in firms of outsider systems is effectuated through the 
market mechanism of exit, whose threat can be particularly acute in the face of a 
                                                
25 Glenn Morgan et al., Introduction, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS (G. MORGAN ET AL., EDS.) (2010),6; Erik Berglöf, A Note on the Typology of Financial 
Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (K. HOPT & E. WYMEERSCH, EDS.) (1997), 151; 
See MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL  ANALYSIS (2001). 
26 See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Ownership and Control in the UK, Germany and France, 
9 JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 30 
27 See Ross Levine, Bank-based or Market-based Financial Systems: Which is Better?, NBER Working 
Paper 9138 (2002). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=307096; To be sure the market-oriented 
vs. bank-oriented typology is introduced to classify financial systems around the world, but given the 
impact of corporate finance patterns on corporate governance structures it is used as a taxonomy for 
corporate governance purposes as well. 
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hostile takeover28. The US and the UK are viewed as the paradigm outsider 
systems. 
 Insider systems, on the other hand, are usually also bank-oriented and 
are characterized by weak or unimportant securities markets. Equity finance is 
provided mainly by a dominant shareholder with the result being the prevalence 
of concentrated ownership. Banks take an active role in the corporate 
governance of listed corporations by closely monitoring the firms, to which they 
have lent funds, while managers have to respond to the concerns of various 
stakeholders, particularly of the employees, whose influence on corporate affairs 
may be secured by their mandatory presence on the firm’s board. Equity 
capital’s influence in insider systems’ firms is effectuated through ‘voice’, 
particularly by the dominant shareholders. Continental Europe, mainly Germany 
and The Netherlands, and Japan are viewed as the paradigm insider systems. 
The second strand of comparative corporate governance literature puts 
forward the ‘convergence claim’, i.e. the assertion that corporate governance 
systems around the world gradually –or eventually will- converge to the 
outsider/market-oriented model29. The convergence theorists posit that despite 
the differences in corporate systems around the world there is a clear universal 
tendency towards the dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology in corporate 
law. In other words, the competitive pressure generated by the globalization of 
trade and finance is thought of as inspiring institutional convergence in the field 
of corporate governance30. 
The third sub-group emerged from the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
approach that by drawing on the new economics of organization sets a new 
framework in the study of comparative capitalism that helps explain the 
institutional variation of the different economic systems31. The corporate 
governance literature within the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach views the 
corporation as the crucial actor in a capitalist economy32. The fundamental 
distinction of economic systems here that also leads to an implicit corporate 
governance taxonomy is between ‘liberal market economies’ (‘LMEs’) and ‘co-
ordinated market economies’ (‘CMEs’). If we were to draw an analogy with the 
outsider vs. insider taxonomy, LMEs would equate to outsider systems of 
corporate governance, while CMEs to insider systems. 
External corporate finance in CMEs is thought of as not being entirely 
dependent on current profitability and publicly available financial data; 
therefore, network embeddedness, expressed through board interlocks and other 
                                                
28 Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control, 53 THE 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1, 2 
29 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History of Corporate Law, 89 GEORGETOWN 
LAW JOURNAL 439 
30 See Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 641; MARK 
ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006), 6, 140ff. 
31 Peter Hall & David Soskice, Introduction, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (P. HALL & D. SOSKICE, ED.) (2003), 1-2 
32 Id., at 6 
CORPORATE LAW & ECONOMIC STAGNATION 
 
types of inter-firm networks33, has developed into a governance mechanism that 
allows investors to monitor the firms, to which they commit their funds34. This 
allows capital –mainly debt- in CMEs to be more patient and thus more 
conducive to finance long-term projects35. The absence of an obligation of firms 
to sustain current profits in the face of a fluctuating economy renders them more 
able to make credible commitments to their employees about job security36. 
Moreover, due to the prevalence of concentrated ownership in CMEs’ firms, the 
latter are largely immune from hostile takeovers, which could bring about abrupt 
changes in the firm’s workforce. Consequently, labor markets tend to be less 
fluid in CMEs and therefore employment is more long-term and secure.  
The institutional structure of CMEs endows corporations in these 
countries with the capacity to develop incremental innovation strategies that are 
marked by continuous small-scale improvements to existing product lines37. 
Secure employment allows employees to risk suggesting changes to products or 
processes that would otherwise alter their job situation in case of failure and 
long-term tenures encourage the development of synergies between the 
employees that provide a fertile soil for incremental innovation38. In turn, 
incremental innovation capacity confers upon CMEs’ firms the comparative 
advantage to produce capital-intensive goods, such as machine tools, engines, 
consumer durables etc.39. This assumption of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
approach is empirically backed by the industrial profile of CMEs, such as 
Germany40 or Japan, whose output is of great physical weight41. 
In LMEs external corporate finance is traditionally obtained more from 
the securities markets and less from bank lending. Rentiers of finance rely more 
on publicly available information and current earnings, while they contract with 
firms on an arm’s length basis due to the lack of networks that would signal 
inside information42. Focusing on the share price is more important for managers 
                                                
33 See Walter Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 RESEARCH IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 295  
34 Hall & Soskice, supra note 31, 22-23 
35 While this view seems to have been traditionally valid for Germany, the paradigm CME, it purports not 
to hold equally true for The Netherlands, the other main CME country of the ‘Rhenish’ model of 
capitalism, as Dutch banks have in the past been reluctant to participate in the long-term financing of the 
industry; EELKE HEEMSKERK, DECLINE OF THE CORPORATE COMMUNITY: NETWORK DYNAMICS OF THE 
DUTCH BUSINESS ELITE (2007), 49-50 
36 Peter Hall & Daniel Gingerich, Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the 
Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis, MPIfG Discussion Paper, 04/5, 23 
37 Hall & Soskice, supra note 31, 38 
38 Meredith Jones & Richard Mitchell, Legal Origin, Legal Families and the Regulation of Labour in 
Australia, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EMPLOYEES (S. MARSHALL ET 
AL., EDS.) (2008), 82 
39 Hall & Soskice, supra note 31, 38 
40 Sigurt Vitols, Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK, in VARIETIES OF 
CAPITALISM, supra note 20, 350ff. 
41 Measuring the physical weight of an economy’s output, although certainly not a formal way to evaluate 
an economy’s growth or productivity, can tell us a lot about this economy’s industrial profile and 
innovation capacity; see David Wessel, From Greenspan, a (Truly) Weighty Idea, WALL ST. JOURNAL, 
May 20, 1999, p. B1 
42 Hall & Soskice, supra note 31, 28-29 
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since dispersed ownership renders the firm vulnerable to hostile takeovers; the 
cheaper your equity is the easier it is for a corporate raider to launch a successful 
takeover bid. Therefore, shareholder value emerges as the principal concern for 
managers in LMEs that results in them being less responsive to stakeholders’ 
and especially employees’ concerns. Shareholder value orientation and frequent 
changes in corporate control give rise to fluid labor markets that allow LMEs’ 
firms to hire and fire more easily in order to grasp new opportunities. This 
confers upon firms in these countries the capacity to be more open to radical 
innovation that brings ‘new to the world’ or ‘new to the industry’ products -
rather than merely ‘new to the business’ products that is what incremental 
innovation brings about43. The institutional structure of LMEs, therefore, 
endows them with the comparative advantage to be more productive in the high-
tech and services sectors. This assumption is backed empirically by the 
industrial profile of the paradigm LMEs, the US and the UK, whose GDP output 
is ‘lighter’ compared to CMEs44. 
The fourth strand of comparative corporate governance literature, more 
commonly known as the ‘law and finance’ approach, starts from the 
Schumpeterian assumption45 that strong financial markets are indispensable for 
economic growth46. It then postulates that strong legal protection of investors 
and particularly of shareholders is indispensable for a country to attract private 
investment in its securities markets, which would then get to develop and 
function as the engine of economic growth47. In light of this approach, the ‘law 
and finance’ line of literature engages in a comparative statistical analysis of the 
legal underpinnings of corporate finance48 and identifies that poor legal 
protection for investors is correlated with high ownership concentration49 -i.e. 
the holding of large blocks of shares by a relatively small number of 
shareholders- while strong legal protection leads to dispersed shareholder 
structures in firms. Countries are for the purposes of the comparative analysis 
classified according to their ‘legal origin’ into common law and civil law 
countries. Once the legal indicators are regressed against economic outcome 
variables50, common law countries that have strong investor protection norms, 
dispersed shareholdership and strong securities markets are found to be having 
higher growth rates, while civil law countries with weak investor protection, 
concentrated ownership and weak securities markets are identified as lagging 
                                                
43 See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Patterns of Innovation in Australian Businesses, Cat. No. 8163, 
2003. 
44 See Wessel, supra note 41 
45 See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, THEORIE DER WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG (1911) 
46 See Robert King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right, 108 QUARTERLY 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 717 
47 See Raphael LaPorta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1131 
48 Rafael LaPorta et al., Law and Finance, 106 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1113, 1114 
49 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 
737 
50 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 9, 18 
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behind in growth51. Thus, the ‘law and finance’ line of literature backs by means 
of a different line of argumentation Friedrich Hayek’s old claim that common 
law countries have a superior performance to civil law countries52. 
 
4.2. The study’s novelties in relation to the existing comparative corporate 
governance literature   
 
As mentioned under 3.1. above, this study’s First Hypothesis is that the 
shift in the institutional logics of corporate governance towards shareholder 
value coupled with shareholdership’s short-termism have cumulatively 
contributed to the low rates of growth that have been observed in the major 
Western economies since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 
early 1970s. In the process of backing the First Hypothesis –but also the Second 
one- I introduce a series of ancillary arguments that relate to the corporate 
governance systems we observe around the world. My argumentation buttresses 
the assumptions of some of the aforementioned sub-groups of comparative 
corporate governance literature, but takes issue with others. Identifying the 
complementarities of the study’s arguments with prior scholarship in this field is 
of paramount importance, as it will help establish the study’s limitations, 
novelties and in general its scientific identity. 
In this sub-section I explain how my study relates to each sub-field of 
the niche of comparative corporate governance53. The textboxes convey the 
novel arguments that my study (derivatively) spires to introduce into the 
respective line of comparative corporate governance literature. Fore readers 
familiar with the basic tenets of comparative corporate governance the textboxes 
offer the possibility of quickly understanding what this study adds to the existing 
literature. 
 
4.2.1. An additional point of intersection between outsider and insider 
systems 
 
The current study does not in principle intend to interfere with the 
classical distinction of outsider vs. insider corporate governance systems. While 
as I explain below, it may offer some support to the convergence claim, it 
observes that the differentiating features of the insider corporate governance 
systems remain unaltered. A large percentage of listed corporations in insider 
systems still have a controlling shareholder rather than dispersed owners. This 
retention of control on behalf of a dominant shareholder is effectuated either 
through the offering to outside shareholders within initial public offerings 
                                                
51 See Paul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 503 
52 See FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) 
53 For the position this study takes on the fundamental debate of corporate governance, i.e. the 
shareholder value vs. stakeholder value debate, see Chapter Five. 
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(‘IPOs’) of less than the majority of stock outstanding54 or through the 
introduction of control-enhancing mechanisms, i.e. structures that deviate from 
the one-share/one-vote principle55, such as multiple voting shares, voting caps, 
pyramidal holding and cross-holdings56. This study does not offer a novel 
argument regarding the holdings of controllers. It identifies, however, a common 
feature regarding publicly traded non-controlling stock in both outsider and 
insider corporate governance systems: this stock is predominantly short-termist. 
Again, however, there is another limitation in the remark I am making, 
since I refer to all publicly traded non-controlling stock except stock held by 
equity index funds57.  
Indexing or index tracking is the investment strategy of tying your 
portfolio to the performance of the market as a whole58. The ideal vehicle for 
indexing is the index fund. An equity index fund is a collective investment 
vehicle, which holds a small percentage of shares in all or almost all companies 
that constitute an index, i.e. an imaginary portfolio of securities representing a 
particular market or a portion of it that is used as a benchmark to track targeted 
stock market activity. The most popular index for equity index funds is the S&P 
500, which represents about 75% of the total market value of the NYSE, and 
shows how the stock of 500 US corporations that have a large market 
capitalization has traded during a specific trading session. Equity index funds 
that follow the S&P 500 gain exposure to the vast majority of the companies that 
form the components of the index or to companies that are deemed to be 
representative of the index composition, so as to mirror or replicate the index’s 
movements rather than outperform the index59. 
 These clearly defined rules of share ownership of fixed predetermined 
holding weights, by which equity index funds abide60, has turned equity index 
                                                
54 In a survey conducted in firms that went public between January 1994 and December 2004 in several 
insider system countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Switzerland) it was identified that post-IPO the pre-IPO controlling shareholder retains on average 
52% of the shares; see Franck Bancel & Usha Mittoo, Why Do European Firms Go Public?, 15 
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 844, 869. In some insider systems countries, such as Italy, the 
percentage of shares retained by the controller post-IPO can be much higher; see Silvia Rigamonti, 
Evolution of Ownership and Control in Italian IPO Firms, Borsa Italiana (BIt) Notes, N. 17 – May 2007, 
21, who finds that in Italian IPOs that took place from 1985 to 2005 the stake offered to outside 
shareholders within the scope of an IPO was on average 30%. 
55 For an overview of the status of control-enhancing mechanisms in 16 Member States of the EU in 2007 
see the study conducted within the scope of the European Commission’s Action Plan on Company Law 
and Corporate Governance - ISS Europe, ECGI, Shearman & Sterling, Report on the Proportionality 
Principle in the European Union, 18 May 2007. Available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf  
56 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The 
Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (R. MORCK, ED.) (2000), 295 
57 This remark reflects author’s conversations with Robert A.G. Monks. 
58 Kathryn Montgomery, The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 26 CANADIAN 
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 189, 192 
59 MARTIN GOLD, FIDUCIARY FINANCE: INVESTMENT FUNDS AND THE CRISIS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
(2011), 97  
60 ROBERT A.G. MONKS ET AL., CORPORATE VALUATION FOR PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT: ANALYZING 
ASSETS, EARNINGS, CASH FLOW, STOCK PRICE, GOVERNANCE, AND SPECIAL SITUATIONS (2010), 227 
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funds into a class of ‘permanent’ shareholders with long-term horizons 
regarding the performance of their index’s companies61. Although a series of 
more active management techniques has emerged lately for equity index funds 
that require them to rebalance their holdings from time to time62, traditional 
indexing only requires them to modify their holdings when a company enters or 
leaves an index. This contributes to the relative permanence of their shareholder 
positions.  
Investments by equity index funds are on the rise in both outsider and 
insider systems. At the end of 2009 assets invested in equity index funds 
represented 13.7% of all equity mutual funds’ assets in the US63, while their 
shareholdings accounted for about 11% of the capitalization of the S&P 500 
index64. Accordingly, this is more or less on average the percentage of an S&P 
500 firm’s outstanding stock that is held by permanent shareholders. Equity 
index funds based on other indexes, such as S&P Europe 350 that represents 
70% of the European equity market capitalization, have collectively a smaller 
stake in the companies consisting the index, since it is the S&P 500 attracts most 
of index funds existing. 
However, this new class of permanent shareholders does not seem to be 
able to imprint its long-term horizons on the firms’ strategies65. Influencing 
corporate governance would require equity index funds to take a more activist 
stance within the corporations, in which they hold stock, and that would result in 
them having to increase their management fees that due to their ‘free rider style’ 
of passive management are half the fees that other types of collective investment 
vehicles charge to investors66. Therefore, although they are by nature long-term 
shareholders, they should not be accounted for long-termist governance players. 
Still though, I am obliged to leave them out of the general remark I am making, 
which in light of the above should be rephrased as follows: 
                                                
61 Montgomery, supra note 58, 192 
62 MONKS ET AL., supra note 60, 227 
63 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK – 50TH ED., A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITY IN THE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY, 22. Available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2010_factbook.pdf  
64 John Spence, Visa Shares Get S&P Bounce, MARKETWATCH, Dec. 14, 2009 available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/visa-shares-rise-on-sp-500-nod-2009-12-14 ; ARCHIE RICHARDS, 
UNDERSTANDING EXCHANGE-TRADE FUNDS (2007), 47    
65 Donald Nordberg, The Politics of Shareholder Activism, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESIS 
OF THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE (H. KENT BAKER & R. ANDERSON, EDS.) (2010), 418 
66 MONKS ET AL., supra note 60, 228 
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Publicly traded non-controlling stock except for the stock held by 
equity index funds is short-termist in both outsider and insider 




4.2.2. Nominal divergence, but functional and formal convergence between 
insider and outsider systems 
 
The claim that corporate governance systems around the world 
converge or will eventually converge to the outsider model has two variations. 
There are those who claim that convergence is or will be formal, in the sense 
that corporate law –statutory or case law- will reorient firms in insider countries 
towards shareholder value67 and those who claim that convergence will be 
functional68, meaning that, although formal rules won’t change, corporate 
governance mechanics will in practice promote shareholder value.  
I am of the opinion that we currently have both formal and functional 
convergence of the two systems of corporate governance without though having 
at the same time nominal convergence. Functional convergence is the one 
caused by extra-legal institutions; extra-legal forces and arrangements produce 
the result of shareholder value orientation among corporate managers. Formal 
convergence is the one caused by legal institutions, belonging to the field of 
corporate law or financial regulation. The legal rules distribute rights and assign 
obligations to the various corporate constituents that in aggregate have the result 
of orienting the firm’s management more towards the interests of the 
shareholders, rather than towards the interests of other stakeholders. Nominal 
convergence would require that the corporate legal systems of both insider and 
outsider countries provide to the most determinative question of corporate 
governance the same explicit answer, i.e. that the firm ought to be managed in 
the shareholders’ interests (‘shareholder primacy norm’).  
If one looks at the corporate laws of representative insider countries, 
one would understand why it cannot be asserted that there is nominal 
convergence. The German Constitutional Court seems to have indirectly rejected 
a contractarian theory of the firm, out of which a shareholder orientation for 
corporate law could eventually emerge, since it has adjudicated that the 
economic view of the firm should be complemented with a social approach, 
which would conceive the firm as the joint undertaking of labor and capital69. In 
addition to this, recently in the other main representative country of the Rhenish 
model of capitalism70, The Netherlands, the Supreme Court within the scope of a 
multibillion takeover battle explicitly rejected the shareholder value 
maximization approach that is followed in such cases in outsider systems (e.g. in 
Delaware), which indicates that when a company is up for sale then the duty of 
the board is to maximize the proceeds from the takeover bid for the benefit of 
                                                
67 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 29 
68 See John Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and its Implications, 93 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 641 
69 ‘Diese ist der Preis der angestrebten Ergänzung der ökonomischen durch eine soziale Legitimation der 
Unternehmensleitung in größeren Unternehmen, der Kooperation und Integration aller im Unternehmen 
tätigen Kräfte, deren Kapitaleinsatz und Arbeit Voraussetzung der Existenz und der Wirksamkeit des 
Unternehmens ist’ ; Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts Bd. 50, 290, 352. 
70 The ‘Rhenish model of capitalism’ is a term that originates from the French term ‘capitalisme rhénan’ 
that was introduced in MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISME CONTRE CAPITALISME (1991), 119, a precursory 
work to the varieties of capitalism line of literature. 
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the shareholders71. While Amsterdam’s Enterprise Chamber, a specialized court 
for corporate disputes, had in the same case adjudicated that when a company is 
clearly the target of a takeover contest, the board’s duty is to create for the 
benefit of the shareholders the best possible conditions for the bidding process to 
unravel72, the Dutch Supreme Court overturned this adjudication by stating that 
the foundations of Dutch company law, as exemplified by the Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code, require the board to take under account the interests of all 
stakeholders even in ‘bidding war’ situations73. Thus, The Netherlands’ ultimate 
judicial authority refused to accept the introduction into Dutch company law of 
the so-called ‘Revlon duty’, a standard of review for managerial actions 
introduced by the most sophisticated judicial forum for corporate disputes of the 
outsider countries, the Delaware Supreme Court, that mandates the board within 
takeover battles to run a fair auction, so as to maximize the price received by the 
shareholders74. Thus, the Dutch Supreme Court resisted the acceptance of the 
shareholder primacy norm that the Amsterdam Enterprise Chamber attempted to 
introduce. 
While in light of the above it may be clear that there is no nominal 
divergence, a prima facie reading of insider countries’ corporate law could lead 
one to assert that there is no formal convergence either. Germany still has in 
place the co-determination law (‘Mitbestimmungsgesetz’)75 that requires half of 
the seats of the supervisory boards of German corporations that employ more 
than 2,000 persons to be occupied by employee representatives76 and also an act 
that requires companies that employ more than 500 persons to have one-third of 
the members of the supervisory board elected by the employees77. The 
Netherlands has a rigid law regarding employee representation on supervisory 
boards as well, as in principle one third of the seats of the latter are reserved for 
persons proposed by the firm’s works council78.  
This study though shows in Chapter Three through the construction of 
the post-Bretton Woods shareholder value index that reforms in corporate law 
have reoriented corporate governance in insider countries towards the 
maximization of shareholder value despite the residual existence of 
                                                
71 BA7970, Hoge Raad, R07/102HR (OK 137); For an overview of the Dutch Supreme Court’s decision 
on this case that pertained to the takeover battle between Barclay’s and a consortium led by RBS for the 
acquisition of ABN AMRO see Wilco Oostwouder, Can You Trust the Dutch (Company Law System)?, 4 
EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 211 
72  BA4395,Ondernemingskamer Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 451/2007; For an overview of the Enterprise 
Chamber decision see Cornelis de Groot, The ABN AMRO Ruling: Some Commentaries, 4 EUROPEAN 
COMPANY LAW 168 
73 See HR, supra note 65, at 4.5 (‘Ook hier geldt dat het bestuur bij de vervulling van zijn bij wet of 
statuten opgedragen taken het belang van de vennootschap en de daaraan verbonden onderneming 
behoort voorop te stellen en de belangen van alle betrokkenen, waaronder die van de aandeelhouders, bij 
zijn besluitvorming in aanmerking behoort te nemen’) 
74 Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) 
75 Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer vom 4. Mai 1976 (BGBl. I S. 1153) (‘MitbestG’) 
76 §§1 and 7 MitbestG 
77 § Gesetz über die Drittelbeteiligung der Arbeitnehmer im Aufsichtsrat vom 18. Mai 2004  (BGB1. I S. 
974) 
78 Art. 2:158 of the Dutch Civil Code (‘BW’) 
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stakeholderist rules. These reforms appear on their face to have helped corporate 
law adapt to the era of financial markets, but at the same time some of them 
have had the unintended consequence of promoting shareholder value. I am not 
necessarily implying that the new rules have allowed shareholders to increase 
their explicit influence over corporations, i.e. by means of direct intervention 
into management. They have mostly allowed them to increase their implicit 
influence, i.e. through market mechanisms that eventually induce managers to 
cater for shareholders’ interests79. Thus, in Chapter Three through the Second 
Hypothesis this study endorses the formal convergence claim. 
As well as this, this study implicitly accedes to the claim that there is 
functional convergence in corporate governance between outsider and insider 
systems. In Chapter One I present a series of structural changes in international 
political economy and particularly a (formal) convergence of countries in their 
approach to issues of monetary policy and current and capital account openness 
that have had the unintended consequence of spurring convergence in the 
functioning of corporations in both outsider and insider systems. The increased 
mobility of capital that followed from capital account liberalizations provided 
firms of insider countries with the opportunity to raise capital by listing their 
securities in the more developed stock exchanges of the outsider countries, but 
this meant that through the listing agreement with the self-regulatory 
organization that provides the stock exchange facility (e.g. NYSE, LSE) the firm 
had to introduce some more ‘outsider-like’ corporate governance 
arrangements80.  This has also been called ‘convergence by contract’81. In 
addition to this, the freedom of establishment for corporations in the EU (Art. 54 
TFEU) as interpreted by a trilogy of rulings delivered by the ECJ (Centros82, 
Überseering83, Inspire Art84) had an effect on the corporate mobility of small 
and medium sized enterprises (‘SMEs’) within the EU85, as a number of SMEs 
operating in insider countries of continental Europe are now registered in the 
UK and thus subject to an outsider system of corporate governance86. This has 
been called ‘hybrid convergence through regulatory competition’87 and although 
                                                
79 Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder 
Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 129, 
147 
80 See Coffee, supra note 68 
81 Ronald Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 329, 346, 349  
82 ECJ 9 March 1999, Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. V. Erhvervsog Selskabsstyrelsen 
83 ECJ 5 November 2002, Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Co Baumanagement 
GmbH 
84 ECJ 30 September 2003, Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. 
Inspire Art Ltd. 
85 GERT-JAN VOSSESTEIN, MODERNIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON ITS LEGAL LIMITS (2010), 124ff. 
86 See Marco Becht et al., Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, 14 JOURNAL 
OF CORPORATE FINANCE  241 
87 Gilson, supra note 81, 350 
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it is currently relevant only for SMEs88, which remain outside the scope of this 
study, it is a convergence indicative of the dynamics that regulatory competition 
in corporate law might eventually develop in the future with regard to large 
listed corporations as well, as it has happened in the framework of regulatory 
competition in the US.    
To be sure, an ancillary distinctive attribute of the outsider system of 
corporate governance is believed to be short-termism or myopic horizons89. The 
constant takeover threat caused by the dispersed ownership of outsider systems’ 
corporations has been claimed to induce managers to sacrifice long-term 
interests in order to boost current profits, so as to keep the firm’s quoted stock 
price up and thus render it expensive for a corporate raider to launch a takeover 
bid90. The arm’s length character of corporate finance in outsider countries that 
relies on publicly available information on earnings is also prone to spur short-
termism to managers, as the stock markets’ rational forecast of firm value is 
epitomized in the belief that higher earnings today means higher earnings in the 
future and this eventually traps managers into behaving myopically91. 
On the other hand, the stereotypical view of insider systems, as it was 
implied above under 4.1, is that they are long-term oriented92 particularly 
because of the inside information regarding a firm’s financial condition that 
rentiers of finance are able to get through vertical firm networks and cross-
shareholdings within industrial groups, as is the case with the Japanese 
keiretsu93.  However, the reforms discussed in Chapters One, Three and Four 
have indirectly unrooted the long-term character of corporate governance in 
insider systems, since among the firm’s financiers they have disproportionately 
empowered -in terms of implicit influence- the holders of non-controlling equity 
that according to the empirical data presented in Chapter One have short-term 
investment horizons. 
Therefore, the current study enriches the convergence claim, by adding 








                                                
88 PETER-CHRISTIAN MÜLLER-GRAFF & CHRISTOPH TEICHMANN, EUROPÄISCHES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 
AUF NEUEN WEGEN (2010), 43ff. 
89 See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 49 
90 See Jeremy Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 61 
91 Jeremy Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 
104 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 655, 656 
92 See Michael Porter, Capital Disadvantages: America’s Failing Capital Investment System, 70 
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 65 
93 See Takeo Hoshi et al., The Role of Banks in Reducing Financial Distress in Japan, 27 JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 67 
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4.2.3. Equity’s new role in the finance-dominated model of development 
 
A study related to corporate governance cannot escape its duty to make 
a contribution to the political economy of contemporary capitalism. As it has 
been mentioned:  
 
Corporate governance lies at the core of comparative and international 
political economy […] Patterns in corporate governance […] affect the 
rates of economic growth and adjustment […] They mingle with trade 
disputes and international economic coordination. Corporate 
governance is not the sole driver in these areas of policy, but it is an 
important component…94 
 
No other approach in the comparative corporate governance literature 
has been more integrated with political economy, as the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
intellectual framework. The latter provides a firm-centered political economy, 
where corporations are viewed as the key agents of economic adjustment, whose 
‘activities aggregate into overall levels of economic performance’95. The 
‘varieties of capitalism’ analysis is built on the concept of institutional 
complementarity that views institutions in an economy as interacting to give a 
coherent outcome. Each institution introduces a set of constraints, incentives and 
possibilities that determine agents’ behavior96, but often the influence of one 
institution is reinforced by the existence of another institution97. These two 
‘reinforcing’ institutions then are said to be complementary. 
In this study, I accede to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ institutional 
complementarity concept in the sense that although I focus on the impact of 
legal institutions on shareholders’ and corporate managers’ time-horizons, I do 
not deny that short-termism is cumulatively caused by the simultaneous 
existence of other institutions particularly of the macroeconomic sphere. This is 
                                                
94 PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL (2005), xiv 
95 Hall & Soskice, supra note 31, 6 
96 Bruno Amable, Institutional Complementarity and Diversity of Social Systems of Innovation and 
Production, 7 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 645, 656 
97 Bruno Amable et al., How Do Financial Markets Affect Industrial Relations: An Institutional 
Complementarity Approach, 3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REVIEW 311, 313 
Functional Convergence Towards Short-termism 
 
Outsider and insider systems of corporate governance are 
functionally converging not only towards the shareholder value 
approach, but also towards the dominance of short-term 
horizons in corporate decision-making under the influence of 
non-controlling equityholders. 
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the reason why I put corporate governance in the international political economy 
context in Chapter One, so as to fend off against potential criticism that I have 
not given due attention to other institutional factors that affect corporate 
constituents’ time horizons.   
However, to identify how this study exactly relates to the political 
economy dimension of existing comparative corporate governance literature, an 
overview of the so-called ‘Regulation School’ (‘école de régulation’), one of the 
institutional economics approaches on which the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
framework was founded, is necessary.  
The ‘Regulation School’ is a heterodox approach to political economy 
that insists on the variability of capitalisms [sic] across time98. Within this 
approach capitalist economies are seen as having some generic features that are 
differently configured in successive stages of capitalism99. 
Regulationists coined the mode of economic growth that prevailed in 
the world’s industrialized nations until the 1970s as ‘Fordism’100. Fordism is 
seen as a model of development based on economic and extra-economic 
conditions that favored mass production and mass consumption101. Fordist firms 
were relying on economies of scale and by a technical division of labor they 
were able to introduce a model of mass production that increased their 
productivity. The firms’ increased output was absorbed by mass demand, which 
was becoming possible due to the fact that wages were linked to productivity 
and thus they were also simultaneously increasing102. The virtuous circle was 
completed through the reinvestment of profits back into the business, which 
improved mass production equipment and led to a further rise in productivity 
and hence wages103. 
The Fordist regime is commonly acknowledged to have contributed to 
the high rates of growth that were marked during the ‘Golden Age of 
Capitalism’ (late 1940s – early 1970s) in the world’s industrialized nations. 
However, the great transformations that occurred during the 1970s –on which I 
elaborate in Chapter One- marked the end of the Fordist regime and prompted 
                                                
98 Bob Jessop, Survey Article: The Regulation Approach, 5 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 287, 
289 
99 Id., at 290 
100 See MICHEL AGLIETTA, REGULATION ET CRISES DU CAPITALISME : L’ EXPERIENCE DES ETATS-UNIS 
(1976) 
101 BOB JESSOP, BEYOND THE REGULATION APPROACH: PUTTING CAPITALIST ECONOMIES IN THEIR 
PLACE (2006), 58 
102 Id., at 59-60 
103 Henry Ford himself had declared his firm’s settled policy ‘My ambition is to employ still more men; to 
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their 
lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our profits back into the business’. 
He explicitly invoked this policy in a dispute he had with certain minority shareholders (the Dodge 
brothers), who challenged Ford Motor Company’s board decision not to declare a dividend out of a large 
pool of earnings that had been retained to fund new projects. Coincidentally, this case was the one that 
introduced in the US the shareholder primacy norm, since Ford’s policy was not accepted by the court on 
the basis that ‘it is not within the lawful powers of a board to shape and conduct the affairs of a 
corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting 
others’; see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) 
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regulationists to analyze the new structures of the capitalist economy in order to 
identify Fordism’s successor. While the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach is 
right in suggesting that CMEs/insider systems are more resilient to change and 
thus one could suggest that they haven’t yet abolished all of their Fordist 
attributes, my view is that the finance-led regime that has emerged in 
LMEs/outsider systems as the strongest candidate to succeed Fordism104 has also 
affected the structure of the CMEs. Hence, again I attempt to balance my 
contribution to the comparative corporate governance literature between the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ approach and some variation of the convergence claim. 
A finance-led capitalist model is viewed as an institutional setting that, 
apart from carrying the characteristics of ‘financialization’ that were discussed 
under Section 2 above, is governed by an accumulation regime, i.e. the 
complementary pattern of production and consumption that is reproducible over 
a long period105, that is dominated by finance106. While in Fordist economies 
consumption was financed by the increasing wages of employees, in the finance-
led regime adjusted wage shares have fallen107 and thus consumption is 
increasingly financed by consumer’s access to financial gains and credit108. 
Concerns arising from the ageing population in Western countries led to the 
privatization of many aspects of social security from 1980s onwards. 
Institutional investors, such as pension funds, undertook the privatized savings 
function by providing wage earners with an indirect access to the stock market. 
Additionally, the falling adjusted wage shares are also partly offset by the 
massive employee stock-option programs. Thus, the stock market has an 
increasing wealth effect on the savings/consumption allocation109. At the same 
time, the expansion of the importance of the stock market along with the 
deregulation of the commercial banking industry from the 1980s onwards 
allowed consumers to post their financial wealth as collateral in order to borrow 
from banks110. Facilitated access to private credit in turn stimulated 
consumption. 
 In light of these observations, I would claim that in the finance-led 
model of capitalism the stock market transformed from a mechanism to finance 
the supply side of the economy (i.e. the industry) into a mechanism that finances 
the consumption side. This negative net contribution of equity to the financing 
of industry from the 1970s onwards is evident in the analysis of Section 7 of 
Chapter One (see Figures 21–24). 
                                                
104 See Michel Aglietta, Le Capitalisme de Demain, NOTE DE LA FONDATION SAINT-SIMON 101 (1998) 
105 Jessop, supra note 98, 291 
106 Robert Boyer, Is a Finance-led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism? A Preliminary 
Analysis, 29 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 111, 112 
107 Engelbert Stockhammer, Wage Moderation Does Not Work: Unemployment in Europe, 39 REVIEW OF 
RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMICS 391, 394-395 
108 Boyer, supra note 106, 120; MARC LAVOIE, INTRODUCTION TO POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS (2009), 
151 
109 Till van Treeck, A Synthetic, Stock-Flow Consistent Macroeconomic Model of Financialisation, IMK 
Working Paper 6/2007, 7 
110 Boyer, supra 106, 121 
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 The shareholder value orientation of firms that I claim that prevailed in 
both LMEs and CMEs was a precondition for the transition from a Fordist 
model of accumulation to a finance-dominated regime, as it helped divert the 
firm’s profits out of the firm’s reinvestment program and into the shareholders’ 
pockets111. The shareholder value approach, thus, did nothing more but to ensure 
that stock would increasingly get to serve consumption rather than production.  
Consequently, the current study by blending corporate governance 
analysis with heterodox political economy’s analysis of the current finance-led 
or finance-dominated model of development suggests that: 
 
4.2.4. Corporate law’s new desideratum and equity’s share of blame in the 
crisis  
 
The final strand of the comparative corporate governance niche, the 
‘law and finance’ line of literature, is a very influential set of articles112 written 
by leading financial economists and legal commentators, who within the general 
framework of a ‘law matters’ thesis have developed a series of arguments, each 
of which carries its own value. From this series I have disaggregated two 
arguments that deserve special attention and that I find to be relevant for the 
purposes of the current study. Identifying how this study relates to each of these 
two arguments is essential in order to reveal how it views the normative role of 
the legal institutions of corporate governance in the post-2008 world. 
 
 
                                                
111 Engelbert Stockhammer, Some Stylized Facts on the Finance-dominated Accumulation Regime, 12 
COMPETITION & CHANGE 184, 185 
112 The ideas developed within the scope of these studies influenced the World Bank ‘legal technical 
assistance programs’ that saw the transplantation of law, which has worked well in the case of developed 
countries, as the secret of economic success for an emerging economy. 
Equity : From Financing Supply to Financing Demand 
 
In the finance-led model of capitalism the stock market 
transformed from a mechanism to finance the supply side of the 
economy (i.e. the industry) into a mechanism that finances the 
consumption side. This marked a transformation in the role of 
equity as well, which might also explain the gradual 
transformation of shareholders’ time horizons. When stock is 
needed to finance consumption it has to provide returns more 
rapidly than when it is needed to finance production, since 
financing production would require the stockholder to be more 




4.2.4.1. Can corporate law restore trust in the economy? 
The first argument that emerges from the ‘law and finance’ strand of 
comparative corporate governance is the one that depicts corporate law as a kind 
of technology that can be inserted into an economy and propel the growth of 
securities markets. This argument, which has been duly called the ‘technical 
corporate law theory’, flows from empirical data that show that deep securities 
markets correlate with an index of shareholder legal protections113. An implicit 
tenet that is found within this argument is that the quality of corporate law can 
arouse trust among potential investors, so that they can decide to take the risk 
associated with the holding of a security and thus infuse the financial markets 
with additional liquidity.  
Although corporate law is not the only and most likely not the most 
crucial mobilizing force behind strong securities markets114, its capacity at least 
to infuse the investor community with trust should not be contested. Thus, 
corporate law although a second-order phenomenon in the creation of securities 
markets can become one of the main weapons for fighting the confidential crisis 
that has thrown the post-2008 global economy into a stagnation-persisting 
liquidity trap. While I leave the explanation of the Keynesian concept of 
liquidity trap for Chapter One (Section 1.2), I confine myself to stating here that 
a preference for hoarding over spending is the main characteristic of this 
phenomenon115.  
                                                
113 MARK ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006), 165-166 
114 There have indeed been several studies that show that countries that have or have had at a certain point 
in time deep securities markets were able to develop them in the absence of corporate law or securities 
regulation. For instance, the Japanese equity market of the early 20th century, which played a major role 
in the financing of Japanese industry and agriculture, developed due to the presence of prominent 
directors on Japanese firms’ boards, who –in the absence of business regulation- were fulfilling a 
signaling intermediary role between firms and investors; see Yoshiro Miwa & Mark Ramseyer, The Value 
of Prominent Directors: Corporate Governance and Bank Access in Traditional Japan, 31 JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 273. Investment bankers were developing similar bonding mechanisms in the nascent US 
securities markets of the early 20th century; see John C. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The 
Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1. 
Other studies have shown the importance of private ordering and self-regulation in the development of 
securities markets by referring to the contribution of the NYSE stock exchange rules in enforcing crucial 
governance obligations on firms in the pre-’New Deal’ US; see Mark Roe, Political Preconditions to 
Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1463. Finally, the technical 
theory of corporate law is contested by the fact that civil law countries that within the ‘law and finance’ 
literature are shown to have poor quality of corporate laws had very developed securities markets before 
World War I; see Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the 20th Century, 69 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 5 
115 Signs of hoarding among firms and investors seem to be present in the post-2008 world as it becomes 
evident from the ratio of cash assets to loans outstanding on banks’ balance sheets and the ratio of cash 
assets to total assets on non-financial corporations’ balance sheets. US companies have boosted their 
liquid assets by 26% in the first quarter of 2010, which is the highest level since 1952; see Aki Ito, Japan 
Companies Join US in Hoarding Cash on Europe, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, JUNE 17, 2010. These 
numbers are too high to infer that corporate America is just trying to deleverage or that banks prepare for 
the implementation of the ‘Basel III’ accord that mandates larger liquid reserves; See Adrian Blundell-
Wignall & Paul Atkinson, Thinking Beyond Basel III: Necessary Solutions for Capital and Liquidity, 
OECD JOURNAL: FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS  (2010), ISS. 1. Evidence that the US economy is in a 
liquidity trap is further reinforced by facts about consumer spending. Consumers in the US are also 
hoarding, since the personal savings rate has risen after the 2008 crash [see RICHARD POSNER, THE CRISIS 
OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY (2009), 300], while the 2008 $80bn tax rebate program of the US 
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The positive correlation between public trust and economic growth has 
been documented in several studies116. The investment decision is not only the 
outcome of a rational calculus, but also an act of faith in the overall market 
system117. It follows that the greater the faith one has in the institutional 
infrastructure of the financial system, the more likely it is for her to invest part 
of her wealth in securities. 
But, how exactly can corporate law infuse the market players with 
faith? According to a modern taxonomy in behavioral economics there are two 
types of trust that are crucial for economic growth118. The first one is utterly 
subjective and is called benevolent trust. Benevolent trust arises from culture 
and is due to social norms rather than rules119. The second type of trust is based 
on objective characteristics of the financial system, such as the quality of 
investor protection, the enforcement of the legal rules governing capital markets 
etc.120 and is called deterrent trust. In other words, deterrent trust is the trust that 
arises from reliance on the law121 122.  
                                                                                                              
government resulted in just a $12bn increase in consumption (see Martin Feldstein, Rethinking the Role of 
Fiscal Policy, 99 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 556, 557) indicating that the new money just piled 
up unspent and uninvested. The situation is no better in the rest of the world as signs of hoarding are 
omnipresent. In Europe not only is lending by banks reduced [see Caroline Hyde & Esteban Duarte, 
Banks Hoarding Cash in Europe Drives Treasurers to Record Bonds, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2009). 
Available at:  http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6e52XamCxWc)] despite 
stimulus packages in several countries and despite banks capitalization with governmental funds (see 
Katharina Pistor, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Banks and Governments in the Global Crisis: Towards a New 
Governance for Global Finance?, 10 EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 333, 338) but in 
addition to this a June 2010 effort by the ECB to offer European banks a deposit facility by taking bids 
for one-week deposits in order to absorb the liquidity created by its emergency purchases of government 
bonds, failed to induce banks to part with their money despite a relatively high interest rate. Japanese 
corporations appear to parallel the trend as they are holding trillions of assets in currency, the most since 
1997 (see Aki Ito, Japan Companies Join US in Hoarding Cash on Europe, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
JUNE 17, 2010). Australia is also experiencing a flight to cash, as Australian banks have seen their total 
deposits rise 11,9% within 2010 [see Scott Murdoch, Fearful Investors Hoarding Trillions of Dollars, 
HERALD SUN, (Jul. 10, 2010). Available at http://www.news.com.au/money/fearful-investors-hoarding-
trillions-of-dollars/story-e6frfmci-1225890082605]. 
116 See e.g. Luigi Guiso et al., Trusting the Stock Market, 6 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2557; Paul Zak & 
Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 295 
117 Guiso et al., supra note 116, 2557 
118 See Toshio Yamagishi & Midori Yamagishi, Trust and Commitment in the United States and Japan, 
18 MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 129 
119 Bruce Ian Carlin et al., Public Trust, The Law and Financial Investment, 2 available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1033102  
120 Guiso, supra note 116, 2557-2558 
121 ‘The bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without 
the fear of some coercive Power’ [see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORME AND 
POWER OF A COMMONWELATH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVILL, (A.R.WALLER, ED.) (1904) [1651], 92]. 
This Hobbesian dictum shows that between the two types of trust it is deterrent trust that carries more 
weight in the equation leading to economic growth. Of course, social norms that increase benevolent trust 
have in the past functioned as efficient non-legal devices for governing economic activity; there are 
indeed economies, such as the South Korean and Japanese one, that in the 1960s and 1970s are thought to 
have grown due to a reliance on extralegal mechanisms rather than the rule of law. But as we move from 
domestic-oriented economies to a global market for capital with firms’ cross-listings in foreign stock 
exchanges and funds’ products being marketed across several jurisdictions, benevolent trust is likely to 
reduce. The social glue that allows people to interact in low transaction costs is somewhat less strong 
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Max Weber, whose economic sociology actually sew the seed of the 
conceptualization of trust as the link between the sphere of economy and the 
sphere of law123, identified ‘calculability’ as the foremost virtue that law should 
possess in order to spur deterrent trust and foster the development of a market 
economy124. Calculable is the law that can foster a stable and predictable 
atmosphere within a system of competitive capitalism. In a free market economy 
the interaction of selfish profit-seekers, who while pursuing the maximization of 
their own individual welfare might theoretically cause damage to the economic 
comfort of others, creates a business environment of radical uncertainty125. 
Thus, according to Weber the organized coercion of law should nurture the 
belief among market participants that detrimental egoistic tendencies in the 
market will be constrained126.  Law should have the capacity to foster such 
conditions in the market, so as to induce economic agents to make a 
psychological commitment not to further their own self-interest if this would be 
done to the detriment of others or of the system as a whole. In the world of 
modern finance a legal system can be deemed calculable if it reduces the 
possibility that economic agents will generate negative externalities by means of 
their market behavior. 
This study’s three hypotheses focus on corporate law’s orientation 
towards shareholder value and fostering of short-termist shareholdership that 
together have a negative influence on economic growth. Thus, if any normative 
conclusions are to be drawn from this study the focus should be on how 
corporate law can create to market players the faith that it won’t have any more 
a ‘stagnation-generating’ character. In other words, the type of calculability I 
envision for corporate law in the post-2008 world is one that will result in the 
markets believing that the corporate apparatus can become again the engine of 
rapid economic growth. This is the desideratum of the normative concept of 
Long Governance, which is introduced in Chapter Five. 
 If corporate law re-emerges as a device able to cure the structural 
pathology of capitalism, i.e. the economic stagnation, it is not only the markets 
that will start functioning in a counter-cyclical way, but labor as well, since 
employees will be induced to make more firm-specific investments that will 
increase its productivity. At the moment, short-termist pressures on corporations 
generated by shareholders expose the employees to a holdup problem that 
                                                                                                              
when cross-border transactions take place. Therefore, in today’s world deterrent trust is what is more 
crucial for a vibrant economy.  
122 The fact that a malfunctioning legal system can be a source of ‘confidential crisis’ is an idea that can 
be traced back to Henry Thornton, who in 1802 wrote that ‘in a society in which law and the sense of 
moral duty are weak, and property is consequently insecure, there will of course, be little confidence or 
credit, and there will also be little commerce’; HENRY THORNTON, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND 
EFFECTS OF THE PAPER CREDIT OF GREAT BRITAIN (1802), 14 
123 KENNETH MORRISON, MARX, DURKHEIM, WEBER: FORMATIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT 
(2006), 291 
124 MAX WEBER, GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY (F. KNIGHT, TRANSL.) (2003), 271 
125 David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and Capitalism, 3 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 720, 740-741 
126 David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 
YALE LAW JOURNAL 1, 13 
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discourages them from making a firm-specific investment127. In the presence of 
a ‘downsize and distribute’ pressure on behalf of the shareholders, employees, 
who have invested in acquiring skills specifically deployable in the corporations 
they work, are likely to be threatened with opportunistic renegotiation of their 
employment contract that will result in a loss of part of the rent on the 
investment128. This threat is thought to reduce their incentives to make a welfare 




















4.2.4.2. Does financial development promote economic growth or increase 
macroeconomic fragility? 
As it was mentioned in sub-section 4.1 above, the second basic 
argument in the ‘law and finance’ line of literature is that developed financial 
markets are linked to economic growth (‘the finance for growth argument’). 
Given the many comprehensive papers bearing on the finance for growth 
argument129, I will restrain myself here from dealing in detail with the topic. In 
the face though of the heterodox economic approach to corporate law that this 
study takes, it is necessary for reasons of analytical coherence to identify very 
briefly how the relationship of finance to growth is viewed by the Keynesian 
and Post-Keynesian schools of thought, from which this study largely draws 
inspiration.  
Financial markets do have multiple functions, but the one that is 
important for the macroeconomic setting and for economic growth is the 
                                                
127 See Gelter, supra note 79  
128 Id., at 130 
129 See Marco Pagano, Financial Markets and Growth: An Overview, 37 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 
613; Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 688; Mariassunta Giannetti et al., Financial Market Integration, Corporate 
Financing and Economic Growth, European Commission Economic Papers No. 179 (2002) 
The Calculability of Corporate Law and Short-termism 
 
For corporate law to become calculable and thus conducive to 
restore trust in the economy in the post-2008 world, a set of 
reforms must be undertaken that will allow the corporate 
apparatus to act in a counter-cyclical and “non-stagnation-
generating” way. Since short-termism is identified as one of the 
causes of economic stagnation, corporate law, in order to 
become calculable, should stop sustaining short-termism. This 
will eventually induce the markets to overcome their appetite 
for hoarding and be incentivized to lend out funds to 
corporations again, while employees will be induced to make 
more firm-specific investments, which will result in labor’s 
increased productivity in the economy. 
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financing of real investment130. The extent, to which financial markets manage 
to translate the savings of households into corporate business investment, 
characterizes the degree of the financial system’s ‘functional efficiency’131. In 
Chapter One I present evidence that equity markets at least are not functionally 
efficient (see Figures 21-24), as the stock market through the shareholder value 
orientation that it introduces for quoted corporations has given rise to a ‘coupon 
pool capitalism’, where corporations first return their earnings to financial 
markets through dividends and stock buybacks and then compete to re-acquire 
those funds132. In heterodox macroeconomic thought investment spending is the 
prime mover of the economy, so if financial markets negatively affect it then 
prospects for growth are impaired133. 
This functional inefficiency of the equity markets is stylized in Chapter 
Two through my analysis of the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm, by which it 
is shown that it is theoretically sound to claim that there is a causal link between 
shareholder influence on public corporations and the negative capital 
accumulation that is marked in the last four decades.  
Apart from the seemingly negative influence of financial markets on 
capital accumulation, finance capital may actually increase macroeconomic 
fragility by acting as a rapid destabilizer in times of uncertainty134. One of the 
foundations of the design of modern financial systems is the reversibility of 
investment. This means that after funds have been invested in a particular 
market, field or corporation they should always be allowed to be withdrawn 
rapidly and at a minimum cost; the financial system is concerned with building 
these technological and regulatory institutions that will secure the effectiveness 
of this right to enter and exit from an investment rapidly135. As it has been noted 
in respect of the pro-cyclical character of finance capital: 
 
There is an obvious contradiction between the necessary lasting 
investment in production, with its specific risks, and this absolute 
freedom of movement demanded by finance. Non-financial firms must 
confront the structural crises following from […] the recurrent 
recessions of the business cycle, and adapt to the constant pressure of 
                                                
130 Peter Mooslechner, Finance for Growth, Finance and Growth, Finance or Growth…? Three 
Perspectives on the Interaction of Financial Markets and the Real Economy, in OESTERREICHISCHE 
NATIONALBANK – FOCUS ON AUSTRIA 1/2003, 82. Available at 
http://www.oenb.at/en/img/foa_20031_tcm16-8299.pdf  
131 See James Tobin, On the Efficiency of the Financial System, 153 LLOYDS BANK REVIEW 1 
132 See Özgür Orhangazi, Did Financialization Increase Macroeconomic Fragility? An Analysis of the US 
Nonfincanial Corporate Sector, in HETERODOX MACROECONOMICS, KEYNES-MARX AND 
GLOBALIZATION (J. GOLDSTEIN & M. HILLARD, EDS.) (2009) 
133 See Hyman Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behavior of 
the Economy, in FINANCIAL CRISES: THEORY, HISTORY AND POLICY (C. KINDLEBERGER ET AL. EDS.) 
(1982) 
134 Orhangazi, supra note 129; see James Crotty, Marx, Keynes and Minsky on the Instability of the 
Capitalist Growth Process and the Nature of Government Economic Policy, in MARX, SCHUMPETER, 
KEYNES: A CENTENARY CELEBRATION OF DISSENT (S. HELBURN & D. BRAMHAL, EDS.) (1986) 297 
135 Gérard Duménil & Dominique Lévy, Costs and Benefits of Neoliberalism - A Class Analysis, 8 
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 578, 602 
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competition. Finance attempts to use its own institutions to obtain 
protection against these risks, thanks to its ability to withdraw, 
attempting to impose the consequences of these movements on others. 
Doing so, it can considerably deepen the crises or even create new 
crises and, therefore, jeopardize growth and employment136. 
 
This destabilizing character of finance capital becomes more acute, 
when the investor worries unduly about short-term market losses. It is the short-
termist investor who will predominantly feel the urge in the face of a recession 
to move her money out of the illiquid and risky markets. A long-term investor 
that can overlook the near-term financial impact of a crisis and instead focus on 
the long-term opportunities coming out of it, will instead act as a countercyclical 
force providing businesses with liquidity at the times when it is most needed137.  







                                                
136 Id. 
137 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE FUTURE OF LONG-TERM IVESTING (2011), 44. Available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FutureLongTermInvesting_Report_2011.pdf  
The Pro-cyclicality of Short-term Equity and the Counter-
cyclicality of Long-term Equity 
 
Short-term equity –as well as short-term capital in general- is 
of pro-cyclical nature and can act as a destabilizing force that 
can deepen crises, while long-term equity –as well as long-term 






Corporate Governance and International Political Economy:  
How Changes in the International Monetary Order Brought About the 




‘We wish to understand on the 
one hand the relationships and the 
cultural significance of individual 
events in their contemporary 
manifestation, and on the other the 
causes of their being historically so 
and not otherwise’ 
Max Weber138 
 
This Chapter introduces the study’s First Hypothesis: the shift in the 
institutional logics of corporate governance towards shareholder value (‘Great 
Reversal in Corporate Governance’) coupled with shareholdership’s 
increasing short-termism (‘Great Reversal in Shareholdership’) have 
cumulatively contributed to the low rates of GDP growth that are observed in 
the major Western economies since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system 
in the early 1970s. 
As explained in the Introduction (3.1), the First Hypothesis is a story of 
causality links. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of monetary 
management in the early 1970s opened the Pandora’s Box bringing about a 
series of transformative changes in international political economy that affected 
irreversibly corporate governance and the set of preferences of (equity) 
investors. Of course I am not ignorant of the fact that ‘it is difficult to formulate 
universal claims over time and across cultures because of the mutable nature of 
institutions and the potential role of free will (that is of actors’ ability to change 
their minds and pursue new goals)’139, but recent studies on the sequence of 
events in the post-Bretton Woods world support my conviction that free will 
must have been a negligible contributing factor to the transformation of the 
institutional setting140. 
Sections 1-6 of this Chapter offer a timeline presentation of the 
macroeconomic and intellectual events that culminated in these two great 
reversals in the major Western economies. The analysis covers France, 
                                                
138 Max Weber, The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy (1904), in MAX 
WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (E. SHILS & H.A. FINCH, trans.) (1949), 72 
139 Ernst Haas & Peter Haas, Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International Institutions, 31 
MILLENNIUM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 573, 584 
140 See YANIS VAROUFAKIS, THE GLOBAL MINOTAUR: THE TRUE CAUSES AND NATURE OF THE CURRENT 
ECONOMIC CRISIS (2011) 
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Germany, the UK and the US (and to a lesser extent The Netherlands) and stops 
in the mid-2000s, i.e. before the start of the ongoing economic collapse, in order 
to show that the failures of capitalism were existent even before the cataclysmic 
events of the post-2008 era. The reader, who is familiar with postwar and post-
Bretton Woods economic history or is not interested in the details of these 
periods’ institutional settings may focus on the textboxes found within the 
Sections, which provide in a nutshell the impact that the developments at the 
political economy level had on firms’ orientation towards shareholder value and 
on the shortening of shareholders’ time-horizons. In addition to this, Figures 9 
and 10 provide an illustrative summary of the array of institutional 
developments that brought about the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance 
and the Great Reversal in Shareholdership respectively; the two Figures are also 
suitable for use by readers, who want to quickly gain an understanding of where 
this Chapter’s discourse is heading to. 
Section 7 puts forward the causality links of the First Hypothesis 
accompanied by relevant empirical data. The two great reversals led to increased 
payout ratios in the corporations of the major Western economies; that meant 
lower retention ratios, which in aggregate reduced the growth rate of business 
capital accumulation bringing about lower rates of GDP growth. The layout of 
the empirical data in Section 7 and the attempt to provide preliminary logical 
explanations for the existence of a causation link between the aforementioned 
trends does not rule out the possibility of a relationship of mere correlation 
rather than of causation (see Section 7.7). This is why Section 7 should be read 
in conjunction with Chapter Two that offers an economic model of the impact 
that shareholder value coupled with short-termism can have on firms’ 
accumulation dynamics. It is Chapter Two that completes the causation 
argument embedded in the First Hypothesis. 
   
 
1. The intellectual substructure of the Golden Age of Capitalism: Keynesian 
economics 
 
In the post-2008 world governments started looking for ways to drive 
the economy out of the recession. This is when Keynes was rediscovered (at 
least in the US and the UK). The rediscovery was either implicit judging from 
the Keynesian spirit of the policies that governments started implementing in 
response to the collapse or explicit since there were even direct references to 
Keynes’s regulatory philosophy in parliamentary speeches and governmental 
announcements141.  
Keynes’s theory provided the conceptual basis, on which the economic 
policies that brought the global economy out of the Great Depression were 
                                                
141 See e.g. Alistair Darling’s, UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, announcement of the 19th October 
2008 about massive government borrowing that would kick-start the British economy, where he explicitly 
mentioned that ‘Keynes’s ideas are coming back into vogue’. 
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designed and that guaranteed the rapid growth of the first two postwar decades 
that have been called the ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’. It was, thus, believed that 
since the Keynesian recipe worked to take us out of the Great Depression of the 
1930s, it would work again to heal the wounds of the 2008 meltdown.  
Keynes did a great job in penetrating into the understanding of the 
deeper pathologies of an economic recession mainly through his magnus opus 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. He provided us with a 
very accurate account of why an economy in a recession might not show signs 
of recovery in response to monetary or other short-term remedies devised by 
governments. Indeed, during the Great Depression it became a common belief 
that monetary policy was a string; ‘you could pull on it to stop inflation, but you 
could not push on it to halt recession’142. Increasing the quantity of money in the 
economy by having the central bank lower the interest rates just did not seem 
enough to boost investment and consumption back in the dark days of the 1930s. 
Keynes explained why and proposed an alternative route: fiscalism instead of 
monetarism. We’ll see below in Section 1.3 what that means exactly. For the 
moment let’s focus on the diagnosis of the diseases of a recessionary economy 
according to Keynes. 
 
1.1. The Keynesian theory on uncertainty and the notion of ‘confidential 
crisis’ 
 
Keynes was not a polemicist of capitalism143; he was simply not victim 
of the market utopia, in which neoclassicists believed. Keynes generally 
believed in the price mechanism, in the ability of the market to self-correct, but 
he thought that the ‘magical’ matching of supply and demand just didn’t work in 
every case and at least in two segments of the market: the labor market and the 
capital market144. The latter two are the Achilles’ heel of capitalism. Like 
Schumpeter and Marx, Keynes also saw capitalism as inherently unstable, but he 
didn’t believe in the self-healing process of creative destruction; he believed that 
the economy could remain ‘in a chronic condition of sub-normal activity for a 
considerable period without any marked tendency either toward recovery or 
toward complete collapse’145. 
As a prophet of the modern field of behavioral economics Keynes 
argued that much of the inherent instability of the capital markets derives from 
investors’ irrational behavior. In Keynesian analysis agents do have rational 
intents; in this, Keynes is in line with the utilitarian tradition and neoclassical 
economics. However, to Keynes agents are also highly susceptible to 
psychological forces and therefore, despite their optimal intents, their ultimate 
                                                
142 Milton Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1, 1 
143 Paul Krugman, Introduction to JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST AND MONEY (2006)  
144 VAROUFAKIS, supra note 4,  284  
145 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY [1936] 
(LONDON MACMILLAN - 1973), 249 
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decisions are subject to the fallible powers of judgment146 and thus may not 
always be rational as neoclassicists assume. This takes us back to the Humean 
gnome that reason is enslaved: ‘reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions’147.  
In Keynesian theory, irrational decisions are the result of the inevitable 
problem of uncertainty148, which constitutes a state of intrinsic insecurity that 
cannot be quantified and thus integrated into the mathematical decision models 
of the neoclassicists149. Uncertainty translates into partial and vague knowledge 
and is distinct from the notion of risk150, which has come to be quantified by 
modern economics151. Putting it in option theory terms, uncertainty is the 
variability of beliefs, i.e. the greater likelihood of substantial revision of one’s 
beliefs in the near future152. Without full or at least quantifiable information, the 
model of the rational agent, as the neoclassical orthodoxy assumes it, does not 
function properly153. Keynes structured his theory of economic fluctuations 
around this very notion of uncertainty. 
What kind of behavior does uncertainty exactly trigger? In the 
Keynesian analysis the agent is called to make a decision in the context of an 
unalterable past and a perfidious future154. The greater the fog surrounding this 
future the more intense the so-called ‘liquidity preference’ of the agent becomes. 
‘Liquidity preference’ is defined as the tendency of people towards retaining a 
certain amount of their resources in the form of money155; it is the desire to 
hoard. Consequently, in brief, uncertainty triggers hoarding and reduces the 
appetite for investment156. This causal relationship between uncertainty and 
liquidity preference is explained by the fact that uncertainty affects the 
precautionary and speculative motives for the demand for money, i.e. the desire 
                                                
146 Athol Fitzgibbons, The Microeconomic Foundations of Keynesian Economics, in KEYNES, 
UNCERTAINTY AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: BEYOND KEYNES, VOL. II (S. DOW & J. HILLARD, EDS.) 
(2002), 7 
147 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, VOL. II [1739] (1966), 127 
148 WILLIAM GREER, ETHICS AND UNCERTAINTY: THE ECONOMICS OF JOHN M. KEYNES AND FRANK H. 
NIGHT (2000), 55 
149 Yanis Varoufakis, Pristine Equations, Tainted Economics and the Post-war Order (2009), 33. 
Available at http://www.econ.uoa.gr/UA/files/1349178174..pdf  
150 For the distinction between risk and uncertainty see the seminal work of FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921) 
151 Elmar Helten, Ist Risiko ein Konstrukt? Zur Quantifizierung des Risikobegriffes, in RISIKO, 
VERSICHERUNG, MARKT: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WALTER KARTEN ZUR VOLLENDUNG DES 60. LEBENSJAHRES 
(D. HESBERG ET AL., EDS.) (1994), 19FF. 
152 Robert Jones & Joseph Ostroy, Flexibility and Uncertainty, 51 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 13, 13 
153 The role of uncertainty in the decision making process is also well-documented in experimental 
decision theory through the Ellsberg paradox that proves that in the presence of uncertainty the expected 
utility hypothesis, which constitutes the cornerstone of the neoclassical economics’ model of the rational 
agent, is violated; see Daniel Ellsberg,  Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 QUARTERLY 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 643 
154 PAUL DAVIDSON, MONEY AND THE REAL WORLD (1973), xii 
155 Jörg Bibow, On Keynesian Theories of Liquidity Preference, 66 THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL 238, 239 
156John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 51 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 209; reprinted in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE GENERAL 
THEORY AND AFTER: PART II. DEFENCE, VOL. 14 (1973), 116 
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of people to be prepared for unforeseen expenditures157. Uncertainty causes a 
fall in demand for inflexible positions, i.e. those that are less liquid, and an 
increase in demand for flexible positions. 
The causality between uncertainty and an increased liquidity preference 
seems logical. The question is then what causes uncertainty in the first place. 
The answer lies in Keynes’s phrase: 
 
Our desire to hold money as a store of wealth is a barometer 
of the degree of our distrust of our own calculations and 
conventions concerning the future. The possession of actual 
money lulls our disquietude; and the premium which we 
require to make us part with money is the measure of the 
degree of our disquietude. 158 
 
What Keynes implies in the above quotation is that a downward shift in 
the agent’s state of confidence, in the reliability of her anticipations about the 
future, is what actually causes uncertainty159. In essence, the state of confidence 
is one of the factors determining the schedule of the marginal efficiency of 
capital in an agent’s mind160. Reduced confidence of investors results in 
increased uncertainty about the future and ultimately to a reluctance to invest, so 
as to avoid being trapped in illiquid positions161. In other words, distrust 
translates into uncertainty and further to a shift in liquidity preference. 
Investment reduces, so does consumption, so the two of the four basic 
components of an economy’s GDP (GDP = Investment  + Consumption + 
Government Expenditure + Net Exports) are reduced causing slow growth in the 
GDP, i.e. stagnation, or –worse- recession, i.e. negative growth in the country’s 
GDP. 
A certain level of non-quantifiable uncertainty is always present in the 
decision-making of market players. We have learned to live and transact 
tolerating the small doses of uncertainty that intrude in our decision-making 
process.  
However, there is one type of uncertainty that signifies that the markets 
are filled with a high level of distrust, that they are experiencing a so-called 
‘confidential crisis’, which is essentially what can throw the economy into an 
irrecoverable downward spiral162. It is the uncertainty that is caused by the 
distrust of the willingness or the aptitude of the other market players to observe 
                                                
157 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY, New 
York, Harcourt, Brace and World (1936), 168 
158 Id., at 170 
159 Bibow, supra note 64, 252 
160 KEYNES, supra 157, 149 
161 We must, however, give credit to Henry Thornton for being the first to articulate the causality 
relationship between uncertainty and liquidity preference, although he didn’t put it in these exact terms. 
Thornton viewed the lack of confidence among market players as inducing people to hold money ‘as a 
provision against contingencies’; see HENRY THORNTON, supra note 120, at 39, 47, 71, 145, 308 
162 VAROUFAKIS, supra note 4, 235 
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commercial rules or worse by the distrust of the rules themselves163. The 
difficulty to get market players (firms or investors) to invest increases as 
uncertainty regarding the market players’ expectations of one another rises and 
as frustration about the market’s institutional endowment, i.e. the rules 
governing the transactions, grows. 
From the foregoing analysis a circle of causal relationships (see Figure 
5) can be drawn that eventually leads to this situation, which Keynes has 
described, where the economy cannot be stimulated either by lowering the 
interest rates or by increasing the money supply164, i.e. by the application of 
orthodox monetary remedies. This situation is called the ‘liquidity trap’.  
 
Figure 5 – Keynes’s Causality Links Leading to Persistent Recession 
 
1.2. The ‘liquidity trap’ 
 
Keynes, reflecting his Zeitgeist, developed the notion of the ‘liquidity 
trap’, when he observed that in the first years of the Great Depression, despite 
the fact that interest rates were low, there was no increase in investment 
resulting in a surging unemployment rate. The liquidity trap was a paradox for 
the monetary/neoclassical orthodoxy that viewed low interest rates as an engine 
of economic growth. Neoclassicists believe(d) that if interest rates are low then 
‘buying’ capital becomes a bargain and so an agent abiding by the Benthamite 
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calculus of utility maximization165 would be incentivized to raise capital and 
then invest the money to boost her output. However, not only during the Great 
Depression, but also at later points in time, such as Japan’s economic crisis 
during the 1990s166, the same problem of liquidity trap was present and thus 
private initiative did not respond effectively to expansionary monetary policies. 
After the short exposure to Keynes’s theory about how uncertainty 
influences the decision-making process of an agent, it is now time to understand 
how the Keynesian argument about liquidity traps plays out.  
Suppose that in the framework of one of capitalism’s usual recessions, 
there is a fall in demand. This fall freezes the capital markets for a while, as 
investors see that firms reduce production to equate their supply to the reduced 
demand. Investors do not want to be exposed to firms with a reducing output 
and are thus reluctant to hold on to their securities or to buy new ones, so their 
trading behavior creates a bear market. With diminishing capital being available 
the firms reduce further their output and thus have to lay off employees to 
reduce their obligations and remain in a solvent state. As unemployment rises 
due to the layoffs, consumers’ income falls, since more and more consumers are 
unemployed, so with less aggregate income available for spending, there will be 
a further fall in the demand side of the economy. In the face of this recession, 
the central bank, following the monetary policy dictated by neoclassical 
economics, pursues a traditional monetary growth policy by lowering the 
interest rates to make it easier for firms to raise capital, so that they can then 
increase their output and employ more people. With more people employed the 
aggregate income of consumers is expected to rise, so the demand side of the 
economy will rise inducing the supply side to equate it. Thus, it is plausible to 
expect that the economy will sooner or later be driven out of the recession. But, 
Keynesian economics argue, that the reduction in the interest rates won’t work 
this way; markets in the tumult of uncertainty will instead fall in the liquidity 
trap.  
What exactly is the liquidity trap? In the above described economic 
environment, uncertainty among firms skyrockets. In this climate ‘the facts of 
the existing situation enter […] into the formation of our long-term 
expectations’, so the firms are expected to take the depressive situation they are 
facing and project it into the future in order to make their economic decisions167. 
It seems logical that in light of this decision-making mechanism firms would be 
reluctant to invest in production out of fear that demand will keep falling. Their 
state of confidence in the market, in the rules and in the willingness of other 
firms to raise capital and invest is shaken.  
                                                
165 Jeremy Bentham is perceived to be the father of the utilitarian tradition, within which the genes of the 
equi-marginal principle, the foundational principle of neoclassical economics, are to be found. See 
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1798) 
166 See Ben Bernanke, Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis?, in JAPAN’S 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS PARALLELS TO US EXPERIENCE (A. POSEN & R. MIKITANI, EDS.) (1999) 
Special Report 13, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 149–166. 
167 KEYNES, supra 157, 148 
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This last remark about the state of confidence of firms in other firms 
brings to the front the problem of the coordination failure, which is central to 
Keynesian economics.  
One of Keynes’s axiomatic ideas is that our investment behavior 
depends –among other factors- largely on the expectations we have of other 
parties in the investor community168. You’re doing what you anticipate others 
will do as their prime strategy169. In this respect, our investing behavior is 
‘intersubjective’. In a recessionary economy what you expect of others is that 
they are going to practice extensive cost-cutting and suspend investment170. So, 
you do the same. The most convenient way for a firm to obtain the goal of 
keeping costs down, so that it is in line with other competitors, is by laying off 
more employees, rather than by reducing their wages; reduced wages would 
cause frustration to the employees, who wouldn’t be so productive. Thus, in this 
climate of insecurity and distrust every individual firm deciding in isolation is 
doing the same: cutting the cost of labor and hoarding because of augmented 
liquidity preference. Therefore, unemployment rises even more, so demand will 
fall even more. What firms feared would happen, i.e. a fall in demand, is 
actually caused by their own actions.  
Under general uncertainty what seems to be efficient for every single 
firm individually, is actually inefficient for the economy as a whole and thus 
ultimately ends up being inefficient for every single firm. If firms were able to 
surmount the distrust problem and coordinate, so as to agree that they would all 
stop laying off people, then a further fall in demand could be prevented. The 
economy would stabilize again and the firms would be able to gradually start 
investing again leading the system out of the recession. This collective action 
problem, where what benefits the individual harms the collective good, is typical 
of an under-regulated market and disproves the existence of some sort of self-
correction mechanism. 
As a result of the aforementioned chain of events caused by the 
idiosyncratic incentives, to which an economic crisis gives birth, firms, investors 
and consumers will develop a ‘fetish of liquidity’ and will be driven to practice 
extensive hoarding. Stocks’ and bonds’ prices fall, as investors are willing to 
                                                
168 KEYNES, supra 157, 47 
169 Michael Rosenwald, When You’re Flush, But Acting Flat Broke: Social Cues Can Drive a Downturn, 
Washington Post, Apr. 16. 2009 
170 Keynes’s axiom on how the decisions an investor makes depend largely on his expectations of what 
other investors will do is depicted in a brilliant metaphor he makes (Keynes, supra 65, 156): 
‘professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which 
the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred 
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly 
corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors a s whole; so that each 
competitor has to pick, not hose faces which he himself finds prettiest, but hose 
which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of other competitors, all of whom are 
looking at the problem from the same point of view. […] We have reached the … 
degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion 
expects the average opinion to be.’ 
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have less money invested in securities, so as to have more money immediately 
available for them; banks won’t lend out to firms and consumers, as they want to 
have liquid reserves for the hard times that they see ahead. Everyone takes 
divestment decisions. But, saving with the mentality of hoarding does not 
translate into investment. Thus, more hoarding means less growth; more 
hoarding means more poverty. After all, capitalism is all about taking risks, so 
without daring to act, the capitalist economy cannot work. 
 Thus, while each market participant looks to her own self-interest 
everyone is in aggregate worse off. The intersubjective nature of investing 
behavior, which during recessions causes pessimism, shows that the market 
alone cannot bring the economy out of the slump171. Nor monetary remedies 
alone can fix this situation. But, the GDP equation shows that policymakers 
have another weapon in their arsenal to spur economic growth: government 
spending. 
 
1.3. Keynesian fiscalism 
 
The message of Keynes’s General Theory was that government 
spending could make up for insufficient private investment; it could preempt 
savings that would finance private capital formation. The gap between what 
people earn and what they consume would be counterbalanced by governmental 
investment in the economy172. In addition to this, tax reductions could also 
compensate for hoarding and the ensuing reduction in demand. In general, a 
more interventionist economic policy could save the day.  
 According to Keynes the way, by which the government could 
intervene to drive the economy out of the cyclical fluctuations that capitalism 
would inevitably bring, was the application of expansionary fiscal policies173. 
This government-managed recovery meant running a deficit budget by 
increasing government spending and reducing personal income taxes. As 
revenues would fall short of expenses the financing of the deficit would require 
borrowing on behalf of the state. However, despite the leverage, the multiplier 
effect, which meant that for every government dollar spent demand is expected 
to rise for more than one dollar, and the increase in households’ take-home pay 
because of the tax reductions were two factors expected to boost consumer 
spending. As consumer spending would increase, firms would get to sell more, 
which would require them to hire more people. Thus, expansionary fiscal 
policies were believed to lower unemployment and increase the economy’s GDP 
–i.e. bring the growth that would bring the economy out of the slump174. For 
instance, deficit spending on behalf of the US government during World War II, 
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so as to finance the military operations, has been credited with driving the 
American economy out of the Great Depression with the US GDP growing by 
17.10% in 1941, 18.50% in 1942 and 16.40% in 1943 and unemployment 
reaching an all-time low of less than 2% in 1943175. 
  In general, the theme of Keynesianism was economic growth and full 
employment. After all, growth would provide the resources, which directed to 
the government through taxes, would finance the welfare state envisioned by 
policymakers in the postwar world176. Price inflation –the salient economic evil 
under monetarism- was indeed not the top priority of macroeconomic policy, but 
was not ignored altogether, as popular anti-Keynesian views would suggest. 
This is because fiscal policy was not only used to fight recessions, but also to 
help prevent hyperinflationary phenomena during booms. For instance during 
the Korean War taxes were introduced in the US in order to restrain the -due to 
the military operations- climbing demand, which was threatening price 
stability177.  
As it was mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Keynesian ideas 
about macroeconomic management were prominent during the Golden Age of 
Capitalism, an era of high rates of economic growth and low rates of 
unemployment178.  
Although during this period there was a de facto need for reconstruction 
that helped spur economic growth, Keynesian fiscalism did its part by making 
sure that the recessionary periods that would inevitably appear during this period 
would not be felt so severely. In almost every recession during the Golden Age 
fiscal stimulus was applied to promote recovery; and it saved the day in many 
instances.  
For instance, the US economy was characterized by trade surpluses in 
the period 1945 to 1965; these surpluses were recycled into foreign direct 
investment that helped to finance the growth of other countries, mainly in 
Western Europe179. When these US trade surpluses started shrinking in the mid-
1960s the fuel of global growth seemed to start depleting until Johnson’s 
Administration undertook expansionary fiscal measures that boosted consumer 
spending in the US market (Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ program), which thus 
kept welcoming imported products, in turn allowing other countries’ net exports 
to remain steady and hence their GDP to keep rising180. 
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2.  The macroeconomic institutions of the Golden Age: the Bretton Woods 
system 
 
2.1. A legal analysis of the Bretton Woods Agreement 
 
2.1.1. The bitter experience of the Great Depression 
 
The experience of the Great Depression, when liquidity preference 
posed a firewall between central bank low interest policies and consumer 
spending behavior, made economists and policymakers distrust the potency of 
monetary measures. The preference of Keynes and his followers for fiscal rather 
than monetary stimulus181 reflects this bitter experience.  
The prevalence of the Keynesian ideology during the Golden Age is 
reflected in the fact that at least until the mid-1960s low interest rates were 
maintained not so much as a matter of direct macroeconomic policy, but in order 
to hold down interest payments in the government budget and thus lower the 
government’s cost of debt service182. In general, credit policy by central banks 
was not perceived to be a great remedy for recession and the evil of inflation 
could be fought with other measures rather than by raising the interest rates183.  
To be sure though, Keynes himself in his General Theory did not 
advocate for a complete demise of monetary measures, but certainly saw them 
as having a subsidiary role to the fiscal technology of demand management184. 
The subsidiarity of monetary policy was embedded in the Bretton 
Woods Agreement, a multilateral international treaty establishing an 
international monetary order that was concluded in 1944 within the scope of the 
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference under the official title 
‘Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund’ (‘the Bretton 
Woods Agreement’). Keynes himself being Britain’s main negotiator in the 
Conference was one of the two main architects of the new international 
monetary order and therefore secured his intellectual imprint on the Bretton 
Woods Agreement’s provisions. The other main architect was Harry Dexter 
White, the principal US negotiator, a New Dealer also fond of Keynesian ideas. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the Agreement introduces certain 
structures that maximize the ability of the states to employ fiscal policies and 
impose certain limitations on the flexibility of the domestic monetary authorities 
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of the states-parties to the Agreement. Therefore, its provisions can be thought 
of as partially responsible for the unpopularity of countercyclical monetary 
policy during the Golden Age.  
As an international monetary system Bretton Woods featured first of all 
an exchange rate regime185. The architects of the Agreement wanted to outlaw 
what was thought of back then as the ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ exchange rate 
management that was employed by many states during the Great Depression in 
their effort to recover186. 
 As foreign lending by the US declined in 1928 and the world was 
falling into the recession, a series of countries in Western Europe found out that 
the fact that their currency was pegged to gold (‘the gold standard’) did not 
allow them to use monetary technology to fight the economic slump. The gold 
standard meant that the value of a country’s currency unit (e.g. one franc, one 
reichsmark, one dollar) was kept constantly equal to a certain weight of gold187. 
This did not permit the state to exercise control over the money supply; money 
supply could only grow if the reserves of gold grew. In other words, domestic 
monetary authorities could not print more money, if they did not have in reserve 
enough gold to back it188. By not having discretion over money supply, they did 
not have the ability to depreciate the country’s currency, so as to increase the 
competitiveness of their exporting products and help the economy recover by 
pumping up the net exports constituent of the GDP equation189.  
In absence of international monetary law or in the presence of a 
negligible international monetary law of customary origin190 the solution was 
simple and seemed to rest at the discretion of the sovereign: abandon the gold 
standard and depreciate the currency. 
Great Britain officially suspended the gold standard in 1931 and it was 
soon followed by all the Scandinavian and the Benelux countries191. At the same 
time these countries’ currency was devalued, as they were afraid they would 
lose the exports race to others that were already depreciating192. A kind of race 
to the bottom ensued on the lines of a policy of ‘each-country-for-itself-and-the-
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devil-take-the-weakest’193; the race has also been coined as ‘competitive 
depreciations’194. 
 At the same time, the hoarding tendency, which -as explained under 1.1 
and 1.2 above- emerges due to the insecurity that prevails in a state of recession, 
was creating deflation in many countries; i.e. reduced demand for goods and 
services that drives the prices down. This was a nightmare for indebted 
households and institutions that could no longer make the income to service 
their loans that were extended at higher nominal values back in the days when 
prices were higher. As the depreciating countries were flooding the deflationary 
countries with their underpriced products, demand for domestic products in the 
latter countries was reduced even more throwing them deeper into the 
deflationary spiral. 
 
2.1.2. Exchange rate stability: pegging national currencies to the US dollar 
 
To prevent the phenomena of the Great Depression from occurring 
again, the delegates in Bretton Woods opted for tighter controls on the value of 
currencies; exchange rate stability was a desideratum of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement195. 
 Exchange rate volatility was also believed that it would adversely 
affect international trade, as businesses would have to hedge against exchange-
rate risks, and that would make the maintenance of postwar peace more 
difficult196. Therefore, according to the Bretton Woods Agreement exchange 
rate management would no longer be left at the sole discretion of the sovereign, 
but the legal authority over it would be divided between the International 
Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) and the states-parties to the Bretton Woods 
Agreement197. 
Consequently, under Article IV of the Bretton Woods Agreement a par 
value or pegged rate currency system was established. All states that were 
parties to the agreement were required to establish a fixed relationship between 
their national currency and the US dollar of the weight and fineness in effect of 
July 1, 1944 [Article IV, Sec.1 (a) of the agreement]. The dollar of that date was 
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of fixed gold content, which was expressed in the relationship of $35 per troy 
ounce. It follows that a par value of any other national currency expressed in 
terms of that dollar was also fixed in terms of gold, although indirectly198. In 
other words, all countries were supposed to peg their currencies to the US dollar, 
which would take over the role that gold played in the gold standard system. 
Every state-party to the Bretton Woods Agreement undertook vis-à-vis the IMF 
the obligation to determine the initial par value of its currency based on the 
exchange rates prevailing in the market on the 60th day preceding the entry into 
force of the Agreement [Article XX, Section 4 (a)]. 
2.1.2.1. How was exchange rate management effectuated by states? 
Sovereigns bound by the Bretton Woods Agreement incurred the 
obligation to take action in order to continuously render the initial par value of 
their currency against the dollar effective as the basis for exchange transactions. 
It was the state’s responsibility to ensure that exchange transactions between 
currency traders taking place in its territory involving the national currency and 
the currency of another party-state were kept within certain limits of the parity 
relationship between them199. To be more precise, states were mandated to 
guarantee that spot exchange transactions200 would not differ from parity by 
more than 1% [Article IV, Section 3(i)]. The measures, by which each state 
would perform its obligation, were not defined in the agreement.  
The common practice, by which monetary authorities would intervene 
in the exchange market by purchasing or selling US dollars –or possibly, albeit 
rarely, other foreign currencies- within the 1% margin from parity set by the 
Bretton Woods Agreement, was deemed by the IMF as an appropriate measure 
that a country could take to fulfill its obligation to maintain the relative par value 
of its currency. 
 The only country that employed a different technique to fulfill its 
obligations under the agreement was the US that, instead of intervening in the 
exchange market by standing ready to deal in foreign currencies, it maintained 
the parity value of the dollar by being prepared to engage in gold transactions. 
The US negotiated for this practice to be explicitly included in the agreement as 
also fulfilling the exchange stability obligation of a country [Article IV, Section 
4(b)] and thus it notified the IMF that it continuously stood ready to redeem US 
dollars on the request of foreign monetary authorities for the –already 
determined- $35 per ounce.  
To sum up, a state would not be deemed to be fulfilling its exchange 
rate stability under the agreement if it remained utterly passive and abandoned 
the determination of its currency’s exchange rate to the market forces of supply 
and demand. Not taking action in the face of the occurrence of exchange 
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transactions outside the margins, would effectively mean letting the currency 
float and floating would be an outright violation of the obligations incurred 
under the Bretton Woods Agreement according to the Annual Report of the 
Executive Directors of the IMF for 1951201. 
 
2.1.2.2. The role of monetary policy in the Bretton Woods system 
The Bretton Woods Agreement did not want to create merely a sub rosa 
gold standard for the postwar world and thus on the lines of the motto ‘stability 
without rigidity’ it was ready to accommodate changes in the initial par value of 
a national currency202. A sovereign could propose to the IMF a change in the 
currency’s par value to correct balance of payments problems; if the proposed 
change in the currency’s par value did not exceed 10% of the initial par value, 
the IMF would raise no objection and the state could proceed without IMF’s 
concurrence [Article IV, Section 5(c)(1)]. A monetary expansion or contraction 
that would revalue or devalue the currency for more than 10% compared to the 
initial par value would not be prohibited per se, but it would require the 
concurrence of IMF that should be satisfied that the proposed change was 
necessary to correct a fundamental disequilibrium in the state’s balance of 
payments [Article IV, §5(a)].  
While –in light of Article IV- the system was not one of entirely fixed, 
but somewhat adjustable, parities and still allowed the application of monetary 
policy on behalf of the states, it discouraged games with money supply, which 
partly explains the unpopularity of monetary policy during the Golden Age. 
Substantial changes in the money supply were only allowed with IMF’s 
permission and only in a case of fundamental disequilibrium, which although 
not defined in the Agreement, came to mean that a country would be allowed to 
devalue or revalue only to restore its medium-run balance of payments rather 
than to promote short-term countercyclical policy203. The system was not as 
harsh as the gold standard, but still it fostered stability in international trade by 
not encouraging opportunistic changes in monetary policy. 
However, the hardcore Keynesian spirit of the Agreement pertaining to 
the use of demand management monetary tools was gradually hollowed out as 
the so-called ‘neoclassical synthesis Keynesians’ became more influential in the 
design of domestic macroeconomic policy, starting by their appointment at 
Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisers in 1961204. A combination of fiscal 
policy and monetary policy effectuated through a synthesis of government 
expenditure, tax reduction and easing of credit and interest rates was employed 
from 1961 onwards to fight the post-1957 stagnation and the high 
unemployment rates205. To the extent that the US played a dominant role in the 
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Bretton Woods system and the staffing of the IMF the ascent to dominance of 
the neoclassical synthesis Keynesians influenced other states-parties to the 
agreement and affected the macroeconomic policies that IMF was indicating to 
countries that had recourse to its financial assistance to reduce their deficits. 
Thus, monetarism entered as a ‘Trojan horse’ into Keynesian economics and 
was on the rise again from the late 1960s. We’ll see later in this chapter how it 






2.2. The Bretton Woods system and the restrictions on capital movement 
 
2.2.1. The economic rationale behind capital controls: ‘The irreconcilable 
trinity’ of the Mundell-Fleming model 
 
Apart from the parity value exchange regime that the Bretton Woods 
Agreement introduced into the new international monetary order another 
hallmark of the Bretton Woods system were the limitations on free capital flows 
between countries. Capital controls were deemed essential by both Keynes and 
White in order for the new model of interventionist government to work without 
external constraints206. The consensus that exists today among orthodox 
economists that capital controls are detrimental to economic efficiency because 
they prevent productive resources from being used where they are most needed 
did not exist back then207. 
But, how would free capital flows affect sovereign fiscal and monetary 
policy? To provide a well-founded answer to this we need to have recourse to a 
neo-Keynesian model that emerged during the 1960s in the subfield of 
international macroeconomics: the Mundell-Fleming model208.  
This model indicates that there exists an ‘irreconcilable trinity’ or a 
‘trilemma’ in the formulation of international macroeconomic policy. No 
country can have all three of the following at the same time: fixed exchange 
rates, monetary independence and free movement of capital. Inevitably, 
priorities should be set and the policy choice made will determine the range of 
possibilities a state can have. Pegging your exchange rate and being open to 
capital flows would mean losing your monetary independence. Preserving your 
monetary autonomy and also adopt a libertarian stance towards capital flows 
would mean having to function under a floating exchange rate regime. 
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Preserving both monetary autonomy and wanting to have a fixed exchange rate 
regime means closed financial markets. 
In the Bretton Woods system one of the three above choices was given. 
As we saw, there was a somewhat flexible but in general relatively fixed 
exchange rate system to exclude ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ practices in the future. 
Therefore, the choice that was now left according to the Mundell-Fleming model 
was between monetary independence and free movement of capital. The 
preservation of monetary independence would secure that monetary policy 
would at least be able to fulfill its subsidiary role under Keynesian 
macroeconomics. Monetary policy could be used as a secondary tool of demand 
management or as a tool to monetize public debt, which would greatly ease the 
application of expansionary fiscal policies209. Therefore, free movement of 
capital would come to be sacrificed within the Bretton Woods system to ensure 
that countercyclical macroeconomic policies would enjoy a complete arsenal of 
fiscal and monetary weapons.  
Keynes epitomized the above logic by stating that ‘the whole 
management of the domestic economy depends upon being free to have the 
appropriate rate of interest without reference to the rates prevailing elsewhere in 
the world; capital control is a corollary to this’210. Accordingly, Article VI sec. 3 
of the Bretton Woods Agreement stated that ‘members may exercise such 
controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements’. 
Here is how, according to the Mundell-Fleming model, the 
effectiveness of a state’s monetary policy is mitigated in the presence of fixed 
exchange rates and international capital mobility. Suppose that within the scope 
of a general effort to fight a recession, there is an interest rate decrease on behalf 
of the central bank to complement the expansionary fiscal measures. In presence 
of these low interest rates, if capital is free to move, it would be induced to flow 
out of the country in search of countries with higher interest rates, where the 
profit for the capital’s usage can be higher. This movement of funds out of the 
country means that demand for this country’s currency reduces. It follows that 
the exchange rate of the country’s currency will reduce as well. If the country 
though has pledged to keep a fixed exchange rate, its central bank would have to 
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use its foreign exchange reserves to buy back its own currency in order to create 
demand for the country’s currency. This buyback removes currency units 
(money) from the markets, thus resulting in an effective reduction in the money 
supply. Such a monetary contraction means that less money is available to 
lenders and borrowers and thus interest rates will inevitably rise again. The rise 
in the interest rates will cancel the earlier lowering; the easing of credit on 
behalf of the central bank would thus not be effective because of the 
combination of fixed exchange rates and capital mobility. 
 Thus, neither fiscal policy –which would be impaired if there could be 
no possibility for public debt monetization through monetary measures- nor 
monetary policy could be pursued independently by the government because of 
the threat of arbitrary capital outflows. Therefore, countercyclical activist 
macroeconomic policy on behalf of the states could not be obtained without 
certain controls on capital outflows. 
International capital mobility would not only impair a government’s 
ability to fight recessions. Capital flight in particular could impose an undue 
balance of payments constraint on domestic macroeconomic objectives211 by 
compromising a country’s effort to build and maintain a welfare state. The 
postwar settlement between workers and employers, especially in Europe, was 
the creation of the welfare state, which was thus viewed as a way of maintaining 
social peace212. By keeping capital in the domestic economy the taxation of 
wealth and interest income would be facilitated in order for the state to gain 
revenues and gather the resources necessary to run the welfare state. Otherwise, 
as the Bretton Woods Agreement’s architects were afraid, capital would be 
induced to flow out of the country, in order to escape the burdens of the welfare 
state and would thus halt the government’s desire to promote policies of growth 
and employment213.  
The fact that the Bretton Woods system wanted to preserve the 
unfettered ability of the states to fine-tune their economies without external 
constraints was also evident by the fact that even, when a state proposed a 
revaluation or devaluation exceeding 10% of the initial par value in order to 
correct a fundamental disequilibrium in its balance of payments, the IMF could 
not object to the proposed change on the grounds that there were other ways to 
restore the equilibrium, such as deflationary policies etc. [Article IV, Section 
5(f)]. 
 
2.2.2. The mechanics of capital controls  
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The non-preference for free capital movement should not trick us into 
believing that the Bretton Woods system promoted isolationism as a recipe for 
the avoidance of contagious crises. To the contrary, the Bretton Woods 
Agreement strived to promote international trade, as its architects believed that 
the latter would have a stabilizing function in the postwar world214.  
To understand how the agreement managed on the one hand to allow 
restrictions on the free movement of capital for the sake of not impairing the 
effectiveness of governmental activist policies and on the other hand to 
encourage multilateral international trade we need to have an insight into how a 
country’s balance of payments works.  
 
 
2.2.2.1. Current and capital account 
A sovereign’s balance of payments sheet records all transactions 
between the country and the rest of the world215. All payments that go out to 
foreigners and all payments that come into the country from foreigners are 
depicted there. The sheet comprises of two parts: the current account part and 
the capital account part. In the current account part the cross-border trade, in 
which the country is engaged, is recorded. In the capital account part the cross-
border sales and purchases of assets are depicted.  
To be more precise, in the current account part a country records all its 
receipts due to goods exported to foreigners and all the payments it made to 
import goods from foreigners216. Apart from transactions pertaining to exported 
goods and imported goods the current account part shows also receipts due to 
service exports and payments attributable to service imports. Finally, current 
account records so-called ‘factor income’, i.e. a payment in exchange for the use 
of physical capital or the use of the principal on a loan217. Thus, sums that the 
country’s residents received from foreigners as interest for a loan they had 
extended or as a dividend for a share they had acquired and payments by the 
country’s residents to foreigners that are classified as interest and dividend all 
belong to the current account.  
A capital account covers all transactions associated with change of 
ownership in international financial assets and liabilities218. All private and 
public capital transfers belong here; direct investments in foreign firms from 
residents, direct investments in domestic firms from foreigners, acquisition of 
foreign securities by residents, acquisition of domestic securities by foreigners, 
lending to foreigners, borrowing from foreigners etc. 
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A country’s capital account balance must equal and be opposite in sign 
from its current account balance219. A deficit in the current account is always 
accompanied by an equal surplus in the capital account and vice versa220. This is 
because a country that imports more goods and services than it exports (i.e. 
current account deficit) must pay for those extra imports by selling assets or 
borrowing money (i.e. capital account surplus).  
  Under the Bretton Woods Agreement states undertook the legal 
obligation not to impose –without the approval of the IMF- restrictions on the 
making of payments and transfers for current international transactions (Art. 
VIII Sec. 2). That meant that currencies were to be convertible if a resident or a 
foreigner wanted to buy foreign or domestic exchange respectively for the 
purpose of effectuating a transaction that would be then recorded on the current 
account221. Current account convertibility was a prerequisite for international 
trade to take place and thus the states, which were parties to the agreement, were 
given a grace period of five years after the establishment of the IMF to liberalize 
their current accounts222. 
While current accounts had to be liberalized and exchange controls 
were not to be applied, the same did not apply to capital accounts. Under Article 
VI it rested within the state’s own discretion to implement policies that were 
designed to limit or redirect capital account transactions.  
Capital controls were limiting asset transactions either through price 
mechanisms (mainly taxes) or through quantity controls, i.e. quotas or explicit 
prohibitions223. In a world of fixed exchanged rates, such capital controls could 
be either outward -i.e. restricting capital outflows- designed to empower a weak 
currency or inward -i.e. restricting capital inflows- to alleviate the pressures 
towards appreciation of the currency224. For example, Britain consistently 
employed outward controls to prop up a weak sterling, while during the same 
era Germany employed inward controls to protect the deutsche mark from 
appreciation, which would compromise Germany’s export-led development 
strategy225. 
 
2.2.2.2. The example of US capital controls 
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Two interesting examples of outward capital controls and also of the 
reasons why a sovereign might want to introduce them were the US interest 
equalization tax (‘IET’) that survived for about a decade, from 1963-1974 and 
the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program (‘VFCR’) introduced in 1965 
and repealed in 1973.  
Since the days of the Korean War the US was experiencing a balance of 
payments deficit problem226. A country’s balance of payments is the sum of the 
current account balance and the capital account balance; it thus indicates the 
summary of all economic transactions between a country and the rest of the 
world for a given period of time227.  
The US had a trade surplus in these years, which meant that it had a 
current account surplus; it had though a capital account deficit, whose absolute 
number exceeded the current account surplus. This ensued from the fact that the 
trade surplus did not offset the private demand for foreign assets228. That meant 
that the US was sending abroad more dollars than it received from its exports.  
This was due to the fact that after the end of World War II there was a 
dollar shortage in the world. European nations had to repay their wartime loans 
and needed liquidity to import commodities and energy that would help them 
reconstruct. International liquidity under the Bretton Woods system could be 
provided only by the issuance of dollars, which were the global reserve –as they 
were convertible into gold- and trading currency. As a glοbal reserve currency, 
the US dollar was essential, since it would first be used by other nations’ central 
banks’ as their main constituent of foreign exchange reserves, which would get 
to be used in the markets if the domestic currency had to be stabilized and 
second it was the currency, in which many products and commodities traded in 
the international market were priced. 
 As Europe was a net importer at the time, no dollars were flowing in to 
help the European nations achieve those goals229. In order not to endanger the 
infant postwar economic and political stability the US decided to flood the world 
economy with dollars230. The European Recovery Program -more commonly 
known as the ‘Marshall Plan’-, i.e. US aid to Europe, US military spending 
abroad within the scope of the Korean War and the maintenance of US military 
troops in Germany and both governmental and private US foreign direct 
investment in Europe and Japan created a balance of payments deficit that 
reached $3.7bn in 1959231. 
                                                
226 Thomas Zoumaras, Plugging the Dike, in JOHN F. KENNEDY AND EUROPE (D. BRINKLEY & R. 
GRIFFINS, EDS.) (1999), 173 
227 ROBERT MITCHELL STERN, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: THEORY & ECONOMIC POLICY (2007), 1 
228 Neely, supra note 207, 24 
229 HERMAN VAN DER WEE, PROSPERITY AND UPHEAVAL: THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1945-1980 (1986), 42-
43 
230 MARK RANDAL BRAWLEY, POWER, MONEY AND TRADE: DECISIONS THAT SHAPE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS (2005), 320 
231 Zoumaras, supra note 226, 173 
CORPORATE LAW & ECONOMIC STAGNATION 
 
This dollar glut made the global economy starting to have less 
confidence in the ability of the US to convert the dollar into gold. The dollar 
growth was less than the gold reserves growth in Fort Knox232 and it was thus 
commonly believed that the dollar was overvalued. It will be shown later in this 
Chapter (3.1) that as these misgivings escalated, the Bretton Woods system 
collapsed with the closing of the ‘gold window’ by President Nixon. 
 A country in the position of the US would theoretically have certain 
policy alternatives to correct this balance of payments deficit and thus close the 
dollar gap. For instance, it could devalue the currency to make it more expensive 
for Americans to buy foreign goods, services and assets; the current account 
would mark a greater surplus as the US would export more and import less. But, 
this would compromise the exchange rate stability of the Bretton Woods system. 
In addition to this, the Fed (the US central bank) could reduce the money supply 
and thus create deflation; domestic goods, services and assets would become 
cheaper, foreign goods, services and assets would become more expensive and 
thus the reduced demand for foreign goods and assets would eliminate the 
balance of payments deficit. The contraction in the money supply though would 
reduce domestic demand and employment, which has highly undesirable in 
these Keynesian years. Furthermore, again the exchange rate would be affected 
and under Bretton Woods that wasn’t an option.  
The only option that seemed to work in order to maintain the fixed 
exchange rate and not affect the money supply was to restrict capital outflows 
by the introduction of an outward capital control. Governmental dollars would 
keep flying out of the country to support US foreign policy, but private dollars 
would have to stay inside the US to restore the deficit in the balance of 
payments.  
US investors were attracted by the high interest rates prevailing in 
continental Europe. The Continent did not have deep capital markets yet and 
thus there was great demand for the limited capital funds that existed, which 
made the latter more expensive and thus the rentiers of capital able to charge 
higher interest rates233. The Kennedy administration, thus, opted for 
discouraging US investors from investing their money abroad by introducing the 
IET, a tax scheme, according to which interest profit and capital gains realized 
on foreign assets would be taxed at high rates. It was hoped that this would 
reduce direct capital outflows. The Johnson administration in the same line of 
policy introduced the VFCR that called banks to voluntarily refrain from 
extending credit to foreigners234. In response, the Fed issued some guidelines to 
US commercial banks asking them to keep the amount of foreign lending in 
1965 to 105% of the level of 1964235. 
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3. The deconstruction of the Golden Age: The breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system 
 
3.1. The Deutsche mark floating and the ‘Nixon Shock’: The fulfillment of 
the ‘Triffin Dilemma’ prophecy  
 
The US balance of payments deficit reduced for three years in a row 
(1964-1966)236, not so much because of the IET –as some clever international 
tax planning helped US investors channel their gains in countries like Canada 
that were exempted from the tax- but because of short-run high interest rates that 
attracted capital into the US237. But any surpluses in the private balance of 
payments were swallowed up by the dollar outflow originating from the US 
government that had to send an increasing amount of dollars abroad to finance 
the military operations in Vietnam. Thus, the US kept running a balance of 
payments deficit and since the late 1960s it was also moving from a trade 
surplus to a trade deficit. In 1971 the US marked its first trade deficit since 
1893238. The trade deficit was largely due to a boost in US demand caused by 
short-term monetary stimulus that the government hoped would help fight the 
1969-1970 recession239, which in turn ensued by fiscal tightening and stringent 
monetary policies deemed necessary to tide up the fiscal mess and the inflation 
the Vietnam war was causing.  
A US trade deficit meant more imports and hence more dollars ending 
up abroad. At the same time US monetary expansion in 1970-1971240 combined 
with low interest rates in the US resulted in more capital flowing abroad and 
ending up mainly in the Federal Republic of Germany (a.k.a. West Germany) 
deteriorating the inflationary pressures in a country with a permanent surplus in 
its current account and high rates of growth241. Germany was considering for a 
while a revaluation of the mark, which was thought it would help fight inflation 
by slowing down the German exports, but there would be political costs by such 
a decision242. A revaluation would also help reduce the times the intervention 
point for the Bundesbank would be reached and thus as the latter would get to 
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sell less marks in the foreign exchange market the money supply would stop 
expanding so fast.  
Finally, in May 1971 Germany decided not to observe its obligations 
under the Bretton Woods Agreement to take appropriate measures to preserve 
the trading of its currency in its territory within the ±1% margin and thus 
suspended official exchange market operations. The deutsche mark floated and 
the determination of its relative value was left to the forces of supply and 
demand243. Apparently, Germany’s decision was in breach of Article IV of the 
Agreement and the IMF could apply sanctions, such as declaring Germany 
ineligible to use its funds or require her to withdraw from the IMF244. However, 
the IMF did not exert its discretion to apply sanctions against Canada and 
Mexico, when they in 1950 and 1948 respectively floated their currencies, so it 
wasn’t expected to do it in Germany’s case245. 
In the meantime, the continuation of the dollar glut led to a further 
erosion of confidence in the dollar, as it was now clear that it was overvalued 
compared to gold. In 1970 the US gold reserves could cover 55% of the 
liabilities the US had undertaken vis-à-vis foreign central banks by pledging to 
convert dollars into gold for $35/ounce and in 1971 the gold coverage went 
down to 22%246.  The figures led to a run on US gold as France moved to 
redeem 191$ million in gold and Switzerland another 50$ million247. In 
response, on the 15th of August 1971 President Nixon announced that it had 
directed the Secretary of the Treasury to suspend convertibility of the dollar into 
gold sending out waves of shock to the international economic community: the 
‘Nixon Shock’248. 
While Nixon’s televised presidential address per se on an August 
Sunday evening in 1971 shocked foreign monetary officers, as no one outside 
the White House –or, for the sake of accuracy, Camp David- was expecting such 
a decision would be made, the fact that the Bretton Woods monetary order 
would reach this state at some point in time did not come as a surprise to 
knowledgeable economists. This is because back in 1959 a Belgian-American 
economist, Robert Triffin, testified before the US Congress on the long-run 
prospects of the Bretton Woods monetary system concluding that there was a 
fundamental internal contradiction in the way it was designed249.  
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The problem was onwards coined as the ‘Triffin Dilemma’ and is 
summarized in the ascertainment that there was a conflict between the short-
term domestic macroeconomic policies that the state issuing the reserve 
currency, i.e. the US, would want to implement and the long-term viability of 
the global economy. The increase in demand for international liquidity could be 
satisfied only if more of the reserve currency was issued and supplied to the 
world. That meant though that the US would have to keep on running a balance 
of payments deficit, which would lead to the reduction of the gold coverage of 
the dollar and gradually to the erosion of the confidence in the reserve currency. 
However, if the US wanted to prevent confidence in the dollar from being lost 
and opted for tiding up the balance of payments deficit, it would have to tighten 
its monetary policy, which would result in the international community losing its 
largest source of additions to reserves. A reserve shortage would ensue and the 
global economy would be thrown in a deflationary spiral again. We now know 
that in the end, the US chose to push the monetary accelerator and a run on the 
dollar emerged.    
 
 
3.2. The causality relationship between the demise of Bretton Woods and 
the oil shocks of the 1970s 
 
3.2.1. The Smithsonian Agreement, the ‘Snake’ and the ‘dirty float’ 
 
The Nixon shock is commonly attributed with ending the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates. From a legal point of view US’s 
unilateral suspension of the external convertibility of the dollar into gold did not 
terminate the Bretton Woods Agreement nor did it suspend its validity or 
signified US’s withdrawal from it according to the rules of public international 
law. The Bretton Woods Agreement was still valid and enforceable.  
However, the US breached its obligations under the Agreement and 
gave a legal justification to other state-parties to refrain from observing some of 
their obligations as well. To understand this we need first to identify what was 
the obligation that the US breached. Contrary to what most would expect, the 
violation was not the fact that the US suspended its willingness to convert 
dollars into gold. As it was explained above, under Article IV Section 4 this was 
only one of the appropriate measures that a country could take to observe its 
exchange rate stability obligation and it was a voluntary undertaking on behalf 
of the US250. If the US despite the suspension of convertibility stood ready to 
intervene through the Fed’s agents in the exchange markets in order to maintain 
dollar’s relative par value vis-à-vis other currencies, then there would be no 
breach whatsoever. Indeed, there was nothing in Nixon’s presidential address 
that suggested that the US was not willing to intervene in the exchange 
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markets251. However, the Secretary of the Treasury in a press conference that he 
gave the very next day announced that the US had no plans to even intervene in 
the market to keep the dollar within the margins of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement252. This was the moment of breach of the agreement on behalf of the 
US. 
After that move by the US the other states-parties to the Bretton Woods 
Agreement were entitled on the basis of established principles –which are rules 
of public international law deriving from custom- not to intervene in the 
exchange market in order to ensure that transactions between their own 
currencies and the dollar were kept within the agreement’s margins253. The 
principle was that each state was obliged to maintain the value of its currency 
and this burden could not be transferred to other states254. Therefore, after some 
costly initial efforts on behalf of some states, like Japan, to intervene by 
purchasing dollars, in order to support the old parity between their currency and 
the dollar, soon states remained passive in the exchange markets and the world’s 
major currencies started floating against each other255. The Bretton Woods 
Agreement stopped having practical effect and the world moved from a fixed to 
a flexible exchange rate regime. 
The floating lasted for four months until in December 1971, after a 
multilateral negotiation effort, the ten countries (G-10)256 participating in IMF’s 
General Arrangements to Borrow –an additional source of financing for the 
IMF257- produced an agreement outside the IMF that aspired to revive the par 
value system. This agreement that has come to be known as the ‘Smithsonian 
Agreement’ was followed by an almost identical IMF decision, which would 
temporarily bind the non G-10 IMF members in lieu of the practically ignored 
Bretton Woods Agreement 258. Within the scope of the Smithsonian Agreement 
and the IMF decision most major currencies were revalued while the dollar was 
devalued by 8%. The new permissible margins around the par value of the 
currencies were set at 2.25% compared to the 1% determined by the Bretton 
Woods Agreement and countries undertook the obligation to preserve the 
relative value of their currencies within these new wider margins259.  
But, the Smithsonian Agreement proved to be stillborn and never 
actually culminated to a new Bretton Woods-style agreement under the auspices 
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of the IMF, which would restore the disorder in the international monetary 
system. In early 1973, as the US further devalued the dollar by 10%, it became 
impossible for the states to resist the forces of money speculators that were 
pushing the US dollar even further downwards. Thus, after massive purchases of 
dollars on behalf of some central banks that were hoped to keep the exchange 
rate of their currency vis-à-vis the dollar within the Smithsonian margins, 
interventions were gradually abandoned and all major currencies were floating 
again against the dollar and against each other. The only exception to the ‘dirty 
float’ that ensued were the currencies of the countries of the European Economic 
Community (EEC), which were tied together in 1972 through the Basel 
Agreement (more commonly known as the ‘Snake’); the EEC currencies were 
allowed to fluctuate within ±2.25% to each other and EEC central banks with 
the help of a new European Monetary Co-operation Fund260 pledged to provide 
one another intervention support for their currencies and no longer in dollars261 
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3.2.2. International reserves accumulation, oil price shocks, inflation and 
current account deficits  
 
The demise of the Bretton Woods system brought more changes to the 
global economy than just the transition from fixed to fluctuating exchange rates. 
As confidence in the dollar eroded in the face of the Nixon shock, the 
devaluation that took place within the scope of the Smithsonian Agreement and 
the ‘dirty float’, private households, financial institutions and corporations 
worldwide wanted to shift their assets from dollars to other currencies, which 
were appreciating in the new international monetary landscape262.  
The private sector found an eager partner to engage in the currency 
exchange transaction with: the central banks. As the latter were still under the 
obligation before the Nixon shock and during the short-lived Smithsonian 
Agreement to maintain the parities of their currencies vis-à-vis the dollar, they 
were seeking to purchase dollars so as to resist the tide of speculation that 
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Floating Exchange Rates and the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership 
 
The deconstruction of the Bretton Woods system brought on 
a major development that would come to play a role in the 
structural change of investors’ time horizons. As a result of 
the non-observance on behalf of states of the obligation to 
intervene in the currency exchange markets, the world’s 
money markets were privatized, as central banks were 
replaced in their currency relationship-setting role by 
private financial markets. Floating exchange rates created a 
much greater instability and unpredictability in financial 
markets prompting the emergence of a series of hedging 
strategies by investors, among which is the tendency to de-
risk their portfolio by turning around their holdings 
regularly and thus hold on to their investment for shorter 
periods in time. Since long-term investment implies that the 
investor is willing to ride out periods of asset price volatility, 
the more likely such periods become because of 
international macroeconomic factors, the less investors will 
be willing to pursue long-term strategies. 
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pushed the dollar downwards263. As the central banks were purchasing the 
dollars and adding them to their foreign exchange reserves in return for their 
own currency, more of the latter was injected into the domestic economies thus 
increasing the high-powered money.  
As a general rule, foreign reserve accumulation increases the monetary 
base in an economy264. The increase of the monetary base causes through the 
money multiplier –i.e. a process, by which the original amount of fresh funds 
injected by the central bank into the banking system multiply the amount of 
money ‘created’ by banks and lent out to consumers and enterprises265- a 
monetary expansion in an economy, which in turn increases aggregate demand. 
The increase in aggregate demand usually translates in an increase in imported 
products into the country. Considering the time lag between the international 
reserve accumulation and the changes it brings in aggregate demand, the reserve 
growth of the years 1970-1972 might have partially contributed to the current 
account deficits that many countries developed in the years 1973-1974266. 
However, the main causal factor in the aforementioned current account 
deficits was the dramatic increase in oil prices that occurred during the first half 
of the 1970s. As net oil payments from oil-importing nations to oil-exporting 
countries increased, the current account of the former was pushed to the deficit 
side.  
Contrary to the common perception about the oil shock of 1974 the 
cause was not merely the use of oil as a political weapon on behalf of the 
OPEC267 countries vis-à-vis the US and other western nations for their support 
to Israel in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973268. It is true that there was a 
20% cutback in the oil supply on behalf of OPEC nations in response to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973 which was reflected in higher oil prices, but the 
true reason behind the dramatic increases in the price of oil are to be found in 
the dollar devaluation that ensued in the post-Nixon shock period.  
Oil contracts were priced in dollars, so as the dollar started devaluating, 
the OPEC nations naturally felt that although they were making the same 
nominal profit per oil barrel as before, their real profit was lower; sales revenues 
were eroded by the inflation of the dollar. Therefore, they concluded the 
Teheran Agreement of 1971 and amended it in 1972 in order to call for an 
increase of 8.49% in the posted price of oil, which corresponded to the 
analogous rise of the price of gold vis-à-vis the dollar269. As the US dollar 
further devalued during the ‘dirty float’ in the last third quarters of 1973, the 
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OPEC nations raised on January 1, 1974 the price of oil barrel from $4.31 to 
$10.11270 to compensate themselves for the devaluation; a 300% increase 
compared to the pre-1973 price levels271.  
 
3.3. Financing the current account deficits: Petrodollar recycling and 
capital account liberalization 
 
The oil shock of 1974 led oil-importing countries to move from a 
current account surplus to a current account deficit. The current account of the 
OECD countries moved from a $10.5bn surplus in 1973 to a $26bn deficit in 
1974272. Even those export nations, such as Germany, that resisted the oil spikes 
of the immediate post-Bretton Woods years were not able to resist the oil shock 
of 1979273, which was caused by cutbacks in the world oil supply due to the 
Iranian Revolution. While in 1978 the price of crude oil per barrel was at 
$13.66, in 1979 it skyrocketed to $30.73 and only came back to the 1978 levels 
in 1988274. The persistence of high prices over most of the 1980s was due to a 
combination of factors including the 1980 to 1988 war between Iran and Iraq, 
which greatly disrupted oil exports, but also the placement of greater quantities 
of oil by oil-exporting countries on the spot market, where prices were 
vulnerable to speculation and thus upward pressures275. 
While oil-importing nations were accumulating current account deficits, 
oil-exporting nations were having excessive current account surpluses. This 
situation laid the foundations for the emergence of a new spontaneous global 
surplus recycling mechanism (‘GSRM’)276, much like the one that appeared in 
the first postwar decades were the US was recycling its trade surpluses by 
exporting capital to Europe and Japan. Only that in this new GSRM the US 
along with other nations was standing on the receiving side of the surpluses. As 
it will become evident in the next section, this reversal in the flow of the surplus 
recycling was one of the factors that brought about the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership. 
The new GSRM, which I will call the ‘Petrodollar Recycling 
Mechanism’ (‘PRM’), was a means of financing the current account deficits 
through the channeling of the OPEC countries’ surpluses to the oil-importing 
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countries. While the balance of payments financing during the Bretton Woods 
era was done mainly by the IMF and only 1/3 of the financing was intermediated 
by private financial institutions, the post-1974 balance of payments financing 
was predominantly done through capital inflows by the private credit markets277. 
As the aggregate amount of balance of deficits that ensued from the oil shock of 
1974 could not be financed by the IMF despite the set up by the latter of ad hoc 
oil facilities and as at the same time the OPEC countries could not absorb by 
means of investment in their domestic economies the stock of petrodollars that 
was accumulated by their oil exports, the OPEC countries were looking for 
opportunities abroad278. As international supply of petrodollars by oil-exporting 
countries and demand for capital inflows by oil-importing countries met, the 
PRM ensued; a self-equilibrating adjustment of the balance of payments 
problem. 
But there was one obstacle to the PRM functioning. The existent capital 
controls that countries had imposed under the discretion given to them by the 
Bretton Woods Agreement. Therefore, if countries wanted to finance their 
current account deficits they would have to lift capital controls, particularly 
those that limited capital inflows. Consequently, the need for financing the 
current account deficit became the dominant force behind the trend towards 
capital account liberalization that started in 1974 and culminated in the early 
1990s. 
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4. The macroeconomic institutions of the post-Bretton Woods world 
 
4.1. The capital account liberalization movement 
 
While, as it was shown in Section 2.2, capital controls were an essential 
device of the postwar macroeconomic management, the urge to finance current 
account deficits initiated an era of policies of capital decontrol across a great 
number of industrial states between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. 
However, while the necessity to finance current account deficits was the catalyst 
for the abolishment of the prohibition on capital inflows, it is less obvious how 
the monetary and commodities crisis of the 1970s prompted states to liberalize 
capital outflows. This can only be shown by means of country-specific studies, 
The Petrodollar Recycling Mechanism and the Great 
Reversal in Shareholdership 
 
Without the private financial institutions (mainly 
commercial and investment banks) that intermediated 
between the oil-exporting and oil-importing nations in the 
1970s, the governments of the latter nations would not 
have been able to manage the trade deficits that the oil 
spikes were causing. These financial institutions were 
actually underwriting huge quantities of government bonds, 
ensuring to the governments of the oil-importing states the 
funds that they needed to cope with the increased fiscal 
exigencies of the Great Stagflation (i.e. an era of high 
inflation and slow growth). As a result of the fees these 
financial institutions were receiving as underwriters and 
intermediaries, they accumulated huge quantities of funds, 
which allowed them to become major investors in the post-
Bretton Woods equity markets, which are thus 
characterized by a growing percentage of institutional 
ownership of stock. Growing institutional ownership of 
stock marks the divorce between the decision to buy stocks 
from the decision of which shares to buy; this decision is 
increasingly made through models that favor diversification 
(modern portfolio theory) and that are not based on specific 
flesh-and-bone-collected information that is conducive to 
produce a long-term perspective on the equity position in a 
specific firm.  
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which had already liberalized capital inflows before the 1970s crisis and in the 
wake or aftermath of the Bretton Woods deconstruction were forced to lift 
outward capital controls as well.  
Given that the demise of the capital controls may be causally linked to 
the reversal in the time-horizons of shareholdership, it is worth looking at the 
details of the capital account liberalization movement at this stage of the study. 
 
4.1.1. The demise of capital controls in the US 
 
The outward capital controls that the US introduced in the 1960s, 
mainly the IET and the VFCR, resulted in many US banks shifting foreign 
operations to their offshore branches, in order to avoid the reach of US 
regulatory authorities279. US banks’ foreign subsidiaries’ activities in Europe 
reinforced the so-called ‘Eurocurrency’ or ‘Eurodollar’ market, the market in 
which European banks were extending financing denominated in dollars. In 
addition to this, as the foreign subsidiaries of US non-financial corporations 
were decreasingly able to secure financing directly from the domestic offices of 
US banks, they increasingly turned to the Eurocurrency market contributing to 
its further expansion280. 
Therefore, the 1974 OPEC surpluses found the Eurocurrency market in 
its heyday and the OPEC countries chose to place their liquidity there mainly in 
short-term deposits281. The banks of the Eurocurrency market performed their 
maturity transformation function by lending out for the medium-term the 
deposited OPEC funds to the public sector in countries with balance of 
payments deficits. The extensive network of US banks’ subsidiaries, such as 
Citibank, Chase Manhattan or Morgan Guaranty in the Eurocurrency market 
channeled a large proportion of the funds into the domestic US capital markets 
and as capital was flowing inside the US the IET and VFCR outward capital 
controls were repealed282 giving US investors again a way out from the interest 
ceilings on deposits that the Fed had imposed under Regulation Q (see Section 
5.5.1). 
The US was able to repeal first out of all nations its capital controls, as 
it could rely on the sophistication of the US-owned financial intermediaries that 
were operating abroad in order to channel petrodollars into Wall Street. Now 
that capital was flowing in, US banks were left free again to engage in cross-
border financial activities thus contributing to the international financial 
integration that started in the 1970s. 
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4.1.2. The demise of capital controls in the UK 
 
It was mainly via the UK that US banks were trying to do business 
abroad and escape the US outward capital controls. While the number of foreign 
banks in London was 113 in 1967, it rose to 349 in 1974 and most of them were 
actually US-controlled283.  With the presence of the US banks London became 
the hub of the ‘Eurocurrency’ market in the midst of the PRM.  
The British economy stood to benefit from the PRM, as the channeling 
of OPEC funds into the UK would help finance the country’s trade deficit, 
which was at the level of £5.5bn in 1974 compared to only a £2.5bn deficit in 
1973284. So, in 1974 $6bn OPEC funds flew in the UK and sterling became a 
petrocurrency with $2.5bn OPEC deposits denominated in sterling. But, could 
these inflows instead of being just a necessary liquidity injection into the British 
economy, mark the beginning of an upward pressure to the sterling that could 
force the UK to liberalize its capital account entirely? 
 At the same time that London was receiving OPEC funds, the sterling 
assets of some oil exporting countries, particularly of those that had traditional 
ties with the former British Empire, such as Nigeria and Kuwait, marked a 
dramatic increase amidst the oil price hikes, since a proportion of oil contract 
payments was denominated in sterling,285. But, demand for sterling rose even 
more when the UK-based US banks started financing the North Sea oil and gas 
exploration and expectations were created that the UK would soon become an 
oil-producing nation286. 
Indeed, these developments resulted in the sterling receiving upward 
pressure, thus making British products less competitive in the international trade 
arena287. Between 1973 and 1974 the loss in exports was about 3.5%288 and that 
did not serve well the new Labour Government’s plans for the development of a 
state-led ‘industrial strategy’289.  
However, at the same time Britain was struggling with the inflation that 
the oil hikes-spurred commodity boom had caused. Harold Wilson’s 
Government’s unwillingness to cut down public spending did not help to curb 
these inflationary pressures290. Thus, money markets’ confidence in the British 
Government’s policies decreased and in turn the pressure on the sterling 
reversed, as the currency started depreciating. This was a very unpleasant 
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development, since inflation and exchange rate are negatively correlated; when 
the currency depreciates inflation rises and vice-versa291. A downward spiral 
emerged, where inflation fears prompted investors to divest from the sterling 
and the divestment itself was causing even more inflation. Once the sterling 
broke the $2.00 barrier in March 1976, a run on the sterling occurred and despite 
Bank of England’s intervention in the currency markets, sterling’s value in June 
1976 was already at $1.70292.  
In the aftermath of the run on its currency, the UK could either wait for 
the market sentiment regarding the sterling to reverse or it could take action by 
bolstering the reserves position and restore confidence in its currency. It decided 
to follow the latter route and in June 1976 the G10 countries along with 
Switzerland and the Bank for International Settlements (‘BIS’) provided a 
$5.3bn standby credit to the Bank of England. Nonetheless, downward pressure 
to the sterling continued and in November 1976 a loan to the British 
Government from the IMF started being negotiated, as the risk that the G10-
scheme lenders would not be repaid at the maturity of the loan in December 
1976 was viewed as realistic293. 
Negotiations with the IMF resulted in a stand-by arrangement of $3.9bn 
to the UK, almost immediately after which the sterling started appreciating 
again. The total appreciation is also to be attributed to the start of the North Sea 
oil exploitation in 1977294. Oil companies were expected to increase demand for 
sterling, as they would require the currency to pay for tax and royalties, so 
money investors saw the sterling as a good investment and demand for it 
increased. 
 In order for the appreciation not to harm the British exports, the Bank 
of England attempted to intervene again by selling pounds, but the intervention 
increased the inflationary pressure on the British economy and thus in October 
1977 the sterling was allowed to float freely295. 
The need to alleviate the inflationary pressure on the British economy, 
as well as the fact that starting from 1978 the UK had a current account surplus, 
created a tendency to dismantle the UK capital control apparatus. British banks 
had the tendency to invest overseas, so the Government could take advantage of 
this and let money flow out of the country, thus relaxing the inflationary 
pressure. Moreover, capital outflows would not play their destabilizing role any 
more by harming the balance of payments position, as the UK was a current 
account surplus country now and there was no urgent need to lock funds inside 
the country, so as to finance a deficit.  
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Thus, after the Conservatives won the elections of 1979, one of the first 
initiatives the Thatcher Government took was to progressively relax capital 
controls, so as to introduce some downward pressure on the sterling rate296. In 
June 1979 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced its intention to liberalize 
outward direct investment gradually with the pace of relaxation depending on 
sterling’s strength297 and in October 1979 the UK had completely liberalized its 
capital account. 
 
4.1.3. The demise of capital controls in Germany 
 
Germany was facing different challenges at the macroeconomic level 
compared to the US and the UK during the Bretton Woods and the early post-
Bretton Woods era, so it followed a different route regarding its capital controls 
regulation, which, nonetheless, led to the same result: that of complete capital 
account liberalization. 
From the early 1950s Germany started developing a current account 
surplus. Capital outflows would, therefore, not harm its balance of payments 
position, so contrarily to other countries it had no reason to install severe 
outward capital controls. Indeed, already from 1958 export of capital from 
Germany was permitted without authorization, as currency convertibility was 
restored both for current account and capital account transactions298.  
The discussion in Germany during the Bretton Woods period and the 
transition years of the 1970s was around the perseverance or demise of inward 
capital controls. German policy-makers were very reluctant in lifting inward 
capital controls, as the ‘holy grail’ of economic policy in post-war Germany was 
price stability and the inflow of capital into the Federal Republic was thought 
that it would import inflation. Although the presence of capital controls 
coincided with the Keynesian perception, whose imprint was omnipresent in the 
macroeconomic institutions of the Bretton Woods world, capital controls in the 
Federal Republic were not of Keynesian inspiration, but rather of a German-
specific, ‘ordo-liberal’ form of monetarism299. 
‘Ordo-liberalismus’ emerged from the anti-statist Freiburg School of 
the 1930s and 1940s that advocated for a ‘social market economy’ 
(Sozialemarktwirtschaft), where the state would not be interventionist, but 
would foster the conditions that would allow the stability that the private 
business sector needs to flourish300. Keynesian reflationary policies were 
rejected by German ordo-liberals, as they would increase inflation.  
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The reason why the Germans had a special sensitivity to inflation was 
the bitter experience of the Weimar Republic’s hyperinflation of the early 1920s, 
which wreaked havoc on the inter-war German economy and was thought of as 
partially responsible for the development of a public sentiment that favored the 
gradual rise of National Socialism to power301.  The German government 
financed its military efforts during World War I by borrowing instead of by 
introducing taxes and the German Reichsbank (the central bank of the era) 
helped in the financing effort by monetizing the public debt, thus flooding the 
economy with printed Papiermarks, which thus quickly started depreciating302.  
Since then the wider public in Germany believed in the critical 
importance of monetary stability, a precondition of which was thought to be the 
central bank’s independence from an inflation-prone government303; an 
independence that gained legal status in the Bundesbank Act of 1957304. 
The Bundesbank (the Federal Republic’s central bank) had a difficult 
task in fending off the upward pressures on the mark, as Germany was a trade 
surplus country during the Bretton Woods era and thus demand for its currency 
was high. To alleviate these pressures the Bundesbank intervened by selling 
marks. Therefore, the intervention per se was causing inflation. Now, if the 
Bundesbank wanted to eliminate this source of inflation, it could revalue the 
mark, so that its selling intervention wouldn’t be necessary any more305. But, a 
revaluation of the mark would harm German products’ competitiveness and thus 
harm Germany’s export-led growth strategy. Therefore, the only option left was 
to keep in place the prohibition on capital inflows306.  
Bundesbank’s resistance to the revaluation of the mark broke down in 
1969 and inward capital controls were thus lifted. But they were introduced 
again in 1971, as the mark started appreciating after massive inflows into the 
Federal Republic from the US that was experiencing a monetary expansion (see 
Section 3.1.)307. 
A few years later, in 1974, after the first oil shock Germany remained a 
surplus country. Thus, prima facie it had no reason to relax inward capital 
controls in order to finance a trade deficit through capital inflows. However, 
from 1973 onwards with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement the 
German mark was floating vis-à-vis the dollar. That meant that the Bundesbank 
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would not have to intervene any more in the foreign exchange market by selling 
marks, thus expanding the money supply and generating inflation. As one source 
of inflation was eliminated, capital inflows started seeming to be less 
threatening. And indeed after the second oil shock in 1979 capital inflows were 
perceived not only to be less threatening, but actually necessary, as Germany 
turned from a DM 17.5bn surplus in 1978 to a DM 10.5bn deficit in 1979 and 
required a source of deficit finance308. Faced with this challenge the Bundesbank 
had no other option but to completely liberalize the capital account in 1981 and 
allow Germany to benefit from the PRM. 
 
4.1.4. The demise of capital controls in France 
 
The economic boom that France experienced during the Golden Age is 
to a significant extent attributable to an idiosyncratic French model of 
development that was established during the French Fourth Republic (1946-
1958) and that was greatly influenced by the ideology of the French Resistance 
during the occupation of France by the Axis powers in World War II309.  
The spirit of the French Resistance favored the adoption of national 
economic planning310 and the French Administration came up with the first plan 
to reconstruct and modernize the economy in 1946 with the initiator being Jean 
Monnet (‘Monnet Plan’)311. The French policymakers gradually developed a 
model of ‘state-led developmentalism’, where an interventionist state was using 
subsidies and subsidized credits in order to create well-capitalized ‘national 
champion’ firms that could withstand international competition and excel in 
international trade, which was continuously deepening during the Golden Age as 
a result of the GATT negotiating rounds of Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), 
Torquay (1951), Geneva (1956), Dillon (1960-61) that contributed to the 
reduction of tariff barriers and of the Kennedy round (1964-67) that aspired to 
address non-tariff barriers312. These policies were reinforced in the early years of 
the French Fifth Republic (1958-) as a result of de Gaulle’s ‘politics of 
grandeur’. 
The developmental policy philosophy aimed to promote investment 
over price stability313; according to the Monnet Plan productive investment was 
to be promoted ‘at all costs’314. For this purpose a series of public and 
semipublic lending institutions were set up to provide credit to the French 
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industry. The seemingly endless availability of state-sponsored credit to French 
firms turned France into an ‘overdraft economy’. An overdraft economy is one, 
where economic agents have assured borrowing power; an economy where 
economic agents are susceptible to a variation of the ‘soft budgets constraints’ 
syndrome, which existed in socialist economies, where the state could not 
commit not to finance a failing firm315. In an overdraft economy it is difficult for 
the monetary authorities to control the growth of credit and implement monetary 
policy316 with the result being the development of an inflationary bias, as the one 
that characterized France during the Bretton Woods and the early years of the 
post-Bretton Woods era. 
Here is why a so-called ‘overdraft economy’, such as the one that 
existed in France317, has an inherent tendency to inflation: In textbook economic 
theory, when demand for credit increases because of an increase in overall 
economic activity, the price of credit increases too, so that eventually demand 
for credit levels off. This is a market mechanism that slows down monetary 
expansion and thus combats inflation. Now in an overdraft economy, where the 
conviction among economic agents exist that borrowing power is assured, an 
increase in the price of credit will be dealt with by economic agents through 
increased borrowing on their behalf; after all, there is confidence among debtors 
that they will be able to roll over the more expensive debt that they take on. 
Thus, an overdraft economy possesses no market mechanism to slow down 
monetary expansion318. 
The inflationary bias of the French economy created a persistent 
downward pressure on the French franc and a congenital foreign exchange 
reserve shortage319. This led to outward capital controls being present at almost 
all times and capital inflows prohibited only in extreme circumstances, such as 
during the dollar crisis in 1971. However, the tightening of exchange controls 
was particularly acute following periods of fiscal and monetary expansion, such 
as in 1958 during the Algerian War and after the events of May 1968, which 
were increasing the downward pressure on the franc. In other periods, during 
which France was experiencing a strengthening of its balance of payments 
position and a rise on its central bank’s reserves, outward capital controls were 
to some extent relaxed. 
An example of relaxation of outward capital controls was the 
abolishment in 1962 of the ‘devises-titres’ market, where residents that wanted 
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to invest in foreign securities had to acquire the foreign exchange necessary for 
the transaction from resident sellers of foreign securities at a market-clearing 
rate320. But, the ‘devises-titres’ market was reestablished in 1969 after the events 
of the French May of 1968. 
 President de Gaulle decided to deal with French citizens’ discontent in 
May 1968 by raising wages. This caused inflation that resulted in a flight from 
the franc to the deutsche mark321. In response, the Banque de France intervened 
in the foreign exchange market by purchasing francs, losing about $3bn in 
foreign exchange reserves322. The government considered devaluing the franc, 
but the US feared that this would upset the international monetary system, so it 
orchestrated a $2bn rescue package to address the problem of Banque de 
France’s foreign exchange shortage323. Along with the extension of the rescue 
package outward capital controls were tightened, including the resurrection of 
the ‘devises-titres’ market, to prevent the franc from depreciating even more, as 
short-term capital would flee the country. Eventually though the franc was 
devalued by 11.1% in August 1969324 adding another episode to the 
international monetary crisis of that year, which, as it will be shown below 
(Section 4.2), prompted the initiation of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union, another institution that contributed to the concerted capital account 
liberalization of the post-Bretton Woods era. 
However, as in almost all other countries, it was the demise of the 
Bretton Woods monetary order during the early 1970s that contributed 
decisively to the French abolishment of capital controls. In the case of France, 
though, the causality link between the breakdown of the system of fixed 
exchange rates and the capital account liberalization was not as straightforward 
as in other OECD countries. In general, as it was noted above in Section 3.3. and 
illustrated in Section 4.1.3. through the case of Germany, the depreciation of the 
dollar within the scope of the deconstruction of the Bretton Woods system 
caused the oil crisis that created a current account deficit in oil-importing 
countries, which in turn had to liberalize their inward capital controls regime to 
finance this deficit. In the case of France, which, as we saw, had a relaxed 
approach towards inward capital controls, but a tight policy on capital outflows, 
the causal links between the demise of the Bretton Woods and the liberalization 
of its capital account did not work exactly this way. 
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  The floating exchange regime that followed the Bretton Woods 
system’s deconstruction posed a new challenge for French policymakers: the 
depreciation/inflation spiral.  
Under the regime of fixed exchange rates devaluation of the franc could 
be used as a tool in order to adjust France’s balance of payments position. The 
currency would be devalued and the initial inflation that would emerge from the 
devaluation could be tamed through austerity measures; austerity measures 
would reduce the supply of francs, but this reduction in the money supply would 
not result in the appreciation of the franc in the money market, because the 
Banque de France would stand ready to intervene abiding by its obligation to 
keep the parity of the franc to the other currencies.  
Nevertheless, under the post-Bretton Woods system of floating 
exchange rates, a devaluation of the franc and the subsequent implementation of 
austerity measures to tame inflation would not work. The austerity measures by 
reducing franc’s supply would put uncontrolled upward pressure to the franc 
resulting in an appreciation, which would cancel the realization of the balance of 
payments benefits that were sought within the scope of the earlier 
devaluation325. 
Therefore, the new priority for policymakers was to defend the value of 
the franc on the exchange by all means326; otherwise, no macroeconomic 
adjustment could be made to the changing international commodities trade 
environment. This priority also represented France’s EEC commitment to 
exchange rate stability first on the basis of the ‘Snake’ (1972-1979) and then on 
the basis of the European Monetary System (1979 onwards). 
The tool, to which the French government resorted in 1972 to defend 
the value of the franc, was the infamous encadrement du crédit. It was a tool 
specially designed to deal with the inflationary threat that credit expansion 
posed to the value of the franc. The encadrement essentially meant that financial 
institutions had to deal with quantitative restrictions regarding their outstanding 
loans; if the institutions extended more loans than those allowed and thus 
exceeded the threshold set by the restriction, then the penalty would be an 
increase in their reserve requirements327. In light of these penalties, financial 
institutions were forced to withdraw a portion of their funds from interest-
earning activities328. The encadrement served well at the same time the 
traditional industrial policy of the French State to create ‘national champions’, 
as credit directed to specific sectors, such as export industries, was exempted 
from the limitations and banking institutions could lend to firms of this sector 
without fearing penalties. 
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The high rates of inflation that destabilized the business environment of 
the 1970s led the French administration to act in accordance with the rising 
monetarist spirit of the times329; money supply growth targets were set for every 
year. Apart from the availability of credit, money supply growth also depends on 
deficit spending and on net foreign earnings330. Therefore, the French monetary 
authorities in order not to fall short of the money supply growth targets they had 
set, they were required, apart from fine-tuning the requirements of the 
encadrement, to exercise fiscal conservatism, so as to control deficit spending 
and to identify the right mix of capital controls, so as to manage net foreign 
earnings. 
Although the French authorities did a good job in defending the value 
of the franc, they had less success in fighting inflation. This was attributed to the 
behavioral ramifications that the ‘overdraft economy’ had on economic agents; 
demand for credit could not be reduced easily and therefore credit expansion 
kept inflation rates high. The term ‘overdraft economy’ (économie d’ 
endettement) entered the French vocabulary in 1978 by the writings of two 
Banque de France economists, who thus helped state officials realize what the 
real cause of French inflation was and what had to be done to overcome the 
problem331.  
The structures of the overdraft economy were depriving the French state 
from the ability to implement the rigorous monetary policy that the post-Bretton 
Woods years required332; the monetary targets were also essential from 1979 
onwards, as France was bound by the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the 
European Monetary System that required the franc market exchange rate to 
fluctuate vis-à-vis other European currencies within strict bands333. In light of 
the identification of this problem, the French officials realized that the 
responsibility for allocating credit should be transferred from (semipublic) 
lending institutions to the marketplace, where the market mechanisms would 
level off demand for credit334. This required principally reforms that would lead 
to the strengthening of capital markets in France, which during the Golden Age 
stagnated under the state-led credit system. 
In the early 1980s, as the pressure on the franc mounted, threatening to 
compromise France’s commitment to the EMS, the new Socialist government 
was facing two options: (i) to abolish capital controls and raise the interest rates, 
so as to attract capital into France thus increasing the demand for the franc; and 
(ii) to tighten capital controls, so as to lock capital inside France –thus ensuring 
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that demand for the franc would not decrease substantially- and keep interest 
rates low. The Keynesian spirit of the Socialist government mandated that the 
economy receive a monetary stimulus through low interest rates in order to 
alleviate French residents’ burden in the global recession of the early 1980s due 
to the enduring second oil shock335. Therefore, capital controls were to be 
tightened in order not to sacrifice the goal of exchange rate stability; foreign 
exchange positions of French companies and borrowing in France by 
nonresidents were put under scrutiny336. The monetary stimulus increased 
French demand for imports amidst global recession thus putting France in a  
 
severe current account deficit position. The government was forced to devalue 
the franc and then decided to pursue deflationary monetary and fiscal policies 
and tighten capital controls even further337. 
This is when the need to liberalize finance in order to fight the overdraft 
economy’s inflationary pressures really took momentum. France had to create 
deep and open capital markets to reduce French firms’ over-reliance on bank 
loans; at the same time Mitterand’s government saw the UK financial sector 
growing and feared that the French industry and finance would stay behind, if 
reforms were not pursued towards the direction of establishing Paris as a leading 
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Capital account liberalization and the Great Reversal in 
Corporate Governance 
 
The formal convergence of countries in their approach to 
issues of capital account openness following the emergence of 
current account deficits and other monetary disturbances in 
the late 1970s had the unintended consequence of spurring 
convergence in the functioning of corporations in both 
outsider and insider systems of corporate governance. The 
increased mobility of capital that followed from capital 
account liberalizations provided firms of insider countries 
with the opportunity to raise capital by listing their 
securities in the more developed stock exchanges of the 
outsider countries, but this meant that through the listing 
agreement with the self-regulatory organization that 
provides the stock exchange facility (e.g. NYSE, LSE) the 
firm had to introduce some more outsider-like	   corporate 
governance arrangements.  This led to a convergence by 
contract of corporate governance systems towards the 
institutional logics of shareholder value. 
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financial market338. Indeed, as we saw above under 4.1.2. the UK was 
reorienting its economy towards the provision of (financial) services, as a result 
of both a policy philosophy of Thatcher’s government, but also due to the so-
called ‘Dutch disease’, which hits an economy that turns from oil-importing to 
oil-exporting with the result being the revaluation of its currency and the 
subsequent loss of competitiveness of its manufacturing sector339. 
These two exigencies, one economic and one political, led to the shift of 
French policy in favor of capital mobility; France phased out from 1986 to 1990 
all capital controls abiding at the same time by its obligations that flew from 
Directive 88/361/EEC, which set out the different types of movement of capital 
that were to be liberalized by Member-States340.   
 
  
4.2. The European Monetary Union and the erga omnes free movement of 
capital 
 
We examined above how the US, the UK, Germany and France were 
led to the liberalization of their capital accounts after the collapse of Bretton 
Woods in order to deal with domestic macroeconomic and institutional 
exigencies. As it is already mentioned, many other OECD countries (e.g. 
Japan341) were forced to liberalize their capital account –at least with regard to 
inward capital controls- in order to finance their post-oil crisis current account 
deficits. But, for European nations at least an additional force behind capital 
account liberalization was the setting up of the European Monetary Union 
(‘EMU’), whose foundational pillar was the establishment of the free movement 
of capital both inside the EU, as well as between the EU and third countries 
(erga omnes). 
 
4.2.1. The EMU as a response to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system  
 
The exchange rate stability that the Bretton Woods system procured to 
the European nations made any monetary arrangements at the European 
Economic Community (‘EEC’) level unnecessary; all EEC currencies were 
pegged to the dollar and thus indirectly to each other342. However, as it was 
mentioned in Sections 4.1.3. and 4.1.4., in 1969 Germany was forced to revalue 
the mark and France to devalue the franc. These unilateral decisions affecting 
the relative exchange rates of EEC currencies alarmed European officials, who 
convened a meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the EEC in The 
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Hague in December 1969. Fluctuations of the relative exchange rate of EEC 
currencies would disrupt the intra-Community trade that the European customs 
union was then predominantly aspiring to deepen; the EEC would have to shield 
itself from the monetary disturbances that the foreseeable weakening of the 
Bretton Woods system would bring.  
The Heads of the EEC Member-States agreed that ‘a plan in stages will 
be worked out during 1970 with a view to the creation of an economic and 
monetary union’343. They agreed so because of ‘the necessity for monetary 
solidarity, the absence of which was first spectacularly demonstrated by the 
events of 1969’344. A committee was set up led by Pierre Werner, Prime 
Minister of Luxembourg, to draw a plan for achieving an economic and 
monetary union between the EEC Member-States. 
The committee produced the so-called ‘Werner report’ in October 1970 
indicating that a monetary union must occur in three stages345: 
1. For the first stage, the fluctuation margins between the 
currencies of the Member-States must be reduced. 
2. For the second stage, the freedom of capital movements within 
the EEC must be achieved, along with the integration of the 
financial markets, and particularly of the banking systems. 
3. For the final stage, exchange rates between the currencies must 
be irrevocably fixed.  
In March 1971 the EC Council of Ministers signed a resolution 
adopting the Werner report. However, the Werner plan collapsed two months 
later, as the Bretton Woods system started disintegrating with Germany and The 
Netherlands floating their currencies in May 1971 and the Nixon shock in 
August 1971 (see Section 3.1).  
Subsequently, as it was also mentioned above (Section 3.1), in April 
1972 the EEC initiated the ‘snake in the tunnel’ in response to the Smithsonian 
agreement. The Smithsonian agreement set bands of ±2.25% for currencies to 
move relative to their rate against the US dollar. This allowed for a ’tunnel’, in 
which EEC currencies could trade. Nevertheless, although the bands on their 
face seemed minimal, the way the Smithsonian arrangement was structured, 
implied much larger bands, in which one currency could move against each 
other. For instance, a certain EEC national currency could start at the bottom of 
the band, i.e. at -2.25% against the dollar, and it could appreciate in aggregate 
by 4.5% against the dollar, i.e. to +2.25%; at the same time though another EEC 
currency could start at the top of the Smithsonian band, i.e. at +2.25% against 
the dollar, and depreciate by 4.5% reaching the point of -2.25% against the 
dollar. The bottom line would be that the former EEC currency would have 
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appreciated by 9% against the latter currency, which was seen as an excessive 
differential for the currencies of a customs union, as the EEC was back then. 
With the Basel agreement in 1972 the six EEC Member-States inserted a ’snake 
in the tunnel’ by binding the bilateral margins between their currencies to be 
limited to 2.25%, implying a maximum change between any two EEC 
currencies of 4.5%. 
The ‘Snake’ proved unsustainable with the franc and the Italian lira 
leaving and rejoining the arrangement in the aftermath of the 1973 dollar float. 
The arrangement was replaced in 1979 with the European Monetary System 
(‘EMS’) and its exchange rate mechanism (‘ERM’), which assigned every 
participating currency a fixed exchange rate against a notional composite unit of 
account, the European Currency Unit (‘ECU’)346. 
The 1985 White Paper on the completion of the internal market347 and 
the Single European Act of 1986 revived the ultimate objective of a monetary 
union, which was the irrevocable fixing of the exchange rates. Given the 
existence of the EMS, the necessary step at this phase was the introduction of 
rules allowing for the free movement of capital (it will be explained in the next 
sub-section, 4.2.2., why the liberalization of capital movements is from a 
macroeconomic perspective necessary for the realization of a monetary union). 
France, having acknowledged –as it was noted in Section 4.1.4. above- the 
benefits that financial liberalization would bring to its overdraft economy, 
played a pivotal role in the new attempt to liberalize capital movements at the 
Community level348 and helped overcome the deadlock that previous 
negotiations on the matter had met.   
Indeed, the White Paper elevated the full liberalization of capital 
movements to an essential part of the process of completing the Internal 
Market349 and the Single European Act, being the first major revision of the 
Treaty of Rome [i.e. the Treaty establishing the EEC, (‘EEC Treaty’)], made 
considerable progress in preparing the EC institutions for the challenges that the 
effort for the institutionalization of the free movement of capital at the 
Community level would give rise to. The EEC Treaty included some provisions 
with regard to the free movement of capital, but fell short of achieving a 
complete harmonization in this area. Member-States were nominally bound by 
the obligation to ‘progressively abolish between themselves all restrictions on 
the movement of capital’ [Art. 67(1) EEC Treaty], but the actual implementation 
of this provision required the Council to issue the necessary directives (Art. 69 
EEC Treaty). Moreover, as far as the issue of the free movement of capital 
between the Member States and third countries is concerned, the EEC Treaty 
required the Commission to propose to the Council appropriate measures, on 
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which the Council would issue directives acting unanimously [Art. 70(1) EEC 
Treaty]. All in all, the provisions on the free movement of capital of the EEC 
Treaty were not having at this point a direct effect350; Art. 67ff. of the EEC 
Treaty could not be invoked in national courts against the state (vertical direct 
effect) or against private parties (horizontal direct effect)351.  
The Single European Act pushed towards complete harmonization 
pertaining to the issue of free movement of capital by setting as a deadline for 
the adoption of the appropriate measures in this field the 31st of December of 
1992 (Art. 13 of the Single European Act) and facilitated the decision-making 
process with regard to the issue of the erga omnes free movement of capital by 
allowing the Council to issue the relevant directive by acting with a qualified 
majority rather than unanimously; unanimity would only be required for 
measures, which would constitute a step back with regard to the liberalization of 
capital movements [Art. 16(4) of the Single European Act]. 
In response to the prioritization of the issue of liberalization of capital 
movements that the Single European Act had set, the Commission embarked on 
a Community-wide capital account liberalization program that culminated in the 
issuance of Directive 88/361/EEC, which brought about the complete 
liberalization of capital movements within the Community. The Directive set 
July 1990 as the deadline for Member-States to take the measures necessary to 
comply with its provisions, but allowed countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and 
Ireland) that were in a weak balance of payments position to keep capital 
controls for a little bit longer (until the end of 1992 the latest). 
The favorable macroeconomic circumstances of the early 1990s 
allowed the free movement of capital to move from secondary Community law 
to the Treaty level and thus the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 unequivocally 
prohibited the restrictions on the free movement of capital both between 
Member States and between Member States and third countries in Art. 73b(1) of 
the EC Treaty (now Art. 63 TFEU); a provision that was quickly recognized to 
be directly effective352.   
In the meantime the institutionalization of the free movement of capital 
allowed the vision of a European monetary union to progressively materialize. 
Two days after the adoption of Directive 88/361/EEC, the Hannover European 
Council entrusted a committee led by Jacques Delors, Commission President, 
‘with the task of studying and proposing concrete stages leading towards this 
union’353. The Delors report was adopted by the Madrid European Council in 
1990 and its proposals were thus later largely incorporated in the Maastricht 
Treaty initiating the path that led to the creation of the European Monetary 
Union in 1999 and the adoption of the Euro.  
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4.2.2. The optimum currency area theory as the intellectual foundation of 
the EMU- related liberalization of capital movements 
 
 In the previous section we noticed that since the days of the Werner 
report the intra-Community capital account liberalization was seen as a sine qua 
non of the monetary union, whose third and final stage would come to 
materialize only after all Member States that would participate in this union 
would have lifted their capital controls. The question to pose at this point is why 
a monetary union cannot be conceived in the presence of closed financial 
markets; why a group of countries cannot have a common currency and have 
capital controls at the same time? 
The answer lies in the tenets of the optimum currency area theory that 
dominated already before the Werner report the thought about the issue of 
monetary integration354.  
Those who wrote within the scope of this theory on issues related to 
monetary integration developed theoretical models that compared the balance of 
payments adjustment process in sets of countries that have flexible exchange 
rates to the equivalent process in sets of countries that have fixed exchange rate 
arrangements between them or in regions of the same country that share the 
same currency. The outcome of these theoretical models was that cross-border 
capital movements serve an equilibrating role in the balance of payments 
adjustment effort in those countries that have fixed exchange rate arrangements. 
As a result, the conviction was developed that a monetary union is doomed to 
fail without free movement of capital between the participating countries. This 
belief was reflected in the Werner report and in all subsequent European plans 
for a monetary union; capital account liberalization was seen as a precondition 
for the completion of the union. 
Indeed, the common denominator among the several optimum currency 
area theorists was that a flexible exchange rate can correct payments imbalances 
between two countries, when demand shifts from the product that the one 
country produces to the product of the other country, but that in a currency area, 
where there is a commitment to exchange rate stability, the payments 
imbalances correction requires a high degree of internal factor (=labor & capital) 
mobility355. It was thought that absent perfect competition in factor markets, 
developments from time to time would push the relative cost levels of countries 
participating in a fixed exchange rate area out of line, exactly because of the fact 
that a payments imbalance would not be easily restored356. 
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 Wage inflation in a country that participates in a currency area or the 
shift in demand from the products of this country could, absent the ability of 
devaluation of the currency, result in a persistent payments deficit, which would 
result in a higher domestic rate of unemployment and a lower domestic rate of 
inflation. At the same time those countries participating in the currency area that 
are found in a surplus position, absent the ability of revaluation of the currency, 
would be stuck with lower unemployment and higher inflation rates than those 
desired357. In other words, a unified exchange rate area was seen as having the 
propensity for relative payments disequilibria358 and thus the area’s free trade 
arrangements would be compromised if they were not complemented by greater 
labor and capital mobility, which would mitigate these disequilibria359. 
Here is how one economist in the late 1950s by using the example of a 
US state, North Carolina (‘NC’) indicated that capital mobility is crucial for the 
balance of payments adjustment in a currency area360. Suppose that new 
investments in NC result in the establishment of new plants that boost the state’s 
industry production. As a result, NC incomes rise; this leads to a rise in prices 
and also to a rise in demand deposits. Because of the increase in demand 
deposits, NC banks build excess reserves and thus are able to buy short-term 
‘foreign’ securities, i.e. financial assets issued by out-of-state institutions. Now 
because of the greater purchasing power that NC residents have, imports to NC 
rise as well and the payments to the importers lead to a drain of the NC bank 
reserves. Normally, one would expect after that reduction in NC bank reserves 
that the state would experience a monetary contraction; however, due to a 
national (i.e. US-wide) financial market NC banks are able to sell to out-of-state 
buyers the ‘foreign’ short-term financial assets they had acquired previously. 
The sale will infuse the NC banks with liquidity and thus they will still be in a 
position to lend out funds to NC residents; thus, the state won’t experience an 
undesirable monetary contraction. The ability to sell securities to out-of-state 
buyers exists because of the free movement of capital within the US and if this 
possibility was not available to NC banks, then the state would surely 
experience a monetary contraction and there would be payments pressure. But, 
the movement of capital into the state can serve an equilibrating role. 
While plausible, this early model is not the one that European 
policymakers had exactly in mind when designing the monetary union. The most 
influential model, which apart from the virtues also indicates the vices of the 
free movement of capital in a currency area, is the one presented by Marcus 
Fleming in his article On Exchange Rate Unification361.  
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Fleming assumes two countries belonging to a currency area; country A 
and country B. Because of a differential in cost-push factors between the two 
countries, wages and prices are pushed upwards in country A compared to 
country B. High costs in country A and low costs in country B create a payments 
disequilibrium between the two countries, as the former moves to a deficit 
position and the latter to a surplus position. This results in a contraction of 
demand in A and an expansion of demand in B. Accordingly, there is a decline 
in savings in country A and a rise in savings in country B. Now, if the level of 
the incentive to invest in country A does not fall more than the level of savings, 
then country A will experience a rise in interest rates; at the same time, if the 
level of the incentive to invest in country B rises less than the level of savings, 
then interest rates will fall in country B. The interest rate differential between 
the two countries will result in capital fleeing from B and being in search of 
investments in A. The capital inflows that the latter will receive will result in 
higher employment there, while capital outflows from B will lead to a lower late 
of inflation in that country. In other words, capital movements inside the 
currency union will play an equilibrating role functioning as remedies for the 
economic hiccups that chronic deficits and chronic surpluses bring362. 
However, what Fleming insisted on was that the free movement of 
capital in a monetary union will not act spontaneously to the benefit of the 
participating countries; if the level of the incentive to invest in the deficit 
country falls more than the level of savings or the level of the incentive to invest 
in the surplus country rises more than the level of savings, then the interest rates 
won’t make the deficit country more attractive and the capital movements will 
accentuate rather than mitigate the disequilibria situation in the currency area363. 
In other words, the mere allowance of capital movements between the 
participating countries will not evolve automatically into a surplus recycling 
mechanism in the absence of certain conditions. Therefore, to allow a monetary 
union to benefit from the free movement of capital and correct its disequilibria, a 
certain level of policy co-ordination is needed; not even the PRM that was 
examined in Section 3.3. above would have functioned effectively without the 
Fed employing an interest rate policy that attracted funds into the US to finance 
the country’s trade deficit. 
The idea of the co-ordination of the capital flows in a currency union, 
so that capital moves from the surplus countries to the deficit countries and thus 
fulfills its equilibrating role, dates back to Keynes and his efforts to establish an 
orderly surplus recycling mechanism to complement the Bretton Woods 
arrangements. Without such a co-ordination there can be no ‘symmetrical 
adjustment’ inside a currency union and sooner or later one participating country 
will experience the deflationary impact of deficits without being necessarily able 
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to benefit from the capital of the surplus countries of the union364.  This is 
because the financial sector tends to regard surplus units as more creditworthy 
than deficit units, so the profits that the surplus country realized will have the 
tendency to remain inside the country rather than flow to the deficit country of 
the union365. So, as Keynes noted, ‘since it now seems possible that nature 
cannot be relied on to do the work’366 an authority should exist within any 
currency area or monetary union to intermediate by drawing profits from the 
surplus countries and direct them to the deficit countries, so that the monetary 
union is sustainable.   
The Werner report seemed to share the Keynesian misgivings about the 
disequilibrating role of capital flows and recognized the necessity for the 
establishment of an authority that would manage intra-union surpluses. The 
report envisioned that this role could be entrusted to the ‘European Fund for 
Monetary Cooperation’, which would ‘progressively manage Community 
reserves’ and would manage intra-European balance-of-payments financing367. 
Unfortunately, though the Fund never actually acquired this status and remained 
just an account at the BIS used for the clearing of bilateral credits368. The need 
for a real EMU surplus recycling mechanism remains to our days and its 
absence explains a good deal of the inability of the EU to tackle the ongoing 
sovereign debt crisis369. 
 
4.2.3. Why liberalize capital movements erga omnes? 
 
After the decision was made by European officials in 1969 to gradually 
develop a monetary union in response to the disintegration of the Bretton Woods 
system, it was clear on the basis of the optimum currency area theory that sooner 
or later intra-union capital movements would have to be liberalized. But, the 
optimum currency area theory fails to explain why the EU actually went one 
step further and liberalized the movement of capital erga omnes, i.e. vis-à-vis 
third countries, through Art. 73(b) of the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, the 
question that should be posed at this point is why did the EU unilaterally 
liberalized capital flows vis-à-vis third countries. 
                                                
364 George Krimpas, The Recycling Problem in a Currency Union, Levy Economics Institute Working 
Paper No. 595, 2. Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=1605188  
365 Id., at 6 
366 KEYNES, supra note 211, 394 
367 Giovannini et al., supra note 342, 221 
368 Marcello de Cecco & Alberto Giovannini, Introduction, in A EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK?: 
PERSPECTIVES ON MONETARY UNIFICATION AFTER TEN YEARS OF THE EMS (M. DE CECCO & A. 
GIOVANNINI, EDS.) (1989), 3 
369 See Yanis Varoufakis & Stuart Holland, A Modest Proposal for Overcoming the Euro Crisis, Levy 
Economics Institute, Policy Note, 2011/3, who propose inter alia to transform the European Investment 
Bank in the authority that will manage the surplus recycling mechanism. Available at: 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=1380  
 
CORPORATE LAW & ECONOMIC STAGNATION 
 
The reason is that it was believed, mainly under the influence of the 
Bundesbank370, that the free movement of capital towards third countries would 
be the best watchdog for the stability of the Euro and would increase the latter’s 
convertibility, so that it could develop into an international investment, 
financing, trade and reserve currency along the lines of the model that the 
deutsche mark had set371. In other words, the interconnection between the 
common currency and free movement of capital towards third countries is what 
explains and justifies the institutionalization of the free movement of capital by 
the Maastricht Treaty as the only one of the fundamental freedoms of the 
Internal Market that extends beyond the latter’s borders372. 
 
                                                
370 STORY & WALTER, supra note 289, 20 
371 Rolf Hasse & Joachim Starbatty, Überlegungen und Empfehlungen zur Währungsunion, in 
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND WÄHRUNGSUNION AUF DEM PRÜFSTAND (1997), 128-129 
372 HINDENLANG, supra note 350, fn 72 
The European Monetary Union and the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership 
 
The need of the EU nations to develop the EMU, in order to 
cope with the monetary disturbances that the deconstruction 
of the Bretton Woods system brought about, required from a 
macroeconomic point of view the institutionalization of the 
free movement of capital as one of the four fundamental 
freedoms, on which the Internal Market would be built. 
However, the European Court of Justice –as it is shown in 
Section 4.1.2. of Chapter Four- in interpreting the Treaty 
rules on the free movement of capital developed over time a 
case law that may be interpreted as preventing the 
engagement by firms in shareholder eugenics that would help 
them craft their shareholder base, so as to include more long-
term shareholders. Thus, the institutionalization of the free 
movement of capital at the EU level as a consequence of the 
construction of the EMU had had the unanticipated 
consequence of preventing the adoption of corporate loyalty 
structures and of preventing long-termist investors to 
imprint more of their preferences on corporate governance. 
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4.3. The interjurisdictional competition for siphoning capital to national 
financial markets 
 
The liberalization of capital movements either by unilateral decisions or 
through intra-state coordination resulted in an interjurisdictional competition to 
attract capital. States sought to endow their national stock exchanges with the 
institutions and the facilities that would allow them to develop into global 
financial centers. All of the jurisdictions, whose capital decontrol efforts were 
studied above in Section 4.1, promoted specific reforms that would allow 
international funds to be siphoned to their capital markets. The US moved first 
towards this direction in the mid-1970s with the UK following a decade later 
and France responding promptly to the British challenge. Germany’s plan for 
‘Finanzplatz Deutschland’ was developed around the mid-1990s and some 
specific aspects of it will be analyzed later in Chapter Three, as they are of 
greater significance for corporate law. 
The common denominator in these reforms was the reduction in the 
transaction costs. As it is documented in the theory of financial economics, the 
cost of transacting affects the frequency and volume of trade; to be more 
specific, trading volume is inversely related to transaction costs373. Therefore, as 
it would be expected, after these reforms the volume of trading in the stock 
exchanges increased and this is documented in the higher market turnover of the 
stock exchange illustrated in Figures 6-8 below. In addition to this, several 
studies in the field of financial economics have suggested that there is a 
relationship between short holding periods and lower transaction costs374; this 
suggestion allows us to ascertain that the reduction in the average holding period 
of stock, on which we elaborate further in Section 7.5, can be partly attributed to 
the reforms that are presented in sub-sections 4.3.1. – 4.3.3 below. 
 
4.3.1. US’s ‘May Day’ (and the ERISA pension reform) 
 
On the 23rd of January 1975 the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(‘SEC’) adopted Rule 19b-3 that prohibited any stock exchange from retaining 
any rule that would require its members to charge fixed commission rates for 
transactions effected on the exchange or by the use of the exchange facilities375. 
The Rule was effective on the 1st of May 1975 (‘May Day’) with regard to 
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brokerage rates charged by members of the stock exchange to non-members that 
were extending trading orders and a year later it became effective for rates 
charged by members to members376. In addition to this, the Congress left its 
imprint on the May Day reform by introducing §6(e) in the 1975 Securities Acts 
Amendments, which prohibits any exchange from fixing commission rates.  
This reform changed the practice of fixed commission rates on the stock 
exchanges of the US, which originated in the ‘Buttonwood Tree Agreement’ of 
1792, by which the stock exchange that would later evolve into the NYSE was 
founded. Direct price competition in brokerage rates ensued and shortly large 
trading orders from institutional customers could be negotiated and handled at 
less than 10¢ per share, whereas before May Day they could cost up to 30¢377. 
As a result, the number of transactions in the US exchanges multiplied, as the 
cost of securities transfer was reduced and there was a wider margin to profit 
from short-term fluctuations in the securities price. The annual market turnover, 
i.e. the percentage of listed shares that were traded during the year, skyrocketed 
after May Day marking a reversal in the expectations of shareholders, who 
henceforth sought to profit from capital gains rather than from dividends. Figure 
6 below illustrates the dramatic increase in the NYSE market turnover after 
1975. 
However, while there are good reasons to believe that the May Day 
reforms were introduced in order to allow the US to benefit from the PRM and 
finance its current account deficit through Wall Street, there existed structural 
pathologies in the fixed commissions regime that this radical change sought to 
cure. As brokers could not compete in the rates field, a non-price competition 
had emerged that involved inside tips to institutional clients and under-the-table 
cash bribes378. In addition to this, institutions’ desire for lower unit costs led to 
the rapid development of a third market, where institutional investors could 
engage in over-the-counter (‘OTC’) transactions and trade large blocks of stock 
between them without having to meet the high fixed commission rates. This was 
a development that prompted even the president of the NYSE to advocate for the 
dropping of fixed commissions in 1970379. 
The May Day reforms came just on time for the NYSE that would 
anyway have to accommodate a greater volume of transactions from 1974 
onwards because of a separate and independent development in the pension 
industry. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (‘ERISA’) 
mandated the funding of pension promises that were made from employers, thus 
enlarging the pool of pension assets that would be invested in the capital 
markets. 
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Before ERISA, private pension plans, i.e. employer-provided retirement 
benefits, were a creature of contract. Employees were facing a series of risks; 
agency risk, because the plan’s managers could misuse the assets, forfeiture risk, 
which meant  
that the employee could loose her pension as a result of a layoff or change of 
jobs and default risk, i.e. that the plan would be left with no funds to fulfill its 
obligations towards its beneficiaries380. The convinction ‘we need to save now in 
order to provide for the future’ gathered steam in the early 1970s as it became 
evident that the US ageing population coupled with the inherent risks that 
private pension plans were carrying would jeopardize the income of a sizeable 
group of the population after retirement. ERISA promoted reforms in line with 
the spirit of the worker-security theory. It sought to minimize the agency risk by 
introducing fiduciary standards for pension fund managers, the forfeiture risk by 
introducing minimum (rapid) vesting standards and the default risk by 
introducing funding standards and a government-run insurance program. 
Especially as far as the default risk is concerned, companies had to fund their 
pension promises over 30 years, which meant that they would have to make 
large contributions to be in line with the new cover ratio that pension plans were 
required to have381. That led to an unprecedent expansion of the pension assets.  
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4.3.2. UK’s ‘Big Bang’ 
 
While it is not entirely clear whether the repeal of the US regime of 
fixed commission rates was done solely in order to siphon capital to Wall Street, 
UK’s equivalent to May Day reform, the so-called ‘Big Bang’, seems to have 
been dictated exclusively by the international competition for attraction of 
capital that emerged in the post-Bretton Woods world. In the words of the 
Governor of the Bank of England in 1984 ‘early and substantial change is now 
unavoidable, if we are not to lose out in the world marketplace’382. 
At the time, the London Stock Exchange (‘LSE’) had a regime of fixed 
commissions, just like in pre-May Day US, while the members of the LSE acted 
in a single capacity; either as dealers in shares (‘jobbers’) or as stock brokers 
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The Rise of Competition to Manage Pension Assets 
and the Great Reversal in Shareholdership 
 
The May Day reforms in the US changed the role of 
Wall Street financial firms from supporting long-term 
investment activities of corporations –mainly through bond 
issues- to generating fees through equity trading. 
 Simultaneously, the ERISA-spurred enlargement of 
the US pension plans’ pool of funds resulted in the emergence 
of a competition among investment companies for the 
management of pension assets. Despite the structural 
interest of a pension fund in the implementation of a long-
term investment policy on the basis of the underlying long-
term nature of the pension contract, the fact that one year of 
severe underperformance on behalf of the investment 
manager could lead to a serious risk of termination of the 
mandate resulted in pension fund managers striving for 
short-term returns. The short-termism of the post-ERISA US 
pension fund industry, originating from the central conflict 
between commitment and competition in the finance sector, 
is also one of the reasons that explain the skyrocketing of the 
market turnover of the NYSE after 1975 and the concomitant 
reduction in the average holding period of stock in the NYSE 
after that year. 
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taking trading orders and advising investors383. This regime reduced the 
competitiveness of the LSE compared to the US stock exchanges, so that 
especially after the liberalization of exchange controls in the UK in 1979 many 
British companies preferred to raise capital through the NYSE by issuing 
American Depository Receipts (‘ADRs’), as investors could buy them in larger 
volumes because of the much lower average commission rate in the US384.  The 
chain of events leading to the ‘Big Bang’ was initiated when the Office of Fair 
Trading (‘OFT’), UK’s national competition authority, commenced proceedings 
in 1979 against the LSE for the system of fixed commissions arguing that this 
constituted an illegal restrictive practice under the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act385. The LSE was appealing to the government since 1976 to gain exemption 
from that Act, but its efforts were futile both when there was a Labor 
government in the UK and after the rise of the Tories in power. The Bank of 
England backed OFT’s legal action and the case was finally brought before the 
Restrictive Practices Court in 1983; the OFT filed evidence before the court 
about the results of May Day in the US in order to make its case against fixed 
commissions and the dual capacity. In response, the LSE agreed to reform itself 
rather than allow the court to reach a ruling386.  
As a result, on the 27th of October of 1986 fixed commissions were 
abolished and single capacity of LSE’s members was replaced by dual capacity, 
while new (foreign) members were allowed to enter the LSE387. Additionally, 
the LSE introduced Seaq International, a screen-based quotation system for 
international equities modelled on the one that Nasdaq in the US was using, in 
order to facilitate and speed up the realization of the transactions. As a result of 
the ‘Big Bang’, the LSE experienced an unprecedent boom in the market 
turnover during the following period, as it is shown below in Figure 7. Thus, the 
tide towards shareholder short-termism in the UK had already begun: 
 
4.3.3. The French ‘Small Bang’ 
 
As it was mentioned in Section 4.1.4. above, the liberalization of 
finance in France was seen as a necessary move in order to fight the inflationary 
French overdraft economy. The developments toward this direction were 
expedited because of the international competition for attraction of funds. Paris 
had to fend off London’s competition in the financial arena and provide a 
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response to the ‘Big Bang’388. Stock trading of major French companies had 
been directed to LSE because of liquidity problems on the Paris Bourse389. 
First of all, the French had to modernize their stock exchange 
infrastructure. Therefore, in July 1986 a system of continuous computerized 
quotation was substituted for the open-outcry floor. This helped to manage large 
volumes of trading and to reduce back-office costs. It was complemented by a 
system of channeling trading orders automatically, while some years thereafter, 
in 1990, a new automatic-settlement system was introduced390. 
The French ‘Small Bang’ –a.k.a. ‘Little Bang’- though came with the 
Law No 88-70 of 22 January 1988 on securities exchange and the subsequent 
Decree No 88-254 of 17 March 1988. Banks wanted to move in the securities 
business to compensate for the losses they were incurring in their traditional 
activities. However, the regime of stockbrokers’ (agents de change) monopoly 
in the stock exchange was standing in the way of banks; the brokers were 
individuals and could only match buy and sell orders, but not deal in securities. 
However, after the reforms the members of the Bourse could also be approved 
incorporated securities companies, in which many French and foreign banks 
acquired equity stakes, and which could also engage in dealing and investment 
banking activities under some limitations. As these companies were allowed to 
purchase securities for their own account as dealers, the French stock 
exchange’s liquidity was greatly improved391. 
To repeal the regime of fixed commissions just like in the US and the 
UK the new rules mandated full negotiation of commission rates by 1990. The 
rise in the market turnover of the Bourse after these reforms was immediate as 
shown in Figure 8.  
In the same spirit, the stamp duty on securities transactions was 
repealed in December 1994. Naturally, that reform would increase the market 
turnover in the French stock exchanges, as recent experience from Sweden had 
shown that the reverse reform, i.e. the introduction of a securities transaction 
tax, had decreased the rate of turnover in Swedish stock markets392. Indeed, as 
shown in Figure 8 the repeal of the stamp duty marked an increase in the market 
turnover of the French stock exchange after 1994 verifying the impact that 
taxation regimes can have on the decision to hold or sell a security (see Section 
3.2.2. of Chapter Five).  
As a result of these reforms, many previously undercapitalized French 
firms were enabled to take outside shareholders, many of whom were foreign 
institutional investors. Major domestic institutional investors that could absorb 
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the growing securities supply in France after the ‘Small Bang’ were not present, 
particularly due to the absence of French pension funds. The French government 
realized the necessity for the emergence of pension funds in France, but it failed 
to pass an ERISA-style reform that would allow for funded pensions393. 
Therefore, part of the securities supply was matched with demand from foreign 
institutional investors, who became very active particularly in buying stakes in 
privatized state-owned enterprises (‘SOEs’). This is because from 1986 onwards 
the French governments embarked on a privatization program that would allow 
the French state to reduce its fiscal deficit, but also to increase the market 
capitalization of the Bourse394. The state ensured the continuation of control 
over the privatized SOEs through the retention of golden shares, but a large part 
of the non-controlling stock was offered to French retail investors and to foreign 
institutional investors. Foreign institutional investors thus acquired minority 
stakes in the privatized SOEs and approximately 5% of the shares in any given 
privatization were offered to US institutions395. This might seem like a small 
stake, but it was large enough to allow US institutions to leave their imprint on 
French corporate governance. Many of these institutional investors were already 
familiar with the institutional logics of shareholder value that proliferated during 
the 1980s hostile takeover frenzy in the US. Thus, as a result of the French 
privatization program the shareholder value ideology entered as a ‘Trojan horse’ 
inside the French corporate governance landscape and sew the seed of the Great 
Reversal in Corporate Governance in France (see more on US institutional 
ownership of French companies in 6.2.3 below). 
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The International Competition for the Attraction of Capital and 
the Great Reversal in Shareholdership 
 
The international competition for the attraction of capital that 
followed the capital account liberalization movement prompted 
national authorities to introduce reforms, by which the national stock 
exchanges would be modernized. The common denominator in these 
reforms was the reduction in the costs of securities transactions; 
fixed commissions regimes were repealed and stamp duties were 
dropped. Because of the fact that trading volume is inversely related 
to transactions costs, market turnover of the stock exchanges in all 
the countries that undertook reforms skyrocketed. As equity 
turnover can be –with some limitations- treated as a proxy for the 
average holding period of stock, it follows that these reforms also had 
the indirect effect of reducing the investment time-horizons of 
shareholders of listed corporations.  
 




































Figure 6 – NYSE Equity Turnover, 
1951 - 2003 
Source: NYSE Euronext Trading 
Statistics 
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Figure 7 – UK Equity 
Turnover, 1965 - 2003 
Source: LSE Statistics 
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Figure 8 – French Equity 
Turnover, 1969 - 2005 
Source: Factbook Euronext 
Paris 2008 
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5. The intellectual substructure of the post-Bretton Woods world: 
Neoclassical Economics 
 
The developments in the post-Bretton Woods world were largely 
dictated by the new challenges that a world of flexible exchange rates gave rise 
to; the ‘Nixon shock’ initiated a chain of reactions that covered the whole range 
of human economic activity and required new approaches to the socioeconomic 
problems that were usually incorporated in new packages of regulation of 
domestic or international inspiration. 
However, we should not underestimate the support that the economic 
ideology of the post-Bretton Woods world offered to the radical changes that 
took place. Political choices that displaced structures that were present since the 
days of the Great Depression acquired input legitimacy with the blessing of 
neoclassical economics, which by the late 1970s had already become the 
economic orthodoxy. 
In this part I do not intend to present in detail how exactly neoclassical 
economics rose to hegemony in the intellectual sphere, nor to analyze all the 
axioms of neoclassical economics or to explore how each specific post-Bretton 
Woods policy change in the Western world could be attributed to a certain 
neoclassical tenet. Others have carried out this task with success in the past and 
apart from this, such an analysis would divert this thesis from its objective.  
My goal in this part is to show how the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system actually caused the neoclassical revolution and how the latter affected 
the thinking about the functioning of capital markets and served as the major 
force behind the deregulation movement of the 1980s onwards. Thus, this 
section functions as a prelude to the next one, where I explain the great reversal 
in the state of the thought about corporate governance during the post-Bretton 
Woods era, which is to be attributed to the emergence of neoclassical economics 
as orthodoxy. 
 
5.1. The antidote to the Great Stagflation: Monetarism 
 
Just as the Keynesian revolution found the pre-war economic orthodoxy 
in a vulnerable state because of the doldrums of the Great Depression, so did the 
monetarist counter-revolution found Keynesian economics struggling with 
stagflation in the 1970s396. Because of the high rates of inflation that were 
initially caused in the US by the Vietnam war (see Section 3.1) and Johnson’s 
‘Great Society’ (see Section 1.3) and later in the rest of the world because of the 
oil crisis (see Section 3.2.2), central bankers and politicians alike started 
embracing the monetarist ideology that put forward as the vehicle of discipline 
in economic policy-making money stock targets, which were supposed to tame 
inflation by controlling the money growth supply397. 
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At the policy level, Keynesian reflationary demand management and 
fiscal activist policies failed to address one of the two evil prongs of the Great 
Stagflation of the 1970s, i.e. high unemployment, and actually exacerbated the 
other evil prong, i.e. high inflation. From an academic point of view now, 
Keynesian economics could not explain by means of the Phillips curve -which 
showed that the rate of unemployment is inversely related to the rate of change 
in the wage rate398- the contradictory co-existence of low rates of employment 
and high rates of inflation during the Great Stagflation399. The economic reality 
of the 1970s proved that there was no clear-cut relationship between inflation 
and the level of employment and the monetarists drawing on the belief that 
‘money matters’400 gained momentum and brought their theories to prominence. 
The words of a Keynesian economist in the early 1980s provide a very 
accurate description of how the inflationary 1970s weakened Keynesian 
economics giving monetarism a windfall:  
 
‘When the American inflation picked up steam, the misbehavior 
of the Phillips-curve and the inflation premium in nominal 
interest rates became obvious for all to see. Monetarists, who 
had predicted these things by reasoning from the neoclassical 
anticipated inflation model, made enormous headway within the 
economics profession and without. Keynesians, who had 
continued to argue the usefulness of the Phillips-curve and to 
pooh-pooh the empirical relevance of the anticipated inflation 
model, lost face and lost influence. It was a debacle. A bad 
enough debacle so that the profession proclaimed the long 
controversy a Monetarist victory and, by and large, turned its 
interest elsewhere.’ 401 
 
 
5.2. The rise of New Classical Macroeconomics 
 
While monetarism did a good job in exposing the fallacies of Keynesian 
analysis with regard to the demon of the 1970s, inflation, it never actually came 
to play -outside central banks- the organizing theoretical and policy-oriented 
role that Keynesian economics played during the Golden Age. This can be partly 
attributable to the fact that because of the oil spikes the relationship between 
money supply and the level of general prices was not verified empirically in a 
solid way402, as it could have happened if the 1970s were not characterized by 
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this unprecedented commodities crisis. But, the real reason why monetarism in 
its pure form did not rose to durable hegemony as an economic theory, is that 
the writings of its leading thinker, Milton Friedman, the academic community 
and the rising conservative political thought found the spore of a much more 
powerful school of thought, whose intellectual genes are traced back to the 
classical libertarian theories. 
In the 1970s economists were increasingly convinced that monetarism, 
although right in demonizing inflation, did not present a method that could be 
used to develop a theoretical model of the economy as a whole403. But, as 
monetarism blended with conservative political ideologies during the 1970s that 
found in monetarism an ally against the Keynesian state, which in conservatives’ 
view contributed to the rising burden of taxation on businesses and individuals, 
a new wave of economic thought emerged that was centered around the free 
enterprise ideology404. In this mixture of thoughts and ideas Milton Friedman’s 
libertarian views rose to prominence and monetarism’s call for stability in 
macro-economic policy, gradually transformed into a rejection of any 
interventionist ‘fine-tuning’ of the economy by the government that could cause 
instability405. In this intellectual climate, another Chicagoan colleague of 
Friedman, Robert Lucas, seized the opportunity and gave birth with his rational 
expectations theory to the New Classical Macroeconomics, that lies in the heart 
of the modern neoclassical orthodoxy. 
 
5.3. The basic tenets of the Neoclassical orthodoxy 
 
As if the lesson from the Great Depression was never learned406, the 
tendency in economics over the last decades, after Lucas formulated his 
theories, was to embrace once again a variation of Say’s Law of Markets and to 
remodel the Smithian ‘invisible hand’ by using impressive-looking 
mathematics407.  
The first pillar of this wave of economic thought was the theory of 
rational expectations408, which is based on the very notion of homo economicus, 
i.e. that individuals and firms always behave in a way that maximizes their 
subjective expected utility. Rational expectations theory posits that the forecasts 
of rational agents in the market do not differ systematically from the actual 
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outcomes409; agents, behaving rationally, as utility maximizers, can predict 
everything that can be predicted and errors do not occur persistently410.  
The rational expectations assumption led to the second pillar of 
‘freshwater’411 neoclassical economics: the efficient markets theory412. The 
theory asserts that asset prices at any time reflect accurate understandings of 
value and incorporate the best relevant information that is available about the 
intrinsic value of the asset413. The efficient markets theory resulted in the 
development of the idea of rational stock markets; the so-called efficient 
markets hypothesis (‘EMH’)414 positing that capital markets are informationally 
efficient in the sense that securities prices reveal all decision-relevant 
information in the markets415. In its extreme version EMH assumes that 
securities prices reflect even hidden or inside information, which is relevant to 
investor decision (‘strong EMH’). The strong version of EMH implies that 
capital markets are by nature efficient and need only minimal regulation in order 
to function appropriately. While the strong EMH is not backed by empirical 
support and thus it is only used as a benchmark in the neoclassical orthodoxy, a 
semi-strong version of EMH has been more prevalent among economists. 
Securities prices do reflect information, but only up to the point where the 
marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do not 
exceed the marginal costs416. The semi-strong version of the EMH has led to the 
popularization of the belief that capital markets need light regulation, since they 
would largely detect dangers themselves and to a certain extent they would self-
regulate their affairs417.  
The two aforementioned pillars of ‘freshwater’ economics culminated 
in the real business cycle theory (‘RBCT’), a reincarnation of Say’s Law418. For 
RBCT theorists the only reason why an economic downturn may occur in a 
capitalist system is the rational reaction of individuals and firms to the lack of 
productive opportunities that is caused by a technology or other similar shock to 
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the supply side of the economy419. In other words recessions cannot be caused 
by poor investment decisions or by private changes but only by technological 
changes that reduce productivity on the supply side forcing the demand side to 
also adjust downwards for a while until productivity boosts again.  
 
5.4. Neoclassical economics and the deregulation movement 
 
Since according to the neoclassical orthodoxy firms and individuals 
cannot err regarding the price of an asset in an efficient market, a bubble, like 
the housing one that marked the beginning of the post-2008 crisis, cannot occur. 
The rational expectations assumption and the EMH do not allow for poor 
investment decisions420 capable of creating the accumulation of noise that will 
cause the price level of an asset to go above its intrinsic value; there is a series 
of neutralizing mechanisms in the markets that will stop these bubbles from 
growing into dangerous levels421.   
Nonetheless, the failure of neoclassical economics to explain bubbles 
and depressions422 wouldn’t have been a problem if the neoclassical apparatus 
weren’t so influential in the regulatory field423. Because of the advancement of 
market fundamentalism by the neoclassicists crucial segments of the market 
were left under-regulated or worse completely unregulated424.  
Picking up momentum in the 1970s bankers and fund managers, using 
the power they acquired by the PRM (see Section 3.3.), were actively lobbying 
for less regulation425. In addition to this, the new globalized market for banking 
and financial services created an interjurisdictional race-to-the-bottom 
competition (see Section 4.3), in which governments were seeking to attract 
capital placement in their country’s financial institutions by relaxing regulation 
of the financial industry426.  
The lobbying efforts might not have been so successful and the 
deregulation movement might not have gone so far, if neoclassical economics 
weren’t backing the initiatives by assiduously promoting market 
fundamentalism and anti-paternalism. Neoclassical economics with their 
advanced mathematical deductivistic modeling -that fails to explain how the real 
economy and social reality works427- provided support for deregulation 
advocates. The gradual deregulation of the banking industry and the gradual 
                                                
419 GEETIKA, PIYALI GHOSH & PURBA ROY CHOUDHURY, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS (2008), 510 
420 Bateman, supra note 410, 24 
421 POSNER, supra note 115, 269 
422 Robert Lucas, Keynote Address to the 2003 HOPE Conference: My Keynesian Education, 36 HISTORY 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (SUPPLEMENT) 12, 23-24 
423 Id., 271 
424 MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET & JEAN TIROLE, BALANCING THE BANKS: GLOBAL 
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010), 3; POSNER, SUPRA NOTE 11, 269 
425 On how the political process allows small groups to obtain favorable regulation, see George Stigler, 
The Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 3 
426 DEWATRIPONT ET AL., supra note 424, 2-3 
427 Tony Lawson, The Current Economic Crisis: Its Nature and the Course of Academic Economics, 33 
CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 759, 760; Krugman, supra note 16, 2 
CORPORATE LAW & ECONOMIC STAGNATION 
 
abolishment of compulsory specialization of financial institutions led to 
consolidation; that meant larger and more powerful financial firms better 
positioned to capture the regulatory process428. This resulted in sets of rules that 
do not serve the interests of the economy as a whole, but rather those of the 
regulated institutions429. 
The incremental deregulation of the financial industry simply 
encouraged more speculation on securities activities, which was lauded as the 
engine of economic progress. Regulators –themselves being drawn from a pool 
of ‘freshwater’ economists430- were loath to introduce new rules for the use of 
inherently non-transparent financial products, such as CDOs, while they did not 
find it necessary to supervise service providers, such as rating agencies that were 
inflating the ratings of securities431.  
Selective credit controls, such as margin requirements, which were the 
essence of the model of regulation that followed the Great Depression, were 
replaced by a more libertarian approach that allowed banks to originate all sorts 
of risky loans, as long as their balance sheet indicated that they abide by certain 
capital adequacy requirements. This risk-based capital requirements framework 
became the core of prudential regulation’s spirit over the last three decades or so 
and was uniformly determined at an international level through the Basel system 
of regulation. The general underlying rule was that the riskier the asset that a 
bank held on its balance sheet was the more capital in reserve would be 
required432. However, the accord known as ‘Basel II’, in line with the self-
regulation spirit of neoclassical economics, left the banks to measure the risk of 
their own assets themselves based on their internal mathematical models433. In 
essence, the aforementioned accord made it possible for the banks to assign a 
lower risk to assets that were in reality riskier, so as to be able to hold less 
capital in reserve. 
At the same time, government’s control of the economy became 
increasingly constrained as neoclassical economics were praising a monetary 
policy limited to the mere adjustment of short-term interest rates by central 
banks434. When the markets need a push, interest rates are lowered inducing 
asset bubbles435; when low interest rates create inflation, they are raised 
inducing the burst of the bubbles. 
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5.5. A case study on deregulation: The US banking regulation 
 
The deregulation of the US banking industry that took place 
progressively since the early 1980s is a hotly debated topic, since many see the 
roots of the mortgage meltdown that brought us to the post-2008 crisis in this 
process. Many of the structures that the ‘New Deal’ introduced into the US 
banking system in the 1930s to prevent the calamity of the Great Depression 
from happening again were demolished from 1980 onwards. The catalyst forces 
behind these changes were three: (i) the augmented influence that the banks had 
acquired on politics due to their role as intermediaries in the new PRM that 
channeled funds to Wall Street in order to finance the US trade deficit; (ii) the 
threat that the rising interest rates that the Fed introduced in the 1970s in order 
to fight inflation were posing to the US housing industry; and (iii) the input 
legitimacy that neoclassical libertarian economics (‘Reaganomics’) were 
offering to the reforms.  
US commercial banks were allowed again through a series of reforms 
that span from 1980 through 1999 to become major players in the securities 
industry, something that was prohibited since the days of the Great Depression. 
Understanding the neoclassical inspiration of the reforms that were introduced 
for the US banking sector during the post-Bretton Woods era means 
understanding the ‘silent’ reason behind the gradual introduction of a new major 
player in the securities industry, a critical step that helped capital markets grow 
even more and resulted in them becoming the main generator of the forces that 
brought about the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance.  
 
5.5.1. Making the asset side of banks’ balance sheet riskier 
 
Banking is both inherently risky and critical to economic stability. 
Banks can be made safe with regulation, but since safety is not their natural 
state, if the regulation is removed they have the propensity to get out of control. 
A bank is an intermediary between borrowers and savers; banks channel funds 
from savers to borrowers. They collect surplus funds from savers and allocate 
them to those with a deficit of funds. They do so by using a process that is called 
‘maturity transformation’; the transformation of securities with short maturities 
offered to depositors, into the securities with long maturities that borrowers 
desire436. So, banks borrow short-term and lend out long-term. But, there are 
certain preconditions in order for this process to be effectuated. The bank should 
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be able to borrow at a lower interest rate, than the one for which it lends. 
Otherwise it won’t be able to cover its costs. Short-term loans are less risky 
because the future is not so distant and thus it is more foreseeable; this enables 
the bank to pay a lower interest rate to depositors and charge a higher one to 
borrowers and so the bank profits from the spread. But, a higher interest rate to 
borrowers implies a higher risk undertaken by the bank. 
State legislatures in the US had traditionally since the colonial times 
used usury law, i.e. laws prohibiting excessive interest rates to be imposed on 
loans that the banks were making to borrowers437. During the 1970s the Fed, in 
order to control the money supply, had introduced very high interest rates, which 
surpassed the rate permitted by the usury ceilings in many states. This situation 
did not allow lending institutions to profit from their maturity transformation 
function. Congress sought a remedy for this issue and thus in 1980 it introduced 
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act438 
(‘DIDMCA’); section 501(a)(1)(A) preempted any state law that limited the 
interest rate charged on a first lien residential loan. Two years later a similar in 
effect act, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982439, was 
enacted for the benefit of savings & loans (‘S&Ls’) associations in the US that 
allowed them to extend adjustable rate mortgage loans. As it will be shown in 
the next section, that latter law had had a profound effect in the development of 
the leveraged buy-out market of the 1980s in the US that solidified the 
‘shareholder value’ orientation in US corporate governance and thus the Great 
Reversal in Corporate Governance. 
The DIDMCA did not only mark the end of state usury ceilings, but 
also laid the foundations for the subversion of an important ‘New Deal’ 
arrangement that was introduced through the Banking Act of 1933 (a.k.a. the 
Glass-Steagall Act)440: Regulation Q. The latter prohibited the payment of 
interest on demand deposits and authorized the Fed to set interest rate ceilings 
on time and savings deposits paid by commercial banks. Interest on deposits was 
thought at the time of the Great Depression of creating the tendency of interbank 
balances, as interior banks were depositing their reserves in banks located at 
money centers that paid an attractive interest on the deposit441. This was 
affecting the liquidity of the banking system, as it discouraged banks to lend 
more to their local communities442. It was also thought that competition for 
deposits was pushing banks to acquire riskier assets, in order to obtain the 
spread that would make them profitable443. The DIDMCA arranged the phase-
out of interest rates ceilings on time and savings deposits from 1980 to 1986 
through the co-ordination of the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
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Committee; in 2010 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010444 repealed the prohibition of interest-bearing demand 
accounts altogether. 
The relaxation of the interest rate ceilings was seen as necessary in 
order to restore the competitiveness of the –influential in the political arena- 
banking sector that during the 1970s lost many depositors to the mutual fund 
industry. The latter had found a way round Regulation Q. It introduced money 
market funds that were investment companies specializing in investing funds in 
short-term securities in order to provide investors with returns for parking short-
term cash with them. Since money market funds were technically mutual funds 
they were not subject to Regulation Q, but regulated by the Investment 
Company Act of 1940. Consequently, they were allowed to offer in essence 
interest-paying checkable accounts, thus being a competitive substitute for 
banks445. 
Again, the chain of reactions that followed the deconstruction of the 
Bretton Woods at the economy and policy level was the catalyst for the passage 
of these acts. The high interest rates prevailing in the inflationary 1970s was 
threatening the viability of the US banking sector that was at the same time left 
behind by innovations in the finance industry. The Congress had to make the 
appropriate adjustments in order not to compromise the stability of the banking 
sector. However, through this legislation the banks were enabled to make riskier 
loans; in theory, they were enabled to take on more risk than was socially 
optimal, in the sense that this risk increased the banks’ chances for failure, 
whose costs would not be borne entirely by banks. But, this eventuality was not 
seen as alarming under the lens of the neoclassical belief that banking 
institutions are in the position to manage risk themselves and self-regulate their 
activities; beliefs that were espoused back then by President Reagan’s Council 
of Economic Advisers that featured notable representatives of the libertarian 
way of thinking in economics.  
 
5.5.2. Overturning the divorce between commercial and investment 
banking 
 
In the ‘New Deal’ period it was ascertained that one of the causes of the 
Great Depression lied in the structural pathology of the US banking regulation 
that allowed the same banking organizations to engage both in commercial and 
in investment banking activities. 
During much of the Antebellum period in the US (i.e. the era preceding 
the American Civil War of 1861-65) banks were limited in core banking 
activities446. Banks were easily chartered due to the laissez-faire ideology that 
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prevailed in the post-Jacksonian era447, but incorporation was only made at the 
state level. The Civil War though urged the federal government to obtain 
financing for the military operations of the Union against the Confederacy of the 
southern States. To facilitate the obtainment of the financing, it enacted the 
National Currency Act of 1863 - restated in 1864 as the National Bank Act-, 
which allowed banks to be chartered at the federal level. These national banks 
would be chartered through the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(‘OCC’) of the Treasury Department and they would be required to purchase 
federal bonds and paper currency that the Treasury issued448. Thus, the dual 
banking system was introduced, as banks could be chartered either at the state or 
at the federal level, but the government really hoped to induce state-chartered 
banks to convert to national status, as this would also help the US obtain a 
national currency, which was impossible back then since state-chartered banks 
were issuing their own banknotes449. 
At the same time, the industrial revolution and the large infrastructure 
that was required for the expansion of the country created demand for large 
quantities of capital. New specialized firms appeared that were engaged in 
securities underwriting, especially of internal development and railroad 
bonds450. State-chartered banks exerted pressure and obtained the privilege from 
state legislatures to become active in the securities industry by acquiring the 
same powers that trust companies had. They were thus able to underwrite 
securities as well. National banks were not given the authority to engage in 
investment banking-like activities, so the regulatory competition between the 
OCC and the states for charters tilted towards the latter. 
But, national banks had to become competitive vis-à-vis the state banks. 
Thus, they devised ways to circumvent the investment banking restrictions 
either by owning directly securities affiliates451 or by having the national bank’s 
shareholders own the equity of a favored security affiliate. Eventually, the 
regulatory competition ensuing from the dual banking system prompted 
Congress to liberalize the national banks’ scope of powers and it did so with the 
McFadden Act of 1927 that enabled national banks to underwrite those 
securities that the OCC approved452. 
The Great Depression era that followed though saw many bank failures. 
The fact that commercial and investment banking activities were being pursued 
by the same institutions was seen as having changed banks’ risk profile and as 
having rendered them more prone to failure. In 1933 the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee found the banking industry to be abundant in conflict of 
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interests because of its wide array of activities453. Banks were extending loans to 
investors, who were purchasing securities in IPOs that the banks’ securities 
affiliates were underwriting. With the bank loans the IPOs’ securities price 
could be pumped up and thus enable the affiliate of the bank to get a higher 
amount in commission fees, which were calculated as a percentage of the gross 
revenues from the issuance454. In response, the Glass-Steagall Act brought the 
most radical change of the ‘New Deal’: the divorce between commercial and 
investment banking. It prohibited deposit-taking banks to engage in securities 
underwriting (sections 16 & 20), securities firms from taking deposits (section 
21) and interlocking directorates between banks and securities underwriter firms 
(section 32). 
The divorce of commercial banking from investment banking 
epitomized the environment, in which US banks were operating during the 
Golden Age. But, in the 1980s the tenets of the neoclassical thinking that 
entered US public policy in the form of ‘Reaganomics’, the strengthened 
position of the banks due to the PRM and the federal government’s reliance on 
them in order to promote homeownership, which the high interest rates of the 
1970s had damaged, all created the environment for the relaxation of the Glass-
Steagall’s prohibitions. Commercial banks were vindicating the right to 
participate as competitors in the securities business and the campaign to topple 
the Glass-Steagall Act gathered steam in the 1980s. 
Banking gained access to the securities industry not through the repeal 
of the Glass-Steagall Act, but through regulatory relief provided for by the 
federal agencies. The beginning was made in 1972 with Fed’s Regulation Y, by 
which bank holding companies were enabled to sponsor closed-end mutual 
funds. Bank holding companies, regulated by virtue of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 by the Fed, were companies that directly (i.e. through 
25% or more of the voting stock) or indirectly controlled a bank and they were 
introduced as entities in order to permit a bank to affiliate with other banks 
outside its state. In 1982 the OCC authorized Security Pacific National Bank to 
carry out discount brokerage activities without geographic limit. In 1984 the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s regulation allowed state banks, which 
were not members of the Federal Reserve System, to establish ‘bona fide’ 
securities subsidiaries and in 1985 the OCC authorized national banks to broker 
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variable rate annuities.  
These regulations were challenged at the courts by the financial services 
industry, as they were thought of being in breach of the essence of the Glass-
Steagall Act. But, under the influence of the neoclassical thinking about the 
efficiency of the securities markets, into which the banks were now entering, 
and in light of the de facto importance that the financial markets had acquired as 
a source of supplement to the falling wages and pensions within the scope of the 
finance-led model of development of the post-Bretton Woods world (see Section 
4.2.3. of the Introduction), the federal courts allowed the commercial banking 
industry to win a series of judicial battles over the validity of the aforementioned 
regulations and over interpretative issues, such as what constitutes a ‘security’ or 
‘underwriting’ under the Glass-Steagall Act455. 
The regulatory developments and the court victories led to a rapid 
consolidation of the financial services industry. The reforms that were 
effectuated judicially and administratively were essentially codified with the 
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999456 that consummated the repeal of the divorce 
between commercial and investment banking that the ‘New Deal’ had 
introduced457. This Act, apart from expanding the power of ‘well-capitalized’ 
and ‘well-managed’ banks to engage in financial activities through bank 
subsidiaries, introduced a new type of entity called the ‘financial holding 
company’ that would signify the liberalization of the activities, which bank 
holding companies would be authorized to engage in. The vehicle of 
consolidation would not be the banks themselves, but the bank holding 
companies. It’s true that even prior to the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act the powers 
of bank holding companies were more expansive than pure banking, but they 
were in principle exempted from securities activities [section (4)(c)(8) of the 
Bank Holding Act]. However, after the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act a bank holding 
company, all of whose subsidiary banks were ‘well-capitalized’ and ‘well-
managed’ could become a financial holding company and thus engage in the full 
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6. The shift in the institutional logics of corporate governance in the post-
Bretton Woods world 
 
In Section 3.1. of the Introduction it was mentioned that this study’s 
First Hypothesis adheres to the view that the reason behind the reduced rates of 
capital accumulation in the major Western economies is the orientation of 
corporate governance towards shareholder value along with the fact that 
shareholders have been increasingly short-termists. So far, I have presented 
several developments that have contributed to these two great reversals, such as 
the growing presence of US institutional investors in insider countries’ 
corporations’ shareholder structure and the burgeoning of the US capital markets 
due to the growth of the pension funds industry and due to the entrance of 
Universal Banking in the US and the Two Great 
Reversals 
 
The deregulation spirit of neoclassical economics 
that gathered steam during the 1980s laid the intellectual 
foundations for the gradual fall of the barriers that 
separated commercial banking from securities activities in 
the US since the time of the New Deal. The new ideology 
along with the political and economic reality that the 
inflationary 1970s had given rise to became the catalyst 
forces behind the institutional change that allowed banks to 
emerge as full competitors in the securities business. 
Universal banking became another contributing factor of 
the burgeoning of the US capital markets in the post-
Bretton Woods world that helped change the institutional 
logics of corporate governance towards shareholder value. 
The reemergence of universal banking influenced 
the shareholders’ time-horizons as well. Banks’ investment 
subsidiaries have underwritten relatively small issues 
compared to independent investment banks and thus 
enabled a greater number of small firms to go public and 
offer their securities to investors. The growth in the 
presence of smaller firms in the stock markets has reduced 
the average holding period of shares, because a great 
percentage of the latter are issued by these small firms, 
which are generally considered riskier than larger ones and 
thus require investors to rebalance their portfolio more 
regularly, an act that inevitably shortens the holding 
period. 
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commercial banks into the securities business. However, none of these 
developments would actually push towards this direction, if it wasn’t for a shift 
in the intellectual paradigm of corporate governance that emerged within the 
neoclassical economics movement in the 1970s. 
As a result of the new theoretical developments in the theory of the firm 
during the 1970s and some stock market events of the 1980s that de facto made 
managers espouse this theory, the institutional logics of corporate governance 
changed; first, in the US and then in the other Western economies.  
The set of values and rules that prevailed in corporate governance 
during the Golden Age of Capitalism and allowed the Fordist mode of economic 
growth to flourish (see Introduction, 4.2.3.) was epitomized in the model of the 
‘Chandlerian’ corporation that carried with it the spirit of long-termism. 
Thereafter, the shareholder value ideology unrooted the institutions of the 
Chandlerian corporation and brought about the seed for increasing deference to 
a group of stakeholders, who were predominantly short-termists. 
 
6.1. The ‘Chandlerian’ corporation of the Golden Age: ‘retain and invest’ 
 
The late Alfred Chandler, a prominent historian of the organizational 
synthesis of capitalism, intended to engage in  
 
‘the development of generalizations and concepts which, although 
derived from events and actions that occur at a specific time and 
place, are applicable to other times and places, and are, therefore, 
valuable as guideposts for or as tools of analysis by […] other 
scholars.’458 
 
To be sure, Chandler used the outcomes from the study of the comparative 
development of the large industrial corporation in the US, the UK and Germany 
to identify the dynamics of industrial capitalism459. The key to these dynamics 
were found to be the organizational capabilities of the enterprise, i.e. the 
collective physical facilities and human skills, as they were organized within the 
enterprise. These facilities had to be carefully coordinated to ensure that the firm 
would continue to grow460: 
 
‘one of the most critical tasks of top management has always been 
to maintain these capabilities and to integrate these facilities and 
skills into a unified organization –so that the whole becomes more 
than the sum of its parts. Such organizational capabilities in turn 
have provided the source –the dynamic- for the continuing growth 
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of the enterprise. They have made possible the earnings that 
supplied much of the funding of such growth. […] Because of 
these capabilities the basic goal of the modern industrial 
enterprise became long-term profits based on long-term growth- 
growth that increased the productivity, and so the competitive 
power, that drive the expansion of industrial capitalism. ‘461 
 
Chandler provides the description of a corporation that produces 
positive dynamics for the capital accumulation in an economy, a key factor for 
economic growth (see Section 7.2 below). The long-term horizons of the 
Chandlerian firm allowed it to see profits as the source of investment funds and 
as the stimulus to further investment. Much like in the Marxian law of capitalist 
production, where surplus value converts into capital for the purpose of 
producing more surplus value462, the Chandlerian firm contributed through the 
virtue of patience in the growth of fixed capital formation, which lies in the 
center of the crucial capital accumulation process. The institutional logics of the 
Chandlerian firm can be summarized in the phrase ‘retain and invest’463. 
The Chandlerian firm seems to espouse organicism as well (‘the whole 
becomes more than the sum of its parts’). This means that the corporation is not 
a mere reflection of the various desires of the individuals within it. This may 
seem abstract, but it is crucial for the normative theory of the firm that flows 
from the Chandlerian model. By espousing organicism the Chandlerian 
corporation distinguishes itself from the positive and normative view that the 
neoclassical theory has upon the firm, which is based on methodological 
individualism. Under the lens of the latter the firm is hiding the true intentions 
and preferences of the individuals that are its constituents464. This precondition 
legitimizes the normative proposal of the neoclassical theory that the objective 
of the firm should coincide with the objective of one of its constituents: the 
shareholders. 
 Inside the Chandlerian firm there seems to be though one crucial 
constituent that guarantees that the corporation moves towards the fulfillment of 
its goal, which is long-term profits based on long-term growth. This 
constituency is the management; what Chandler called the ‘visible hand’ of 
managerial coordination that had replaced the Smithian invisible hand of the 
market465. 
 The managerial revolution was an institutional structure though that 
emerged largely due to the absence of strong capital markets during the greatest 
part of the era of industrial capitalism (from the late 19th century until the 
1970s). In the US there was consciousness of the existence of that situation in 
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corporate governance through the seminal analysis of Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) that identified the 
separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation; the equity 
capital was dispersed and the shareholders had traded control for liquidity with 
the result being a high level of autonomy for the managerial team. The market 
mechanism was not influential for the US ‘managerial capitalism’ despite the 
existence of liquid stock markets466. In Europe the concentration of ownership 
and the stability of the shareholder base did not give rise to the separation of 
ownership and control in European corporations, but had the same effect, as they 
made managers insensible to the capital markets logic. Profits could be retained 
and reinvested for the future, rather than be distributed to the shareholders467. 
 
6.2. The shareholder value ideology: ‘downsize and distribute’ 
 
6.2.1. The departure from the neoclassical theory of the firm and the ‘nexus 
of contracts’ approach 
 
For the greatest part of the 20th century most of the academic literature 
produced in the field of the theory of organizations was influenced by the 
neoclassical conception of exchange, as it was established by the Walrasian 
exchange theory468. Based on this model of exchange, the firm was represented 
by a production function, which specified the level of output that is obtained 
when given levels of inputs are chosen469. The production opportunity set 
available to the firm was defined in terms of its boundary; what is the maximum 
obtainable output quantity for different levels of input quantities, given the state 
of technology and knowledge470? Within the neoclassical paradigm the firm was 
viewed as a ‘black box’471, where everything operates smoothly and efficiently, 
while the internal decision making machinery was not explicated472. Despite the 
fact that there had been some critical approaches to this view of the firm473, the 
vast majority of economists insisted on portraying the firm as implicitly 
marginalistic474 and they focused exclusively on how firms make the optimal 
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production choices. In a perfectly competitive market, the members of the firm 
would have the proper incentives for maximizing their utility levels and they 
would move towards profit maximization, which implies cost minimization. 
There was no worry about how the owners of the firm succeed in aligning the 
objectives of its various members. Incentive considerations that could arise from 
the assumption that the members of the firm have individually different 
objectives were not incorporated in the neoclassical model.  Even authors who 
conducted research within the framework of the theory of teams and recognized 
the decentralized nature of information within a team postulated identical 
objective functions for the members of a firm475. This seemed to be a broader 
problem of the general equilibrium theory, which did not account for 
informational asymmetries and the full complexity of strategic interactions 
between privately informed agents476. At the same time, the neoclassical 
paradigm gave no explanation why particular activities are organized within 
firms; in other words it did not pin down the boundaries of the firm, thus failing 
to explain differences in size and shape. With all these questions unanswered the 
time came to open the ‘black box’ and examine the actual workings of the 
corporate mechanism inside477. 
The question that the neoclassical theory of the firm left open with 
regard to the boundaries of the firm was addressed by Ronald Coase in his much 
celebrated paper The Nature of the Firm478. Coase argued that outside the firm 
the price mechanism operates in all transactions, while within the firm 
operations are controlled by the direction of the entrepreneur. The range of 
transactions over which the price mechanism is replaced by the authority of an 
entrepreneur-coordinator constitutes the boundaries of the firm479. Direction by 
the entrepreneur can be more efficient than using the price mechanism; in other 
words organizational costs can be lower than price mechanism costs and 
whenever this is the case, the firm structure will be preferred instead of 
contracting in the open market.  
While Coase focused on the boundaries of the firm by emphasizing the 
role of authority in distinguishing it from what happens in the conventional 
market, another group of authors buckled down to the task of integrating 
incentive considerations in the theory of the firm.  
This new way to study the firm was the result of a general departure 
from the general equilibrium theory, which did not encompass asymmetric 
information and the potential for manipulation of private information that 
economic agents might possess480.  The starting point of these authors’ analysis 
was the assumption that some of the inputs of the firm’s production function 
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may have a quality that is endogenous, rather than exogenous481. That means 
that the value of an input, which will affect the production output, may depend 
partially on the effort the manager expends, so that a key issue in every firm is 
how to provide the manager with the proper incentives to improve this quality.  
The reference to the matter of incentives linked the whole issue to the 
so-called ‘incentive theory’482, which analyzes the problem of delegating a task 
to an agent with private information483. Thus, the principal-agent model started 
to play a key role in the discourse about the theory of the firm. This model uses 
the contract governing the relationship between the principal and the agent as 
the unit of analysis for the firm484, thus departing from the neoclassical 
paradigm and the ‘authoritarian’ Coasean approach485 and hence moving 
towards a contractarian approach.  
Under the contractarian approach, transactions within the firm and 
transactions outside the firm are part of a continuum of contractual relations486. 
Therefore, the firm is not an arena for authority and direction as Coase 
postulated, but an arena for making contracts487; a nexus for a set of contractual 
relationships488. The term ‘contract’, however, in this context does not refer to 
the legal notion of contract, but has a much broader range of coverage489; it 
refers to an economist’s view of the contract as any reciprocal institutional 
arrangement between two or more parties that influences and coordinates 




6.2.2. The agency theory 
   
The principal-agent model that was put in the center of the contractarian 
approach of the theory of the firm had to be elaborated further. Jensen and 
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Meckling491 with the aid of the micro-analytical tools of contract theory492 
identified the separation of ownership and control as the essence of the agency 
problem of the firm and focused their efforts on developing the most efficient 
contract governing the shareholder-manager relationship given assumptions 
about people, organization and information493.  
Jensen and Meckling drew inspiration for their theory from the 
diagnosis of the governance structure of the US public corporation, i.e. the 
positive part of the Berle/Means thesis. Berle and Means had illustrated the 
divergence of the interests of the management and the shareholders with the 
following words: 
 
‘[…] the various devices by which management and control have 
absorbed a portion of the profit-stream have been so intimately 
related to the business conduct of an enterprise, that the courts seem 
to have felt not only reluctant to interfere, but positively afraid to 
do so.’494 
  
What Berle and Means meant in the aforementioned quotation is that 
misappropriations proceed from the very of process of management itself; 
managers may wish to expand their wealth and power at the expense of 
equity495. However, the fundamental divergence of the interests of management 
and shareholdership, around which the modern agency theory is centered, had 
been identified by Adam Smith 150 years before Berle and Means: 
 
‘The directors of such companies, however, being the managers 
rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be 
expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own. […] Negligence and profusion, therefore, 
must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs 
of such a company.’496 
                                                
491 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure, 3 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS  305 
492 Jacques Lenoble, From an Incentive to a Reflexive Approach to Corporate Governance, in 
COPRORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH (2003), 20 
493 The issue of incentives to management was touched upon explicitly almost fifty years before Jensen 
and Meckling developed the agency theory framework by Chester Barnard in his book THE FUNCTIONS 
OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938), 139: ‘An essential element of organizations is the willingness of persons to 
contribute their individual efforts to the cooperative system… Inadequate incentives mean dissolution or 
changes of organization purpose, or failure to cooperate. Hence, in all sorts of organizations the affording 
of adequate incentives becomes the most definitely emphasized task in their existence. It is probably in 
this aspect of executive work that failure is most pronounced’. 
494 ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), 
296 
495 AGLIETTA & REBERIOUX, supra note 466, 26 
496 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS [1792] 
(1804), VOL. II, 192 
CORPORATE LAW & ECONOMIC STAGNATION 
 
Now, agency theory develops a theory of contracts in cases, which are 
characterized by asymmetric information and by a divergence of incentives 
between the parties. The foremost agency problem, with which proponents of 
this theory are concerned, is the one that governs the relationship between the 
equity capital suppliers of the firm and the managers; a problem that derives 
from the separation of management and finance497. As in every agency 
relationship, the contractual relationship between the shareholders (the 
principals) and the managers (the agents) is characterized by three essential 
elements:  
(i) The objectives of the principal and the agent do not concur, in 
the sense that they have different utility functions; thus, the 
maximization of each one’s utility depends on the undertaking of 
different actions and the making of different decisions. 
(ii) The principal and the agent have different attitudes toward risk; 
they may prefer different actions because of their different risk 
preferences (the problem of ‘risk sharing’)498. 
(iii) It is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the 
agent is actually doing and if she behaves appropriately. Due to 
asymmetry of information individual actions cannot be easily 
observed499. 
These elements create a problem that is more broadly known as ‘moral 
hazard’500. In essence, the greatest part of the so-called ‘agency costs’ are moral 
hazard costs501. Therefore, when agency theory states that a corporate 
governance institution should be conducive for reducing agency costs, it means 
that a governance structure should help alleviate the moral hazard problem that 
governs the relationship between the shareholders and the managers. Institutions 
of corporate governance should reduce the range of actions, for which the equity 
capital suppliers have disutility while the managers have utility, by generating 
an optimal incentive scheme. 
But, why out of all the contracts that constitute the firm, the agency 
contract between the shareholders and the managers is the most important? 
Agency theorists are -in their own words- concerned with ‘the survival of 
organizations in which important decision agents do not bear a substantial 
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share of the wealth effects of their decisions’502. Therefore, in their view what 
needs to be identified is the corporate constituency, towards the interests of 
which the corporate contract should direct decisions, so that it can add to the 
survival value of the corporation503. This corporate constituency is the one that 
carries the residual risk, i.e. the risk of the difference between stochastic inflows 
of resources and promised payments to agents; in other words, the one that 
contracts for the rights to net cash flows504. In the corporate form this 
constituency is the shareholder. The shareholder is the one, in whose interest it 
is to produce outputs at lower cost, because that would increase the net cash 
flows; but lower costs contribute to the survival of the organization as well. 
For the above reasons the agency relationship, which is at the center of 
the analysis of the firm, is the one between the manager and the shareholders. 
The combination of the agency perspective and the function of the residual risk-
taking within an organization results in the agency theory; a construct that is not 
neutral from a normative point of view, as it carries within it the idea that the 
optimal corporate contract is the one that takes steps to maximize shareholder 
value. In other words, from a normative viewpoint the agency theory advocates 
that the corporate governance mechanisms that will contribute to the alignment 
of the interests of the manager and the shareholders will improve the efficiency 
of the corporation. 
 One of these governance mechanisms that reduces agency costs and 
indirectly helps to align management’s incentives with those of the shareholders 
is the distribution of dividends to the latter. Higher dividends reduce the amount 
of free cash flows available for investment spending with the result being the 
need of the firm to seek further external financing, in order to realize its plans. 
Greater external finance, be it in the form of equity or debt, will enhance the 
monitoring of the management and thus reduce agency costs505; the raising of 
more equity capital will increase the attention that managers will pay to the 
share price and thus they will be incentivized to do what it takes to pump this 
price up, while debt has exceptional disciplining effects on management. Given 
that free cash flows are traditionally considered as a source of agency costs, it 
follows that the distribution of dividends and the concomitant borrowing that 
forces managers to make fixed payments to creditors can contribute to the 
reduction of agency costs and hence to the maximization of the firm’s value506. 
Removing free cash from the corporation means removing an opportunity for 
the insiders to inflate their private benefits. This is why the agency theory and its 
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shareholder value approach favor the proliferation of the institutional logics of 
‘downsize and distribute’ in modern corporate governance. 
 
6.2.3. The shareholder value’s handmaidens: US manufacturing sector’s 
reduced competitiveness, the antitrust law-triggered LBO boom of the 
1980s, US institutional investors in Europe and executive compensation 
 
The fact that the agency theory with its preference for the maximization 
of shareholder value rose to prominence in the intellectual sphere does not mean 
that it automatically penetrated the real world of corporations and instantly 
became the ‘holy grail’ of corporate governance in action. There were many 
chapters in the story between the appearance of the shareholder value approach 
in some academic papers in the 1970s and the pronouncement by the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance in 1999 that corporations should be run in 
the interests of shareholders. 
The bottom line is that just like Monetarism and New Classical 
Macroeconomics found Keynesianism vulnerable due to some factual 
circumstances and became the dominant economic policy approaches (see 
Section 5.1), so did agency theory took momentum in the late 1970s and 
gradually managed to displace the Chandlerian institutional logics of ‘retain and 
invest’, as a result of a series of events that were unfavorable for the latter. 
During the 1960s US public corporations had grown excessively and 
moved beyond their core competencies within the framework of a conglomerate 
merger movement; a conglomerate merger is a merger between firms operating 
in unrelated industries507. This movement was fueled by a booming economy 
and by the slowdown of defense expenditures that urged many large firms in the 
aerospace and natural resources industry that were dependent on the 
procurement contracts of the Pentagon to seek new partners. But, what actually 
pushed firms to engage in a diversification strategy by effectuating 
conglomerate mergers was a heightened antitrust atmosphere during the 1960s 
that grew out of the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, which strengthened the 
antimerger provisions of the Clayton Act of 1914508. According to the Clayton 
Act the acquisition by one firm of the equity of another firm of the same 
industry could be enjoined by the Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’) if the 
resulting business combination would have an anticompetitive effect in that 
industry; but, corporations were off the hook if the business combination was 
effectuated not as a share acquisition, but as an asset acquisition. The Celler-
Kefauver Act closed that last loophole and expansionary Chandlerian-minded 
managers were left with no other option, but to form a conglomerate with a firm 
from another industry that would obviously not have an anticompetitive 
effect509. The dominant antitrust policy paradigm of the 1950s and the 1960s in 
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the US was the so-called ‘Structure-Conduct-Performance’ (‘SCP’) that had put 
forward a theory, which predicted that the more closely the market in question 
approaches the state of monopoly the worse its performance in terms of 
economic welfare gets510. The demon of antitrust policy were high levels of 
concentration in a specific industry and under the influence of the SCP paradigm 
the US Supreme Court had developed legal standards for scrutinizing mergers 
based on the concentration of the industry and the market shares of the merging 
firms511. Therefore, the only way to satisfy the Chandlerian tendency for 
expansion was to look for partners beyond the firm’s industry. 
However, the macroeconomic environment of the 1970s was not 
favorable to the large Chandlerian conglomerate, to which the heightened 
antitrust spirit of the 1950s and 1960s had given rise to. The Great Stagflation 
left large firms with undervalued assets, low market capitalization and low 
profitability. Many of the young conglomerates were not performing well512. At 
the same time the US mass production industries of automobiles, consumer 
electronics and machinery were being challenged by the Japanese industry513. 
As a result, there was a growing disbelief in the ability of the ‘visible hand’ of 
managerial control to allocate resources in the economy efficiently; this disbelief 
was further reinforced by the rise to dominance during the same period of 
neoclassical economics that carried with them the conviction that the market –
the ‘invisible hand’- is superior to management in the efficient allocation of 
resources514.  
While the institutional logics of ‘retain and invest’ were being 
weakened, the agency theory with its preference for the shareholder-friendly 
‘downsize and distribute’ model had already made its appearance. But, its 
proliferation in the real corporate world had to wait for a second large takeover 
movement during the 1980s. 
The second large takeover movement would be triggered again by a 
change in the antitrust rules. The Chicagoan branch of neoclassical economics 
would come to play a catalyst role in this respect. The Chicago School of 
antitrust analysis was developing a new competing to the SCP competition 
policy paradigm. The connection between industry concentration and 
anticompetitive effects was relaxed by Chicagoans; through a typical cost-
benefit analysis they managed to show that anticompetitive behavior in a 
concentrated industry is simply not in the oligopolists’ interest515. In the words 
of a Chicagoan representative: ‘the desire to make a buck leads people to 
undermine monopolistic practices’ 516. This phrase epitomizes the hallmark of 
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the Chicago approach to political economy; the market can cure itself and needs 
no legal intervention from the state. Under the Chicago approach to antitrust law 
and policy, the legal standard shifts from an inquiry into market power to an 
effects-based approach about whether the practice in question is efficient. The 
new US Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice (‘DoJ’) in Reagan’s administration espoused the Chicago 
approach and thus under his guidance the DoJ Merger Guidelines of 1968 were 
rewritten in 1981 reflecting the new paradigm517. According to the new 
Guidelines almost all mergers except those that led to a concentration ratio of 
80% in the same product line would be approved by the FTC518; mergers were 
thus facilitated. In addition to this, Reaganite corporate income tax cuts, also left 
capital free for takeover finance; a new takeover movement emerged. 
But, this takeover movement would have some distinguishing 
characteristics that were formed due to the combination of an important 
financial innovation and the deregulation of the pension fund and banking 
industry. 
Michael Milken, an employee of the investment bank of Drexel, 
Burnham and Lambert started in the late 1970s a high-yield bond trading 
department, which would enable the investment bank to underwrite ‘junk’ 
investment-grade bonds (‘junk bonds’). A 1978 ERISA amendment and the 
enactment of the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 (see Section 5.5.1) created a 
demand for junk bonds, as pension funds and S&L associations were now 
allowed by law to invest in them. Soon a highly liquid junk bond market 
developed centered around Drexel, which fed the 1980s leveraged-buyouts 
(‘LBOs’) boom. Potential acquirors would raise acquisition debt by issuing junk 
bonds and secure their creditors’ claims against the assets and the future cash 
flows of the target corporation; with the proceeds from the junk bond issuance 
they would launch a public takeover bid for the target’s shares.  
Under the ‘buy it, flip it, sell it’ strategy of the private equity funds that 
were orchestrating the LBOs, the target’s stock price had to be pumped up after 
the acquisition, so that the acquiror could exit her investment later at a profit. 
This made the stock price the ‘holy grail’ for a target’s post-LBO managers and 
fueled in practice the trend towards maximizing shareholder value through 
infamous practices, such as asset stripping and layoffs that in aggregate had had 
the effect of reducing business capital accumulation.  
On the other hand, target’s pre-LBO management could only fend off 
the attack by a corporate raider by focusing on the share price; only if the latter 
was high enough could the acquisition be made prohibitively expensive for the 
potential acquiror. Thus, even in that case maximizing shareholder value became 
the key to keeping the company intact. Therefore, those involved in the market 
for corporate control of the 1980s became out of necessity acquainted with the 
normative tenet of the agency theory, the maximization of the shareholder value. 
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The acquaintance of the US corporate community with the shareholder 
value approach to corporate governance during the 1980s takeover movement 
was later exported to Europe. This peculiar export was effected firstly as a result 
of the cross-listing of European corporations in the NYSE and the issuance of 
ARDs to US institutional investors (for the case of the UK see 4.3.2) and due to 
the fact that European countries were looking to expand their financial markets 
from the late 1980s onwards by offering equity stakes in corporations to US 
institutional investors, many of whom took an activist stance against the 
stakeholderist practice of European boards (see for the case of France in 4.3.3.).  
For instance in 2001 the California Public Employees Retirement 
System (‘CalPERS’), a US pension fund that is one of the largest shareholders 
in the world, allocated $1.7bn of its investments specifically to pursue activist 
corporate governance strategies in European and Japanese corporations519. Even 
earlier than that, in 1997, CalPERS was issuing guidelines, as to how it would 
vote in French corporations’ annual general meetings520, while the same year 
Institutional Shareholder Services (‘ISS’), the champion US proxy advisor at the 
time, opened a branch in Paris to make inroads into the European corporate 
governance521. Especially, in France, where large domestic pension funds were 
not present at the time when many SOEs were being privatized, minority equity 
stakes in many French corporations were bought by US institutional investors, 
whose shareholdings in French companies increased from 15% to 25% between 
1990 and 1994522.  
However, the main driving force behind the penetration of the 
shareholder value ideology in boardrooms was the executive compensation 
programs that were heavily based on stock options. This has been and still is a 
very popular topic in corporate governance literature with an abundance of 
exhaustive studies on how executive compensation managed to align the 
interests of the managers and the shareholders in both outsider and insider 
countries and bring about the convergence in corporate governance systems. I 
will, thus, restrain myself from analyzing the issue here, but I revert to it under 
Chapter Three (see Section 2.5. of Chapter Three), where I try to prove that 
corporate law reforms that promoted the Great Reversal in Corporate 
Governance.  
                                                
519 Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Turns Up Corporate Governance Heat (Nov. 15, 2001). Available 
at http://www.calpers.org/whatsnew/press/2001/1115a.htm  
520 French Corporate Governance Issues Far From Being Resolved, AFX NEWS, July 7, 1997 
521 ISS Forms Link with French Firm, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS  (Feb. 6, 1995), at 18 
522 Joel Chernoff, French Investor’s Institutions Boost Equity, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, August 4, 
1997, at 16 
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The Takeover Movement of the 1980s and the Great 
Reversal in Corporate Governance 
 
The shareholder value approach, whose efficiency 
was praised by the agency theory, proliferated in US 
boardrooms during the 1980s due to the hostile takeover 
movement that was nurtured by the spontaneous 
creation of a market for junk bonds and the shift in the 
institutional logics of US antitrust law and merger 
control, as a result of the rise to dominance of the 
neoclassical Chicagoan paradigm in competition policy. 
Pumping up the share price by means of the adoption of 
shareholder value-enhancing strategies was the only way 
for management to defend against the threat of a hostile 
tender offer, while the profitable secondary sale of a firm 
by an acquiror also required the pumping up of the share 
price through similar measures. US institutional 
investors became acquainted with the shareholder value 
culture of the 1980s and exported it to Europe, which 
from the late 1980s sought to attract US investors to 
European corporations within the scope of the national 
financial liberalization and privatization programs 
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7. Backing the First Hypothesis: Are there indications that the post-Bretton 
Woods economic stagnation is attributable to the Great Reversal in 
Corporate Governance and the Great Reversal in Shareholdership? 
 
In this final section of Chapter One indications and empirical data are 
provided that support this study’s First Hypothesis, i.e. that the Great Reversal 
in Corporate Governance and the Great Reversal in Shareholdership, which 
occurred due to the array of institutions presented in Figures 9 and 10 and due to 
developments in corporate law that are discussed within the scope of the Second 
and Third Hypotheses in Chapters Three and Four respectively, have caused the 
high equity payout ratios and the concomitant low retention ratios in 
corporations, which are trends responsible for the slowdown in the growth rates 
of capital accumulation that is in turn responsible for the slowdown in economic 
growth in the post-Bretton Woods era. The discussion as to the plausibility of 
the First Hypothesis will be completed in Chapter Two with the presentation of 
the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm that models that influence of shareholder 
value orientation and short-termism on capital accumulation dynamics. 
 




7.1. The post-Bretton Woods economic stagnation 
 
After the exceptionally high rates of growth of the Golden Age the 
major Western economies seem to have entered a stagnation mode from 1973 
onwards, as it becomes evident by the average annual GDP growth rates of 17 
OECD countries in the post-Bretton Woods era (Figure 11). For the first 25 
years following the breakdown of the system of fixed exchange rates, during 
which most of the changes in the international political economy discussed in 
Sections 3-6 took place, no developed economy apart from Norway had an 
average annual growth rate above 3%, while the first decade of the 21st century 
Great Reversal in 
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marks an increase in the average GDP growth rate, which is, however, nowhere 
close to the growth rates of the Golden Age.  
There are several plausible explanations of why the major Western 
economies have experienced this slowdown in their rates of growth from the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and onwards. One could dedicate an 
entire book to present the interpretations that economists have given to the 
phenomenon (for a summary see Section 7.7). In light of the limitations that this 
study has set for itself in the Introduction, what I am going to do in the 
following sub-sections is focus on a widely-accepted determinant of economic 
growth, capital accumulation, and then attempt to unravel the skein of how the 
Great Reversal in Corporate Governance and the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership may have affected the trends in the accumulation of capital. 
The discussion on the causality chain between the two great reversals and the 
rates of economic growth will be completed in Chapter Two, but this final 
section of Chapter One provides some preliminary explanation as to how the 
reorientation of corporate governance towards shareholder value and the 
simultaneous short-termism of the shareholders causally relate to the slowdown 









Austria 2.41 0.25 5.35 2.36 2.44 
Belgium 2.02 1.03 4.08 2.08 2.17 
Denmark 2.66 2.55 3.81 2.09 1.63 
Finland 2.74 2.69 4.94 2.44 3.29 
France 1.63 1.15 5.05 2.10 1.96 
Germany 2.81 0.30 5.68 1.76 3.86 
Greece 2.23 1.41 6.98 2.22 3.86 
Italy 1.94 1.49 5.64 2.28 1.19 
Netherlands 2.16 2.43 4.74 2.39 2.43 
Norway 2.12 2.93 4.06 3.48 2.21 
Spain 1.68 1.03 6.81 2.47 3.45 
Sweden 2.17 2.74 3.73 1.65 2.97 
Switzerland 2.55 2.60 4.51 1.05 2.07 
Portugal 1.27 2.35 5.73 2.88 1.6 
UK 1.90 1.19 2.93 2.00 2.54 
USA 3.94 2.84 3.93 2.99 2.58 
Japan 2.44 2.21 9.29 2.97 1.24 
 
Figure 11 – Annual average compound GDP growth rates (in %) in 17 
OECD countries, 1870-2008 
Source: For the years up to 1998: Angus Maddison, The World Economy, Vol. 
2: Historical Statistics (OECD 2006); for the years 1999 to 2008: OECD 
National Accounts  
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7.2. The post-Bretton Woods slowdown in capital accumulation 
 
The GDP depicts the market value of all final goods and services 
produced within a country in a given period of time. Its four basic components 
are consumption, investment, government purchases and net exports. A great 
deal of the production process and the investment in capitalist economies takes 
place within firms, so that the growth of business GDP is decisive for the 
growth of the overall real GDP of an economy. It follows that the business GDP 
grows if the productivity of business grows. Productivity is the quantity of 
goods and services produced from each unit of labor input523. It follows that 
productivity’s two major determinants is the human capital factor and the 
physical capital factor. The physical capital, i.e. the stock of equipment and 
structures that are used to produce goods and services524, though is a suis 
generis input in the production process, in the sense that it is a produced factor 
of production; physical capital, which at a given moment in time becomes an 
input of production, was at some point in the past an output from the production 
process525. Consequently, one way to raise future productivity (and further the 
GDP) is by investing more current resources out of savings or profits in the 
production of physical capital that will later become a valuable input thus 
ensuring productivity also in the years to come. This process of investment in 
real capital goods and tangible means of production is called (physical) capital 
accumulation. 
The oversimplified analysis above already indicates how important 
physical capital accumulation is for the growth of a GDP of an economy. 
However, a brief recap of the main traditions within the literature of economic 
growth will show that indeed (physical) capital accumulation, as the result of 
deliberate investment decisions, is widely-accepted as a robust source of long-
run economic growth regardless of the philosophical presuppositions of the 
various economic schools of thought.  
Classical economists, although they failed to produce a theory 
appropriate to industrial capitalism526, recognized that the accumulation and 
productive investment of a part of the social product is the main source of 
economic growth and that in the capitalist economy this process takes the form 
of the reinvestment of profits527.  
Karl Marx saw accumulation of capital as the main driving force of 
capitalist development; through the process of converting surplus value into 
capital, the capitalist economy has in Marxian theory the inner logic of an 
inherently expansionary system528. 
                                                
523 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (4TH ED.), 554 
524 N. Gregory Mankiw, The Growth of Nations, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, VOL. 
1995, 275, 289 
525 MANKIW, supra note 523, at 556 
526 DAVID LEVINE, ECONOMIC STUDIES: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1977) 
527 DONALD HARRIS, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION (1978), 4 
528 Id., at 14-15 
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The neoclassical model of growth, centered on Solow’s production 
function of capital and labor529, emphasizes as well the role of physical capital 
accumulation for long-run economic development530. 
The endogenous growth theory, which developed as a response to some 
deficiencies of the neoclassical model of growth, does not underestimate the 
physical capital accumulation’s significance, but expands the definition of 
‘capital’ to include human capital as well and emphasizes the role of investment 
in skills and knowledge531. Physical capital accumulation is seen as introducing 
positive externalities in the framework of the endogenous growth theory, 
because the creation of economy-wide knowledge is viewed as a by-product of 
the investment activity of individual firms (‘learning by investing’)532. 
Since (physical) capital accumulation is –without serious doubts- such 
an important co-determinant of economic growth, then it is plausible to suggest 
that the post-Bretton Woods stagnation might have been caused by a slowdown 
in the accumulation rate, i.e. in the growth rate of the gross business capital 
stock. Therefore, it is appropriate to ask ourselves at this point whether there is 
indeed evidence that the growth rate of the gross fixed (business) capital 
formation has been slowing down from 1973 onwards. Figures 12 and 13 
provide a positive answer to this question for the case of four of the world’s 
strongest economies (France, UK, US, The Netherlands). 
In the United States, France and The Netherlands we notice a similar 
trend; while the rate of growth of private non-residential (a.k.a. ‘business’) 
capital stock is relatively stable during the Golden Age and reaches a high point 
around the years 1972-1974 (i.e. when the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates definitively collapses), it has high fluctuations and persistently 
decreases after that point never reaching again the all-times-high of the Golden 
Age. The UK is the only economy that has experienced a high enough growth 
rate of its capital base at certain years during the post-Bretton Woods era, but 
shows signs of a slowdown from the late 1990s onwards. However, the linear 
regression trend line in Figure 13, shows that even for the case of the UK the 
long-term trend in capital accumulation is declining.  
The Netherlands have been included in the calculations of the growth 
rate of accumulation of business capital, in order to show how developments 
concerning capital accumulation have played out in a country, whose businesses 
function along the lines of the Rhenish model of corporate governance, since the 
collection of reliable relevant data for the German business capital accumulation 
is difficult due to the pre-1990 division of Germany. However, data were 
collected regarding the investment rate in Germany for the period 1970 - 2010 
                                                
529 See Robert Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 65 
530 Mankiw, supra note 524, 275-80 
531 See Robert Lucas, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 JOURNAL OF MONETARY 
ECONOMICS 3; Paul Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth, 94 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 1002; Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 89 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
571 
532 See Romer, supra note 531 
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(Figure 14); the investment rate, which is calculated as gross fixed capital 
formation to GDP, is a widely used proxy for the rate of the capital 
accumulation in an economy533. Therefore, in light of the clearly falling 
investment rate in Germany, it is safe to conclude that the rate of physical 
capital accumulation in Europe’s largest economy is also in constant decline 
during the post-Bretton Woods era, which might be a plausible explanation for 
the slowdown in economic growth during the same period.
                                                
533 Studies using the investment rate as a proxy for capital accumulation include the following: Dongchul 
Cho, Industrialization, Convergence and Patterns of Growth, 61 SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 398; 
Sherman Robinson, Sources of Growth in Less Developed Countries: A Cross-Section Study, 85 THE 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 391; Ferdinando Targetii & Alessandro Foti, Growth and 
Productivity: A Model of Cumulative Growth and Catching Up, 21 CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
22; Rosa Capolupo & Giuseppe Celi, Openness and Growth in Central Eastern European Countries, 58 
ECONOMIA INTERNAZIONALE 141 
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7.3. The reducing retention ratio of corporations in the post-Bretton Woods 
era 
 
Within the scope of the recap of the theories of economic growth in the 
previous sub-section it became evident that in the process of physical capital 
accumulation the mechanism of reinvestment of profits on behalf of 
corporations is central. Therefore, in light of what was discussed under Section 
6 regarding the shift in the institutional logics of corporate governance from a 
‘retain and invest’ to a ‘downsize and distribute’ model, one could logically 
assume that corporations in the post-Bretton Woods era running on the latter 
model were reinvesting profits at a smaller rate than during the Golden Age and 
this is why the slowdown in capital accumulation has occurred. The question to 
be posed here is whether there is evidence that corporations have indeed 
behaved this way. 
What needs to be done in this respect, is to check the historical trend in 
firms’ retention ratio, in other words to verify whether firms statistically tend to 
keep a lesser percentage of their net income inside them as time goes by. Figure 
15 identifies that this hypothesis hold true at least for US NFCs. 
From the late 1970s onwards it is obvious that there is a persistent 
reduction in the retention ratio of US NFCs, which possibly explains the 
slowdown in the rate of accumulation that has been observed for the US during 
the same period in Figure 13. To illustrate the similar path that the retention rate 
and the capital accumulation rate have followed over the past decades in the US 
and thus depict the interrelationship between the process of reinvestment of 
corporate profits and the growth rate in the business capital stock, I put the two 
trends ‘cheek-to-cheek’ in Figure 16 below, as others have done as well534. 
What emerges from that juxtaposition is the fact that retained profits condition 
accumulation535. 
                                                
534 Till van Treeck, The Political Economy Debate on Financialisation – A Macroeconomic Perspective, 
16 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 907, 923; GERARD DUMENIL & DOMINIQUE LEVY, 
THE CRISIS OF NEOLIBERALISM (2011), 152 
535 DUMENIL & LEVY, supra note 534, 153 
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7.4. ‘Downsize and distribute’ in action: The evolution of corporate payout 
policy in the post-Bretton Woods era 
 
7.4.1. The increasing equity payout ratio of capital-intensive firms 
 
Financial economics suggest that the retention ratio is the inverse of the 
dividend payout ratio, which is the percentage of earnings paid to shareholders. 
This means that the reduction in the rate of retained profits that we noticed in the 
previous section must be accompanied by an increase in the dividend payout 
ratio. From an analytical point of view, the fact that payouts to shareholders 
increase must be causing the reduction in the rate of reinvestment of profits and 
further the reduction in the rate of capital accumulation. This logical 
assumption, however, needs to be backed by empirical data, before it can be 
accepted as possibly holding true. 
Several studies have been carried out on the issue of the evolution of 
corporate payout policy in the US. These studies seem to agree on: (i) the fact 
that aggregate real dividends show a consistent increasing tendency over the 
past decades536; (ii) the fact that stock repurchases have gradually become a 
major payout vehicle537; and (iii) the fact that the proportion of firms that pay 
out profits to their shareholders, either in the form of traditional dividends or by 
undertaking stock repurchases, is declining over time538. This final trend, which 
at first sight seems to be contradictory to the assumption we are trying to prove, 
has given rise to a series of papers centered on the issue of ‘disappearing 
dividends’. 
However, the fact that for instance the percentage of firms paying 
dividends in the US had fallen from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999539 should 
not trick us into believing that the overall dividend payout ratio had been falling 
during the same period. The reduction in the percentage of non-paying firms is 
due to the changing characteristics of publicly traded firms; newly listed firms 
always tend to be smaller. Payers are found to be about 10 times as large as non-
payers and non-payers are found to be firms with a higher Tobin’s Q540, which 
implies that they have valuable intangible assets, goodwill, a stock of patents 
and good managers, rather than a stock of physical assets541. Therefore, the non-
paying firms are not so crucial for capital accumulation, while the paying firms 
seem to be the large industrial firms that if they had been reinvesting their 
profits at a higher rate, then their behavior would make a difference for the 
                                                
536 See HARRY DEANGELO ET AL., CORPORATE PAYOUT POLICY (2009), 36 
537 See Douglas Skinner, The Evolving Relation Between Earnings, Dividends and Stock Repurchases, 87 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 582 (stating that the total annual value of share repurchases now 
usually exceeds that of cash dividends in the United States). 
538 See Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or 
Lower Propensity to Pay?, 60 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 3 
539 Id., at 3-4 
540 Id., at 4 
541 Eric Lindenberg & Stephen Ross, Tobin’s Q Ratio and Industrial Organization, 54 JOURNAL OF 
BUSINESS 1, 4 
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aggregate capital accumulation dynamics in the US. Therefore, despite the 
‘disappearing dividends’ header of that line of literature, it seems that those 
firms that actually matter for capital accumulation do continue to pay dividends 
and at a higher rate. 
The same ‘concentration’ of dividends in only the largest firms is also 
observable in the EU, where the percentage of firms paying dividends to 
shareholders has also decreased from 88% in 1989 to 51% in 2005542 due to the 
fact that the financial characteristics of the ‘typical’ publicly traded company 
have changed; from 1978 onwards newly listed firms tend to have low profits, 
high growth opportunities, and an asset base tilted heavily towards intangible 
rather than fixed assets543. It is no surprise then, that in the US, Germany, France 
and Japan dividend payers were found to account for more than 92% of the 
aggregate market capitalization in the 1999-2002 period544. 
In accordance with the above remarks, in most jurisdictions there exists 
a large difference between mean and median real dividends. While the median 
real dividend per payer is low and decreases over time, as it is less affected by 
the small number of large payer firms that pay well in excess of the vast 
majority of listed firms, the mean real dividend per payer, which is more 
affected by the large capital-intensive payer firms, increases over time 
explaining the fact that aggregate real dividend payouts are observed to have 
been on the rise. Despite the sharp decline in the percentage of firms that pay 
dividends, the increase in dividends by top-tier firms far exceeded the modest 
simultaneous reduction in dividends from the loss of many small payers from 
the bottom tier545. 
 Figure 17 shows the increase in mean real dividends per payer in the 
US, Canada, the UK, France and Germany for the years 1990 to 2002: 
Now focusing only on the paying firms, which are those, whose 
structural characteristics make us believe that they matter the most for capital 
accumulation, we observe that in the EU15 countries there is an increase in their 
mean total payout ratio for the years 1989 to 2005 (Figure 18). 
                                                
542 Henk von Eije & William Megginson, Dividends and Share Repurchases in the European Union, 89 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 347, 353 
543 Id., at 349 
544 David Denis & Igor Osobov, Why do Firms Pay Dividends? International Evidence on the 
Determinants of Dividend Policy, 89 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 62, 76 
545 DEANGELO ET AL., supra note 536, 74 (referring to the US case) 
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7.4.2. The catering theory of dividends as an indication of the causality link 
between the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance and the increased 
equity payout ratios 
 
Obviously, the question, which was set at the beginning of the previous 
sub-section on whether there is evidence that the reduction in the retention ratio 
is due to an increase in the equity payout ratio, is answered in the affirmative, 
after reviewing Figures 17 and 18. However, the question that remains 
unanswered is whether this increasing payout ratio can be causally attributed to 
the management’s increasing orientation towards shareholder value. If not, then 
this study’s First Hypothesis is substance-less, because the establishment of a 
causality relationship between the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance and 
the increase in the payout ratios initiates the causality chain of the First 
Hypothesis (see Figures 2). As it has been mentioned in the introductory part to 
this Chapter, this question will be answered decisively in Chapter Two along 
with the question of whether the Great Reversal in Shareholdership is also 
responsible for increased payout ratios. Nevertheless, at this point the reader 
deserves at least some indication that there is value in this causality claim.  
The so-called ‘catering theory of dividends’ can provide this indication 
and establish the possibility of some link between the payout trends observed in 
Figures 17 and 18 and the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance. This theory 
asserts that companies supply dividends to meet investor demand546. This 
explains why dividends tend to disappear during pronounced booms in growth 
stocks and reappear after crashes in such stocks; investor demand is sentiment-
driven, so it is natural that investors will request dividends, when they feel most 
unsafe and they want to part with liquidity (see the Keynesian ‘liquidity 
preference’ in Section 1.2)547.  
At the heart of the theory that dividends are distributed to satisfy 
demand on behalf of the shareholders, lies the character of a firm, whose 
managers are sensitive to the capital markets; a character that did not exist in the 
era of managerial capitalism, when the Berle-Means corporation’s managers 
were devising a corporate governance model that was not influenced by the 
stock market. Demand for dividends has grown as stockholders have become 
more yield-conscious; the change in the shareholder structure that brought more 
institutional investors in the forefront that compete to each other and have to 
return gains to their beneficiaries has made them more demanding towards the 
firms. It is natural then, according to the catering theory of dividends, to notice a 
rise in the equity payout ratios around the world over the past decades, so this 
theory provides some indication that rising equity payout ratios stem from the 
Great Reversal in Corporate Governance. 
                                                
546 See Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, A Catering Theory of Dividends, 59 THE JOURNAL OF 
FINANCE 1125 
547 See Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Appearing and Disappearing Dividends: The Link to Catering 
Incentives, 73 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 271 
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The assumption that lies at the heart of the catering theory of dividends 
that the increasing payout ratios can be attributed to the greater sensitivity that 
managers show to the shareholderist logic of the modern capital markets is 
empirically backed by the fact that stock repurchases are globally on the rise as 
transitory vehicles of distribution (Figures 19 and 20). Stock repurchases serve 
three functions, all of which are related to the position of the firm inside the 
capital markets and to the increasing deference that firms pay to shareholder 
value. Therefore, if distributions via stock repurchases are found to be on the 
rise, it follows that firms are becoming more deferent to the preferences of 
shareholders, since they choose the distribution vehicle most favorable to 
shareholder value (for more on stock buybacks’ effects and mechanics see 
Chapter Four, 3.1). To be sure, the three functions that stock buybacks serve are: 
i. Signaling: In the modern capital markets management wants the firm’s 
share price to be as high as possible for three reasons: (a) a high share 
price functions as a ‘natural’ takeover defense, as it makes the 
acquisition of a controlling block of the firm’s shares through a public 
takeover bid very expensive; (b) the firm can raise more equity capital 
in case it decides to make a seasoned equity offering; and (c) managers 
will realize higher capital gains by cashing in their stock options, which 
form part of their compensation. Therefore, it is essential for 
management to be able to signal through some device to the investor 
community that they have private information regarding the firm’s 
future profitability. By initiating a stock buyback the firm is signaling 
to the markets that the share price is lower than a valuation of the firm’s 
fundamentals would suggest. Thus, share buybacks are used as 
signaling devices to legally manipulate the share price548. 
ii. Boosting earnings per share (‘EPS’): EPS is the standard measure 
employed by the investor community in order to measure the 
profitability of a firm. Since EPS is calculated as net income divided by 
the number of outstanding shares, a share buyback reduces the 
denominator and boosts EPS. A higher EPS will attract more interest in 
purchasing this firm’s shares and the stock price will go up. 
iii. Share buybacks are also effected for practical reasons, in order for 
shares to be distributed to managers and employees within the scope of 
stock option programs. 
Therefore, until Chapter Two clears out any doubt that there is a link 
between the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance and the increase in the 
equity payout ratio and the concomitant reduction in the rate of capital 
accumulation, the catering theory of dividends in connection with the empirical 
data on the use of stock buybacks by corporations provide some indication that 
the study’s First Hypothesis is plausible at least with regard to its first initiating 
variable, the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance. 
                                                
548 See Aharon Ofer & Anjan Thakor, A Theory of Stock Price Responses to Alternative Corporate Cash 
Disbursement Methods: Stock Repurchases and Dividends, 42 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 365 
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7.5. The Great Reversal in Shareholdership I: Equity’s reduced 
contribution to financing capital formation 
 
In Section 7.4. I provided signs that something more than a mere 
correlation exists between the increasing orientation of corporate governance 
towards shareholder value and the reduction in the accumulation rate in the 
major Western economies. Now, the two-fold goal of Sections 7.5 and 7.6 is to 
provide signs that equity in public corporations has become impatient and that it 
is this very characteristic of equity that actually makes the orientation of firms 
towards shareholder value so detrimental for the capital accumulation dynamics 
in an economy. In other words, the goal here is to show that the Great Reversal 
in Shareholdership has indeed occurred and –along the lines of the First 
Hypothesis- to provide an indication that this reversal coupled with the Great 
Reversal in Corporate Governance is causally linked to the increased equity 
payout ratios. As with the relationship of the Great Reversal in Corporate 
Governance and the accumulation dynamics, the discussion on whether the 
relationship between the Great Reversal in Shareholdership and the observed 
trends in payouts and accumulation amounts to causation will of course be 
completed in Chapter Two. 
 
7.5.1. Indications of a causality link between short-term shareholdership 
and low retention ratios 
 
Impatient capital is poorly equipped to finance investment and fixed 
capital formation. Myopic investors are less likely to allow the funds they 
provide the firm with to be recycled into long-term capital-intensive projects 
before the latter come to fruition and the funds return to them in the form of 
dividends or other transitory distributions. On the contrary, long-termist 
investors having in a self-disciplined way already accepted a certain degree of 
irreversibility for their equity investment by committing not to liquidate their 
position at the first opportunity to realize capital gains won’t be at odds with the 
firm using their funds for a capital investment that de facto is characterized by a 
substantial degree of irreversibility549. It follows that not any shareholder value 
orientation on behalf of the firm is detrimental to capital accumulation; only the 
shareholder value orientation that has as its benchmark the preference function 
of a short-termist shareholder. Thus, the Great Reversal in Corporate 
Governance cannot be per se detrimental to capital accumulation dynamics, if it 
is not accompanied by the Great Reversal in Shareholdership. Equity payout 
ratios wouldn’t be so high, if the shareholder value approach was informed with 
the set of preferences of the long-termist shareholder; retention ratios wouldn’t 
be so low in the presence of more long-termist equityholders in the firms’ 
shareholder structure, which the shareholder-oriented managers would have to 
serve. Thus, the causality links suggested in Sections 7.1. to 7.4. presuppose that 
                                                
549 Barry Bosworth, Comment, on Lawrence Summers, Taxation and Corporate Investment: A q-Theory 
Approach, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 67, 131  
CORPORATE LAW AND THE GREAT REVERSAL IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 145 
the second variable, i.e. the Great Reversal in Shareholdership, is already 
present in the beginning of the causality chain (for a more concrete analysis on 
how shareholder value orientation should be accompanied by short-term 
shareholdership to produce the negative results on capital accumulation see 
Section 3.4. of Chapter Two). 
 But, is it safe to suggest so rigorously that short-term shareholdership, 
which lends its preference function to shareholder value, is so hostile to fixed 
investment? In other words, is there an indication that short-term 
shareholdership is hostile to the reinvestment of profits and thus that it may have 
caused the low retention ratios and the concomitant high equity payout ratios 
discussed in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 above?  
Empirical research provides such an indication by showing that those 
firms, whose equity is owned by a significant percentage of short-termist 
shareholders, tend to cut down R&D spending, which is a widely-used proxy for 
long-term investment550. This makes sense, since the potential value created 
from a long-term project might not be fully reflected in the stock price because 
of investors’ myopia; therefore, managers might not be able to afford this 
mispricing in the stock and will thus take a capital budgeting decision that does 
not favor the long-term prospects of the firm551. A high proportion of ownership 
by institutions exhibiting transient ownership characteristics, such as high 
portfolio turnover, diversification and momentum trading, has been proved to 
significantly increase the probability that managers will cut down R&D to boost 
earnings552. Greater ownership by short-termist investors has been shown to 
amplify the decrease in investment that modern corporations experience553; 
long-term equity ownership, to the contrary, is likely according to the same 
studies to dampen that reduction in investment.  
Consequently, the empirical data on the reduction of R&D in firm’s 
with a high proportion of short-termist investors in their shareholder base 
provide an indication that it is plausible for the First Hypothesis to suggest a 
causality link between the Great Reversal in Shareholdership and low retention 
ratios or –the exact inverse- high equity payout ratios. 
 
7.5.2. Equity as a negative net source of capital: A proxy for short-termism 
 
Has the Great Reversal in Shareholdership really occurred though? In 
light of the above, it is plausible to assume that if equity in public corporations 
is predominantly short-termist, as I have suggested in Section 4.2.1. of the 
                                                
550 See Philippe Aghion, John Van Reenen & Luigi Zingales, Innovation and Institutional Ownership, 
CEPR Discussion Paper 7195 (2009). Available at NBER: http://www.nber.org/papers/w14769 (last 
visited on 06.07.2012) 
551 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 137, 42 
552 See Brian Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 
THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW 305 
553 See Francois Derrien et al., Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies, (2011). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491638  
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Introduction, then it must be found to be an insignificant –and perhaps even 
negative- net source of capital formation. 
Thus, apart from the average holding period of stock, which is an 
obvious measure of shareholder short-termism, the percentage, by which equity 
contributes to capital formation in modern corporations, can also be treated as a 
proxy –subject to certain limitations- for shareholders’ time horizons. If this 
contribution is found to be decreasing over time, then there is an additional 
argument to back the premise for the occurrence of the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership. 
Figures 21-23 show that indeed equity in the US, France and Germany 
has over time moved towards the direction of being a negligible –even negative 
in the case of the US and Germany- source of capital formation and physical 
investment; this is a sign that shareholders have increasingly been generating a 
short-termist bias in corporate governance and in the US and Germany they 
have even caused net outflows from corporations. Figure 24 shows that in the 
UK equity has strengthened its position as a financing source of capital stock, 
which could possibly explain why under Figure 12, the UK was identified as the 
only one in this set of countries to be experiencing an increase in the rate of 
capital accumulation in some of the years of the post-Bretton Woods era. 
According to the Figures, it seems that, especially in France and 
Germany, bank credit has increasingly provided precisely the functions that one 
would expect of a risk sharer: banks have showed the willingness to ride out 
current losses in the expectation of future compensation, thus allowing for the 
promotion of capital formation and investment activities. This is essentially an 
equity type of service that in theory should have been expected by the 
shareholders554, who according to the Figures below show a lower level of 
commitment in the post-Bretton Woods world. 
                                                
554 The same trend has been noticed in the case of Japanese banks by Colin Mayer, New Issues in 
Corporate Finance, 32 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1167, 1181 
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7.6. The Great Reversal in Shareholdership II: The reduction in the 
average holding period of stock 
 
In Sections 3-6 I presented many developments that in theory might 
have induced shareholders in the major Western economies to hold on to their 
investment for shorter periods of time (for a summary see Figure 10). In the 
previous sub-section I treated equity’s reduced contribution to capital formation 
as a proxy for shareholders’ short-termism providing indications that the Great 
Reversal in Shareholdership actually occurred. In this section though I intend to 
present the progress in the most representative measure regarding shareholders’ 
time-horizons: the average holding period of stock. 
 The average holding period of stock is estimated by looking at the ratio 
of the market value of the shares outstanding to the value of shares traded in any 
given year555. This is the inverse of the market turnover and studies having 
discussed this issue in the past have used it as a proxy for shareholders’ time-
                                                
555 This is the formula used in a paper that has quickly become a classic in the growing niche of social 
sciences studying short-termism, Andrew Haldane, Patience and Finance, (Sept. 2010), 16. Available at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech445.pdf  
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horizons556. However, some may treat this as not a very good proxy for the 
holding period, since the stock may have a sub-group of very long holding 
period owners, but high turnover among the remaining investors. The median 
holding period might be a better proxy for shareholders’ time horizons and 
indeed some studies use it instead of the average (mean)557. It is important to 
understand this limitation in using the average holding period of stock as a 
proxy to make our case, but it is difficult to identify the median holding period 
for the entirety of investors in large stock exchanges, like the NYSE and the 
LSE, where the world’s largest firms are listed, as this would require the 
collection of data on actual ownership length558. 
Figures 25-27 show a convergence between the shareowners of 
corporations listed in the NYSE, in the LSE and in the French Bourse in the 
issue of the holding period of stock; in all three stock exchanges shareowners 
show a tendency to reduce the time, during which they remain invested in the 
stock of a particular corporation, especially after the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods arrangements. In the NYSE the average holding period of stock around 
the year 1970, i.e. before the initiation of events that led to the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, was 6 years; in the year 2002 it was less than one year 
(Figure 25). In the LSE the average holding period of stock was 5 years around 
1970; it was less than a year in 2004 (Figure 26). In the French Bourse the 
average holding period of stock was 5.5 years around 1970; it was just over a 
year in 2006 (Figure 27). 
                                                
556 See Atkins & Dyl, supra note 374 
557  See Randi Naes & Bernt Arne Ødegaard, What is the Reltaionship Between Investor Holding Period 
and Liquidity, (April 2007)  
558 For smaller stock exchanges, like the Oslo Stock Exchange, authors have been able to conduct such 
accurate studies, see Id. 
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7.7. The limitations of the First Hypothesis: Alternative explanations for the 
post-Bretton Woods economic stagnation 
 
The First Hypothesis attempts to link the observed slowdown in the 
economic growth of the western economies during the post-Bretton Woods era 
(see Figure 11) with a great reversal that occurred in corporate governance and 
with a great reversal that affected the owners of corporations, i.e. the 
shareholders, in the last four decades. The alleged linking factor standing in 
between the two great reversals and the economic stagnation is the slow growth 
rate of physical capital accumulation (see Figure 2). Therefore, as it is 
mentioned in section 7.2, this thesis implicitly accedes to the viewpoint that 
physical capital (and investment) is the most fundamental determinant of 
economic growth.  
However, in absence of a more rigorous quantitative analysis, the 
observed relationship between the trends of the post-Bretton Woods growth rate 
of physical capital accumulation (see Figures 12 and 13) and the post-Bretton 
Woods GDP growth rate cannot be safely labeled as causal559. The analysis in 
sections 7.1. – 7.2 provides indications that there might be causality between the 
                                                
559 However, causality for the relationship between the two great reversals and the slowdown in the 
growth of business capital stock can be more safely inferred by means of the Post-Keynesian model 
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reduction in the growth rate of business capital stock and the economic 
stagnation, but one could assert that instead of a causation there is a mere 
correlation between the two trends. Indeed, for the sake of serving the ultimate 
goal of this study, which is to expose corporate law’s role in the slowdown of 
economic growth, the First Hypothesis’s analysis does not control for other 
well-known determinants of economic growth that might carry equal (or greater) 
explanatory power for the slowdown in the GDP growth rates of the Western 
economies during the post-Bretton Woods era. 
To be sure, apart from investment and physical capital accumulation, 
which is identified in economic theories of various philosophical 
presuppositions as a fundamental determinant of economic growth (see section 
7.2), several other factors have been documented in economic literature as 
sources of growth. 
First of all, endogenous growth models have shifted the emphasis away 
from physical capital to human capital. Human capital, as a determinant of 
economic growth, refers to labor’s acquisition of skills through education. 
Therefore, proxies for the quality of human capital, such as school-enrolment 
rates, have been treated in many empirical studies as more important drivers of 
economic growth compared to business capital stock560.  
Additionally, endogenous growth models have identified technological 
progress as an important determinant of growth and accordingly several studies 
have emphasized the relationship between innovation, R&D activities and 
economic growth561. 
Furthermore, openness to trade has been traditionally considered to be 
another important determinant of economic growth. Openness facilitates the 
transfer of technology and the diffusion of knowledge, while it is supposed to 
increase an economy’s exposure to competition. Empirical research has 
indicated that economies open to trade and to capital flows exhibit higher GDP 
per capita and more rapid growth562. This segment of economic thought has 
certainly contributed to the post-Bretton Woods deepening of the European 
integration and to the post-Bretton Woods intensification of GATT negotiating 
rounds and the eventual establishment of the WTO in 1995.   
                                                
560 See Robert Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 407; ROBERT BARRO & XAVIER SALA-I-MARTIN, ECONOMIC GROWTH (1995); Aymo 
Brunetti, Political Variables in Cross-Country Growth Analysis, 11 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS 
163; Eric Hanushek & Denis Kimko, Schooling, Labor-Force Quality, and the Growth of Nations, 90 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1184; Greg Mankiw et al., A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic 
Growth, 107 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 407 
561 See Hulya Ulku, R&D Innovation and Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis, IMF Working Paper 
185 (2004); Frank Lichtenberg, R&D Investment and International Productivity Differences, NBER 
Working Paper, No. 4161. Available at:  http://www.nber.org/papers/w4161; Jan Fagerberg, A 
Technology Gap Approach to Why Growth Rates Differ, 16 RESEARCH POLICY 87 
562 See David Dollar, Outward-Oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence 
from 95 LDCs, 1976-1985, 40 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 523; DAVID DOLLAR 
& AART KRAAY, TRADE, GROWTH AND POVERTY (2000); Sebastian Edwards, Openness, Productivity 
and Growth: What Do We Really Know?, 108 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 383; Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew 
Warner, Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies, 6 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES 335 
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Moreover, the institutional environment in an economy has also been 
praised for its significance in the attainment of rapid GDP growth rates. In 
growth literature the term ‘institutions’ implies the formal rules, informal 
constraints and the enforcement mechanisms563. Property rights, regulatory 
institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilization, institutions for social 
insurance and institutions of conflict management all have been noted as 
determinants of growth564 and their significance for GDP growth rates has also 
been tested empirically565. 
Finally, the demographic trends in an economy have also been 
identified as determinants of economic growth. Indeed, a growing number of 
scholars have conducted studies that link population growth, population density, 
migration and age distribution to economic growth566 
After this short review of the various alternative determinants of growth 
the question is which of them might have contributed to the slowdown of 
economic growth of the western economies during the post-Bretton Woods era, 
which the First Hypothesis attributes mainly to the reduction in the growth rate 
of business capital stock. 
While it would be difficult to assert that there hasn’t been rapid 
progress in the West with regard to technology, openness to trade and 
institutional framework during the last decades, the largest economy in the 
world, i.e. the US, did experience a slowdown in the growth rate of human 
capital during the post-Bretton Woods era. Empirical studies indicate a rapid 
educational advance in the US during the first three quarters of the twentieth  
century and a stagnation in educational attainment during the last quarter. To be 
more precise, the educational attainment of a child born in the US in 1941 was 
2.18 years more than that of his parents, while the education attainment of a 
child born in 1975 was just 0.50 years more than that of his parents567. 
Therefore, the post-Bretton Woods stagnation of the US economy can be 
attributed partly to the slower growth rates of human capital. However, human 
capital growth in Western Europe accelerated during the last three decades of 
                                                
563 See DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
(1990), 35 
564 See Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High-quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them, 35 
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  3 
565 See Robert Hall & Charles Jones, Why Do Some Countries Produce so Much More Output than 
Others?, 114 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 83; Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social 
Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-country investigation, 112 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 1252; Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 681 
566 See Robert Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 407; David Bloom & Jeffrey Williamson, Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles 
in Emerging Asia, 12 WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW 419; Allen Kelley & Robert Schmidt, Aggregate 
Population and Economic Growth Correlations: The Role of the Components of Demographic Change, 
32 DEMOGRAPHY 543; Roger Kormendi & Philip Meguire, Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: 
Cross-country Evidence, 16 JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 141 
567 CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY (2008), 
19 
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the 20th century, so there must be other reasons why these economies stagnated 
in the post-Bretton Woods era568.  
For the case of Western Europe strong indications exist that the 
demographic trends of the last decades might have had a negative impact on 
economic growth. There is indeed a growing ratio of elderly dependents 
compared to working age groups in Western Europe’s population; this ageing 
population changes the non-labor to labor ratio in an economy and affects the 
growth dynamics569. In other words, with the population share of those being 
over 60 years old increasing in the developed Western European economies 
since the 1950s570, one could plausibly suggest that the observed slowdown in 
GDP growth can be partly attributed to that trend. 
Finally, in the framework of the discussion of alternative reasons that 
might have contributed to the observed slowdown in the GDP growth rates of 
the leading western economies during the post-Bretton Woods era a reference 
must be made to the concept of diminishing returns to capital. The law of 
diminishing returns to capital is grounded on the assumption that ‘an increase in 
some inputs relative to other fixed inputs will, in a given state of technology, 
cause total output to increase; but after a point the extra output resulting from 
the same additions of extra inputs is likely to become less and less’571. In other 
words, each additional amount of capital results in smaller addition to output572. 
The law of diminishing returns to capital implies that the per capita growth rate 
is inversely related to the starting level of income per person573. This in turn 
means that rich economies, as the western economies were already at the time of 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements, tend to grow at a slower rate 
than poorer economies, whose growth rate has boomed lately574. All in all, 
according to the law of diminishing returns to capital the slowdown of the GDP 
growth rate that the western economies experienced during the last four decades 
might be nothing more than a natural development following the economic 
boom of the Golden Age of Capitalism. 
                                                
568 Id., at 22ff. 
569 See Thomas Lindh & Bo Malmberg, EU Economic Growth and the Age Structure of the Population, 
42 ECONOMIC CHANGE & RESTRUCTURING 159 
570 David Bloom et al., Implications of Population Aging for Economic Growth, PGDA Working Paper 
No. 64, 5-6. Available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/pgda/WorkingPapers/2011/PGDA_WP_64.pdf  
571 PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, 8TH ED. (1970), 25 
572 JOHN TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS, 5TH ED., (2007), 209 
573 See Solow, supra note 529 
574 Robert Barro & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Convergence, 100 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 223, 224 






Modeling Short-term Shareholdership’s Negative Impact on the Dynamics 
of Capital Accumulation:  




Chapter One, particularly in Sections 3 to 6, presented several 
developments that took place at the international macroeconomic sphere and at 
the intellectual level that had as a result from the 1970s onwards a great reversal 
in the institutional logics of corporate governance, i.e. the reorientation of 
managers towards the maximization of shareholder value, and a great reversal in 
shareholdership, i.e. the shortening in non-controlling equity’s investment time-
horizons.  
To clear the way for the buttressing of this study’s First Hypothesis, i.e. 
that these two great reversals have cumulatively throughout a causality chain 
caused a slowdown in the rate of (physical) capital accumulation, I presented a 
series of empirical data and preliminary explanations in section 7. These data 
and explanations together provide a strong indication that the slow rates of 
economic growth that have been observed in the post-Bretton Woods era are 
caused by the slowdown in the growth of the business capital stock, which is in 
turn caused by the reduction in the corporate retention ratios and the 
concomitant increase in the equity payout ratios that in turn are caused by the 
heightened short-termism of shareholders that push towards the adoption of the 
‘downsize and distribute’ corporate governance model and the shareholder value 
orientation of firms.  
While the empirical data point towards the direction of the outcome that 
the post-Bretton Woods stagnation and the two great reversals cannot be 
independent to each other, no safe conclusion can be drawn that there is indeed a 
causality relationship between them without modeling the influence that short-
term shareholders can have on a firm’s retention strategy. Indeed, a more 
stylized approach is needed to make the First Hypothesis appear plausible and 
thus I have chosen to complete the discussion started in Section 7 of Chapter 
One by presenting in this Chapter the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm that 
models the causality relationship implied to exist.  
Post-Keynesians575 are not interested in the study of small firms in a 
perfectly competitive market, and prefer to study big businesses in oligopolistic 
                                                
575 Post-Keynesian economics draw their inspiration by the work of John Maynard Keynes, but also by 
those who were instrumental in creating the Cambridge School in the 1950s and 1960s (Kaldor, Kalecki 
and Sraffa). Post-Keynesians are different than the new-Keynesians and the ‘neoclassical synthesis’ 
Keynesians, whose theories are structurally neoclassical (often with Austrian injections) with a minor 
Keynesian flair. 
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markets576. Thus, the setting of their analysis is more conducive to serve the 
goals of my effort, as I strive to show that it is what happened to those big 
corporations that are crucial for the (physical) capital accumulation in an 
economy that caused the prolonged economic stagnation Western economies 
were experiencing even before the 2008 financial meltdown. 
 
 
1. The Post-Keynesian firm’s objective: power and growth 
 
The intellectual roots of the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm were 
developed during the Golden Age of Capitalism, an era, which -viewed through 
the corporate governance lens- was also called the age of managerial capitalism. 
This was a time when managers were not so vulnerable to external pressures and 
could thus foster their Chandlerian instincts for expansion and growth (see 
Section 6.1. of Chapter One). 
The Post-Keynesian and the Chandlerian theories of the firm share 
many things in common and eventually coincide in what they view as the firm’s 
objective. However, Post-Keynesians focus more on the endogenous constraints 
of the managerial pursuit of the firm’s objectives; an issue, with which the 
Chandlerian approach does not deal so rigorously, as it focuses mainly on how 
managers react and adapt to exogenous changes in the economic environment. 
Moreover, the Post-Keynesian theory is ideal for the modeling of the firm’s 
behavior in the era of post-Bretton Woods financialization, as it focuses more on 
how capital market constituents influence the managerial pursuit for growth, 
expansion and long-term productivity. 
The Post-Keynesian theory of the firm starts with one of the 
presuppositions of Post-Keynesian economics -and perhaps of all heterodox 
economic theories-: organicism or holism577. Organicism is premised on the 
Aristotelian axiom that ‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts’578. In this 
light, Post-Keynesians view the firm as a semiautonomous economic agent able 
to develop a preference function of its own579, which does not necessarily 
coincide with the preferences of one group of its stakeholders, as the 
neoclassical theory of the firm posits (see Section 6.2.1. of Chapter One).  
For the Post-Keynesians the firm’s preference function, i.e. its 
objective, is determined by Keynes’s axiom of fundamental uncertainty580. 
Firms act in a world of fundamental uncertainty and they need to devise a way 
that procures some level of security to the organization pertaining to the future. 
The firm’s objective then is to have some degree of control over future events. 
                                                
576 Thomas Dallery, Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization, 41 REVIEW OF 
RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMICS 492, 494 
577 LAVOIE, supra note 108, 8 
578 Met. 10f-1045a 
579 James Crotty, Neoclassical and Keynesian Approaches to the Theory of Investment, 14 JOURNAL OF 
POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 483, 486 
580 MARC LAVOIE, FOUNDATIONS OF POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1992), 100 
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Thus, it seeks power over its environment, be it economic, social or political581. 
Power seems to be the firm’s ultimate objective in the Post-Keynesian theory, 
although this is not accepted unequivocally by all Post-Keynesian economists as 
many have suggested that it might not be feasible to get a knock-down answer 
as to what exactly the firm’s objective is582. But, powerful relations allow 
corporations to have access to scarce information, without which the firm would 
be immobilized and enter in the state of inaction that pervades uncertain 
situations, which Keynesian theory demonized. Indeed, power guarantees access 
to financial capital, increases the chances for the firm to survive in the long-
run583 and allows it to control the quality of its labour force, its suppliers, the 
prices of the industry, the possibility of takeovers, the future of the industry and 
even government legislation (with power comes efficient lobbying).   
To become powerful, firms must be big584; to become big, firms must 
grow585. The need to control environment encourages much greater size586; the 
greater the size of the firm the greater the scope to plan the economic activity 
that will eventually fend off uncertainty587. Consequently, to achieve its 
objective, the firm must seek to obtain growth in size measured in sales588, 
assets, employment or real output589. So, if firms are actually seeking to 
maximize something, then this is growth in the aforementioned sense590591. To 
make the connection to Chapter One, the central mechanism of capital 
accumulation is exactly the urge that firms have to grow592; in this we can detect 
the Marxian roots of the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm, as in the Marxian 
                                                
581 See Robert Dixon, Uncertainty, Unobstructedness, and Power, 8 JOURNAL OF POST KEYENSIAN 
ECONOMICS 585 
582 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1975), 124; Joan Robinson, 
Michael Kalecki on the Economics of Capitalism, 39 OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
7, 11 
583 Within the Keynesian line of thought the long-run survival of the firm was seen as a central objective: 
‘For any organization, as for any organism, the goal or the objective that has a natural assumption of 
preeminence is the organization’s survival. This, plausibly, is true of the technostructure’; JOHN 
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1972), 170 
584 Dallery, supra note 576, 495 
585 ‘All the diverse objectives that can be pursued by managers are reduced to the single motive of 
sustainable long-run growth’; ROBIN MARRIS, MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM IN RETROSPECT (1998), 113 
586 GALBRAITH, supra note 582, 125 
587 EDITH PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (1959), 15  
588 For most Post-Keynesians growth was measured in terms of sales revenue; see GALBRAITH, supra note 
600, 174; ADRIAN WOOD, THE THEORY OF PROFITS (1975), 4; 
589 ROBIN MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM (1964), Ch. 2 
590 ‘The primary affirmative purpose of the technostructure is the growth of the firm’; GALBRAITH, supra 
note 599, 116 
591 It will be shown in Section 2 below that profits are just the means to the end of maximizing growth. To 
be sure though, industrial economists have found that it is hard to distinguish empirically between growth 
measured in terms of sales revenue and growth measured in some other manner – e.g., in terms of profits 
over time [Peter Kenyon, Pricing, in A GUIDE TO POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS (A. EICHNER, ED.) 
(1979), 37]. But, however, measured, under the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm it is clearly growth that 
is the goal of the firm, in the sense that firms try to maximize something over time and for the long-run 
rather than eyeing for a short-run profit maximization to benefit the shareholders, as the neoclassical 
theory would tend to suggest; see LAVOIE, supra note 580, 107 
592 JOAN ROBINSON, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1962), 38 
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discourse on capitalism the firm must continue expanding in order to keep its 
share in the market (see Section 7.2 of Chapter One)593 . 
Nevertheless, one could assert that power and growth might indeed 
have been a firm’s objective in the era of managerial capitalism, when the 
divorce between control and ownership was more acute, since the floating 
population of shareholders, were acting as Veblenian abstentee owners594 and no 
signs of shareholder activism were present to change this picture. But, authors 
within the Post-Keynesian tradition have successfully –in my view- pointed to 
the fact that also in the era of entrepreneurial capitalism, in the 19th century, 
family businesses were just as keen on growth as any modern corporation595. 
Anyone who is in business naturally wants to survive (particularly if her own 
heirs and successors are involved) and to survive it is necessary to grow596. 
Therefore, the claim that a firm’s objective is to grow can be seen as perennial. 
To understand how different presuppositions and assumptions might 
result in the formulation of different theories, it is worth reminding here some 
facts about the neoclassical theory of the firm, which was presented in Section 
6.2.1. of Chapter One. The neoclassicists posit that the objective of the firm is to 
maximize the present value of its future earnings (earnings being profits in the 
present sense minus interest payments, taxes and asset depreciation). Given the 
fact that one of the presuppositions of neoclassical economics is methodological 
individualism, organizations, such as firms, only hide the true intentions and 
preferences of individuals597. This means that if the firm’s intention is the 
maximization of profit, then the latter must be the objective of one group of 
individuals that belongs to the firm’s constituencies. This group could not be but 
the one of the residual claimants, i.e. of those that have an interest in the firm 
making the largest possible profit because they get to see money in their pockets 
only after everyone else is paid: the shareholders. Therefore, while the Post-
Keynesian theory of the firm starts from the presupposition of holism and views 
the firm’s objective as being long-run growth, the neoclassical theory of the firm 
starts from the presupposition of methodological individualism and ends up 




2. The role of profits in the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm 
 
 Let us consider now a firm, which according to the Post-Keynesian 
assumption sets as its target to obtain a specific rate of growth. To move towards 
                                                
593 NICHOLAS KALDOR, FURTHER ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC THEORY (1978), xvi 
594 See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP-BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES: THE CASE 
OF AMERICA [1923] (1964) 
595 See WOOD, supra note 588, 8; James Clifton, Competition and the Evolution of the Capitalist Mode of 
Production, 1 CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 137, 147-8; LAVOIE, supra note 580, 105 
596 JOAN ROBINSON, ECONOMIC HERESIES: SOME OLD-FASHIONED QUESTIONS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 
(1971), 101 
597 LAVOIE, supra note 108, 8 
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the realization of its target, the firm must accumulate capital; it must incur 
investment expenditures. Without investment in fixed assets and stocks the firm 
is unlikely to expand its productive capacity that will allow it to grow598. To be 
able to meet the investment expenditures that have to be borne to obtain the 
desired rate of growth, a firm needs profits. This is because profits help the 
financing of the investment that needs to be undertaken599; they release the 
financial constraint on capital accumulation600. And they do so in two ways: (i) 
profits can be turned into retained earnings, so that the firm can internally 
finance the accumulation process; and (ii) profits facilitate the attainment of 
external finance as well, since they signal to rentiers of capital (creditors and 
shareholders) that the firm has a good performance record and thus it is solvent 
and creditworthy601. 
Regarding the importance of the transformation of profits into retained 
earnings enough have been said already in Chapter One, especially under the 
light of the empirical data presented in Figures 21 to 24 that showed the 
dominant role of retained earnings in the financing of fixed capital formation. 
As it has been stated ‘finance raised externally – whether in the form of loans or 
equity capital- is complementary to, not a substitute for, retained earnings’602. 
 Regarding the second function of profits, as a lure for external finance, 
Post-Keynesian theory rests firmly on Kalecki’s principle of increasing risk, 
which posits that the funds that can be obtained through external finance by a 
firm are a multiple of its current level of retained earnings (a.k.a. undistributed 
profits)603. Kalecki’s principle of increasing risk is based on the Keynesian 
notion of fundamental uncertainty. In a world where there is uncertainty about 
the future, external financiers seek to limit their own risks, when extending 
financing to firms604. Thus, they are more likely to rely on the firm’s 
profitability record of the past in order to ascertain whether the firm is 
creditworthy enough to receive their funds605. 
It follows, that as opposed to the neoclassical theory of the firm, profit 
for Post-Keynesians is not an end to itself, but it’s the means to effectuate the 
accumulation process and further to realize the objective of growth606. So, 
although profit is not the ultimate maximand for Post-Keynesians, you still need 
to maximize it to get financing for your investment plans, which will then allow 
you to grow. One would fairly wonder then: is there a practical difference 
between the post-Keynesian hypothesis of maximizing growth and the 
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604 LAVOIE, supra note 108, 37 
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neoclassical hypothesis of profit maximization?607 Neoclassicists would claim 
that you can focus on profits and still get growth as a side-effect, if this is what 
you ultimately want; it does not make a difference where you want to go to, as 
in both cases profits are still a maximand, whether intermediate or ultimate.  
Still though from a normative point of view the ultimate focus in a 
firm’s activities makes a difference. Because when profit maximization is the 
‘holy grail’ of corporate governance this will inevitably be reflected in the 
dividend and investment policies of the firm. Eyeing profit means having a 
‘fetish’ for liquidity (to put it in the words of Keynes himself), so when liquidity 
will be available for those that are entitled to enjoy it (i.e. the shareholders) it 
won’t be refused to them. In other words, if profit maximization is the ultimate 
maximand, then once free cash flows will be available, they will be distributed 
instead of retained. A profit-maximizing firm calls for contributions by investors 
that are seeking to complement their portfolio with a riskier and highly liquid 
investment; investors that are unlikely to then have the patience to wait for 
remoter gains, when gains are immediately available. A profit-maximizing firm 
calls for impatient investors that have a peculiar zest in making money quickly. 
In brief, profit-maximization means aiming at short-run profit maximization, 
while growth maximization means aiming intermediately at long-run 
maximization of profit, which by its very nature is a different goal, as investors 
will know beforehand that their investment plan will be served only if profits are 
made and retained for a certain amount of time. As a side note here then, we 
could add that this is why the rise to dominance of the neoclassical theory of the 
firm has promoted short-term shareholdership. 
 
 
3. The growth-profit tradeoff in corporate governance 
 
 We now turn to the analysis of the relationship between profit goals 
and growth objectives, which is crucial in order to understand the role that 
shareholders play in the Post-Keynesian firm and especially the influence that 
the shareholder value orientation may exert on the firm’s strive to grow through 
capital accumulation, as suggested in the previous section. 
 Again let’s consider a firm that has selected to pursue a certain growth 
rate. It will necessarily have to make some investments to obtain its goal. 
According to the Post-Keynesian line of thought the firm faces two constraints 
in its investment plans. I will try below to present these two constraints by using 
an oversimplified math model to make my case, hopefully understandable by 
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3.1. The finance constraint of the corporate accumulation process 
 
The first constraint is called the finance constraint609. The firm’s 
investment, which will allow it to obtain the desired growth rate, needs to be 
financed somehow. Finance may be internal or external. In both cases, as it was 
noted above in Section 2, retained earnings play a central role in the financing 
opportunities the firm will have; they are themselves the means of internal 
finance, but also function as a determinant of the external finance funds the firm 
will be able to secure according to Kalecki’s principle of increasing risk. 
Especially with regard to external finance, retained earnings determine not only 
the amount that external financiers will be willing to provide the firm with, but 
also the amount of external finance that the firm itself will want to take on; 
management will self-impose stricter limits on itself than the suppliers of funds 
will and these limits will be based on some multiple of the firm’s retained 
earnings610. 
Let’s denote a firm’s contributed capital611 with the symbol  and the 
capital borrowed through loans or bond issues with the symbol . Let  be 
the firm’s gross earnings, i.e. the firm’s revenues before dividends and interest 
are paid out. With we denote the rate of returns on shares (taking under 
account both the dividend payments and the cash flows used for stock 
repurchases) and with  the rate of interest on borrowed capital612. Then the 
retained earnings, which are practically additions to the contributed capital, are 
equal to the firm’s gross earnings minus the amount that has been paid out in 
dividends and stock repurchases minus the amount that has been paid back to 
lenders in interest: 
                                                                       (1) 
 
We may now assume that the rate of return on contributed capital and 
the rate of return on borrowed capital are identical613. This is an assumption that 
Post-Keynesians defend as not being too unrealistic. The basis for it is that since 
the promise to equityholders does not represent some fixed obligation for the 
firm, managers will adopt a dividend policy that is simply adjusted to the market 
conventions, one of which is the yield of fixed-income financial assets of a 
similar class614. This is based on the fundamental premise of the Post-
Keynesians that dividend payments, like interest payments, are for the managers 
a cost of autonomy from capital market constituents; the management will pay 
                                                
609 See Dallery, supra note 576, 496; LAVOIE, supra note 580, 109; Eckhard Hein & Till van Treeck, 
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as a return on the share just as much as it is required to keep the shareholders 
passive, so this amount is not likely in the long-run to be considerably greater 
from what a bondholder would make615 616. Under this assumption equation (1) 
looks the following way: 
 
                                                                                      (2) 
 
So far we’ve got the variables that determine the firm’s internal finance. 
We now turn to Kalecki’s principle of increasing risk (see Section 2 above), 
which views a firm’s external finance as a multiple  of the current level of 
retained earnings, which we gave just above under (2). Thus, a firm’s external 
finance is given by the function: 
 
                                                                                            (3) 
 
The firm now has gathered funds both from internal and external 
sources and may use them in order to realize the investment, which will be 
necessary to obtain the desired growth rate. The firm’s investment expenditure 
(I) will necessarily be (smaller or) equal to the funds obtained from retained 
earnings and from external sources617: 
 
                      =   +   =( −  )+ ( −  )                 (4) 
 
Equation (4) above shows us that one of the determinants of investment 
is the firm’s profits. Thus, we gradually start to understand what was said above 
about the role of the profits in the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm; that profits 
are a means to the firm’s end. In the above equation we see clearly that the more 
profits  a firm makes the higher the investment expenditures (I) incurred will 
be. 
But, when we are trying to identify the finance constraint the firm faces 
in its effort to obtain a specific growth rate, we need to formulate an equation, 
where one of the variables will be this growth rate (g). The rate of growth is the 
objective, whose attainment depends on the amount of finance a firm will be 
                                                
615 James Crotty, Owner-Manager Conflict and Financial Theories of Investment Instability: A Critical 
Assessment of Keynes, Tobin and Minsky, 12 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 519, 534. 
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average 97% the yield on AAA bonds over the period from 1870 to 2000; but there have been eras, 
during which there was a high divergence between the two yields (see http://www.capital-flow-
analysis.com/investment-theory/dividend-yield.html). Justifiably, there might be concerns about adopting 
this assumption and indeed there are many studies in the Post-Keynesian realm that do not incorporate it; 
but still in the end the same conclusion is drawn regarding the impact of shareholder value orientation on 
the firm. In light of this, it wouldn’t harm if for the sake of simplicity we choose to adopt this assumption 
at this point, as others have done. 
617 Dallery, supra note 576, 496 
CORPORATE LAW AND THE GREAT REVERSAL IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 167 
able to secure on the first hand. Since as we explained a firm’s finance, internal 
or external, is determined by its undistributable profits (a.k.a. retained earnings) 
we need to rearrange the equation in such a way, so as it can give us the 
relationship between the firm’s growth rate and the firm’s profits, the latter also 
being expressed in dynamic terms (i.e. being measured as a ‘rate’ rather than as 
an absolute number). The dynamic version of profitability is the profit rate (r). 
What we need to identify then is what profit rate a firm must reach in order to be 
able to get the growth rate it aspires. This rate of profit is the finance constraint 
the firm needs to struggle with in its effort to obtain the growth it wants618.  
Profit rate (r)  is given by the ratio of  π/Κ . Growth rate (g) is given by 
the ratio of i/K. So, in equation (4) above we divide I by K to get g; we divide 
 by K to get r and then we rearrange and isolate r on the one side, which will 
enable us to see the variables the profit rate depends on. Thus, we break down 
the finance constraint to its determinant factors. After some manipulation we 
get: 
                                                                                 (5) 
 
 Equation (5) is the firm’s finance constraint for the attainment of a 
specific rate of growth.  
What we need to focus on in equation (5) for the purposes of our 
analysis, is the fact that the rate of return on shares and the rate of interest on 
borrowed capital (i) is located in the numerator. That effectively means that the 
higher the rate of return on shares and the rate of interest on borrowed capital (i) 
is, the higher the profit rate (r) a firm must achieve in order to finance the effort 
to move towards a specific growth rate. Therefore, if a firm has to pay large 
amount of its earnings in dividends and stock repurchases to its shareholders, 
then it will have to strive for a greater profit (as measured by return on capital, 
which is essentially what the profit rate r is) in order to meet its growth targets. 
The more profits are squeezed out of the company to the benefit of 
equityholders, the lower is then the possibility that the firm will actually end up 
having the money that is necessary to effectuate the accumulation process that is 
instrumental for its aspired rate of growth. Accordingly, the lower the dividends 
paid to shareholders, the lower the profit rate a firm needs to achieve in order to 
realize its investment plan619. So, a stronger shareholder value orientation, 
materializing in the form of higher equity payout ratios, functions as a 
counterforce to growth620. The equity’s preference for profit affects the inherent 
in the firm growth-profit tradeoff in a way detrimental to growth621. The more 
then the institutional logics of corporate governance favor the promotion of 
shareholder value, the less investment/capital accumulation firms will be able to 
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effect and thus the less growth we should expect in this economy’s business 
sector.  
Even without the fore stated algebraic representations, we could 
conclude from the mere discursive description of the way internal and external 
finance works in the Post-Keynesian theory that the higher the orientation of a 
firm towards shareholder value is, the more dividends will be paid out of the 
realized profits and thus the lower the firm’s retention ratio will be, which 
determines the magnitude of the firm’s internal and external financing. Thus, 
firms that really want to meet their investment and hence growth goals have to 
struggle to make higher profits, so that even after the squeeze dictated by the 
strive to keep the share price up, there can still be some free cash flows that can 
go for the finance of the firm’s investment plans. Shareholder value orientation 
makes the finance constraint more difficult to surpass. 
The analysis of the finance constraint leads us to the conclusion that 
there is indeed a growth-profit tradeoff within firms and thus shareholder value-
improving mechanisms of corporate governance, such as stock option 
remuneration packages, are likely to negatively affect the growth prospects of a 
firm due to their implicit impetus for distribution rather than reinvestment of 
profits. 
 
3.3. The expansion frontier 
 
According to the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm the second obstacle 
firms face in their effort to accumulate capital and obtain their selected growth 
rate is the so-called expansion frontier622. 
The general rule is that there is an increasing relation between 
growth/accumulation rate and profit rate623. The bigger you get the greater your 
return on capital. Neoclassical economics call this ‘economies of scale’. Since 
                                                
622 Also known as the ‘opportunity frontier’; WOOD, supra note 588, 62 
623 Dallery, supra note 576, 497 
The Great Reversal in Corporate Governance and the 
Financing of the Capital Accumulation Process 
 
According to equation (5) for a given profit rate (r) managers 
can finance a higher accumulation rate, the lower the dividend 
payments are. It is valid then according to equation (5) to 
suggest that the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance, 
which has prompted managers to cater more for shareholders’ 
interests by adopting more generous equity payout policies, has 
actually hampered the accumulation process inside 
corporations, which means that this study’s First Hypothesis is 
in this respect confirmed. 
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growth comes with greater investment in capital stock, it is natural that the latter 
provides the firm with the extra capacity needed to supply for any given increase 
in demand624. Increased investment expenditure also improves the firm’s 
efficiency since it renders it able to integrate the latest technologies, thus 
reducing the costs of production and therefore attain a higher profit margin. 
However, the increasing relation between the capital accumulation or 
growth rates and profit rate is not infinite. There is a rate of growth, called the 
expansion frontier, beyond which accumulation rate and profit rate are 
negatively related. This means that beyond this point growth has a negative 
effect on profits due to a series of difficulties the rapidly expanding firm faces. 
The student of the discourse of neoclassical economics on the ideal firm size 
might think that this axiom of the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm is what 
neoclassicists call ‘diseconomies of scale’625. However, there is a difference in 
that neoclassical economics believe that the frontier is related to a firm’s 
absolute size, while Post-Keynesians view the frontier as being determined by 
the rate of expansion, by how rapidly a firm grows626. Post-Keynesians believe 
that there is no optimal size for a given firm and that it is indeed feasible for 
managers to coordinate activities within organizations that have an infinite size 
(at least up to the size they are allowed by national competition authorities 
depending on the market share they obtain). What causes the problem in the 
Post-Keynesian theory of the firm is the speed, with which a firm changes and 
grows; this is what may cause problems to the managerial factor of production. 
The negative relationship between growth and profit beyond the 
expansion frontier is due to a series of reasons such as: (i) the large amount of 
money that the firm needs to expend in order to increase the demand for its 
products (e.g. extra advertising, promotion, product innovation and quality 
improvement) will cause its unit costs and prices to rise and thus the firm’s 
profit margin will go down627; (ii) growing firms must integrate new managers 
and train them to handle the complexities of the business, but this integration is 
time consuming and costly to the firm (this difficulty is known as the ‘Penrose 
effect’)628; (iii) expanding firms tend to diversify in new markets and new 
products, of which management lacks knowledge. 
When the firm moves in the area below the expansion frontier then both 
growth and profits are at suboptimal levels. The firm would like to grow more, 
since this is its objective, while the shareholders would like to make more 
profits. When the firm reaches the expansion frontier, profits are at their peak629 
and this is the optimal situation from the shareholder point of view. But the 
Post-Keynesian firm that tries to maximize growth is not satisfied yet, as it 
knows it can grow even more. But, since the relationship between profits and 
growth is an inverted U-shape, if the firm wants to go beyond the expansion 
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frontier it won’t be so profitable anymore, so the shareholders will be unhappy. 
So, if the firm has a strong shareholder value orientation, it won’t grow beyond 
the expansion frontier. This analysis is better understood with the following 








On the horizontal line we measure the firm’s growth rate. On the 
vertical we measure the firm’s profit rate. Let’s assume that the firm wants and 
is able to pursue pure profit maximization under the influence that the 
shareholder value orientation generates. Its desire will be to realize profits at a 









Figure 27 – The expansion frontier 
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 rate leads to point R, which is associated with a suboptimal growth rate . 
If the firm is Post-Keynesian and is completely insulated by shareholder 
pressure, so that it can maximize autonomously its own preference function, 
which is the pursuit of growth as a maximand, then the firm would be able to 
reach growth rate , which leads to point G in the graph, which is in turn 
associated with a suboptimal profit rate  that is however sufficient for the 
firms in order to finance their objectives.  
The analysis of the expansion frontier with the help of Figure 28 
confirms the existence of the growth-profit tradeoff and shows how shareholder 
value orientation with its inherent ‘fetish for liquidity’ may enter the top 
management’s decision function at the expense of the firm’s real growth 
prospects 
 
3.4. Integrating the parameter of shareholdership’s short-termism in the 
Post-Keynesian theory of the firm 
 
The Post-Keynesian theory of the firm offers a more solid foundation 
than the explanations in Section 7 of Chapter One for the backing of this study’s 
First Hypothesis. However, so far in Chapter Two what has been shown is that 
the slowdown in capital accumulation may plausibly be suggested to having 
been caused by the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance. The question to be 
asked at this point then is whether this stylized negative influence of the 
shareholderist thought on fixed investment that the Post-Keynesian model 
suggests would still be there, even in the absence of the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership. In other words, is shareholder value orientation alone capable 
of hampering the growth aspirations of the firm regardless of the time-horizons 
of the shareholders?  
The short answer is no. Shareholder value orientation alone does not 
make or break a company. Shareholder value orientation has a derivative 
content; the influence that it generates depends on something exogenous: on the 
character of shareholdership. The content of the preferences of the shareholders 
The Great Reversal in Corporate Governance and 
the Optimal Growth Rate 
 
Figure 28 shows that the maximum profit rate, which 
shareholder value orientation will dictate the firm’s 
management to achieve, is associated with a suboptimal 
growth rate. This confirms that the Great Reversal in 
Corporate Governance has pushed corporations to opt for 
less capital accumulation and hence less growth; thus Figure 
28 backs the study’s First Hypothesis in this respect. 
 
CORPORATE LAW AND THE GREAT REVERSAL IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 173 
makes a big difference for the results that the orientation towards the satisfaction 
of those preferences will produce. Therefore, whenever any theory or line of 
thought suggests that the dominance of the shareholder value approach in 
corporate governance leads to the production of a specific set of results, it makes 
implicitly some assumptions regarding the equity’s preferences and appetite. 
So, in light of this analysis, the crucial question to be posed is what is 
the assumption that the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm makes regarding 
shareholdership? The answer is that the Post-Keynesian model in setting the 
preference function of the shareholders, as profit maximization, assumes 
implicitly that shareholders are short-termists. The shareholder value orientation 
is conducive to produce these negative results on the efforts of the firm to 
surpass the finance constraint and move beyond the expansion frontier, because 
it is implicitly assumed by Post-Keynesians to be an orientation towards the 
delivery of short-term profits. If shareholders were interested in the intermediate 
to long-term prospects of the enterprise, then it would be plausible to suggest 
that they would be concerned with the firm’s investment policy630 and would not 
seek to hamper the firm’s efforts to accumulate capital. The premise that short-
termist shareholders have this negative stance towards capital accumulation is 
backed by empirical data presented in Section 7.5. of Chapter One. If 
shareholders were observed in reality to be long-termists, then the Post-
Keynesians would not lend to shareholder value orientation the content of 
orientation towards the distribution rather than the retention of profits. Why else 
would the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm stylize the influences flowing from 
the equity towards the firm as hostile to fixed investment, if it didn’t view 
shareholders as having a, typical for myopic horizons, ‘fetish for liquidity’ and 
hence a distaste for the irreversible and illiquid nature of fixed capital 
formation631?  Since in Chapter One it was shown (Figures 25-27) that 
shareholders only have a fleeting relation with any particular enterprise, then the 
implicit assumption of the Post-Keynesians cannot be blamed as unrealistic and 
hence it is plausible to suggest that the Post-Keynesian modeling backs the 
claim that short-term shareholdership coupled with shareholder value orientation 
is responsible for negative accumulation dynamics in firms.  
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The Post-Keynesian Theory of the Firm and the 
Great Reversal in Shareholdership 
 
What the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm actually does is 
that it documents the influence on the dynamics of capital 
accumulation of a shareholder value orientation that has as 
a benchmark the preferences of a short-termist shareholder. 
Therefore, the negative influence of shareholders on the 
finance and expansion constraints of the firm that the Post-
Keynesian theory models is essentially the influence of 
short-termist shareholders. Thus, the Post-Keynesian theory 
of the firm ultimately buttresses the First Hypothesis in 
respect of the combined impact of the Great Reversal in 
Corporate Governance and the Great Reversal in 











As outlined in the Introduction (see Section 3.3.), Chapter Three seeks 
to buttress this study’s Second Hypothesis, i.e. that corporate law is one of the 
determinants of the reorientation of corporate governance towards shareholder 
value. In fact, what the Second Hypothesis seeks to do is to expand the causality 
chain depicted in Figure 2 by adding corporate law as a contributing factor at 
least for the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance (see Figure 29). 
Nevertheless, the Second Hypothesis does not aspire to put forward an 
exclusive explanation for the rise to dominance of shareholder value. Just like 
the First Hypothesis (developed in Chapter One) does not claim to provide a 
complete account of how the world’s developed countries reached the point of 
reduced rates of capital accumulation and economic growth, but merely seeks to 
highlight one of the relevant reasons (see for alternative explanations in Section 
7.7. of Chapter One), so does the Second Hypothesis aspire to put forward just 
one of the reasons why the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance occurred. 
After all, given that this study fully accedes to the idea of institutional 
complementarity with regard to the production of outcomes at the sphere of 
Political Economy, Chapter One has already pointed to an abundance of legal 
and extra-legal institutions that have brought about the reorientation of corporate 




Figure 28 - The Causality Chain of the Second Hypothesis 
 
The Second Hypothesis seeks, apart from complementing the First 
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claim: that the rise of shareholder value has been largely unaccompanied by 
changes in the corporate law. It has been claimed that ‘the recrudescence of 
shareholder influence appears to have occurred against the backdrop of a 
remarkable stability over the post-war period in the relevant company law 
provisions’632. Others in summarizing the reasons for convergence in corporate 
governance have stated that corporate law has displayed ‘a certain inertia’633. 
Although, these claims empower the perception that there have been forces in 
play other than corporate law that brought about the Great Reversal in Corporate 
Governance, a perception, with which this study does not take issue, at the same 
time they weaken the Second Hypothesis. Therefore, the pitfalls of this 
perception need to be shown in this Chapter, in order to marshal the argument 
that the causality flow that leads to low GDP growth rates in the post-Bretton 
Woods era starts inter alia from corporate law.  
Chapter Three responds to these challenges by introducing the post-
Bretton Woods shareholder value index (‘PBWSV’); an index that shows the 
progress that the corporate laws of the five jurisdictions, whose capital 
accumulation rates were presented in Chapter One (France, Germany, The 
Netherlands, UK, US), have made at the shareholder value level during the post-
Bretton Woods era. Such a post-Bretton Woods shareholder value index would 
show how each jurisdiction’s corporate law scored from a shareholder value 
perspective at the time of the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements in 
1973 and then how this score changed over the years until 2007, the year before 
the ongoing crisis officially started. This index is ‘dynamic’, in the sense that it 
identifies what the relevant scores were for each jurisdiction every single year 
from 1973 to 2007.  
Eventually, out of the index a trend line will emerge illustrating the 
incremental move of each jurisdiction’s corporate law towards shareholder value 
or away from shareholder value. If in the end of the Chapter the trend line is 
found to have an upwards direction for these five jurisdictions (i.e. a direction 
towards shareholder value), then there is an indication that the Second 
Hypothesis holds true and that the foundations of the ‘inertia’ or the 
‘indifference’ claim regarding corporate law’s role in the Great Reversal in 
Corporate Governance will be shaken.  
As it will be shown, the PBWSV builds on the wisdom of previous 
numerical comparative corporate law studies, but is the first to evaluate the 
development of these five corporate laws on the specific issue of shareholder 
value (and not shareholder protection broadly). 
 Apart from backing the Second Hypothesis the PBWSV provides 
evidence that there is some degree of formal convergence between the insider 
and outsider systems of corporate governance (see Section 4.2.2. of the 
Introduction). Therefore, Chapter Three is to be added to the cohort of papers 
that bear on the functional vs. formal convergence debate, but also to the group 
                                                
632 Paul Davies, Shareholder Value, Company Law and Securities Markets Law – A British View, in 
CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW (K. HOPT & E. WYMEERSCH, EDS.) (2003), 261, 262 
633 AGLIETTA & REBERIOUX, supra note 502, 71 
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of papers that adopt numerical methods to measure the convergence and 
divergence of legal rules between different countries in general634. 
 
 
1. The art of quantifying corporate law 
 
1.1. The LLSV index 
 
The ‘law and finance’ line of thought (see Section 4.2.4. of the 
Introduction) initiated the trend to quantify the law in relation to shareholder 
protection635 and more generally to use a numerical method when conducting 
comparative research in law. What ‘law and finance’ scholars actually did was 
to ‘cherry pick’ some types of arrangements that exist in the various legal 
systems, identify them as important for shareholder protection and make them 
the variables of a ‘shareholder rights index’ (‘LLSV index’) 636, according to 
which each jurisdiction would be assessed as to the degree of protection it offers 
to its shareholders. If a country’s legal system had in place the selected 
arrangement, then it scored one point on the index; if the arrangement didn’t 
exist it scored zero. On the condition that the arrangements chosen as variables 
of the LLSV index are adequate proxies for shareholder protection, then this 
index can classify jurisdictions from the most shareholder-protective to the least 
shareholder-protective on the basis of the jurisdictions’ scores. This is a result 
that can be difficult to obtain through traditional descriptive comparative 
studies. 
 To understand the mechanics of the quantification of corporate law and 
pave the way for understanding the principles that are followed here in the 
construction of the PBWSV, it is worth looking briefly at the technicalities of 
the LLSV index.  
 As far as the variables are concerned, firstly, the index looks at whether 
jurisdictions have in place the one-share/one-vote (‘1S/1V’) principle. Secondly 
the index points to the existence or non-existence in a country’s legal system of 
six shareholder rights that together comprise the so-called ‘anti-director rights 
index’ (‘ADRI’)637. Finally, it looks at whether jurisdictions have the institution 
of mandatory dividends or not. All in all, the LLSV index is composed of eight 
variables that are used as proxies for shareholder protection. 
 Regarding the 1S/1V principle a jurisdiction receives one point on the 
LLSV index if it has institutionalized the principle in its corporate law and zero 
                                                
634 See William Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 715; 
Mark West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations from Japan and the 
United States, 149 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 528 
635 The seminal paper is La Porta et al., supra note 48, 1126ff. 
636 The abbreviation ‘LLSV index’ derives from the first letter of the last name of the authors that 
introduced that index in their well-known paper: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,Vishny. 
637 The six ADRI variables are: (i) the right of shareholders to mail their vote; (ii) the prohibition of share 
blocking; (iii) the derivative suit and the appraisal remedy; (iv) the existence of institutions that allow 
proportional representation on the board; (v) the pre-emptive right; and (vi) the right of shareholders to 
call an extraordinary meeting.  
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if not. Regarding the ADRI, for each of the six rights of this constituent index 
that are provided for in national corporate law a jurisdiction receives one point, 
but no point at all if there is no relevant provision. Thus, the maximum a 
jurisdiction can theoretically get on the ADRI is six points, the minimum zero. 
No points are given to a country if it has in place the institution of mandatory 
dividends, as this is viewed upon as a legal substitute for the overall weakness of 
shareholder protection in a country638. The higher a jurisdiction scores on the 
overall LLSV index (ADRI index + 1S/1V), the shareholder-friendlier its 
corporate law is perceived to be. 
The goal of the LLSV index is to identify the corporate law 
determinants that lead to strong capital markets. Obviously, the provisions in 
corporate law that matter the most from this viewpoint are those related to the 
protection of minority shareholders; minority protection makes an equity 
investment safer, so the argument goes. It is natural then that the LLSV index 
comprises mainly of those rights that are traditionally in the corporate legal 
doctrine associated with the protection of minority shareholders. Consequently, 
while the mechanics of the LLSV index should be taken under account in 
constructing the post-Bretton Woods shareholder value index, the latter cannot 
borrow the LLSV variables, as the two indexes have different objectives and 
aspire to measure different aspects of a corporate legal system. 
 
1.2. Alternative shareholder protection indices: the Lele/Siems index 
 
The LLSV index has become a widely used way of evaluating the level 
of shareholder protection that a national corporate legal system offers, as the 
hundreds of citations to the paper introducing it show639. Nevertheless, it is also 
criticized, as having a limited scope and not including all arrangements that 
matter for shareholder protection640 or as being US-biased641, given the fact that 
some of the rights included in the index were chosen because of their existence 
in the US, which means that in essence the object of comparison is how close a 
national corporate law is to the US system of shareholder protection (hidden 
benchmarking). Others assert that the scores of some countries on the index are 
not accurate and that jurisdictions that get zero points for a certain variable have 
another institution in place that fulfills the same function as the rule, which the 
law and finance scholars are looking for in formal law.  
                                                
638 La Porta et al., supra note 48, 1128 
639 See Craig Doidge et al., Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-listing Decision, 64 
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 425; Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Statistics of Legal Infrastructures: A Review 
of the Law and Finance Literature, 8 AMERICAN LAW & ECONOMICS REVIEW 62; Marco Pagano & Paolo 
Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1005; 
Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 537 
640 See John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership : The Role of Law in the Separation of Ownership 
and Control, 111 YALE LAW JOURNAL 
641 See Erik Berglöf & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: 
Implications for Transition and Developing Countries, WDI Working Paper 1999. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=183708  
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The criticisms led certain authors to recode or to expand the LLSV 
index. Some attempted to make it more accurate642, others to adjust it to the 
exigencies of comparative legal research that includes the study of corporate 
laws of transition economies, which cannot be judged yet on the basis of 
Western standards643.  
Of the various indexes that have quantified shareholder protection since 
the LLSV index the most comprehensive is the one prepared by Lele and Siems 
in 2006644. To be sure, most recently authors have begun to build their 
comparative research in corporate law and governance on the Lele/Siems index 
rather than on the LLSV645. This is because the Lele/Siems index comprises of 
60 variables/proxies for shareholder protection and thus escapes the criticism of 
narrowness that burdens the LLSV index, but also because it is constructed on 
the basis of solid methodological foundations. These methodological 
foundations are derived from an earlier paper of Mathias Siems, where he had 
designed a concrete framework for all numerical comparative studies646 and 
from a paper by Holger Spamann, where he recoded the LLSV index647.  
The recent recognition of the qualities of the Lele/Siems index indicates 
that its methodological foundations should serve as the basis for any further 
effort to conduct a numerical comparative study in corporate law. In light of 
this, the PBWSV, despite the fact that it comprises of different variables than the 
Lele/Siems index, is constructed after the mechanics of the Lele/Siems index, so 
as not to be accused of not respecting the principles of comparative law, of 
containing measurement errors or of comparing otherwise incomparable rules. 
The next section serves exactly the purpose of adjusting the Lele/Siems 
methodology to the exigencies of the study to be conducted by the PBWSV.  
 
1.3. Constructing the post-Bretton Woods shareholder value index 
 
1.3.1. The compatibility of the post-Bretton Woods shareholder value index 
with the principles of comparative law 
 
Any effort to do comparative law by using numerical methods, such as 
an index, is unavoidably subject to criticisms; it can be accused as a reductivist 
approach, as being governed by arbitrariness or as suffering from home bias, to 
name but a few. The challenge then is to construct the index in a way that is in 
                                                
642 See Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-Director 
Rights Index’ under Consistent Coding, ECGI – Law Working Paper No. 67/2006  
643 Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder Protection and Creditor Rights in Transition 
Economies, 1 EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 59 
644 Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 17 JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE LAW STUDIES 17 
645 See Christopher Van der Elst, Law and Economics of Shareholder Rights and Ownership Structures: 
How Trivial are Shareholder Rights for Shareholders?, Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 008/2010, Feb. 15, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553094 
646 Mathias Siems, Numerical Comparative Law – Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Order to Reduce 
Complexity?, 13 CARDOZO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 521, 539ff. 
647 Spamann, supra note 642, 4ff. 
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accordance with the general principles of comparative legal research, so that the 
‘micro-comparison’648 of the legal rules that it entails can lead to results that 
won’t be easily disputed by many. 
 
1.3.1.1. Designing a legal trend line 
The necessity of using a numerical method, such as the PBWSV, 
instead of a more mainstream descriptive method of comparison must be 
established649. In connection to this the purpose of the discourse in this Chapter 
has to be reiterated, since it is commonly acknowledged that it is the purpose of 
the comparative research that will determine the method of comparison that 
ought to be used650.  
The purpose of Chapter Three is to back the Second Hypothesis, which 
suggests that the rise of shareholder value, which contributed to the reduction of 
growth rates in the post-Bretton Woods era, is attributed to reforms in the field 
of corporate law during the same period. In essence, the goal is to show the 
corporate law-propelled rising trend of a specific set of corporate governance 
institutional logics that contributed to a declining trend in a macroeconomic 
indicator. Trends can be better illustrated by the design of (linear regression) 
trend lines and the latter can only be drawn on the basis of numerical data. 
Therefore, just like this study used numerical data to illustrate through a trend 
line the incremental fall of capital accumulation rates in the post-Bretton Woods 
era, it must use a trend line based on numerical data to illustrate the incremental 
rise in the promotion of shareholder value by corporate law during the same 
period. This is why a numerical approach is preferred over a descriptive one. 
 
1.3.1.2. A complement to the political economy analysis 
It is claimed that a comparative legal study must include a study of the 
history, the politics, the economics, the cultural background in literature and the 
arts, the religions, beliefs and practices and the philosophies of the countries, 
whose legal order is put under scrutiny651. Many of these issues have already 
been touched upon in this study with regard to the five jurisdictions, whose legal 
route at the shareholder value level the index investigates (see Sections 3-6 of 
Chapter One). Therefore, the presentation of the historical evolution of the legal 
rules pertaining to shareholder value is not done out of context here. In fact, in 
many cases the time that a reform in the corporate rules presented here was 
undertaken is found to coincide with the years that the jurisdiction at hand 
decided to enter more aggressively the international battlefield for the siphoning 
of funds into its national capital markets (see Section 4.3. of Chapter One). 
 
                                                
648 The term ‘micro-comparison’ refers to the comparative study of specific topics and aspects of two or 
more legal systems and is to be distinguished from ‘macro-comparison’, which refers to the comparative 
study of entire legal systems. The two terms have been coined in comparative law by MAX RHEINSTEIN, 
GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN (1979), 245 
649 Siems, supra note 646, 539 
650 PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD (1999), 227 
651 Ferdinand Stone, The End to be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TULANE LAW REVIEW 325, 351 
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1.3.1.3. Concrete criteria for the selection of the points of comparison: 
corporate rules that minimize residual loss and corporate rules used by 
shareholder activists 
A comparative study must be conducted in such a way, so as to avoid 
imposing the author’s own legal conceptions upon the foreign legal cultures it 
puts under scrutiny652. This principle amounts to a more general desideratum of 
the methodology of social sciences that calls for elimination of subjective 
judgment to the extent possible653. A study that aspires to make a contribution to 
the comparative corporate governance and to modern political economy cannot 
afford to be accused of arbitrariness in the choice of its variables/points of 
comparison. 
In light of this challenge, the question to be asked is: how should the 
variables of the PBWSV be chosen, so as not to have an arbitrary or biased 
selection of the norms that are put under scrutiny?  
The first point that should be made here is that a shareholder value 
index is not the same with a shareholder protection index; the former is more 
specialized, while the latter more general. Not every legal arrangement that 
protects shareholders vis-à-vis the management or vis-à-vis other (dominant) 
shareholders promotes at the same time the institutional logics of shareholder 
value in corporate governance. Shareholder protection rules may help reduce 
monitoring and bonding costs and thus eventually lead to better book-to-market 
ratio, share price, Tobin’s Q, greater dividend yield and stock return, but they do 
not necessarily cause the managers to think in a way more favorable to 
shareholders654. In my view, shareholder value-promoting legal institutions are 
those that help minimize what agency theory calls ‘residual loss’ (see Section 
6.2.2. of Chapter One). Residual loss is the money equivalent of the reduction in 
welfare experienced by the shareholders because of the divergence that exists 
between the management’s decisions and those decisions, which would 
maximize the shareholders’ welfare655. Corporate law rules that ‘nudge’ 
managers to think more in shareholder-welfare terms, i.e. that align the 
management’s incentives with those of the shareholders, are the rules that 
reduce the said money equivalent and maximize what is called ‘shareholder 
value’. Therefore, it is only these rules that will be inserted as variables in the 
PBWSV.  
Nevertheless, while the residual loss-minimizing effect may be obvious 
for some rules (e.g. rules facilitating the use of stock options), for other 
provisions it may not be so evident. Therefore, so as not to miss out legal 
arrangements that are significant for this study’s purposes we treat the 
significance that shareholder activists assign to certain corporate rules as a proxy 
                                                
652 DE CRUZ, supra note 650, 223 
653 GARY KING, ROBERT GEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY (1994), 25 
654 In fact many empirical studies using indexes show the correlation of these firm characteristics to 
stronger shareholder protection; see Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 107; Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate 
Valuation, 57 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1147 
655 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 491, 308  
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for these rules’ positive effect on shareholder value. Rules for the introduction 
of which shareholder activists have lobbied or whose content they have sought 
to impose upon the firm through private ordering arrangements belong to the 
PBWSV. In addition to this, existing legal devices that have been frequently 
used by shareholder activists to promote their goals are also considered here to 
be shareholder value-maximizing and are thus featured in the index at hand. 
Apart from the residual loss-minimizing rules and the legal 
arrangements that shareholder activists treat as ‘holy grails’, the PBWSV 
features an additional innovation in the issue of selection of variables/points of 
comparison. In the calculation of the overall score of a jurisdiction the PBWSV 
takes under account corporate or securities rules that have a documented 
counterbalancing effect on specific shareholder value-promoting rules. This 
point will be elaborated further under Section 1.3.2.3 below, when explaining 
the methodology of rating.  
From the explanation of the criteria that shape the structure of the 
PBWSV it becomes evident, why the latter could not simply constitute a 
recoding of the LLSV or a reduced version of the Lele/Siems index. The 
PBWSV is a suis generis index that can avoid criticisms about arbitrariness by 
drawing firmly on agency theory and on empirical data for the selection of its 
variables and that respects comparative law’s principle of functionality by 
exposing inconsistencies within the same legal system, which may deprive some 
formal rules of their intended effect. 
 
1.3.2. The mechanics of the post-Bretton Woods shareholder value index 
 
One of the sources of criticism for previous indexes in the field of 
corporate law was the lack of transparency regarding the variables and the 
coding. In the previous sub-section the effort to make the PBWSV more 
transparent compared to previous indexes began by laying down the criteria, by 
which the variables on the index are chosen. In this sub-section the sources, 
where the variables are sought for, are identified, the issue of whether both 
mandatory and default rules are considered is tackled and the technicalities of 
rating are touched upon. 
   
1.3.2.1. Sources of corporate law 
 The sources of law, where the rules constituting the variables of the 
PBWSV are sought for, must be identified. This issue is linked to the more 
foundational question of what are the sources of corporate law. 
 In Section 3.3 of the Introduction I acknowledged that among the legal 
institutions that brought about the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance 
securities law has a prominent position, but I pledged not to extend the scope of 
the legal part of this study beyond corporate law. Prima facie this would mean 
that a clear line should be drawn, so that developments in securities law are not 
taken under account for the PBWSV, despite the fact that this study deals 
exclusively with listed corporations, for the functioning of which securities 
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regulation is of utmost importance. Nevertheless, in between corporate and 
securities law there are ‘grey’ territories that may formally belong to one niche, 
but may serve functions traditionally reserved for the other niche. Therefore, it 
would be a mistake to perceive modern corporate law as consisting just of that 
core statute that exists in most jurisdictions, which establishes the corporate 
form, and the decrees and case law that flow from this statute. That could be 
considered as ‘stricto sensu corporate law’ or ‘formal corporate law’, but the 
modern legal doctrine accedes to a broader perception of corporate law that also 
includes those rules that may be found in territories formally considered part of 
securities law, but that affect directly the internal affairs of the corporation656. 
Of course the greatest part of securities law affects corporate governance, but 
mostly in an indirect way; part of ‘lato sensu corporate law’ or ‘functional 
corporate law’ are only those securities law provisions that introduce procedures 
and requirements that are applied in the framework of the internal machinery of 
the (listed) corporation and thus affect the functioning of the latter in a direct 
way.  
Therefore, given that corporate law here is perceived lato sensu the 
variables that are featured in the index are also to be found in sources of ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ securities law; this includes listing standards issued by the major stock 
exchanges of the five jurisdictions that are studied here, as well as corporate 
governance codes and other self-regulatory codes, compliance to which is found 
to be the rule in practice.  
To be sure, a special issue arises with regard to the US, where corporate 
law is mostly state law. Which state’s corporate statute will be taken under 
account? The answer appears to be obvious given that more than half of the 
Fortune 500 US firms are incorporated in Delaware657. Needless to say though, 
that since the study embraces the concept of lato sensu corporate law, US 
federal securities regulation that deals directly with issues of corporate 
governance is also to be taken under account. 
 
1.3.2.2. Mandatory and default rules 
The second methodological challenge that the PBWSV has to tackle is 
whether it will include only mandatory or both mandatory and default rules, the 
latter meaning rules that allow a divergence provision in the articles of 
association. The fact that the law and finance scholars did not take a position 
with regard to this issue is deemed as one of the LLSV index’s weaknesses and 
one of the sources of its inaccuracies658.  
My position in the PBWSV is to include both mandatory and default 
rules and rate the same a jurisdiction that sets as a default an arrangement that 
another one introduces as mandatory. The purpose of the PBWSV to show the 
law’s attitude over time towards shareholder value, so the mere fact that a 
                                                
656 See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2009), 17-18 
657 LEWIS BLACK JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE (2007), 1 
658 Spamann, supra note 642, 6 
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jurisdiction introduced a shareholder value-enhancing rule, even if replaceable, 
shows that the legislator has indeed made a step towards the promotion of 
shareholder value, which must be depicted on the trend line that is to be 
produced. Otherwise, we would have to check first if the shareholder value-
enhancing default rule is indeed followed by corporations in a jurisdiction and 
then decide how to rate the latter with regard to this arrangement. This would 
lead to inconsistencies, as the PBWSV would have to rate a jurisdiction with 
one point at the time of the introduction of a default rule because the firms chose 
initially to incorporate it and after some years rate the jurisdiction for the same 
arrangement with no points, not because of some change in corporate law, but 
because the firms for extra-legal reasons chose to deviate from the rule set as 
default659.  
 
1.3.2.3. Rating  
Not all shareholder value-enhancing legal provisions have the same 
weight. Obviously, the information right of the shareholder cannot incentivize 
managers to think in shareholder interests as much as the granting of stock 
options to them can. That means that it may be appropriate to weight the 
variables and multiply the jurisdiction’s score at each variable by the weight 
factor.  
Nevertheless, weighting the variables would add another layer of 
subjective element into the PBWSV660, which in the previous section was noted 
as undesirable for any study in the field of social sciences. A certain shareholder 
value-enhancing device, for instance a shareholder suit, might in practice be the 
most useful weapon in shareholdership’s arsenal in one jurisdiction, while in 
another jurisdiction the filing of such a suit might in practice be very rare. The 
dilemma then would be whether the weight to the variable would be attributed 
according to the importance that it has in the former jurisdiction or according to 
the importance it has in the latter. Therefore, to avoid such inconsistencies I 
opted for non-weighted variables in the PBWSV. 
Another issue is whether the rating should be binary, i.e. ‘1’ or ‘0’, as in 
the LLSV index, or non-binary, as in the Lele/Siems index. I believe that the ‘all 
or nothing’ approach of the LLSV index is not capable of illustrating fully the 
progress that jurisdictions have made at the shareholder value level; therefore, in 
order to show the gradual progress that has been made in this respect in the post-
Bretton Woods era it is decided, where this is feasible, to use non-binary rating, 
therefore allowing for intermediate scores (e.g. 0.5, 0.75). 
Finally, there is the issue of how those rules -referred under Section 
1.3.1.3 above- that have a counterbalancing effect on certain shareholder value-
enhancing provisions are accommodated by the rating methodology. The 
                                                
659 See for instance deviations over time in the percentage of firms replacing a default rule under 
Delaware law in Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REVIEW OF 
FINANCIAL STUDIES 783, Table I. 
660 Simon Deakin & Beth Ahlering, Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A Case 
of Institutional Complementarity?, 41 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 865, 885 
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counterbalancing effect is documented by subtracting points from a jurisdiction, 
when it has in place the ‘counter-rule’. This does not mean that the PBWSV 
seeks to subtract points from a jurisdiction, when for instance it has established 
some type of labor codetermination in public corporations’ management or 
some other general stakeholderist rule, because the exact mitigating effect these 
rules have on shareholder value is abstract and cannot be measured. The 
PBWSV only subtracts points from a jurisdiction, when it has in place a legal 
arrangement that takes away the specific benefit that flows from a specific 
residual loss-minimizing arrangement. For instance, corporate rules that 
facilitate shareholder coordination produce a residual loss-minimizing effect that 
is counterbalanced/mitigated by the existence of an ‘action in concert’ rule in 
the same legal system; in such a case, the points awarded to the jurisdiction for 
the shareholder coordination rules will be cancelled through the subtraction of 
equal points for the existence of the concerted action rule. 
 
 
2. The post-Bretton Woods shareholder value index 
 
In this part I present the PBWSV based on the principles and the 
methodology that was laid down in the previous section. The PBWSV consists 
of 18 variables. These 18 variables are classified into seven broader categories 
of corporate law subjects; some subjects contain more than one variable (e.g. 
shareholder litigation), others contain only one (e.g. independent directors). 
Each variable of the index is presented in three steps. First, it is explained why 
the subject of corporate law, in which the variable belongs, was chosen for the 
index. The justification for the inclusion of each subject and each subject’s 
variables in the index is given by identifying their residual loss-minimization 
effect and their potential existence in shareholder activists’ agendas (see Section 
1.3.1.2). Secondly, the criteria, by which the jurisdictions are rated for the 
variable under scrutiny are presented. Third, an explanatory part is added 
identifying and explaining the exact rules in each jurisdiction that are 
responsible for the score that the latter received for the variable under scrutiny; 
the scores, as explained and analyzed, are inserted to the five tables that are 
found in the Annex to Chapter Three.  
After this three-step approach is completed for all the variables of the 
PBWSV a graph illustrating the progress that each jurisdiction has made at the 
18-point shareholder value scale over the past decades is presented on the basis 
of the tables of the Annex (Figure 30). Out of the graph a linear regression trend 
line emerges showing the overall tendency of corporate law in these five 
jurisdictions towards shareholder value (Figure 31). 
2.1. The right to put items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting        
 
2.1.1. Reasons for inclusion in the index 
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 In order to enable shareholders to cast an informed vote at the annual 
or extraordinary meeting or to consciously grant power of attorney to a 
proxyholder to vote on their behalf, the shareholders must be aware of the 
agenda of the meeting and any matters being voted on. Therefore, the general 
rule is that the board is required to draft the meeting’s agenda and to disseminate 
it to the shareholders prior to the meeting in a timely manner. In jurisdictions 
following the ‘pull’ system of dissemination of pre-meeting information the 
agenda must be included in the convocation of the general meeting661, while in 
jurisdictions following the ‘push’ system of dissemination it must be included in 
the proxy packet mailed to the shareholders662 663.  
Customarily, for the greatest part of the Bretton Woods years 
shareholders that did not hold a dominant stake in the firm would not bother 
trying to influence the content of the agenda if they were dissatisfied with it; 
they would prefer to sell their stock and exit the firm rather than make their 
voice heard (a.k.a. ‘the Wall Street Rule’)664. From the 1970s onwards with the 
rise of institutional ownership of stock (see Section 3.3. of Chapter One) activist 
shareholders, starting from the US, began their attempts to enrich the meetings’ 
agendas with their own resolutions665. In the 1970s shareholder proposals for the 
agenda were social/political, but quickly shareholder activists’ focus shifted to 
corporate governance and their proxy proposals aspired to influence the firm’s 
governance policies666. 
Overall, it is well documented that shareholder proposals, i.e. the 
exercise of the right of shareholders to put items on the shareholder meeting’s 
agenda, are very high on shareholder activists’ agendas and their associations 
have in the past sought to shape the rules related to them667. But, do shareholder 
proposals have a residual loss-minimizing effect as well, so as to deserve a place 
on the PBWSV? 
Empirical research conducted on the issue of shareholder proposals has 
shown that the firms, in whose general meetings shareholder proposals are 
submitted in both the US668 and in the EU669, are firms, whose stock 
                                                
661 See Art. 5(3)(a) of the Shareholder Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC) (‘SRD’) 
662 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a), SEC Schedule 14A 
663 For a general overview of the differences between the ‘pull’ and the ‘push’ system of dissemination of 
pre-meeting information see Pavlos Masouros, Is the EU Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously? An Essay 
on The Impotence of Shareholdership in Corporate Europe, 7 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 195, 197 
664 Gerald Davis & Tracy Thompson, A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control, 39 
ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 141, 154 
665 JAY EISENHOFER & MICHAEL BARRY, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM HANDBOOK (2010), §3.03[A] 
666 Id., at §3.03[C] 
667 See PR Newswire, The Council of Institutional Investors Opposes SEC Staff Decision on Shareowner-
Sponsored Access Proposals. Available at:  
http://news.findlaw.com/prnewswire/20050207/07feb2005170757.html; Synthesis of the Comments on 
the Second Consultation Documents of the Internal Market and Services Directorate-General ‘Fostering 
an Appropriate Regime for Shareholders’ Rights’, (Sept. 2005), 14ff.. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/consultation2_report_en.pdf  
668 Luc Renneboog & Peter Szilagyi, Shareholder Activism through the Proxy Process, ECGI – Finance 
Working Paper No. 275/2010, 14ff. 
669 Peter Cziraki et al., Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective, 16 
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 738, 761ff. 
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performance has been relatively poor the period prior to the submission of the 
proposal, whose CEO has less exposure to the firm’s equity and whose capital 
structure is less leveraged, a fact which in agency theory is seen as a source of 
management’s shirking670. This profile of shareholder proposal-targeted firms 
shows that shareholders opt to exercise their right to put items on the agenda, 
when the firm is not delivering value to them to the degree that its peers do. 
Thus, prima facie shareholder proposals constitute a monitoring device that 
helps to better align the incentives of the management to those of the 
shareholders.  
A closer look at the issue will reveal that shareholder proposals can be 
effective residual loss-minimizing mechanisms as well. This is particularly the 
case in the jurisdictions, where shareholder proposals may include the issue of 
directors’ replacement. In these cases managers know that the probability to 
become a target of a shareholder proposal becomes greater the more its stock is 
underperforming the market index; therefore, in the face of the threat to be 
ousted as a result of such a proposal they are likely to focus more on pumping 
the stock price up, thus delivering more shareholder value. Consequently, the 
threat of a shareholder proposal minimizes residual loss in the jurisdictions, 
where shareholders may replace directors through such a proposal. 
However, even in jurisdictions, where replacement of the directors is 
excludable as an issue of shareholder proposal from the proxy packet, 
shareholder proposals continue to have a residual-loss minimizing effect. In the 
US, where this is the case, shareholder proposals are shown to have a negative 
signaling effect, as their submission depresses the firm’s stock price671. This 
negative signal is due to the fact that the submission of a shareholder proposal 
reveals failed behind-the-scenes negotiations between shareholders and 
managers672. Therefore, even there, where a simple shareholder proposal may 
not threaten to oust managers, the latter are again likely to want to avoid the 
submission of a shareholder proposal by pumping the stock price up, because 
the reduction in the firm’s share price that will likely occur after the event of the 
proposal will affect their equity-based compensation.  
In light of the above, whether replacing directors is includable in a 
shareholder proposal or not, the latter is likely to incentivize the management to 
think more in shareholder value terms. Therefore, the degree to which a 
jurisdiction’s corporate law facilitates the exercise of the right to put items on 
the agenda is a criterion of the shareholder value orientation of this jurisdiction’s 
corporate law and thus it should be included in the PBWSV. 
 
2.1.2. Variables (i) - (iii): percentage required to put items on the agenda, 
includable items and proxy solicitation’s costs allocation 
 
                                                
670 See Jensen, supra note 505 
671 Cziraki et al., supra note 669, 770-771 
672 See Andrew Prevost & Ramesh Rao, Of What Value are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public 
Pension Funds?, 73 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 177 
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There are three things that are separately ratable with regard to this 
right and thus three variables [(i)-(iii)] includable in the index emerge within the 
scope of this activist right: 
(i) The percentage of equity that the shareholder(s) is/are required to 
hold in order to be allowed to submit a shareholder proposal includable in the 
general meeting’s agenda. A jurisdiction receives no points if according to its 
corporate law the minimum percentage required to submit shareholder proposals 
is equal to 10% of the capital or if no such right exists; 0.5 point if the minimum 
percentage is equal to 5% of the capital; 0.75 point if that percentage is between 
1% and 5% and also if the minimum percentage of 5% decreases with firm size 
with the result for large firms being that eventually even a shareholder holding 
less than 5% is entitled to exercise the right; 1 point if the minimum percentage 
is equal to 1% or less. 
(ii) The permissibility of inclusion in the shareholder proposal of 
suggestions pertaining to the election or replacement of the directors. A 
jurisdiction receives no points, if such suggestions are not includable in the 
shareholder proposal; 1 point if such suggestions are includable in the agenda. 
(iii) The costs of proxy solicitation to gather support for the 
shareholder proposal. The sponsoring shareholder must seek the support of 
other shareholders, if the shareholder proposal is to have chances to pass in the 
general meeting. The rules and formalities of proxy solicitation are likely to 
have a major effect on the willingness of the shareholder to engage in the 
activist strategy of adding items to the agenda673. It makes a great difference 
whether the costs of proxy solicitation must be borne by the shareholder or 
whether the management has a ‘common carrier’ obligation, in the sense that the 
shareholder may use the company-financed proxy machinery to solicit proxies 
for her proposal. Thus, the approach adopted for this variable is that when costs 
have to be borne by the shareholder, then points have to be subtracted from the 
jurisdiction under scrutiny, because that rule considerably reduces in practice the 
overall effectiveness of variables (i)-(ii) that grant the right. In light of the 
above, one point is subtracted from jurisdictions, where the shareholder who 
added an item on the agenda has to bear the costs of proxy solicitation herself; 
0.5 point is subtracted in jurisdictions, where the shareholder bears the costs of 
proxy solicitation only for those types of shareholder proposals that are 
considered non-includable in the management-sponsored agenda or where the 
shareholder bears the costs in principle, but her solicitation may be carried with 
the company’s proxy packet; no points are subtracted if the jurisdiction allows 
shareholders to use the company-financed proxy machinery to solicit proxies. 
                                                
673 The Hermes Focus Fund, a UK-based shareholder activist, has estimated that a shareholder-sponsored 
proxy solicitation amounts to 43% of the total voting costs in EU Member States; see European 
Commission, Annex to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Exercise of Voting Rights by shareholders of Companies Having Their Registered Office in a Member 
State and Whose Shares are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive 
2004/109/EC – Impact Assessment, 14, SEC(2006) 181. In EU Member States proxy solicitation costs 
have been calculated to amount to 34-69% (depending on the jurisdiction) of the total activist 
shareholders’ activities costs; see Id., at 223. 
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2.1.3. Score explanations for variables (i) to (iii) 
 
The ratings in the tables of the Annex for variables (i) to (iii) of the 
PBWSV have been formed on the basis of the following corporate rules. 
 
2.1.3.1. France  
(i) With regard to the percentage of capital that enables shareholders to 
put items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting France receives 0.75 points 
throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period. This is because the general 
rule since 1966 is that the percentage required to submit a shareholder proposal 
is 5%674 and since 1967 for large firms there is a sliding scale, which depending 
on the firm’s size allows shareholders that hold as little as 0.5% of the share 
capital to submit proxy proposals675.  
(ii) With regard to the permissibility of inclusion in the shareholder 
proposal of suggestions pertaining to the election or replacement of the directors 
France receives one point throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period, as 
since 1966 it features the most enabling regime in this respect; because of the 
principle of ad nutum revocability of directors shareholders may at their own 
initiative revoke and replace directors at the shareholders’ meeting without this 
issue even be included in the agenda first676.  
(iii) With regard to the issue of the costs of a proxy contest one point is 
subtracted from France throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period since 
there are no provisions in French law that entitle insurgent shareholders of 
French firms to use the firm’s ballot to solicit proxies (e.g. for their slate of 
directors) or that mandate their reimbursement in case they win the proxy 
battle677.  
 
2.1.3.2. Germany  
(i) With regard to the percentage of capital that enables shareholders to 
put items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting Germany receives 0.75 
points throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period. This is because since 
1965 the rule is that the percentage required for submitting a shareholder 
proposal is 5% or holdings of 500,000 EUR, which in large firms may amount 
to less than 5% of the share capital678.  
(ii) With regard to the permissibility of inclusion in the shareholder 
proposal of suggestions pertaining to the election or replacement of the directors 
                                                
674 Loi n 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 sur les sociétés commerciales, art. 160; since the year 2000 this 
provision is codified into art. L. 225-105 of the French Commercial Code (‘Code de Commerce’). 
675 Décret n° 67-236 du 23 mars 1967 sur les sociétés commerciales, art. 128 ; Art. L. 225-120 Code de 
Commerce 
676 Loi n 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 sur les sociétés commerciales, art. 160 ; since the year 2000 this 
provision is codified into Code de Commerce art. L. 225-105.  
677 See Eric Cafritz et al., Will Eurotunnel Inspire French Proxy Battles?, 23 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
LAW REVIEW 33 
678 AktG §122(2) (the AktG was entered into force in 06.09.1965) 
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Germany receives one point throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period, as 
since 1965 shareholders are allowed to include a proposal for the election of 
directors in the agenda without having to justify it further679. 
(iii) With regard to the issue of the costs of a proxy contest one point is 
subtracted from Germany throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period since 
there are no provisions in German law that entitle insurgent shareholders of 
German firms to use the firm’s ballot to solicit proxies or that mandate their 
reimbursement in case they win the proxy battle. 
 
2.1.3.3. The Netherlands 
(i) With regard to the percentage of capital that enables shareholders to 
put items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting The Netherlands receives 
no points until 2003 and one point from 2004 onwards because that year a 
provision was added into the Dutch Civil Code allowing shareholders and 
depositary receipts holders holding a percentage equal to 1% of the share capital 
or shares of 50mn EUR in value to request in writing the addition of an item in 
the agenda680. There is evidence that Dutch corporations were granting the right 
to put items on the agenda by virtue of their articles of association even before 
2004, but this was a result of private ordering rather than of formal law681.  
(ii) With regard to the permissibility of inclusion in the shareholder 
proposal of suggestions pertaining to the election or replacement of the directors 
The Netherlands receives no points until 2003, one point from 2004 to 2006 and 
0.5 point in 2007. This variation is due to the idiosyncratic regime governing 
Dutch public corporations. Since 1971 there is in place the so-called ‘structure 
regime’ (structuuregime) that requires public corporations to have a two-tier 
board682; a supervisory board and a management board. The powers that 
shareholders had regarding the appointment and dismissal of the members of the 
supervisory board were very limited until 2004; under a system of ‘controlled 
determination’ (gecontroleerde coöptatie) the shareholders’ role in the 
appointment and dismissal of the members of the supervisory board was 
essentially advisory in nature683. In 2004 the structure regime was amended 
increasing the power of the shareholders with regard to the appointment and 
dismissal of the members of the supervisory board684; shareholders are able to 
introduce in the agenda a resolution to vote on, by which confidence in the 
supervisory board is removed and all the members are dismissed685. The point 
that The Netherlands receives on the PBWSV with regard to this variable from 
2004 to 2006 is attributed to this amendment. Nevertheless, in 2007 
                                                
679 AktG §127 
680 BW 2:114a §§ 2 and 4 introduced by Wet aanpaasing structuurregeling (Stb. 2004, 370), which was 
entered into force on 1.10.2004. 
681 Rapport Commissie Peters (1997), 5.7. Available at: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/nl-
peters_report.pdf  
682 BW 2:158 §1 
683 PETER VAN SCHILFGAARDE & JAAP WINTER, VAN DE BV EN DE NV (15th ed.) (2009), 415 
684 Wet aanpaasing structuurregeling (Stb. 2004, 370) 
685 BW 2:161a §1 
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Amsterdam’s Enterprise Chamber draw some limitations to the exercise of the 
right686, as it adjudicated that the exercise of this right of dismissal on behalf of 
shareholders is subject to the general requirements of ‘reasonableness and 
fairness’ that govern all the actions of the constituents of a Dutch legal 
person687. This reduced the discretion that shareholders had in this respect and 
thus in 2007 The Netherlands’ score in this variable fell to 0.5 points. 
(iii) With regard to the issue of the costs of a proxy contest one point is 
subtracted from The Netherlands throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods 
period since until 2007 there were no provisions in Dutch law that entitle 
insurgent shareholders of Dutch firms to use the firm’s ballot to solicit proxies 
or that mandate their reimbursement in case they win the proxy battle688. 
 
2.1.3.4. United Kingdom 
(i) With regard to the percentage of capital that enables shareholders to 
put items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting the UK receives 0.75 
points throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period. This is because of a 
provision dating back to 1948 that enables shareholders representing 5% of the 
voting capital689 or 100 shareholders holding shares, on which there has been 
paid up an average sum per shareholder of at least £100, to require the inclusion 
of their proposal in the agenda690. In the latter case, the percentage enabling the 
submission of a shareholder proposal may effectively be well below 5%. 
(ii) With regard to the permissibility of inclusion in the shareholder 
proposal of issues relating to the appointment or removal of directors the UK 
receives one point throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period. The fact 
that this issue was always includable in the right to put items on the agenda 
granted to shareholders is evident from its inclusion in the official model articles 
of association that accompany the Companies Act of each period691.  
(iii) With regard to the issue of proxy solicitation costs one point is 
subtracted from the UK from 1973 until 1984 and half a point from 1985 
onwards. This is due to the fact that with the Companies Act 1985 insurgent 
shareholders were granted the right to request the board to circulate to the 
shareholders along with the notice of the meeting a statement of 1,000 words 
setting out the merits of their proposed resolution692. While in theory the 
                                                
686 OK 17 januari 2007, JOR 2007, 42 (Stork) 
687 BW 2:8 
688 There is lately a proposal to allow investors that hold 10% of the stock to request the firm to distribute 
on their behalf information to shareholders, possibly including proxy materials; Jaron van Bekkum et al., 
Corporate Governance in The Netherlands, 14.3 ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 
(December 2010), 15. Available at  http://www.ejcl.org/143/abs143-17.html  
689 Whether the fact that UK corporate law requires a minimum percentage of the voting capital and not 
of the share capital makes the threshold easier for the shareholders to reach depends on the shareholder 
structure of the company. If the company has issued non-voting shares then it might be more difficult to 
exercise this right, as non-voting shares do not count for the 5%, but if the company has issued multiple 
voting shares then the 5% target will be easier to get. 
690 Companies Act of 1948, s. 140; Companies Act of 1985, s.376; Companies Act of 2006, s.314(2) 
691 Table A prescribed by Companies Act 1948, art. 93; Companies Table A Regulations 1985, art. 76(b) 
(including the amendments by SI 2007/2541 and SI 2007/2826). 
692 Companies Act 1985, s. 367(1)(b) & (5); Companies Act 2006, s. 314(1) & 315(1) 
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circulation must be done on the insurgent shareholders’ own expense, in practice 
the costs of this circulation should not be large, given that the statements 
soliciting the proxies –which since 1984 are ‘two-way’693- are being carried with 
the company-sponsored materials694. This is why shareholder activists name 
British law as the most favorable in the EU for proxy solicitations695. 
 
2.1.3.5. United States 
US: (i) With regard to the percentage of capital that enables 
shareholders to put items on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting the US 
receives one point throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period. This is 
because for those shareholder-sponsored issues that are considered according to 
federal securities regulation includable in the agenda shareholders who have 
owned 1% or $2,000 worth of a public company’s shares for at least one year 
may submit a proposal696. 
(ii) With regard to the permissibility of inclusion of suggestions 
pertaining to the appointment and dismissal of directors in the agenda of the 
shareholders’ meeting the US receives one point throughout the entire post-
Bretton Woods period. Due to the fact that issues related to election to office can 
be excluded from the proxy packet that the management distributes to 
shareholders prior to the meeting697, technically shareholders of US corporations 
must follow a more difficult route in order to add this issue in the agenda than 
the one they follow with regard to other issues. Nevertheless, the issue can still 
be raised on the shareholders’ initiative, so the US deserves a score of one; the 
costly route that is followed to raise the issue of appointment to the office is 
controlled in this index under variable (iii) below. 
(iii) With regard to proxy solicitation costs half a point is subtracted 
from the US for the years 1973 to 2003 and 0.25 point from 2004 onwards. The 
US has a somewhat complicated system governing shareholder proposals. There 
is a range of shareholder proposals that can be included in the management’s 
proxy packet; for this kind of proposals the costs of proxy solicitation are 
essentially borne by the firm, as a proxy form requesting shareholders to vote on 
the proposal must be included in the firm’s mailings. There is, however, a range 
of issues698 that are considered excludable from the company’s ballot and for 
which shareholders must finance a proxy battle, in order to have the 
shareholders’ meeting vote on the resolution they suggest699. The differentiation 
in the points of subtraction from 2004 onwards is due to the fact that in that year 
there was a change in the way SEC interprets some of the excludable issues. 
                                                
693 Listing Rules 1984, s 5.36; Two-way proxies are forms, which enable shareholders to direct the proxy 
whether to vote for or against any resolution; two-way proxies are considered to be in favor of 
shareholders. Now FSA Listing Rules (9.3.6.) require ‘three-way’ proxies (for, against or abstain)  
694 PAUL DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES – PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW, 8TH ED. (2008), 447 
695 European Commission, supra note 673, 14 
696 SEC Rule 14a-8(b)(1) (17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8) promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. §78a, et seq.) 
697 SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(8) 
698 SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(1)-(13) 
699 SEC Rule 14a-7 
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That amendment resulted in shareholders thenceforth being able to include in 
the company-financed proxy packet mandatory bylaw amendment proposals 
related to certain issues bearing on executive compensation700. This 
development considerably increased US shareholders’ say on corporate affairs. 
 
2.2. The right to call an extraordinary meeting 
 
2.2.1. Reasons for inclusion in the index 
 
The threat of calling an extraordinary general meeting (‘EGM’) is 
thought of as forcing managers to sit at the same table with activist shareholders 
and find solutions to the latter’s concerns701. The typology of shareholder 
activism shows that activists usually begin their actions by employing private 
engagement strategies; they first write letters to management expressing their 
dissatisfaction with certain business policies and indicating alternative routes 
and if management remains unresponsive then they escalate their pressure by 
using institutional routes702. How responsive management will be to the 
shareholders’ letter depends on what are the tools that activists have at their 
disposal. If shareholders can call an EGM, collect proxies and replace the 
managers, then the latter know they have to try more to deliver value to the 
shareholders. As Bob Monks, a pioneer shareholder activist, has noted: ‘I fully 
acknowledge that the US is in a far worse state than the UK […] the UK market 
benefits […] from a clause in the Companies Act, stating that 10 per cent of 
shareholders can requisition a meeting to dislodge any or all of the directors of a 
company at any time’703. It is evident then, that the threat of calling an EGM is 
potent enough to bring the firm’s governance closer to the alignment of the 
interests of management to those of the shareholdership.  
In addition to this, the existence of the possibility by shareholders to 
call an EGM is increasing the firm’s vulnerability to hostile takeovers, thus 
exposing managers to the disciplining device of the market for corporate 
control. It is not a coincidence that in the US, where Delaware corporate law 
does not award the right to shareholders to call an EGM but leaves it to the 
corporate charter to provide for it, standardized legal due diligence reports for 
target firms require the legal counsel to the potential acquiror to report whether 
the target grants the EGM right to shareholders or not. If the right exists then the 
acquiror shortly after the takeover can call a shareholders’ meeting and oust 
incumbent management, thus taking officially control of the corporate affairs. 
Without the possibility of an EGM the acquiror will have to wait until the next 
annual meeting to dismiss the incumbent directors –provided there is no 
                                                
700 Verizon Communication, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 213377 (Feb 2, 2004) 
701 Marco Becht, Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK 
Focus Fund, 22 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 3093, 3096 
702 See Carine Girard, Une Typologie de l’Activisme des Actionnaires Minoritaires en France, 4 FINANCE 
CONTROLE STRATEGIE 123 
703 Stock in Trade, Reach. THE FINANCIAL COMMUNICATIONS QUARTERLY FROM THE LSE EXCHANGE 
(2005)  
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staggered board defense- and that considerably reduces its motivation to launch 
a tender offer for the firm. The more potent the threat of a hostile takeover 
becomes because of the increased vulnerability that the possibility of calling an 
EGM causes, the more management will have to focus on pumping the share 
price up, so it can make it more expensive for potential acquirors to launch a 
hostile bid. The EGM thus indirectly nudges management to deliver more value 
to the shareholders. 
 
2.2.2. Variables (iv) and (v): percentage required to call an EGM and the 
interference of the court in the convocation of an EGM 
 
There are two things that are separately ratable with regard to this right 
and thus two variables [(iv)-(v)] includable in the index emerge within the scope 
of this activist right: 
(iv) The percentage of share capital that the shareholder(s) must hold 
in order to be eligible to call an EGM. A jurisdiction receives no points, if the 
required percentage is more than 10% or if no such right exists. A jurisdiction 
receives 0.5 point if it requires shareholders, who want to call an EGM, to hold a 
percentage equal to 10% of the share capital. Finally, a jurisdiction receives one 
point if it allows shareholders holding percentage equal to 5% of the share 
capital to call an EGM.  
(v) The interference of the court in the convocation of the EGM. 0.25 
point is subtracted from a jurisdiction, if the call of the EGM has to be done 
after an application to the court on behalf of the shareholders. This is because 
this extra step reduces the effectiveness of the right, as there might be additional 
delays. No points are subtracted from jurisdictions, where there is no 
interference by the court for the calling of the EGM. 
 
2.2.3. Score explanations for variables (iv) and (v)  
 
The ratings in the tables of the Annex for variables (iv) and (v) of the 
PBWSV have been formed on the basis of the following corporate rules. 
 
2.2.3.1. France  
(iv) With regard to the percentage of capital that is required for 
shareholders to call an EGM France receives half a point until 1993, 0.75 from 
1994 until 2000 and one point for the years 2001 onwards. From 1966 onwards 
French corporate law required a minimum percentage of 10% for shareholders 
to be able to call an EGM704. The restrictive effects of this high threshold were 
somewhat mitigated in 1994, when shareholders of listed companies collectively 
holding at least 5% of the voting capital (and less than 5% in large firms) could 
form an association registered with the Securities Commission and then be able 
to exercise the right to call an EGM705. The fact that an association must be 
                                                
704 Art. 158 Loi no 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 
705 Art. 30 Loi no 94-670 du 8 août 1994 
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formed and registered first is a formality that prevents us from rating France 
with an even higher score for this reform. In 2001 with a major reform of 
corporate law the minimum percentage required to exercise the right to call an 
EGM was reduced to 5% of the share capital. 
(v) With regard to the interference of a court in the convocation of an 
EGM 0.25 points are subtracted from France for the entire post-Bretton Woods 
period since French corporate law provides that the convocation of the EGM is 




(iv) With regard to the percentage that is required for shareholders to 
call an EGM Germany receives one point for the entire post-Bretton Woods 
period, as according to German corporate law 5% of the share capital is required 
if shareholders want to call an EGM707. 
(v) With regard to the interference of a court in the convocation of an 
extraordinary meeting no points are subtracted from Germany for the entire 
post-Bretton Woods period since under German law a court does not mediate in 
the calling of an EGM. 
 
2.2.3.3. The Netherlands 
(iv) With regard to the percentage that is required for shareholders to 
call an EGM The Netherlands receives half a point for the entire post-Bretton 
Woods period, as according to Dutch corporate law a 10% of the share capital is 
required if shareholders want to call an EGM708. 
(v) With regard to court interference in the convocation of an EGM no 
points are subtracted from The Netherlands for the entire post-Bretton Woods 
period, as according to Dutch corporate law the judge enters the scene and 
convenes a meeting only if the supervisory or the management board, to which 
the EGM request was made by the shareholders, have not convened the meeting 
within six weeks709. 
 
2.2.3.4. United Kingdom  
(iv) With regard to the percentage that is required for shareholders to 
call an EGM the UK receives half a point for the entire post-Bretton Woods 
                                                
706 Art. 158(2) Loi no 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 ; Code de Commerce L.225-103(II)(2) 
707 §122(1) AktG 
708 BW 2:110 § 1; There is, however, the opinion that the general principles of reasonableness and 
fairness that govern the entirety of Dutch corporate law would require under special circumstances the 
judge, who is asked by the shareholders to issue the convocation of the EGM, to allow shareholders 
representing even less than 10% to exercise this right. Nevertheless, there doesn’t seem to be case law 
confirming this opinion. See MARIAN KOELEMEIJER, REDELIJKHEID EN BILLIJKHEID IN 
KAPITAALVENNOOTSCHAPPEN: BESCHOUWINGEN ROND AANDEELHOUDERS EN BESTUURDERS IN 
RECHTSVERGELIJKEND PERSPECTIEF (1999), 112  
709 BW 2:110 
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period, as according to UK corporate law 10% of the share capital is required if 
shareholders want to call an EGM710. 
(v) With regard to the interference of a court in the convocation of an 
extraordinary meeting no points are subtracted from the UK for the entire post-
Bretton Woods period since under UK law a court does not mediate in the 
calling of an EGM. 
 
2.2.3.5. United States  
(iv) With regard to the percentage that is required for shareholders to 
call an EGM the US receives no points for the entire post-Bretton Woods 
period, as under Delaware corporate law there is no such right. 
(v) Given that Delaware law has no provision regarding the calling of 
an EGM no rating has been given to the US with regard to this variable. 
 
2.3. Right to coordinate with other shareholders 
 
2.3.1. Reasons for inclusion in the index 
 
The exercise of the rights analyzed in Sections 2.1. and 2.2. above 
depend on the shareholders holding the prescribed percentages of the share or 
the voting capital. Nevertheless, particularly due to the rise of dispersed 
ownership in listed corporations of both insider and outsider countries the 
holdings of single shareholders may be below the 5% or 10% thresholds 
required by corporate laws to exercise the rights. Thus, shareholders will often 
have to join forces with other shareholders in order to be able to put items on the 
agenda, to call an EGM or even to initiate shareholder litigation (see below 
Section 2.4)711.  
The first step for a small shareholder to move towards such an alliance 
is to identify other shareholders and communicate with them712. Without the 
availability of mechanisms that will help a shareholder identify her fellow 
shareholders, so as to be able to coordinate her actions with them and exercise 
the activist rights, the latter are effectively an empty threat for management. If 
managers know that shareholders are unable to identify each other and join 
forces, then they are unlikely to perceive the threat posed by activist rights as 
credible and thus the latter’s potential of nudging them to deliver more 
shareholder value won’t materialize. 
Therefore, the provisions of corporate laws that touch upon the right of 
shareholders to request from the firm a list of other shareholders should be taken 
under account in the framework of the PBWSV. However, merely tracking the 
evolution of this type of provision may not be enough to develop an appropriate 
scoring methodology. The variables that are to emerge from this right cannot 
ignore the reality of modern equity markets that have moved away from a direct 
                                                
710 Companies Act 1948, s. 132(1); Companies Act 1985, s. 368(2); Companies Act 2006, s. 303(3) 
711 MATHIAS SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW (2008), 136 
712 Masouros, supra note 663, 200 
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holding system, where the person who is registered as shareholder (in the case 
of registered shares) or the person who holds the share (in the case of bearer 
shares) is also the true investor713. All the jurisdictions under scrutiny in the 
index employ an indirect holding system, in which the ultimate beneficial owner 
of the shares may hold her entitlement in the firm through a security account 
established with a financial intermediary714, who appears vis-à-vis the firm as 
the formal shareholder. Given that the financial intermediary is not the residual 
risk bearer, it makes a difference whether the legal right granted to a shareholder 
is to identify the formal shareholder or the beneficial owner of the shares, since 
only the latter has the economic interest to engage in activism. Consequently, a 
higher score should be given to jurisdictions that allow the shareholder to pierce 
through the chain of intermediaries and ‘wake up’ the real beneficiary of the 
shares and a lower one to jurisdictions that grant shareholders the right to merely 
inspect the registry of formal shareholders.  
In addition to this, it makes a difference whether the quoted shares are 
registered or bearer shares, as in the latter case identification may be practically 
impossible and very costly even for the issuer. 
Finally, in consistency with the principle of functionality legal forces 
that act in a counterbalancing way to the right of shareholders to identify each 
other and coordinate their behavior should be taken under account. Shareholders 
may be discouraged from joining forces and exercising their activist rights, if 
there is the risk that their collective behavior will be viewed as ‘concerted 
action’ under corporate law that will then require them to launch a mandatory 
bid for the rest of the shares715.  Shareholders may also be discouraged from 
joining forces and exercising their activist rights, if they have to abide by proxy 





2.3.2. Variables (vi) and (vii): the identification right, ‘acting in concert’ 
and proxy solicitation rules 
 
In light of the above analysis, there are two things that are separately 
ratable with regard to this right and thus two variables [(vi)-(vii)] includable in 
the index emerge within the scope of this right: 
(vi) The scope of the identification right. A jurisdiction receives no 
points if there is no right at all for the shareholders to inspect the registry or to 
be provided with a list of the shareholders; no points are given to jurisdictions, 
where quoted shares are exclusively bearer shares and to jurisdictions that 
                                                
713 Id., at 196 
714 Jaap Winter, The European Union’s Involvement in Company Law and Corporate Governance, in THE 
EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW ACTION PLAN REVISITED (K. GEENS & K. HOPT, EDS.) (2010), 73 
715 See Takeover Panel, Public Consultation Paper 10/2002, Shareholder Activism and Acting in Concert, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/pcp10.pdf  
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require a percentage equal to or greater than 5% for shareholders to be able to 
inspect the registry. 0.5 point is given to jurisdictions that grant the right to 
inspect the registry to a single shareholder or to shareholders holding less than 
5% of the capital; one point is given to jurisdictions that grant to shareholders 
both the right to inspect the registry of shareholders and the right to pierce 
through the chain of intermediaries, so as to identify the beneficial owners of 
stock. 
(vii) The existence of legal counterbalancing forces to shareholder 
coordination. 0.25 is subtracted from jurisdictions that feature a mandatory bid 
rule for concerted action. 0.25 is subtracted from jurisdictions that require 
shareholders to abide by the proxy solicitation rules before being able to 
communicate to each other. As it was mentioned in Section 1.3.2.3, this variable 
introduces a distinguishing characteristic of the PBWSV; the introduction of the 
mandatory bid rule is perceived by shareholder protection indexes as a positive 
development for corporate law in respect to shareholder protection, as indeed it 
protects the minority from the controlling shareholder’s behavior716. 
Nevertheless, when we examine the rule from the perspective of the question of 
how does it influence the incentives of managers, we draw the conclusion that 
since the rule is able to curb shareholder activism it indirectly relieves 
management from the pressure of the latter. Thus, in this index it must be coded 
as a negative development. 
 
2.3.3. Score explanations for variables (vi) and (vii) 
 
The ratings in the tables of the Annex for variables (vi) and (vii) of the 
PBWSV have been formed on the basis of the following corporate rules. 
 
2.3.3.1. France  
(vi) With regard to the right of shareholders to identify fellow 
shareholders and beneficial owners of stock France receives 0.25 points for the 
years until 2000, 0.35 for the years 2001 and 2002 and half a point thereafter. 
This is because French corporate law provides since 1967 that a single 
shareholder is entitled to obtain a list of the shareholders holding registered 
shares during the 15 days preceding the general meeting717, but the reality is that 
most listed corporations were issuing and still issue bearer shares718.  Therefore, 
the reality of bearer shares does not allow us to evaluate the right to obtain a list 
of registered shareholders as potent enough in France compared to other 
jurisdictions that have only registered shares. The route that shareholders who 
want to identify bearer shareholders must follow is to exercise their general 
information right to acquire a list of the shareholders that voted in the last 
                                                
716 Giorgos Psaroudakis, The Mandatory Bid and Company Law in Europe, 7 EUROPEAN COMPANY AND 
FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW 550, 554 
717 Art. 169, Loi 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 ; Art. 140 Décret 67-236 du 23 mars 1967 ; Code de 
Commerce L.225-116 
718 Art. 263, Loi 66-537 ; Code de Commerce L.228-1 
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general meeting (‘attestation sheet’)719. Although, this right could allow us to 
rate French corporate law with 0.5 from the beginning of the post-Bretton 
Woods period, the attestation sheet cannot always convey adequate information 
for the bearer shareholders due to two restrictions. Firstly, before 2001 it was 
very difficult for non-resident bearer shareholders to be able to vote at a general 
meeting, if the issuer didn’t provide in its articles of association for a special 
identification procedure for so-called ‘identifiable bearer securities’720. Thus, 
fellow shareholders would not be able to identify non-resident bearer 
shareholders, even after acquiring the last general meeting’s attestation sheet. In 
2001 though a reform allowed non-resident shareholders holding their shares in 
intermediated accounts to vote even in the absence of the special identification 
procedure, so if they were active they would henceforth appear in the attestation 
sheet721. The second restriction that remained until 2003 was that share blocking 
was mandated; that meant that many bearer shareholders would prefer not to 
deposit their shares and be able to vote at the meeting, in order to be able to 
trade their shares during the days immediately preceding the meeting722. 
Therefore, many (resident or non-resident bearer shareholders) would not appear 
on the attestation sheet for fellow shareholders to identify them, if coordinated 
shareholder action was sought. But, in 2003 share blocking ended in France and 
thus more bearer shareholders would get to appear on the attestation sheet, 
effectively allowing French shareholders to identify them723. 
(vii) With regard to the legal counterbalancing forces impeding the 
coordination of shareholder behavior no points are subtracted from France until 
1988, but 0.25 is subtracted thereafter as a result of the introduction of the 
mandatory bid rule in 1989724. 
 
2.3.3.2. Germany 
(vi) With regard to the right of shareholders to identify fellow 
shareholders Germany receives no points until 2004 and half a point thereafter. 
In 2000 Germany introduced a law that removed the right that was previously 
granted to shareholders to inspect the firm’s share registry725. Nevertheless, even 
during the existence of this right shareholders did not in practice have great 
potential of identifying fellow shareholders, since the right allowed them to 
identify registered shareholders726 at a time, when the vast majority of shares 
                                                
719 Art. 170, Loi 66-537 ; Code de Commerce L.225-17. See Michel Germain, Les Droits des Minoritaires 
(Droit Français des Sociétés), 54 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 401, 406 
720 Association Nationale des Sociétés par Actions, Proxy Voting Reform in France : A Guide for Non-
Resident Shareholders, Jan. 2003, 22, 25 
721 Commercial Code L.228-3-2 
722 Art. 136 Décret 67-236 du 23 mars 1967 
723 Art. 38 Décret 2002-775 du 3 mai 2002 
724 Loi 89-531 due 2 août 1989 ; Code de Commerce L. 233-10(I) 
725 Gesetz zur Namensaktie und zur Erleichterung der Stimmrechtsausübung (NaStraG) (entered into 
force on 25 January 2001). 
726 Then Akt §67(5) 
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issued by listed German firms were bearer shares727. Therefore, in practice 
shareholders of German firms did not have a formal mechanism to initiate 
collective shareholder action. Consequently, even before 2000 the score that 
Germany receives cannot be greater than zero. The increase in Germany’s score 
in 2005 with regard to this variable is not because that year shareholders were 
granted enhanced inspection rights; it is rather because the German legislator 
introduced a unique platform, by virtue of which shareholders could let other 
shareholders know that they have the intent to engage in activist activities728. 
The law introduced a special section of the electronic version of the Federal 
Bulletin, in which shareholders may give notice of their intent to file a 
derivative action, to add an item on the agenda or to call an EGM729.  
(vii) With regard to the legal counterbalancing force generated by the 
mandatory bid rule 0.25 is subtracted from Germany from 2001 to 2003. No 
points are subtracted for 2004, 0.15 is subtracted in 2005 and no points from 
2006 onwards. The mandatory bid rule was introduced into German law in 2001 
and in theory it reduced the already minimal chances of shareholders in 
Germany to coordinate their behavior vis-à-vis management; this is because the 
wording used in the rule was far-reaching, as not only explicit agreements would 
fall under its scope and qualify as concerted action, but also voting conduct ‘in 
any other way’ (in sonstiger Weise) 730. Nevertheless, German case law in 2004 
indicated that the rule was not to affect shareholder coordination that didn’t 
manifest a certain degree of sustainability and continuity731. That meant that 
isolated efforts of shareholders to put an item on the agenda or to call an EGM 
did not run the risk of being qualified as concerted action. In 2005 though an 
isolated coordinating voting conduct, by virtue of which shareholders were able 
to replace the chairman of the supervisory board was deemed as concerted 
action732. Although that case concerned a coordinated shareholder behavior that 
resulted in exerting a substantial influence over the corporate affairs and did not 
change German law’s attitude towards milder types of activism, it may have 
discouraged shareholder coordination pertaining to more fundamental issues of 
corporate governance. Eventually though the adjudication, by which the 
replacement of the chairman of the supervisory was deemed as concerted action, 
was overruled by the Supreme Court in 2006 that held that coordinated voting 
on a single item of the agenda does not constitute concerted action733.  
 
2.3.3.3. The Netherlands 
                                                
727  In 1999, two years before the enactment of the NaStraG, 85% of the shares issued by German listed 
firms were still bearer shares. 
728 Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts vom 8.7.2005 
729 AktG 127 
730 §§30(2), 29(2), 35 WpÜG 
731 OLG Frankfurt am Main, Urt. Vom 25.06.2004, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT (2004) 3716, 
3718; OLG München, Urt. Vom 4.04.2005, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2005) 1005, 1008 
732 OLG München, Urt. Vom 27.04.2005, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2005) 856 
733 BGH, II ZR 137/05, 18 September 2006 
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(v) With regard to the right of shareholders to identify fellow 
shareholders The Netherlands receives no points for the entire post-Bretton 
Woods period. This is not only because listed shares of Dutch corporations are 
bearer shares, but also because Dutch corporate law provides for no such right. 
There is a general information right that shareholders have in connection with 
the general meeting734, according to which the boards are required to provide at 
the general meeting information that have been requested even by an individual 
shareholder. But, that right cannot be exercised outside the general meeting and 
even the general principles of reasonableness and fairness have not been useful 
to shareholders that have litigated for the acknowledgment of such right735. 
(vii) With regard to the mandatory bid rule no points are subtracted 
from The Netherlands for the entire post-Bretton Woods period. The rule was 
introduced into Dutch law in 2007 by virtue of transposition of Directive 
2004/25/EC736, but it is commonly interpreted as not covering situations where 
shareholders simply communicate to each other737. Therefore, it is not prima 
facie a disincentive for shareholders that want to coordinate their behavior. 
 
2.3.3.4. United Kingdom 
(vi) With regard to the right of shareholders to identify fellow 
shareholders the UK receives half a point until 1980 and 1 point thereafter. This 
is because until an amendment of the Companies Act of 1948 in 1981738 UK 
corporate law granted to shareholders only the right to inspect the registry and 
thus learn the name of the formal shareholders, not the beneficial owners739. 
From 1981 onwards the right was granted to shareholders representing 10% of 
the capital to request an inquiry into the beneficial ownership of shares740. 
(vii) With regard to the legal counterbalancing force generated to 
shareholder activism by the mandatory bid rule no points are subtracted from the 
UK for the entire post-Bretton Woods period. The mandatory bid rule existed in 
the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers741 throughout this period, but it 
covered the coordinated acquisition of shares rather than the coordinated use of 
voting rights742. The rule wasn’t meant to overturn the traditional shareholder-
                                                
734 BW 2:217 § 2 
735 Levinus Timmerman & Alexander Doorman, Rights of Minority Shareholders in The Netherlands, in 
RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS, XVIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW (E. PERAKIS, ED.) (2002) 181, no. 46 
736 5:70 Wet op het financieel toezicht (Law on Financial Supervision) 
737 See Josephus Jitta, Openbaar Bod op Effecten, in ONDERNEMINGSRECHT EFFECTENRECHT – TEKST & 
COMMENTAAR (VIJFDE DRUK) (J.M. VAN DIJK ET AL, EDS.) (2009), 1980 
738 The change was effectuated through Companies Act 1981, ss. 75, 76(1)-(4), (12) & 83(8) 
739 Companies Act 1948, s. 113(1); Companies Act 1985, s.356; Companies Act 2006, s. 1085 
740 Companies Act 1985, s. 213 & 214; Companies Act 2006, s. 793 & 803 
741 Rule 9.1. 
742 See Matthias Casper, Acting in Concert – Grundlagen eines neuen kapitalmarktrechtlichen 
Zurechnung, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2003), 1468, 1470 
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friendly approach of British corporate governance743 and the Financial Services 
Authority made sure to make this clear recently744. 
 
2.3.3.5. United States 
(vi) With regard to the right of identification of fellow shareholders the 
US receives half a point for the period up to 1985 because of Delaware’s right to 
shareholders to inspect the registry745 and 1 point from 1986 onwards because of 
the combined effect of an SEC Rule that allowed the company to inquire into 
the beneficial ownership of shares746 and of Delaware case law that allowed 
shareholders to access the results of this inquiry747. 
(vii) With regard to legal counterbalancing forces to shareholder 
coordination 0.25 is subtracted from the US until 1991 and no points are 
subtracted thereafter. This is because of the fact that until 1991 communicating 
with other shareholders was thought of as proxy solicitation and shareholders 
thus had to bear the costs. In 1992 after a lengthy regulatory process the SEC 
decided that communication between shareholders no longer requires them to 
file proxy materials and abide by the cumbersome proxy rules748.  
 
2.4. Shareholder litigation 
 
2.4.1. Reasons for (and scope of) inclusion in the index 
 
The risk that the director runs to be found liable vis-à-vis the 
corporation by means of a derivative suit or vis-à-vis individual shareholders by 
means of a direct suit is a disciplining mechanism that prompts the director to 
observe her duties towards the corporation. Corporate law provisions pertaining 
to shareholder litigation serve a preventive function749 and can be thought of as 
residual loss-reducing devices. Empirical studies show that the precipitating 
event for almost all shareholder litigation is a drop in the stock price750. It 
follows, then, that in order to minimize the chances of the filing of a shareholder 
suit, what management needs to do is simple: pump up the share price. This is 
                                                
743 See Listing Rules 10.2.2.R(3)m 10.5.1R, 10 Annex 1, which indicate the encouragement for 
shareholder engagement in corporate governance. 
744 FSA, Shareholder Engagement and the Current Regulatory Regime, Aug. 2009. Available at: 
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/Corporate_Governance/Related_documents/shareholder_
engagement_FSA_letter.pdf  
745 DGCL §220(b) 
746 SEC Rule 14b-1I 
747 Shamrock Assocs. v. Texas Am. Energy Corp., 517 A.2d 658 (Del. Ch. 1986) 
748 Final Proxy Rule Amendments, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) § 85,051, at 83,353 (Oct. 16, 1992); See Norma Sharara & Anne Hoke-Witherspoon, The 
Evolution of the 1992 Shareholder Communication Proxy Rules and Their Impact on Corporate 
Governance, 49 BUSINESS LAWYER 327 
749 Susanne Kalss, Shareholder Suits: Common Problems, Different Solutions and First Steps Towards a 
Possible Harmonisation by Means of a European Model Code, 6 EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL 
LAW REVIEW 324, 329 
750 TOM BAKER & SEAN GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE 
UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2011), 182 
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translated as delivering value to the shareholders. Thus, the risk of a liability suit 
is a nudge to managers to think more in shareholder value terms. 
Even if managers have hedged against the risk of being held liable as a 
result of a lawsuit by having bought D&O insurance, the filing of a lawsuit is 
still unpleasant because it may signal to the market that there are in reality 
higher agency costs inside the firm. Investors may react by disinvesting from the 
firm, which will result in a decline of the share price that will harm the equity-
based part of executive compensation or expose the firm more to the takeover 
threat. Thus, it is in the interest of managers to keep the shareholders happy and 
avoid a liability suit, even if they are insured against liability damages.  
In light of the above, the issue of liability suits must be included in the 
PBWSV. There are two questions that emerge though in this respect: (a) should 
other forms of shareholder litigation remedies, such as injunction remedies or 
nullification suits, that do not involve the liability of managers be included in 
the index?; and (b) should both derivative and direct liability suits be included in 
the index? 
With regard to the first question the answer should be negative with 
regard to temporary measures and injunction remedies that are regulated by 
rules resting largely outside corporate law and positive with regard to 
nullification suits that are creatures of corporate law.  
This is not to say that temporary measures and injunction remedies are 
not important determinants of good corporate governance and do not protect the 
interests of shareholders. In fact, these remedies apart from being effective 
monitoring mechanisms can even help reduce residual loss. This is especially 
true in cases, where the temporary measure sought would result in the 
suspension of directors with conflicting interests751 and the appointment of 
interim directors that will carry out a specific transaction free of conflicts752 and 
won’t deprive shareholders of the benefits that would accrue to them by the 
pursuance of a corporate opportunity. Still though in many jurisdictions the 
aspects of these types of shareholder litigation are regulated by rules resting 
outside corporate laws, e.g. in civil procedure. Therefore, their inclusion in the 
PBWSV would not serve the latter’s objective, which is to track the 
developments in corporate law over the past decades that brought about the 
Great Reversal in Corporate Governance. Despite the undisputed role that these 
litigation remedies have played in the proliferation of shareholder value in the 
corporate affairs their inclusion here would force us to track changes in civil 
procedure codes and in the case law that relates to the ordering of injunction 
remedies.  
This choice though may expose the index to the criticism that it leaves 
out temporary and injunction remedies that in certain jurisdictions are found in 
national corporate law. Indeed for the sake of preserving the comparability of 
the institutions in the five jurisdictions that are under scrutiny here crucial 
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752 See Bernard Grelon, Shareholders’ Lawsuits Against the Management of a Company and its 
Shareholders under French Law, 6 ECFR 205, 209 
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shareholder value-enhancing mechanisms, unique to one jurisdiction, are left out 
of the comparison. This is the case for The Netherlands, where since 1971 an 
idiosyncratic right has been granted by Dutch corporate law to shareholders to 
initiate a special audit into the corporate affairs: the right of inquiry 
(‘enquêterecht’)753. The Dutch right of inquiry, apart from aspiring to cause the 
production of an investigation report for establishing misconduct754, entitles the 
shareholders to request from the court drastic immediate measures, such as the 
dismissal of directors and the temporary appointment of others or the suspension 
of a resolution of the management (e.g. regarding the adoption of takeover 
defenses)755. Therefore, excluding the second prong of the right of inquiry from 
the analysis here may convey an inaccurate picture of the development of Dutch 
corporate law in the post-Bretton Woods period, but to preserve the integrity of 
the comparability effort here we are forced to leave it out of the index. 
As far as nullification suits are concerned, there is no doubt that they 
constitute creatures of corporate law. Therefore, they fall within the scope of the 
objective of the index at hand. But, at first sight nullification lawsuits may seem 
to be irrelevant to shareholder value. Nullification lawsuits are supposed to be 
restorative measures, by which shareholders may correct irregularities in the 
corporate decision-making process and challenge the validity of resolutions of 
the shareholders’ meeting, when the process has not been in accordance with the 
law or the articles of association. How can these litigation tools nudge managers 
to think more in shareholder value terms? 
Empirical studies have shown that nullification suits are often used as 
bargaining tools against the management756. Nullification suits allow 
shareholders to block important transactions that require the approval of the 
general meeting of shareholders, such as a legal merger757. The threat of raising 
a nullification suit and blocking such a transaction, usually on the basis of the 
allegation that inadequate information have been furnished to shareholders 
within the scope of the meeting758, can nudge managers to design the 
transactions in more generous terms for the shareholders. Depending on how 
potent this threat is in a national corporate legal system the nullification suit can 
end up being an effective indirect pressure mechanism for managers to unlock 
shareholder value. Therefore, they deserve a place in the index. 
With regard to question (b) above the answer is that derivative suits 
should be included in the PBWSV, but direct liability suits should not. Direct 
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liability suits although relevant for corporate governance and very efficient in 
holding managers accountable –perhaps even more efficient than derivative 
suits, especially in jurisdictions where class actions are allowed- are not based 
entirely on provisions of lato sensu corporate law. While indeed the direct suit 
may constitute an alternative way of bringing the issue of breach of directors’ 
fiduciary duties under judicial scrutiny759, the manager’s wrongdoing and the 
damage that the suing shareholder has suffered often has to be determined on the 
basis of securities regulation and the principles of tort law760. Additionally, the 
rules governing the procedure of the direct suit against managers are found in 
general procedural law and therefore, because of the fact that procedural rules 
play a crucial role in the effectiveness of the shareholder remedy, the index 
would end up comparing and tracking the development of procedural law, which 
rests outside the Second Hypothesis’s goals. Therefore, direct liability suits have 
to be excluded from the PBWSV, but derivative suits and all types of liability 
remedies, which without being precisely derivative (i.e. without having a 
shareholder litigating on behalf and for the benefit of the firm) seek payment of 
damages to the corporation, must be included in it. 
 
2.4.2. Variables (viii) to (xiv): nullification lawsuits, pre-suit special audit, 
pre-suit screening devices, standing requirements, allocation of costs, 
standard of review for duty of care and duty of loyalty 
  
In light of the above analysis, there are seven things that are separately 
ratable with regard to this right and thus seven variables [(viii)-(xiv)] includable 
in the index emerge within the scope of shareholder litigation: 
(viii) With regard to the issue of nullification lawsuits the one thing that 
is ratable in national corporate laws is the percentage required to file the suit 
that seeks the rescission of the resolution of the general meeting. A jurisdiction 
receives no points if that percentage is more than 10% or if the right does not 
exist at all; 0.5 point if the percentage required is 5%; 0.75 points if the 
percentage is less than 5% and one point if a single shareholder can file a 
nullification lawsuit. 
 (ix) The facilitation of the gathering of the information required for 
preparing and conducting the liability proceedings. The collection of evidence 
in order to substantiate a liability remedy against management is a burdensome 
task and an especially acute challenge given the information asymmetry that 
exists between shareholders and the management. The existence of institutions 
that will facilitate the gathering of evidence is of utmost importance for the 
decision to file a liability suit. Most jurisdictions have introduced special audit 
proceedings that precede the liability suit for this very purpose. A jurisdiction is 
rated here with one point, if it features that institution while its non-existence is 
                                                
759 See in Delaware the seminal cases enforcing fiduciary duties that were brought as direct class actions, 
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rated with no points. An intermediate rating scale is also applicable depending 
on the percentages or holding values required to initiate the procedure. 
(x) The existence of pre-suit screening devices. The filing of a 
derivative suit by shareholders is in many jurisdictions preceded by the 
observance of certain formalities that are meant to discourage frivolous 
litigation. Shareholders may have to make a demand on the board first to resolve 
the dispute or to file the suit; in other cases, the filing of a derivative suit may 
have to be approved first by the shareholders’ meeting. In jurisdictions where 
there is no derivative suit, the exercise of the legal remedy that seeks the 
declaration of director’s liability and the payment of damages to the corporation 
rests usually at the discretion of some corporate organ, so that essentially the 
shareholder right to seek redress to the corporation is reduced to a mere 
initiative right; shareholders merely stimulate the firm to exert its right against 
the management761. The existence of pre-suit screening devices reduces the 
potency of the threat that a liability suit poses for management. Apart from 
providing to the wrongdoers the ability to influence litigation decisions at either 
board or shareholder level, a demand forewarns the defendants on an impending 
suit for damages and thus allows them the time to take evasive actions. 
Litigation is delayed as the shareholder waits for the board or the general 
meeting to respond on her demand and thus creates high opportunity costs for 
the shareholder, who may decide that it is better to choose the ‘exit’ path, i.e. 
sell her stock, rather than the ‘voice’ one, i.e., insist on litigation. In jurisdictions 
where the demand is excused on the condition that the shareholder explains 
before the court why she chose not to make it, then the suit becomes costlier and 
the shareholder is deterred from filing it eventually. Therefore, all pre-suit 
screening devices, although teleologically justified, must be evaluated 
negatively from a shareholder value perspective, as they reduce managers’ 
exposure to litigation risk and thus weaken their incentives to unlock value to 
the shareholders. In light of the above, a jurisdiction receives no points if it has 
in place a pre-suit screening device and one point if it hasn’t one. Pre-suit 
screening devices designed in ways that produce milder legal hurdles to 
litigating shareholders are rated on a scale between zero and one depending on 
the nature of the hurdle. 
(xi) The standing requirements. The minimum share stake that a 
shareholder or a group of shareholders must hold in order to be able to file the 
suit is of great importance for the potency of the threat of derivative litigation. 
The smaller the percentage of share capital is, the greater the chances that a 
shareholder will appear and be ready to hold directors liable. However, 
reference must be made to the opinion that minimum share stakes are of minor 
importance, as the financial motivation to file a suit decreases with the 
percentage that a shareholder holds; a small stake will be entitled only to a very 
small fraction of the proportionate benefit that bounces back indirectly to the 
                                                
761 Dario Latella, Shareholder Derivative Suits: A Comparative Analysis and the Implications of the 
European Shareholders’ Rights Directive, 6 EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW 307, 
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shareholders through payment of damages to the corporation. If we were using a 
weighted index here, we would assign a smaller weight to this variable, but for 
reasons explained in Section 1.3.2.3 this is not the methodological option here. 
Therefore, jurisdictions that require a percentage greater than 10% receive no 
points; jurisdictions that require a minimum of 10% receive 0.25; jurisdictions 
that require a minimum of 5% receive 0.5 point; jurisdictions requiring a 
percentage less than 5% receive 0.75 and jurisdictions granting the right to any 
individual shareholder or to shareholders holding 1% receive one point. Of 
course in jurisdictions where the shareholder’s power is reduced to the mere 
initiative to stimulate the board or the shareholders’ meeting to decide to file the 
liability suit against the wrongdoers, there can be no discussion for standing 
requirements, so these jurisdictions are excluded from rating here.  
(xii) The allocation of costs. The shareholder who plans to file a 
derivative suit or to instigate the company to file a liability suit makes a cost-
benefit analysis before deciding whether it is in her interest to proceed with 
these actions. The benefit bouncing back to the shareholders as a result of the 
compensation that will be paid to the company is only indirect and is 
proportionate to the shareholder’s stake in the company. That means that, unless 
the shareholder has a really considerable percentage of share holdings in the 
firm, the benefit side of the cost-benefit equation won’t make the difference. 
Consequently, it is the costs side that has to be minimal, if the shareholder is to 
ever be financially motivated to take the necessary actions for the liability suit. 
If the shareholder knows that in case she loses she will have to reimburse the 
directors’ costs, then it is unlikely that the costs side will look appealing. It 
cannot be emphasized enough how crucial the costs factor is in the issue of 
shareholder litigation. In fact, it is alleged that the reason why the derivative 
action has come to play such an important role in the US system of corporate 
governance is not because of a better design of the institution of the derivative 
action per se, but because of a very favorable system of allocation of the 
litigation costs762. Indeed, much more important than the existence of pre-suit 
screening devices, than the standing requirements, than the facilitation of 
information gathering is the way costs are allocated between the litigants in a 
shareholder suit763. Jurisdictions that have in place the ‘loser pays’ rule are 
unlikely to see a large number of derivative or liability suits being filed764; this 
rule introduces a disproportionately high cost risk for the shareholder. Even if 
running the risk to expose the PBWSV to the US-bias criticism, the more a 
jurisdiction’s system of allocation of litigation costs resembles to the US system, 
the higher the score it receives on the index should be. In the US it is normally 
the so-called ‘American Rule’ that prevails, according to which litigants bear 
their own litigation costs and the looser is not obliged to indemnify the winner 
                                                
762 See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation ?, 7 THE JOURNAL OF 
LAW, ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATION 55 
763 See ARAD REISBERG, DERIVATIVE ACTIONS & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003), ch.5 – ch. 7 
764 Kalss, supra note 749, 345 ; James Cox & Thomas Randall, Common Challenges Facing Shareholder 
Suits in Europe and the United States, 6 EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW 348, 355 
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in the end765. In derivative litigation though the American Rule is not fully 
applicable; if the shareholder loses she won’t have to pay attorney’s fees to the 
corporation, but if she wins then she won’t have to bear her own expenses, but 
instead the corporation will pay them. All US states follow the ‘common fund’ 
theory, pursuant to which the plaintiff’s counsel expenses are paid out of the 
recovery received by the corporation; the underlying rationale for this is that the 
plaintiff and her attorney have produced a benefit to the corporation and they 
should be reimbursed for their effort. In light of the above, with regard to the 
costs issue a jurisdiction is to receive no points, if it has in place the ‘loser pays’ 
rule and one point if it implements the common fund theory. Intermediate 
solutions that allow the shareholder in some circumstances not to pay all the 
costs even if she loses or to get reimbursed if she wins are rated on a scale 
between zero and one. 
(xiii) The standard of review employed by courts in order to evaluate 
the fulfillment of the duty of care. Shareholder litigation may fall short of 
fulfilling its residual loss-minimizing role, if the standard of review employed 
by the courts in the ex post control of managers’ conduct is lenient enough, so as 
to virtually exclude liability. A standard of review –regardless of whether it is 
judicially created or based on a statutory rule- may in practice be introducing 
very narrow criteria that will contribute in only few managerial conducts 
qualifying as violations of the duty of care. Therefore, the extent to which a 
national corporate law promotes shareholder value depends on the extent, to 
which directors are eventually immunized from being held liable for their 
conduct by the relevant standard of review. In light of the above, a jurisdiction 
receives on the PBWSV no points if the relative standards or rules essentially 
exclude liability for breach of the duty of care; 0.5 point if the jurisdiction 
employs some variation of a gross negligence standard or if it has shaped the 
business judgment rule or a variation of it in such a way, so that it becomes very 
difficult for shareholders to rebut the presumption that directors have not 
breached their duty of care; one point if the jurisdiction employs the business 
judgment rule or a variation of it in such a way, so that there are little 
restrictions in holding management liable for the breach of the duty of care766. 
Of course one cannot draw definite lines, as to the scale, into which the standard 
of review in a jurisdiction should be classified, but even if comparisons between 
national corporate systems are by their nature unsettled with regard to this 
variable, the direction of a trend line towards rigor or leniency vis-à-vis the 
managerial conduct can be safely drawn.  
                                                
765 Cox & Randall, supra note 764, 354 
766 To be sure, while many would object to the fact that the business judgment rule is a liability metric 
that –even in its mild form- deserves to be evaluated as shareholder value-enhancing and thus receive full 
points, it seems to be the best shareholders can get in the capitalist system, which has excluded courts 
from second-guessing management’s decisions. ‘Capitalism is all about taking risks’ the saying goes and 
corporate legal systems around the world have empowered managers to make and pursue risky business 
decisions, since it is perceived to be their flexibility and their speed and efficiency that modern commerce 
demands that ultimately produces corporate wealth; See Leo Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic: 
A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 Harvard Law 
Review 1759, 1763.  
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(xiv) The existence of a duty of loyalty. Shareholder value is harmed 
when managers are slack or incompetent, but it’s also harmed when they are 
active but not in the direction of promoting shareholders’ interests. If 
shareholders cannot hold managers liable for self-dealing or lighter forms of 
conflict-of-interest transactions, then shareholder value-detrimental asset 
diversion is likely to occur within the company. Therefore, it is essential for the 
shareholder value-friendliness of a national corporate legal system to introduce a 
duty of loyalty for managers. On the PBWSV a jurisdiction receives no points if 
it has not institutionalized the duty of loyalty and one point if it has done so. 
  
2.4.3. Score explanations for variables (viii) to (xiv)  
 
The ratings in the tables of the Annex for variables (viii) to (xiv) of the 
PBWSV have been formed on the basis of the following corporate rules. 
 
2.4.3.1. France 
(viii) With regard to nullification suits France receives one point for the 
entire post-Bretton Woods period since according to French corporate law a 
nullification lawsuit may be brought by a single shareholder767. 
(ix) With regard to the facilitation of the information gathering for a 
liability suit France receives 0.25 until 1993, 0.5 from 1994 to 2000 and 0.75 
thereafter. French law grants shareholders the possibility to request from a court 
the appointment of an investigating expert (‘expert de gestion’), who will 
investigate the actions of the management board and record her findings in a 
report. Until 1993 this right was granted to shareholders representing at least 
10% of the capital768. In 1994 registered shareholder associations representing at 
least 5% of the capital became eligible to exercise this right769, while in 2001 
individual shareholders holding this percentage were also allowed to request the 
appointment of an investigating expert770.  
(x) With regard to pre-suit screening devices France receives one point 
for the entire post-Bretton Woods period. This is because French corporate law 
does not require a demand to be made on the board before filing the derivative 
suit or previous approval by the shareholders’ meeting771. To be sure, clauses in 
the articles of association subjecting the filing of a suit conditional on 
shareholder approval are deemed null by law772. 
(xi) With regard to the standing requirements France receives one point 
throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period. This is because French 
corporate law grants the right of derivative action to any individual 
shareholder773. 
                                                
767 Art. 360, Loi no 66-537 ; Code de Commerce, L. 235-1 
768 Art. 226 Loi no 66-537 
769 Art. 30, Loi no 94-679 
770 Art. 113, Loi no 2001-420 du 15 mai 2001 ; Code de Commerce, L. 235-231 
771 Art. 245, Loi no 66-537 ; Code de Commerce, L. 225-252 
772 Art. 246, Loi no 66-537 ; Code de Commerce, L. 225-253 
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(xii) With regard to the costs issue France receives no points for the 
entire post-Bretton Woods period. According to French law, when exercising 
the derivative action the shareholder must advance legal costs and expenses, as 
contingency fees do not exist in France. In addition to this, if the shareholder 
loses she is burdened with her own fees and even if she wins the suit she is in 
practice not fully reimbursed by the company774. 
(xiii) With regard to the standard of review for the breach of the duty of 
care France receives one point throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period, 
as French corporate case law does not seem to have deviated much over the past 
decades from a standard of review that results in the acknowledgement of 
liability for directors at least in cases of manifestly absurd conduct775. It seems 
that an implicit business judgment rule of mild form which, as far as the 
managers’ duty of diligence (‘dévoir de diligence’) is concerned, grants 
managers the right to be wrong in their business decisions (‘droit à l’ 
erreur’)776, has always been present in judicial evaluations of managerial 
conduct in France. It is true that French corporate law has been over the past 
decades receptive of US-style fiduciary duties in its corporate legal order, but it 
cannot be alleged that the traditional French legal concept of good faith (‘bonne 
foi’) that shaped the French standard of review for the duty of care has 
undergone such a major transformation after its interpretation was influenced by 
the US-style business judgment rule777, so as to justify a change in France’s 
score with regard to this variable. 
(xiv) With regard to the duty of loyalty France receives half a point 
until 1995 and one point thereafter. During the first period French corporate law 
entailed provisions relating to the process that must be followed for self-dealing 
transactions to be valid778, but in 1996 the French Supreme Court acknowledged 
a devoir de loyauté for corporate directors, a duty of loyalty that runs to the 
shareholders779 that was later complemented by the acknowledgment of a duty 
of loyalty that runs to the corporation as such780. 
 
2.4.3.2. Germany 
(viii) With regard to nullification suits Germany receives one point for 
the entire post-Bretton Woods period since according to German corporate law a 
nullification lawsuit may be brought by a single shareholder781. 
(ix) With regard to the facilitation of the information gathering for a 
liability suit Germany receives 0.5 up to 2004, because shareholders holding at 
least 10% of the stock or 1mn EUR in value were eligible to file a petition to 
                                                
774 Grelon, supra note 776, 212 
775 YVES GUYON, DROIT DES AFFAIRES (2001), § 459 
776 See Cass. Com., 2 juillet 1985, Cointreau c/ Rémy Martin, D. 1986, 351, note Loussouarn, JCP 1985, 
II no 20518, note Vlandier, REV. SOC. 1986, 231 
777 David Freedman, L’ Américanisation du Droit Français par la Vie Economique, 45 ARCHIVES DE 
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 207, 209 
778 Arts. 101ff., Loi no 66-537 ; Code de Commerce L.225-38ff. 
779 Cass. Com. 27 fév. 1996, Vilgrain, JCP, 1996, ii, 22665 
780 Cass. Com. 24 fév. 1998, K, JCP E 1998, no 17 pan. 637 
781 AktG §§ 243(1) & 249 
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court to appoint a special auditor and one point from 2005 onwards because with 
a reform that year this percentage dropped to 1% or 100,000 EUR in value782.  
(x) With regard to pre-suit screening devices Germany receives one 
point for the entire post-Bretton Woods period. Before the enactment of a 
reform in 2005783 German corporate law did not feature a derivative action; the 
filing of a liability suit required a shareholder approval or an initiative by 
shareholders holding 10% of the capital to request the court to appoint a special 
representative to conduct the proceedings784. The 2005 reform introduced the 
derivative action for shareholders requiring no system of prior approval for its 
filing785. Nevertheless, technically even the pre-2005 system did not feature a 
pre-screening device, when the minority chose to follow the route of requesting 
the court to appoint a special representative to conduct the liability proceedings. 
Therefore, with regard to this variable Germany must receive one point for all 
the years under scrutiny. The indisputable amelioration of the conditions of 
liability suits that was realized by the introduction of the derivative action in 
2005 is controlled in the PBWSV under variable (xi) below. 
(xi) With regard to the issue of standing requirements Germany 
receives 0.25 until 2004 and 1 point thereafter. This is because until 2004 
shareholders holding 10% of the capital could request the court to appoint a 
special representative to conduct liability proceedings786, while from 2005 
onwards shareholders representing 1% of the share capital or holding shares of 
100,000 EUR in value may file a derivative action787.  
(xii) With regard to the costs issue Germany receives no points until 
2004 and 0.75 thereafter. This is because before the 2005 reform, if the 
company lost in court the liability suit, then the company could recover its 
expenses from the shareholders who had induced the suit by requesting from the 
court the appointment of a special representative (‘loser pays’) 788. In 2005 two 
changes were made in favor of suitor shareholders. As far as the shareholder-
induced liability suit that is conducted through a special representative is 
concerned, it is now provided that if the court grants the motion for an 
appointment of a special representative, then it is the company that will bear the 
costs of the proceedings in any case789. As far as the newly introduced derivative 
action is concerned, should the application to the court for admission of the 
derivative action be refused, then the shareholders are liable for the costs of the 
admission stage of the procedure only790. But, there is a cap in these costs791 and 
in case that the refusal is based on the interests of the company that the latter has 
                                                
782 AktG §142(2) 
783 Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts vom 8.7.2005 ( 
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784 AktG §147  
785 AktG §148 
786 AktG §147  
787 AktG §148 
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789 AktG §147(2) 
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failed to substantiate in due course, then the company will be liable even for the 
costs of the admission stage. If the application for admission of the derivative 
action is accepted by the court, then for the costs of the main proceedings stage 
the loser will be formally liable792; but, if it is the shareholder, who is the loser, 
then the company has an obligation to indemnify her not only for the main 
proceedings stage793, but also for the costs of the admission stage794. 
(xiii) With regard to the standard of review for the breach of the duty of 
care Germany receives half a point until 1996 and one point thereafter. Until 
1996 it seems that directors’ liability played an insignificant role in German 
court practice795. A duty of care (‘Sorgfaltspflicht’)796 did exist in statute797 even 
prior to 1997, but was rarely enforced in the post-Bretton Woods years and was 
not clarified adequately, so as to constitute a potent threat for management. That 
year the Federal Supreme Court798 introduced a variation of the business 
judgment rule in the German corporate legal order essentially turning an 
irresponsible conduct on behalf of the directors into a subjective liability 
element for directors799. The judicial standard was in 2005 codified into a 
statutory rule800 creating a safe harbor for the directors along the lines of the 
function of the US business judgment rule801. 
(xiv) With regard to the duty of loyalty Germany receives one point for 
the entire post-Bretton Woods period. There are several statutory provisions 
prohibiting and regulating transactions that fall in the general category of self-
dealing802, but in addition to this an implicit general duty of loyalty 
(‘Treuepflicht’) is acknowledged in theory803 and in case law. 
 
 
2.4.3.3. The Netherlands  
(viii) The Netherlands receives one point for the entire post-Bretton 
Woods period since according to Dutch corporate law a nullification lawsuit 
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may be brought by a single shareholder804, as well as by a depositary receipt 
holder.  
(ix) With regard to the facilitation of the information gathering for a 
liability suit The Netherlands receives one point throughout the entire post-
Bretton Woods period because according to Dutch corporate law shareholders 
holding 10% or 225,000 EUR in value are eligible to file an application for the 
initiation of inquiry proceedings (‘enquêterecht’)805, within the scope of which 
an investigator will be appointed, who eventually drafts a report showing 
whether there has indeed been mismanagement. The mismanagement ruling is 
not binding upon the court that will later evaluate the issue of liability806, but 
information collected during the inquiry proceedings can be used as evidence in 
liability proceedings later807. 
(x) With regard to pre-suit screening devices The Netherlands receives 
no points for the entire post-Bretton Woods period. Dutch corporate law does 
not feature a derivative action; it is possible for the company to hold directors 
liable for mismanagement808, but this cannot be done directly on the initiative of 
the minority. As there are no special provisions regarding any formalities that 
must be followed in the preparatory phase of liability proceedings, it is accepted 
that if the shareholders want to nudge the supervisory board to file a liability suit 
on behalf of the company, they will have to induce the shareholders’ meeting 
approval first809. 
(xi) With regard to standing requirements The Netherlands remains 
unrated because Dutch law features neither a derivative suit nor a liability suit 
that can be instigated by the minority and conducted by a special representative. 
(xii) With regard to the costs issue The Netherlands receives 0.75 for 
the entire post-Bretton Woods period, since the liability suit is an issue 
instigated by the company itself with a mere indirect involvement of the 
shareholders. Shareholders do not have to bear any expenses for the suit, but the 
fact that there are no contingent fees for lawyers in The Netherlands810 may 
discourage to some extent the general meeting or the board to proceed with the 
filing of a liability suit against managers.  
(xiii) With regard to the standard of review for the duty of care The 
Netherlands receives half a point until 1996 and one point thereafter. Before 
1997 the standard implemented by courts in liability proceedings was a gross 
negligence standard811 akin to the standard of review for the liability of an 
                                                
804 BW 2:15 §3(a)  
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806 HR 4 April 2003, JOR 2003, 134 
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809 Timmerman & Doorman, supra note 735, 52 
810 Willem Calkoen & Daniella Strik, The Netherlands, in DIRECTOR’S LIABILITY: A WORLDWIDE 
REVIEW (A. LOOS & M. AVILLEZ PEREIRA, EDS.)(2006), 353 
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employee812. This was proven to be an almost insurmountable hurdle for 
plaintiffs to hold the defendant directors liable, as it required them to prove that 
the defendants were subjectively aware of the reckless nature of their conduct813. 
In 1997 though the Dutch Supreme Court started applying a lighter standard, 
that of serious personal blame (ernstig verwijt)814, in order to diagnose whether a 
director is liable for ‘improper performance’ (onbehoorlijke taakvervulling)815, 
which allows more directorial actions to be held as breaching the duty of care. 
(xiv) With regard to the duty of loyalty The Netherlands receives half a 
point until 2006 and one point for the last year on the index. Dutch corporate 
law does not contain an explicit duty of loyalty for board members816. 
Nevertheless, it was always acknowledged817 that a duty of loyalty can be 
inferred both from the general principles of reasonableness and fairness that 
govern the behavior of all corporate organs818 and from the provision of the 
Dutch Civil Code that forms the basis of directors’ liability819. In addition to 
this, Amsterdam’s Enterprise Chamber had prior to 2007 systematically upheld 
certain conflict-of-interest transactions as cases of mismanagement820. In 2007 
though the Dutch Supreme Court held the provisions of the Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code, which increased the responsibility for conflicted transactions, 
to be mandatory as a matter of law821. This constituted an evolution with regard 
to the responsibilities that flow for Dutch boards from the duty of loyalty, since 
a soft law vehicle, such as the Corporate Governance Code822, that featured 
detailed provisions on this issue was rendered mandatory in this respect. 
 
2.4.3.4. United Kingdom 
(viii) With regard to the issue of nullification lawsuits the UK receives 
one point for the entire post-Bretton Woods period since British case law has 
since the 1950s recognized the right of every shareholder to bring a personal 
action against the resolution of the general meeting823. 
(ix) With regard to the facilitation of the information gathering for the 
liability suit the UK receives 0.25 for the entire post-Bretton Woods period. This 
is due to the fact that 10% of the shareholders of a British firm must request the 
Secretary of State to appoint an inspector that will investigate the affairs of the 
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company and report on them824. The Secretary of State has the discretion to 
deny the appointment of an inspector; his refusal is reviewable by a court. 
Nevertheless, the application must be supported by evidence that there are good 
reasons for the investigation to take place; this has contributed to the institution 
having been practically useless over the past 20 years825. 
(x) With regard to pre-suit screening devices the UK receives no points 
until 1979, half a point from 1980 until 2005 and 0.75 thereafter. The common 
law derivative action deriving from the rule in Foss v. Harbottle826 essentially 
required the court to answer the question of whether the individual shareholder 
should be allowed to sue derivatively or whether the litigation question should 
be left to the company itself827. The principle was that the right to vindicate a 
wrong against the company belongs to the company itself828; it was considered a 
decision, which the board was qualified to make829 and only when directors 
were interested in the transaction that would be challenged, the decision-making 
authority would shift to the shareholders’ meeting830. An individual shareholder 
was able to overcome the collective action problem that shareholder decision-
making posed by raising a derivative action only under very restrictive 
conditions that required her to show that the wrong could not be validly ratified 
by the majority because it was a fraud on the minority and that those who 
committed the fraud were in control of the firm831. These conditions were not 
clear and therefore they limited the remedy’s reach rendering the derivative 
action of little significance prior to the reform of the Companies Act in 2006. 
The only reason why the UK receives half a point from 1980 to 2005 is because 
shareholders had in cases of corporate wrongdoing recourse to a remedy that 
was functionally equivalent to the derivative action, which however didn’t have 
the procedural complexity of the latter832. This remedy is the claim for unfair 
prejudice833 that allows a shareholder to petition for an order, when the 
corporate affairs have been conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial 
to the interests of shareholders in general and may allow the suitor in specific 
cases to request damages to be paid to the company instead of directly to her. In 
the 2006 reform of the Companies Act a new statutory derivative claim replaced 
the common law one834 and the rule in Foss v. Harbottle and rendered the pre-
                                                
824 s. 164, Companies Act 1948; s. 431 Companies Act 1985 (remaining in force after enactment of 
Companies Act 2006) 
825 DAVIES, supra note 694, 635 (fn. 36) 
826 (1843), 2 Hare 461 
827 Davies, supra note 694, 610 
828 Arad Reisberg, Shareholders’ Remedies : In Search of Consistency of Principle in English Law, 16 
EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 1065, 1068 (fn. 18) 
829 Brian Cheffins, Reforming the Derivative Action: The Canadian Experience and British Prospects, 2 
COMPANY FINANCIAL AND INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW 227, 230 
830 Movitex v. Bulfield [1988] BCLC 104 
831 Arad Reisberg, Theoretical Reflections on Derivative Actions in English Law: The Representative 
Problem, 3 EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW 69, 76 
832 Reisberg, supra note 828, 1065 
833 Introduced with the Companies Act 1980 (s. 75) and consolidated as s. 459 in the Companies Act 
1985; Now Companies Act 2006, s. 994 
834 Companies Act 2006, Part 11 
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suit screening somewhat more lenient, thus giving hope that shareholders would 
thenceforth go derivatively rather than through the unfair prejudice claim, which 
couldn’t replace entirely the derivative action despite its functional equivalency. 
After 2006 it is up to the court as a third party to decide whether it is in the best 
interests of the company for the suit to be brought. 
(xi) With regard to standing requirements the UK receives one point for 
the entire post-Bretton Woods period since the common law derivative action, 
the unfair prejudice claim and the new statutory derivative action can all be 
exercised by an individual shareholder. 
(xii) With regard to the costs issue the UK receives no points the years 
1973 and 1974, 0.25 from 1975 to 2002 and 0.5 thereafter. The first two years of 
the index there is an absolute application of the ‘loser pays’ rule. In 1975 a court 
decision introduced the discretion of the court to order the company to 
indemnify the suitor in those cases where in the court’s view a reasonable 
independent board would authorize the exercise of the liability suit835 
(‘Wallersteiner principle’). In 2003 the possibility was introduced for a more 
favorable allocation of litigation costs in the framework of unfair prejudice 
claims, the functional equivalent of derivative actions in the UK. Until then 
indemnity for the costs of the shareholder filing the unfair prejudice remedy was 
not available836, but following a certain court decision the shareholder became 
entitled to seek a recovery order against the company for the costs it incurred, 
when the relief sought under the unfair prejudice claim was for the benefit of the 
company837. With the introduction of the statutory derivative action in 2006 the 
costs issue did not become more favorable, as it continues to rest under the 
court’s discretion to order the indemnification of the shareholder after it grants 
leave to continue the suit and thus the cautious position of the Wallersteiner 
principle has not been changed838. 
(xiii) With regard to the standard of review for the duty of care the UK 
receives 0.25 until 1993, half a point from 1994 to 2005 and one point 
thereafter. During the first period the common law related to the duty of care 
was based on a very low standard of care shaped in highly subjective terms, as 
the reference point for the evaluation of whether the duty has been violated or 
not was the knowledge and experience of the very director, whose behavior was 
under judicial scrutiny839. In 1994 in the framework of cases dealing with the 
directorial conduct in insolvent firms, the duty of care was objectified840 along 
the lines of the objective statutory standards set for the tortuous conduct of 
wrongful trading of the Insolvency Act841. This objectified approach largely 
                                                
835 Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) [1975] QB 373; CPR r19.9(7) (now CPR r19.9E) 
836 Re a Company (No. 005136 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 82 
837 Clark v. Cutland [2003] 2 BCLC 393, 35 
838 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Claims Under the Companies Act 2006: Much Ado About Nothing?, in 
RATIONALITY IN COMPANY LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF D D PRENTICE (J. ARMOUR & J. PAYNE, EDS.) 
(2009), fn. 245 
839 DAVIES, supra note 694, 489 (citing City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Re. [1925] Ch. 407, 427) 
840 D’ Jan of London Ltd, Re [1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 561 
841 s.214(4) 
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formed the basis of s. 174 of the Companies Act 2006 that to a certain extent 
combined the previous subjective approach to the recent objective one, as it sets 
as the standard of review both the reasonably expected knowledge, skill and 
experience of directors as a class and the personal knowledge, skill and 
experience of the director, whose conduct is each time under scrutiny. The 
subjective element allows for the standard of review to become stricter for the 
director depending on the circumstances of each case842. 
(xiv) With regard to the duty of loyalty the UK receives 0.75 until 2002 
and one point thereafter. Under the British corporate law doctrine the ‘no 
conflict’ principle, whose analysis embraces all aspects of the duty of loyalty 
discourse, is sub-divided into three groups of rules: (a) rules related to self-
dealing transactions; (b) rules related to the usurpation of a corporate 
opportunity; (c) rules related to the requirement not to receive benefits from 
third parties in exchange for the exercise of directorial powers843. With regard to 
the group of rules pertaining to self-dealing transactions there have not been any 
significant developments since the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreements; a 
disclosure of conflicts to the board was always required844. With regard to the 
group of rules pertaining to the prohibition of receipt of benefits from third 
parties there have also not been any significant developments since the 1970s; 
the required shareholder authorization of the common law is preserved in s. 
180(4)(a) of the Companies Act 2006. There has been though a development in 
the group of rules related to the usurpation of corporate opportunities, which 
justifies the higher rating that UK corporate law receives for the duty of loyalty 
from 2003 onwards. A crucial question connected to the issue of usurpation of a 
corporate opportunity is how such an opportunity is identified according to the 
law845. Case law until 2003 disqualified directors or officers from diverting to 
themselves an opportunity, which the company was actively pursuing846, on the 
basis of the thought that the opportunity was considered to be the property of the 
company847. In 2003 with Bhullar v. Bhullar848 English case law moved closer 
to the US ‘line of business’ test849 and extended the criteria used for identifying 
a corporate opportunity; if the opportunity falls within the company’s existing 
business activities, then an opportunity the director comes across is a corporate 
one, even if no property or information was deployed by the director to obtain 
                                                
842 For the fact that the new statutory rule effects a change in the standard of review for the duty of care 
and that courts should be cautious in invoking older common law for their guidance henceforth see 
DAVIES, supra note 719, 491 
843 DAVIES, supra note 694, 497 
844 Since the Companies Act 1929 the rule has always been to disclose conflicted proposed and existing 
transactions to the board; with regard to existing transactions the obligation was statutory (see s. 317 
Companies Act 1985), while with regard to proposed transactions the obligation derived from common 
law. The Companies Act 2006, apart from s. 182 that repeated the statutory disclosure requirement for 
existing transactions, codified in s. 177 the common law with regard to the disclosure of proposed 
transactions. 
845 DAVIES, supra note 694, 559-560 
846 Canadian Aero Service v. O’ Malley, [1973] 40 D.L.R. (3d) 371, at 382 
847 CMS Dolphin Ltd. V. Simonet, [2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 704, at 733 
848 [2003] 2 B.C.L.C. 241 
849 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d. 503 (Del. 1939) 
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the opportunity850. Bhullar is said to leave little room for maneuver for directors 
of competing companies who have not had their positions approved by the 
firm851 and thus justifies the higher rating UK corporate law receives in this 
respect after the decision was issued. 
 
2.4.3.5. United States 
(viii) With regard to the issue of nullification lawsuits the US receives 
one point for the entire post-Bretton Woods period since Delaware law provides 
that the Court of Chancery may after the application of any shareholder hear and 
determine the result of any shareholder’s meeting852. 
(ix) With regard to the facilitation of the information gathering for the 
liability suit the US receives no points for the entire post-Bretton Woods period. 
There are no special audit proceedings, nor special representative conducting the 
proceedings under Delaware law. The usual practice of special litigation 
committees consisting of independent directors that investigate and prepare a 
report after a demand is made to the board by shareholders for the filing of a 
derivative suit is a private ordering development that cannot be coded here. Only 
the Model Business Corporation Act –which is not taken under account for US’s 
score on the index- features the possibility for the court to appoint an 
independent panel that will undertake a preliminary investigation and decide 
whether the shareholders’ demand for the initiation of a derivative suit is 
meritless or not853. 
(x) With regard to pre-suit screening devices the US receives no points 
until 1983 and half a point thereafter. The procedural code of Delaware854 
assumes the demand requirement without directly stating it855. In 1984 the 
Delaware Supreme Court issued a ruling that indicated what particular facts the 
shareholder, who wants to proceed with a derivative suit, must allege in her suit 
in order for the demand on the board to be excused (‘Aronson test’)856. The 
shareholder-plaintiff must create before the court either a reasonable doubt that a 
majority of current directors are disinterested or a reasonable doubt that the 
challenged transactions were protected by the business judgment rule. While 
still the shareholder must surpass a legal hurdle to substantiate the excuse from 
the demand requirement, the pre-suit screening requirements became after 
Aronson somewhat more favorable to shareholders from a formal point of view. 
(xi) With regard to standing requirements the US receives one point for 
the entire post-Bretton Woods period since Delaware law allows any individual 
shareholder to bring a derivative suit. 
                                                
850 Davies, supra note 694, 566 
851 John Armour, Corporate Opportunities : If in Doubt, Disclose (But How ?), THE CAMBRIDGE LAW 
JOURNAL (2004) 33, 34 
852 DGCL §225(b) 
853 MBCA §7.44(f) 
854 Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 
855 ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986), 640 
856 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) 
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(xii) With regard to the costs issue the US receives one point for the 
entire post-Bretton Woods period for employing the common fund theory, as 
explained above in the general analysis of this variable. 
(xiii) With regard to the standard of review for the duty of care the US 
receives 0.5 until 1984, 0.75 from 1985 to 1992 and one point thereafter. Until 
1984 the Delaware judiciary employed a strong form of the business judgment 
rule that provided shareholders with little leeway to hold managers liable for 
breaching the duty of care. Then in the framework of the takeover frenzy of the 
1980s the Delaware Supreme Court issued the Smith v. Van Gorkom857 ruling 
that surprised the corporate bar, as it was the first Delaware case to actually hold 
directors liable for breach of the duty of care for the making of a business 
decision858. Its impact was such that it led in the following years to a dramatic 
rise in the level of D&O insurance premia. In 1993 the Delaware Supreme Court 
exposed directors to liability for the breach of the duty of care even more with 
its adjudication in Cede & Co v. Technicolor, Inc.859, another case that arose in a 
takeover context. In that ruling the court adjudicated that ‘a breach of […] the 
duty of care rebuts the presumption that the directors have acted in the best 
interests of the shareholders and requires the directors to prove that the 
transaction was entirely fair’. 
(xiv) With regard to the duty of loyalty the US receives half a point 
until 1993 and 0.75 thereafter. Early courts of the 19th century in the US held 
self-dealing transactions as voidable at the request of the corporation regardless 
of whether the transaction was fair or not. The collapse of the Bretton Woods 
arrangements found Delaware courts having long abandoned the rule of 
voidability and instead upholding self-dealing if disinterested directors approved 
the transaction860. Delaware courts seemed to be treating though the statutory 
rule that required disinterested directors to approve the conflicted transaction861 
as a safe harbor for directors862. Therefore, US’s score on the PBWSV with 
regard to this variable is 0.5 until 1993, because in 1994 Delaware courts made 
clear that the disinterested approval does not displace the court’s role to measure 
the transaction’s entire fairness863. However, since disinterested director 
approval was decided to merely shift the burden to the plaintiff to prove that the 
transaction was not entirely fair, the result was not so favorable for plaintiff-
shareholders, so as to justify the award of one point to the US with regard to this 
variable from 1994 onwards. 
 
 
                                                
857 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) 
858 WILLIAM ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON 
THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2006), 257-258 
859 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (‘Cede I’) 
860 See Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971) 
861 DGCL §144 
862 Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987) 
863 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. 1994) 
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2.5. Executive compensation 
 
2.5.1. Reasons for inclusion in the index 
 
There is no issue more closely connected to the problem of agency 
costs and particularly to that of residual loss than executive compensation864. 
Nevertheless, executive compensation has a Janus face865; it can be residual 
loss-minimizing, if remuneration packages are designed properly, but it also has 
the potential of increasing residual loss, as shown by corporate scandals (e.g. 
Enron)866, which were attributed to perverse incentives provided to managers by 
their remuneration packages867.   
Within the scope of the agency theory it is believed that the alignment 
of managers’ incentives with shareholdership’s interests can be best achieved by 
aligning their risk appetite. Managers and shareholders start with different 
attitudes towards risk; managers make a firm-specific investment, so it is natural 
that they are more risk averse, while shareholders have a diversified portfolio 
that allows them to have a more risk neutral approach vis-à-vis the investments 
undertaken by the firm. So, managers may opt for strategies that yield lower 
expected returns but less uncertainty, while shareholders would prefer the 
opposite868. In other words, because managers will bear the full cost of a failed 
strategy, but won’t benefit from the strategy’s potential upside, they might opt 
for projects that from the shareholders’ viewpoint are suboptimal869.  But, if 
managers were to be compensated for that additional risk, which would be 
preferred by shareholders, then they could undertake the projects that would be 
more appealing to the latter. This is where equity-based executive compensation 
kicks in. 
Equity-based executive compensation schemes entail some variation of 
stock options. A stock option is the right granted to the manager to buy stock in 
the firm in the future at a price, which is usually determined at the time that right 
is granted870. The general idea is that a stock option provides the manager with 
the opportunity to earn compensation in the future, if she contributes to the share 
price going up. Obviously, in theory any stock option scheme, regardless of its 
                                                
864 See Lucian Bebcuk & Jesse Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 71 
865 Jan Lieder & Philipp Fischer, The Say-on-Pay Movement – Evidence From a Comparative 
Perspective, 8 EUROPEAN COMPANY AND FINANCIAL LAW REVIEW 376, 379 
866 As one commentator stated ‘the revelations of corporate misdeeds at Enron, Global Crossing, and 
WorldCom confirm[ed] that there is an urgent need to rein in greedy and overmighty chief executives, 
and to curb rampant abuses of stock options’, WorldCom: Accounting for Change, ECONOMIST, June 29, 
2002, at 13. 
867 See Jaap Winter, Corporate Governance Going Astray: Executive Remuneration Built to Fail, in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS HOPT (S. GRUNDMANN ET AL., EDS.) (2010) 1521; AGLIETTA & REBERIOUX, 
supra note 502, 241 
868 Jeffrey Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (T. CLARKE, ED.) (2004), 328 
869 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2006), 16 
870 MICHAEL SIRKIN & LAWRENCE CAGNEY, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (1996), 5-22 
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vesting schedule, is well-equipped to minimize the residual loss portion of 
agency costs871 and therefore corporate rules that facilitate or prevent stock 
option-based executive compensation should be taken under account within the 
scope of the PBWSV. 
However, if the index would merely control the degree, to which 
corporate law facilitates or prevents the issuance and use of stock options, then 
the Janus face of equity-based executive compensation would be disregarded. 
The index needs to control the extent, to which a corporate legal system 
attempts to mitigate the potential residual loss-maximizing effects of variable 
pay. Executive option plans are by their nature asymmetrical, as they reward 
success, but fail to punish failure872. Therefore, these plans are likely to induce 
managers to take excessive risks. In addition to this, when remuneration 
packages are designed inside the boardroom by a board captured by senior 
management, then the pay schemes are likely to skim wealth from the 
shareholders directly to management’s pockets873. Consequently, the processes 
that corporate laws around the world follow to ensure that the performance link 
and the incentive mechanism of variable pay are not damaged must be taken 
under account here.  
In an effort to mitigate the management’s influence on the designing of 
executive compensation and to spur its setting on an arm’s length basis, 
legislators have adopted various regulatory strategies that allow shareholders to 
control or at least monitor the executive pay-setting process.  
The first regulatory strategy is to induce the transparency of executive 
pay. This is done –particularly with regard to listed companies- through 
requirements concerning annual disclosure to shareholders. While disclosure 
requirements do contribute to enhanced shareholder protection, they do not seem 
to produce direct results for the maximization of shareholder value; the mere 
reporting of their remuneration packages to the investor community is unlikely 
to urge managers to set schemes that will allow them to cater more for the share 
price. Therefore, legal developments with regard to disclosure requirements are 
not controlled in the framework of the PBWSV. 
The second regulatory strategy is the establishment of remuneration 
committees that are delegated the task of setting executive pay. Listing rules 
may require the establishment of such committees and corporate governance 
codes may encourage it under ‘comply or explain’ structures. These 
remuneration committees –where applicable- are composed exclusively or 
predominantly by independent directors, who in corporate governance discourse 
are viewed as guardians of shareholders’ interests. Nevertheless, since legal 
developments regarding independent directors are controlled below under 
variable (xvii), the issue of remuneration committees won’t be taken under 
                                                
871 See Kevin Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived 
Cost of Stock Options, 69 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 847 
872 Guido Ferrarini et al., Executive Remuneration in the EU: Comparative Law and Practice, ECGI 
Working Paper 9/2003, 9. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=419120  
873 Id. 
CORPORATE LAW AND THE GREAT REVERSAL IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 221 
account within the scope of the variables concerned with executive 
compensation. 
The third regulatory strategy in respect of mitigating the damaging 
effects of executive compensation packages is the introduction of ‘say on pay’ 
mechanisms. Under such mechanisms shareholders are called to hold an 
advisory or binding vote on the firm’s overall remuneration policy. This is a 
legal development that must be taken under account in the framework of the 
executive compensation variables of the PBWSV. In theory, this vote is a 
residual loss-minimizing mechanism, as it helps shareholders ensure that stock 
option plans won’t be used in an agency costs-maximizing way. This theoretical 
conclusion is backed by empirical evidence that shows how shareholder activists 
have embraced these mechanisms. Before the enactment of ‘say on pay’ 
regulation in the US, in the proxy season of 2006 there were 131 ‘say on pay’ 
proposals in US public firms, while in the proxy season of 2007 this number 
doubled to 161 proposals874. Therefore, corporate rules related to ‘say on pay’ 
fulfill both the theoretical and the empirical criteria that were set in Section 
1.3.1.3. for the construction of the PBWSV. After all, (quasi-)legislative 
measures promoting ‘say on pay’ arrangements have stressed the latter’s 
shareholder value effect875. 
Nevertheless, it must be stated here that not all authors embrace the 
shareholder value-enhancing approach to ‘say on pay’ rights. Three hypotheses 
have been developed in connection with the effect of ‘say on pay’ arrangements 
on corporate governance: the alignment hypothesis, the interference hypothesis 
and the neutral effect hypothesis876. Empirical evidence does not back clearly 
one hypothesis over the others. The passage of the Say-on-Pay Bill (H.R. 1257) 
in the US House of Representatives in 2007 led to positive returns for the firms 
that had the highest level of abnormal CEO pay877. This signals that ‘say on pay’ 
rights are welcomed by the shareholder community in those cases, where there 
are suspicions that the executive remuneration package is skimming wealth from 
shareholders. At the same time, there seems to be a neutral to positive market 
reaction, when ‘say on pay’ proposals are voted down in firms that would not 
benefit from them878. These results both back the alignment hypothesis at least 
with regard to advisory ‘say on pay’ arrangements and indicate that it may be 
indeed justified to price in this group of corporate rules in the PBWSV.  
 
 
2.5.2. Variables (xv) – (xvi): stock options & ‘say on pay’ 
 
                                                
874 Stephen Deane, Say on Pay: Results from Overseas, THE CORPORATE BOARD July/August 2007 11, 11 
875 See Commission Recommendation of 14 December 2004 fostering an appropriate regime for the 
remuneration of directors of listed companies 
876 See Jie Cai & Ralph Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does it Create Value?, JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030925  
877 Id., Table III 
878 Id.,Panel B of Table X 
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In light of the above analysis, there are two things that are separately 
ratable with regard to executive compensation and thus two variables [(xv) and 
(xvi)] emerge that are includable in the index: 
(xv) The degree, by which a corporate legal system facilitates the 
issuance and use of stock options as an executive compensation mechanism. 
Corporate laws may feature several structures that impede the use of stock 
options. There may be an outright prohibition of the issuance of ‘naked’ options 
by a corporation or restrictions as to the share buybacks that will create treasury 
shares, out of which stock will be issued to managers who will exercise their 
options. No points are awarded to jurisdictions that prohibit the issuance of 
‘naked’ stock options or that prohibit stock buybacks for the purpose of 
awarding shares to directors and officers; 0.5 to jurisdictions that allow the 
issuance of stock options, but feature a prohibition to proceed to a share 
buyback in order to issue stock to members of the board; one point to 
jurisdictions that allow the issuance of stock options and that allow the issuance 
of shares to both officers and members of the board (excluding the supervisory 
board in two-tier systems). To be sure, legal developments in the issue of 
transparency of executive compensation through stock options, as well as 
developments in the tax or accounting treatment of stock options are not taken 
under account here. 
(xvi) The enactment of ‘say on pay’ regulation. Traditionally, corporate 
laws especially in continental Europe feature a requirement that the 
shareholders’ meeting approves the creation of authorized or contingent capital, 
out of which shares will be distributed to executive option-holders, who are 
exercising their right. Thus, by means of these rules shareholders have an 
indirect say on stock option plans and may influence their structuring, but this is 
not what is meant here by ‘say on pay’ regulation. This variable controls legal 
developments that have granted shareholders a direct say on executive 
remuneration packages per se and not merely a say on the issuance of new stock 
that necessarily accompanies such packages. No points are awarded to a 
jurisdiction that does not feature any requirement or any ‘soft law’ rule for 
shareholders to vote on executive remuneration; 0.5 is awarded to jurisdictions 
that allow shareholders to vote on a stock option plan, but leave other aspects of 
executive compensation to be set by the board; one point is awarded to 
jurisdictions that allow shareholders to vote on all aspects of executive 
remuneration, regardless of whether this vote is advisory or binding. The fact 
that advisory and binding ‘say on pay’ votes are both rated here with one point 
derives from empirical evidence that shows that even, where ‘say on pay’ votes 
are advisory, management enters into discussions with shareholders in order to 
draft a compensation plan that won’t be rejected by the meeting and bring 
negative publicity to the company879.     
 
                                                
879 Stephen Davis, Does Say on Pay Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation Accountable, 10, 
Yale Milstein Center Policy Briefing No. 1 (2007). Available at 
http://www.shareholderforum.com/op/Library/20070620_Davis-briefing.pdf  
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2.5.3. Score explanation for variables (xv) – (xvi) 
 
The ratings in the tables of the Annex for variables (xv) to (xvi) of the 
PBWSV have been formed on the basis of the following corporate rules: 
 
2.5.3.1. France  
(xv) With regard to the degree of facilitation of executive compensation 
through stock options France receives half a point until 1984 and one point 
thereafter. This is because before 1985 stock options could not be issued to 
members of the board, but only to officers880. A legal reform in 1985881 allowed 
the granting of stock options to certain                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
members of the board as well882. 
(xvi) With regard to ‘say on pay’ arrangements France receives one 
point throughout the entire post-Bretton Woods period. This is because in 
France the shareholders’ meeting gets to determine the total amount of directors’ 
fees allocated to the board with the board then apportioning the fees among its 
members883 and also because the general meeting authorizes the board to grant 
stock options to all or certain of the company’s employees, to the chairman of 
the board of directors, to the managing director, the deputy managing directors 
or members of the management board884. 
 
2.5.3.2. Germany 
(xv) With regard to the degree of facilitation of executive compensation 
through stock options Germany receives no points until 1997 and one point 
thereafter. This is because before 1998 the issuance of ‘naked’ stock options by 
a firm was prohibited under German corporate law885. Firms were forced either 
to issue bonds to managers with a warrant granting the right to acquire shares 
attached to the bonds or to design phantom stock option plans, within the scope 
of which managers where not granted a real participation in the company, but 
only a remuneration based on a fictitious participation in the company886. 
Following a reform in 1998887 the issuance of ‘naked’ stock options became 
permissible and German firms were permitted to repurchase shares for the sake 
of creating a contingent capital, out of which shares would be issued to the 
                                                
880 Arts. 208-1 & 208-8-1, Loi no 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 
881 Art. 37, Loi no. 85-695 du 11 juillet 1985 
882 Art. 208-8-1, Loi no 66-537 was reformed accordingly; now Code de Commerce L. 225-185 (in 
conjunction with L. 225-177) 
883 Art. 108 Loi no 66-537 ; Code de Commerce L. 225-45 
884 Art. 208, Loi no 66-537 ; Code de Commerce L. 225-177 
885 AktG §113 (pre-1998); see Uwe Hüffer, Aktienbezugsrechte als Bestandteil der Vergütung von 
Vorstandsmitgliedern und Mitarbeitern  - gesellschaftsrechtliche Analyse, 161 ZHR 214, 223 
886 Ingrid Kalisch, Stock Options: Will the Upcoming Amendment of the German Stock Corporation Act 
facilitate their introduction by German Stock Corporations?, INTERNATIONAL COMPANY AND 
COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW (1998) 111, 112-113 
887 Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG) 
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members of the managing board and to senior executives, who exercise their 
options888. 
(xvi) With regard to the ‘say on pay’ arrangements Germany receives 
no points until 2001 and 0.25 thereafter. Before the enactment of the Executive 
Compensation Adequacy Act in 2009 (which remains outside the time scope of 
the PBWSV) that established an optional advisory shareholder vote on executive 
compensation889, the only requirement relevant to this variable was the 
recommendation of the German Corporate Governance Code (first version in 
2002) for the compensation of supervisory board members to be specified by a 
resolution of the general meeting890. Given that a few years ago it was found that 
81.8% of listed German firms comply with this provision, the relevant provision 
is coded in the PBWSV although it’s soft law891. Management board 
remuneration became subject to shareholder approval with the aforementioned 
act in 2009 and before that there does not seem to have been any other 
requirements concerning the shareholder ratification of remuneration that could 
be coded in the index892.  
 
2.5.3.3. The Netherlands  
(xv) With regard to the degree of facilitation of the issuance of stock 
options to directors and officers The Netherlands receives one point throughout 
the entire post-Bretton Woods period. Dutch corporate law never impeded the 
issuance of stock options as part of their remuneration to officers and members 
of the management board; it is only members of the supervisory board that may 
not be granted shares or stock options893. 
(xvi) With regard to the ‘say on pay’ arrangements The Netherlands 
receives no points until 2003 and one point thereafter. In 2004 an amendment 
was introduced into the Dutch Civil Code that made shareholder vote on a 
public firm’s remuneration policy binding894. The remuneration policy for 
members of the management board is drawn by the remuneration committee of 
the supervisory board895 and then it is submitted to shareholder approval896. 
Although the fixing of individual remuneration packages may be delegated to 
another corporate organ897, usually to the remuneration committee, the 
shareholders still get to approve the component of the package that relates to the 
granting of executive stock options898. 
                                                
888 AktG §192(2)  
889 AktG §120(4) 
890 German Corporate Governance Code (2002), No. 5.4.5 
891 Axel v. Werder & Till Talaulicar, Kodex Report 2009: Die Akzeptanz der Empfehlungen und 
Anregungen des Deutschen Corporate Governance Kodex, 62 DER BETRIEB 689, 693 
892 Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the Application by Member States of the EU of the 
Commission Recommendation on directors’ remuneration, SEC(2007) 1022, 11 
893 See Van Bekkum, supra note 688, 8; Corporate Governance Code (2008), III.7.1 
894 Wet aanpassing structuuregeling (Stb. 2004, 370) 
895 Corporate Governance Code (2003 and 2008) III.5 
896 BW 2:135(1) 
897 BW 2:135(3) 
898 BW 2:135(4) 
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2.5.3.4. United Kingdom  
(xv) With regard to the degree of facilitation of the issuance of stock 
options to directors and officers the UK receives one point throughout the entire 
post-Bretton Woods. UK corporate law has never posed any significant 
restrictions to the use of stock options as a remuneration scheme, although in 
practice their use has proliferated from the late 1980s899; developments have 
taken place with the advent of Corporate Governance Codes at the level of 
disclosure of equity-based schemes to shareholders, which are however not 
taken under account in this variable. 
(xvi) With regard to ‘say on pay’ arrangements the UK receives no 
points until 2001 and one point thereafter. In 2002 the Companies Act 1985900 
introduced for every listed corporation the requirement of an advisory 
shareholder vote on an annual directors’ remuneration report901. 
 
2.5.3.5. United States 
(xv) With regard to the degree of facilitation of the issuance of stock 
options to directors and officers the US receives one point throughout the entire 
post-Bretton Woods. Delaware law since 1967 authorizes explicitly the 
corporation to remunerate directors and officers through stock options902. 
(xvi) With regard to ‘say on pay’ arrangements the US receives 0.25 
until 1996, 0.4 in 1997, 0.3 in 1998 to 2002 and 0.5 from 2003 to 2007. In the 
period between 1973 and 1996 NYSE listing rules mandated shareholder 
ratification of stock option plans, with the exception of ‘broadly based’ plans903. 
Although the term ‘broadly based’ was not defined, it was understood that plans 
involving executives and ordinary employees were exempt from shareholder 
vote904. In 1997 the state layer of regulation of corporate governance, Delaware 
corporate law, encouraged further the ratification of stock option plans by 
shareholders; in a fiduciary duty case the Delaware Chancery Court ruled that 
the shareholder ratification of stock option plans shifts the burden to the 
shareholder challenger to show waste, if the setting of executive compensation 
is to amount to a breach of fiduciary duty905. Despite this transient 
empowerment of ‘say on pay’ mechanisms in US public corporations, an 
amendment in NYSE listing rules in 1998 weakened again shareholder rights in 
this respect. The broadly based stock option plan, which was exempted from 
shareholder ratification, was defined by the listing rules as any plan, under 
                                                
899 See Brian Main, The Rise and Fall of Executive Share Options in Britain, in EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (J. CARPENTER & D. YERMACK, 
EDS.) (1999), 83 
900 Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 2002, S.I. 2002/1986 
901 s.420-422, 439, 447, 454(3) Companies Act 2006 
902 DGCL (1967) s. 122(15) 
903 NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 312.03 
904 Margaret Foran, Current Issues Concerning Stock Options, in COUNSELING THE CORPORATE BOARD 
& AUDIT COMMITTEE IN AN ERA OF CHANGE: SEC DISCLOSURE & THE INTERSECTION OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, 336 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B0-01EO 2002) 
905 Lewis v. Vogelstein, 669 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 197) 
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which at least 20% of the firm’s employees are covered906. Thus, effectively a 
‘safe harbor’ was created, in which shareholder ratification of stock option plans 
was legitimately exempted. In 2003 though the NYSE listing rules changed 
again, this time to the direction of shareholder empowerment. According to the 
new rules a corporation must gain shareholder approval for all equity 
compensation plans907. In 2007 a ‘say on pay’ bill that would grant shareholders 
with an advisory vote on executive compensation passed the House of 
Representatives, but stalled in the Senate. A paradigm ‘say on pay’ arrangement 
was entered into force in the US in 2010 with the Dodd-Frank Act that 
mandated non-binding say-on-pay shareholder votes, but this year falls outside 
the scope of the PBWSV. 
 
2.6 Independent directors 
 
2.6.1. Reasons for inclusion in the index 
 
The agency theory has at its core the issue of separation of ownership 
and control (see Section 6.3. of Chapter One). Separation of ownership and 
control means essentially the separation of the decision and risk-bearing 
functions inside an organization. In the framework of such a structure the 
decision agents do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions 
and thus agency costs increase bringing about a reduction in the value of the 
residual claims908. In order to control agency problems but be able to keep the 
benefits of specialization that flow from the separation of ownership of control 
in public corporations, an effective system of decision-process control must be 
in place. Such a system would effectively mean the separation of decision 
control, i.e. the ratification and monitoring of decisions, from decision 
management, i.e. the initiation and implementation of decisions909. Under such a 
system an agent would not get to exercise both management and control rights 
over the same decisions and thus the agency problem would be mitigated. 
In theory, inside a corporation residual claimants delegate internal 
decision control to the directors. Thus, the separation of decision control and 
decision management is obtained through the existence of a board of directors 
that exercises top-level decision control rights, such as hiring, firing and 
compensating top-level decision managers, as well as monitoring and ratifying 
important decisions910. What shareholders ideally expect from board members is 
to step in when incumbent executive officers prove ineffective and take action. 
                                                
906 NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 312.04(g) 
907 Order Approving NYSE and NASDAQ Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Equity Compensation 
Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 48, 108, 68 Fed. Reg. 39, 995 (July 3, 2003); NYSE Listed Company 
Manual Sections 312.03(a) & 303A.08 
908 See Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of Onwership and Control, 26 JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 301 
909 Id., at 304 
910 Id., at 311 
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 Nevertheless, according to the ‘managerial hegemony theory’ the 
board of directors is powerless to control executives’ mismanagement because it 
is effectively controlled by the executive managers911. When the corporate 
governance debate heatened up in the 1980s it became clear that despite the fact 
that –at least in one-tier board jurisdictions- members of the board were 
formally elected by the shareholders, the latter’s collective action problem led to 
them simply voting for whomever was nominated either by the incumbent board 
that was often chaired by the CEO herself912 or by the nominating committee, 
for which the CEO served according to empirical studies as the main source of 
identifying new candidates913. Especially when the nominated and eventually 
elected directors were themselves insiders, i.e. officers or employees of the firm, 
then they were clearly inclined to be deferential to senior management’s 
interests and thus not really helpful in mitigating the effects of the separation of 
ownership and control914.  
Initially, it was thought that the monitoring function of the board of 
directors would be restored if more of its members were outside directors, i.e. 
non-executives. But, quickly it became evident that, although outside, these 
directors were not independent; they were thus characterized as ‘grey’ 
directors915. They were those, who while not employees or managers of the firm, 
were not independent of incumbent management either because they depended 
on the CEO for their tenure on the board given the aforementioned nomination 
process916 or because they had some other affiliation with the corporation; they 
were relatives of an officer, did business with the corporation, were members of 
interlocking directorates etc.  
Outside directors that were not independent were just as likely to 
engage in ‘back scratching’, as inside directors. After all, even if these ‘grey’ 
directors wanted to discharge their monitoring function over management 
efficiently, they were constrained in their efforts in boards, whose chairman was 
the CEO herself and who thus could control the amount of information provided 
to them and the agenda of the board’s meeting917.  
It was then when the call for independent directors entered into the 
corporate governance debate. Independent directors would be individuals with 
no connection to the company other than their seat on the board. They would not 
                                                
911 Rita Kosnik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance, 32 
ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 163, 166-67; Paul Mallette & Karen Fowler, The Effects of Board 
Composition and Stock Ownership on the Adoption of ‘Poison Pills’, 35 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT 
JOURNAL 1010, 1014 
912 ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986), 109 
913 JAY LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S 
CORPORATE BOARDS (1989), 20 
914 Michael Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control System, 
48 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 831, 865 
915 See Michael Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 
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916 Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Directors: An Agenda for Institutional 
Investors, 43 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 863, 875 
917 Jensen, supra note 914, 864 
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be employees of the company, family members of managers or major 
shareholders and ideally they would not be connected in any way to the firm’s 
bank, suppliers, law firm or be part of a network of interlocking directorates918. 
Independence would mean freedom from conflicts of interests with other entities 
and autonomy vis-à-vis the management919. Independent directors would ideally 
be managers of other corporations or important decision agents in other complex 
organizations and given that they would care about their reputation when 
accepting directorships in other companies, they would have the necessary 
incentives to monitor effectively and produce value for the company920. 
The call for independence though was not restricted to one-tier board 
jurisdictions that seem to have the most acute problems with inside directors. 
Two-tier board jurisdictions (e.g. Germany, The Netherlands) seemed to secure 
independence of the monitoring function by having all executive directors in one 
board, the management board, and all non-executive directors in another board, 
the supervisory board. The roles of chairman and CEO were thus separated921, 
since the CEO sat on the management board that was supervised by the 
supervisory board. The decision control responsibilities were delegated to the 
supervisory board and the decision management to the management board and 
thus commentators from one-tier jurisdictions traditionally perceived that the 
supervisory board could take an entirely independent view of the reactions of 
management922. Nevertheless, empirical studies conducted in two-tier board 
jurisdictions had shown already from the early 1990s that the perceived trait of 
independence within two-tier directorship should be put in question923. 
Supervisory board responsibilities were found to often interfere with decision 
management, so that the decision control and decision management functions 
coincided in the same organ, audit and remuneration committees assisting the 
board in discharging its functions often consisted of members of both the 
management and the supervisory board, while frequently it was former members 
of the management board that were appointed at the supervisory board924. It was 
natural then, that the new ‘holy grail’ for shareholders, i.e. independent 
directorship, concerned shareholders of both one-tier and two-tier board 
jurisdictions. 
Independent directors are thought of as minimizing the residual loss 
that is produced by the non-sufficient separation of decision management and 
decision control in public corporations. Thus, they are viewed as guardians of 
shareholders’ interests. Empirical studies have indeed shown a link between the 
                                                
918 ROBERT MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), 227 
919 Myles Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (T. CLARKE, ED.) (2004), 312 
920 Fama & Jensen, supra note 908, 315 
921 See Ada Demb & Franz-Friedrich Neubauer, The Corporate Board, Confronting the Paradoxes, 25 
LONG RANGE PLANNING 9 
922 See ADRIAN CADBURY, THE COMPANY CHAIRMAN (1995), 66 
923 Gregory Maassen & Frans van den Bosch, On the Supposed Independence of Two-tier Boards: Formal 
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presence of independent directors on the board and shareholder value. For 
instance, the shareholder wealth effect of a tender offer is found to be greater, 
when at least half of the board is independent compared to when less than half 
of the board is independent925. The fact that the shareholder community views 
independent directors as beneficial for their interests is also signaled by the fact 
that in the event of a sudden death of an independent director the share price 
drops926, but also by the fact that the adoption of takeover defenses by firms that 
have independent boards is welcomed by the markets with a rise in the share 
price rather than with a drop927. Consequently, it seems that corporate law’s 
arrangements with regard to independent directorship deserve a place in the 
PBWSV as residual loss-minimizing. 
 
2.6.2. Variable (xvii): independent board members 
 
In light of the above analysis, there is one thing that is ratable with 
regard to the institution of independent directors and thus only one variable 
(xvii) emerges that is includable in the index: 
(xvii) The degree of board independence. Jurisdictions that have no 
requirement for independent seats on the board or that require less than 1/3 of 
the board to be independent receive no points on the PBWSV. Jurisdictions that 
require at least 1/3 of directors sitting on the board to be independent receive 
half a point on the index. Jurisdictions requiring half of the board seats to be 
held by independent directors receive one point928. To be sure, in two-tier board 
jurisdictions the independence requirement concerns the supervisory board. 
 
2.6.3. Score explanations for variable (xvii)  
 
The ratings in the tables of the Annex for variable (xvii) of the PBWSV 
have been formed on the basis of the following corporate rules. 
 
2.6.3.1. France  
(xvii) With regard to the degree of board independence France receives 
no points until 1998, half a point from 1999 to 2002 and 0.75 thereafter. In 1999 
a set of recommendations for the corporate governance of French firms, the 
‘rapport Viénot’ (a predecessor of the French Corporate Governance Principles), 
                                                
925 See James Cotter et al., Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender 
Offers?, 43 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 195; John Byrd & Kent Hickman, Do Outside Directors 
Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids, 32 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 195, 207 
926 See Bang Dang Nguyen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence 
from Sudden Deaths, 98 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 550 
927 James Brickley et al., Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL 
ECONOMICS 371, 387 
928 Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here that there are studies that could not find evidence that firms 
with a majority of independent board members perform better than other companies; Sanjai Bhagat & 
Bernard Black, Independent Directors, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW (P. NEWMAN, ED.) (1998), 283. Accession to this view could lead some to reduce variable (xvii) to 
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appeared on the French corporate governance scene and recommended that 
independent directors occupy at least 1/3 of the seats on the board929. Data show 
that despite their non-mandatory character these recommendations were 
followed by the vast majority of French firms930. Then in 2003, drawing largely 
on the rapport Viénot, the French Corporate Governance Principles931 were 
introduced into the French corporate legal system and required on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis French corporations to have a significant number of independent 
directors on the board932; for firms with dispersed ownership the 
recommendation is to have at least half of the board composed by independent 
directors and for other firms at least 1/3 of the board independent933. France is 
awarded less than one point for the post-2003 period despite the ½ independent 
requirement for dispersed ownership firms, because reports have shown that in 
practice less than half of the board of the CAC 40 firms is actually 
independent934. 
 
2.6.3.2. Germany  
(xvii) With regard to the degree of board independence Germany 
receives no points until 2001, 0.25 for the years 2002 to 2004 and 0.4 thereafter. 
The German Corporate Governance Code that was introduced in 2002 
recommended that no more than two members of the supervisory board be 
former members of the management board935. This is not a pure independence 
requirement, but, as it was explained above under 2.6.1., the main problem with 
regard to the independence of supervisory board members in two-tier board 
jurisdictions was their previous service on the firm’s management board. 
Therefore, this constitutes a move towards independence in the case of Germany 
and should not be ignored within the scope of the PBWSV. The 2005 version of 
the German Corporate Governance Code in response to the European 
Commission’s recommendation on the role of supervisory directors936 defined 
independent directorship, as the non-existence of business or personal relations 
with the company or the management board on behalf of the supervisory 
director937. At the same time the requirement regarding the number of 
independent seats on the supervisory board was improved by the Code that 
recommended that ‘an adequate number’ of the directors must be 
                                                
929 Association Française des Entreprises Privées (‘AFEP’) & Mouvement des Entreprises de France 
(‘MEDEF’), Rapport du Comité sur le Gouvernement d’ Entreprise preside par M. Marc Vienot (Juillet 
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independent938. Given that evidence shows that the overwhelming majority of 
German listed firms complies with this recommendation939, Germany could be 
rated with 0.4 for this quasi-legal development. A higher score for that 
development cannot be awarded to Germany for two reasons: (a) there is no 
clear requirement for 1/3 of the supervisory board to be independent; and (b) 
given the appointment of half of the supervisory board by the employees 
(Mitbestimmung)940, which renders half of the members of the supervisory board 
by definition non-independent, it is doubtful whether the mere requirement for 
‘an adequate number’ of independent directors is enough to eventually result in 
1/3 of the seats of the entire supervisory board being independent. 
 
2.6.3.3. The Netherlands 
(xvii) With regard to the degree of board independence The 
Netherlands receives no points until 2003 and one point thereafter. This is 
because in 2004 the Tabaksblat Code for listed companies was entered into 
force requiring all but one members of the supervisory board to be 
independent941. Given that non-compliance with the Code may constitute 
mismanagement under Dutch corporate law the real force of this quasi-legal text 
is more than what the ‘comply or explain’ approach it adopts appears prima 
facie to generate. Therefore, this is a development that should be taken under 
account within the scope of the PBWSV. 
 
2.6.3.4. United Kingdom 
(xvii) With regard to the degree of board independence the UK receives 
no points until 1992, half a point from 1993 to 2002 and one point thereafter. In 
December 1992 the Code of Best Practice of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (‘Cadbury Committee’) was published and 
recommended that a majority of the firm’s non-executive directors be 
independent942. The recommendations of the Code were voluntary, as firms 
were only obliged to issue a statement of compliance with it, but widespread 
compliance has been reported943. The Cadbury Code was followed by the 
Greenbury Code of Best Practice of 1995 and by the Hampel Combined Code of 
Best Practice of 1998 that was amended in 2003 to include an improvement of 
the regime of independent directorship. The new version of the Combined Code 
recommended that at least half of the board members be independent944. 
 
2.6.3.5. United States 
                                                
938 Id. 
939 v. Werder & Talaulicar, supra note 891, 693 
940 See infra text surrounding footnotes 75ff. 
941 Tabaksblat Code (2003), III.2.1 & III.2.2 
942 Cadbury Code of Best Practice, s. 2.2 
943 See Elisabeth Dedman, The Cadbury Committee Recommendations on Corporate Governance – A 
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(xvii) With regard to the degree of board independence the US receives 
0.25 until 2002 and one point thereafter. The issue of independent directorship is 
regulated in the US through the listing rules. The NYSE listing rules required 
since 1966 at least two of the directors to be independent945 and from 2003 
onwards at least half of the board to be independent946. 
 
2.7. Takeover Regulation 
 
2.7.1. Reasons for inclusion in the index 
 
A tender offer provides the shareholders of a corporation with the 
opportunity to sell their share at a premium over the market price. The 
management of the offeree firm though may oppose the offer and take measures 
to impede it either because it perceives the premium offered to the shareholders 
to be insufficient or because other stakeholders of the firm would be harmed by 
the acquisition947. 
In paradigm agency theory those defensive tactics that managers adopt 
in the face of an impending hostile bid (‘takeover defenses’) are considered to 
have negative wealth effects for the shareholders. Not only because they deprive 
shareholders from the premium of the tender offer, but also because they shield 
the management from the disciplinary effects of the market of corporate control. 
If the board of the target knows that it has the legal power to adopt a takeover 
defense, when a tender offer for the target’s shares is unleashed, then the 
directors do not have to worry about keeping the share price high enough, so 
that a ‘natural’ barrier exists around their firm against potential acquirors. 
Therefore, on the basis of what has been called the ‘entrenchment 
hypothesis’ takeover defenses are deemed to be destructive for shareholder 
value. Incumbent management is dominated by an entrenchment motive that 
dictates that any hostile bid must be defeated for the sake of perseverance of its 
position in the company. The entrenchment hypothesis suggests further that in 
the presence of a takeover defense targets experience less positive share 
revaluations from defeated bids. This assumption is backed by empirical studies 
that show that after a bid is defeated target firm shares trade at an average 
discount of 18% to the last takeover bid price948. Furthermore, empirical 
evidence backs the spirit of the entrenchment hypothesis by showing that both in 
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the US and in Europe the mere post-bid adoption of takeover defenses drives the 
share price down without the bid having to be defeated first; for instance, in the 
US announcements of poison pills have been found to be associated with stock 
price declines949, while in The Netherlands shares decline in value after a firm 
has issued preference shares to friendly investors (a common Dutch takeover 
defense) in response to a tender offer950. There is indeed an abundance of event 
studies documenting the negative valuation effect around the announcements of 
adoption of takeover defenses951, but also of long-term studies that indicate the 
negative link between antitakeover indices that count the number of antitakeover 
provisions a firm has in place and measures of corporate performance, such as 
Tobin’s Q952. Finally, the disciplining effect of the market of corporate control, 
which takeover defenses prevent to unfold, is also indirectly backed by 
empirical studies that have found that targets of takeovers, where management 
departed following the takeover, were firms that were performing worse than 
their industry average953; that shows that it is the worst performing managers 
that will have an interest in shielding their firm against a hostile bid. 
On the basis of the entrenchment hypothesis the so-called ‘passivity 
thesis’ has emerged in normative discussions on takeover defenses. The 
passivity thesis advocates that in the face a tender offer for the firm’s shares, the 
board of the target must remain passive and not take any measures that would 
impede the bid. In legal terms that would be translated as support for the 
prohibition of the adoption of takeover defenses by the board in the post-bid 
phase: the board neutrality rule. 
While empirical findings on the impact of post-bid takeover defenses 
on shareholder wealth are overwhelming, it must be noted here that whether 
takeover defenses are harmful to shareholders has been a subject of controversy. 
There is a competing view, the ‘bargaining hypothesis’, which views the board 
as a well-positioned bargaining agent that, if equipped with antitakeover 
provisions, can negotiate with bidders and induce better bids at the end of the 
day954. The bargaining hypothesis in essence views takeover defenses as 
beneficial for shareholder value, because their existence may result in the target 
shares being acquired either by the initial bidder or by another acquiror at a 
                                                
949 See Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 377 
950 See Rezaul Kabir et al., Takeover Defenses, Ownership Structure and Stock Returns in The 
Netherlands: An Empirical Analysis, 18 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 97 
951 See Gregg Jarrell & Annette Poulsen, Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Impact of Antitakeover 
Charter Amendments Since 1980, 19 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 127; Paul Malatesta & Ralph 
Walkling, Poison Pill Securities, Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership Structure, 20 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 347; Sanjai Bhagat & Richard Jefferis, Voting Power in the Proxy 
Process: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 30 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 193 
952 See Gompers et al., supra note 654; Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance, 
22 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 783 
953 See Kenneth Martin & John McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers and 
Management Turnover, 40 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 671 
954 See Jonathan Macey et al., Property Rights to Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 17 VIRGINIA 
LAW REVIEW 705 
CORPORATE LAW & ECONOMIC STAGNATION 
 234 
price above that of the initial bid955. The bargaining hypothesis’s supporters 
oppose the findings of empirical studies that back the entrenchment hypothesis 
and the concomitant passivity thesis by putting forward methodology concerns 
about the latter956 and by indicating endogeneity issues957, but also by offering 
empirical findings that show that antitakeover provisions are not universally 
harmful for shareholders958 or that they actually increase the portion of total 
gains received by target shareholders959. The supposed negative effect of 
takeover defenses on the disciplining role of the market of corporate control is 
also disputed by empirical studies that find little evidence that targets with 
poison pills are less likely to be acquired960. 
On the basis of the bargaining hypothesis the so-called ‘activist thesis’ 
has emerged in normative discussions on takeover defenses. The activist thesis 
advocates that in the face of a tender offer for the firm’s shares, the board of the 
target must not remain passive, but ought to be able to take measures to impede 
the bid, as long as this can strengthen the bargaining position of the target and 
induce a better bid for shareholders. In legal terms that would be translated as a 
rejection of the board neutrality rule. The activist thesis is of course supported 
not only by those who view takeover defenses as eventually improving 
shareholder wealth, but also by those that accede to a more stakeholderist stance 
vis-à-vis takeovers and want the board to be able to fend off against hostile bids 
that would result in damage to other stakeholders’ interests, particularly to those 
of the employees of the target. 
Despite the controversy that prevails, the empirical findings 
documenting the negative shareholder wealth effects of post-bid takeover 
defenses seem to be more convincing. When management is allowed to adopt 
takeover defenses following the announcement of a tender offer for the firm’s 
stock, then it has been documented that in many cases the defensive measures 
were actually used to extract better personal deals for the managers at the 
expense of higher takeover premiums961. This conclusion is further reinforced 
from the fact that within the scope of the most recent official normative 
discussion on the issue, i.e. the one that took place during the preparatory phase 
of the EU Takeover Directive, the entrenchment hypothesis and the concomitant 
passivity thesis were the ones that prevailed962. The compromise that was 
                                                
955 See Jensen & Smith, supra note 501, 107 
956 See John Core et al., Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm 
Operating Performance and Analysts’ Expectations, 61 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 655 
957 See Kenneth Lehn et al., Governance Indexes and Valuation: Which Causes Which?, 13 JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 907 
958 See Miroslava Straska & Gregory Waller, Do Antitakeover Provisions Harm Shareholders, 16 
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 487 
959 See M. Sinan Goktan & Robert Kieschnick, Wealth Effects of Antitakeover Provisions in Mergers, 
(2009). Available at http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Reno/Papers/wealth_effects_ATPs_FMA_version.pdf  
960 See Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrents and 
Wealth Effects on Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 39 
961 See Jay Hartzell et al., What’s In It for Me: CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REVIEW OF 
FINANCIAL STUDIES 379 
962 See The High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Relating to Takeover Bids (2002), at 
21: ‘management are faced with a significant conflict of interest if a takeover bid is made [...] their 
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reached by Member-States with regard to the voluntary nature of the board 
neutrality rule was not the result of an accession to the bargaining hypothesis, 
but a result of the prevalence of stakeholderist views vis-à-vis takeovers; a 
contrario that indicates that indeed the board neutrality rule was viewed upon as 
shareholder value-enhancing. 
 Consequently, it seems that the identification by this study of the board 
neutrality rule as a residual-loss minimizing arrangement that deserves to be 
included in the PBWSV won’t be disputed by many. To be sure, the analysis 
here takes a position only with regard to post-bid takeover defenses and avoids 
inclusion in the index of legal arrangements related to pre-bid takeover defenses 
-which usually take the form of deviations from the one-share/one-vote 
principle- as their effects on shareholder value are not clear enough963.  
 
2.7.2. Variable (xviii): the board neutrality rule 
 
In light of the above analysis, there is one thing that is ratable with 
regard to takeover regulation and thus only one variable (xviii) emerges that is 
includable in the index: 
(xviii) The existence of the board neutrality rule. A jurisdiction receives 
no points if it leaves the adoption of post-bid takeover defenses at the discretion 
of the board of directors. A jurisdiction receives half a point if there is no strict 
board neutrality rule, but there are certain exceptions in the defensive measures 
a board can take in the post-bid phase. A jurisdiction receives one point if it 
mandates the board to remain passive and not adopt takeover defenses after a 
tender offer for the firm’s shares has been submitted. 
 
2.7.3. Score explanations for variable (xviii) 
 
The ratings in the tables of the Annex for variable (xviii) of the 




(xviii) France receives 0.25 until 1988, half a point from 1989 to 2005 
and one point thereafter. For the period until 1988 it is stated that there was in 
place a limited duty of neutrality on behalf of the board964. This is because any 
measures adopted by the target’s board that were beyond the ordinary conduct 
of business and were not specifically authorized by the shareholders’ meeting 
had to be notified to the exchange authority965 without the latter though having 
                                                                                                              
interest is in saving their jobs and reputation instead of maximizing the value of the company for the 
shareholders. Their claims to represent the interests of shareholders or other stakeholders are likely to be 
tainted by self-interest. Shareholders should be able to decide for themselves’. 
963 See Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, ECGI Finance 
Working Paper No. 177/2007 
964 SIEMS, supra note 711, 185 
965 Now see Art. 4(3) Règlement n.2002-4 de la Commission des Opérations de Bourse (COB) 
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the right to prohibit these measures. In 1989 an amendment to the existing rules 
deprived the board of a target company of the legal power to issue new shares 
out of the authorized capital after a tender offer for the firm’s stock was 
unleashed966; therefore an effective takeover defense that would make the 
acquisition more expensive for the bidder was banned. In 2006 the Takeover 
Directive967 was transposed into French law and France was one of the few 
Member States that opted in to Art. 9 of the Directive that featured the board 
neutrality rule968. 
 
2.7.3.2. Germany  
(xviii) Germany receives no points for the entire post-Bretton Woods 
period. In the period preceding the enactment of the Takeover Act, i.e. until 
2001, the dominant view in theory was that the discretion of the board did not 
encompass the power to adopt takeover defenses; in other words, in theory there 
was in essence an undisputable board neutrality rule969. Nevertheless, because of 
the absence of hostile takeovers in Germany, at least until the 
Vodafone/Mannesmann takeover in 1999, this doctrinal approach to the board 
neutrality rule was not given the chance to be tested in court. Therefore, it 
cannot be alleged that there was a solid position taken by corporate law in favor 
of the board neutrality rule. In 2001 though the Takeover Act970, largely in 
response to the hostile takeover of the German Mannesmann by the British 
telecommunications provider Vodafone, did take a clearer stance with regard to 
the issue of post-bid takeover defenses. After a tender offer is launched the 
management must react by taking the interests of the target company into 
account971. The concept of the ‘interest of the firm’ is viewed as allowing the 
board to take under account other stakeholders’ interests and thus to adopt 
takeover defenses by invoking the potential harmful effects of the acquisition on 
the employees972. Finally, within the scope of the transposition of the Takeover 
Directive into German law Germany opted out of Art. 9 that features the board 
neutrality rule, thus not making the board neutrality rule mandatory for German 
public corporations973.  
 
2.7.3.3. The Netherlands  
(xviii) The Netherlands receives no points until 2002, 0.25 from 2003 to 
2006 and half a point for the final year of the index. To be sure, formally, Dutch 
                                                
966 Art. 180(4), Loi no 66-537 (as amended by Loi no 89-531 du 2 août 1989); later Code de Commerce, 
L. 225-129-3 
967 Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids 
968 Code de Commerce, L. 233-32 
969 See Klaus Hopt, Aktionärskreis und Vorstandsneuralität, 22 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 534, 545ff.; Heinz-Dieter Assmann & Friedrich Bozenhardt, Übernahmeangebote 
als Regelungsprobleme zwischen Gesellschaftsrechtlichen Normen und zivilrechtlich begründeten 
Verhaltengsgeboten, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT – Sonderheft 9 (1990), 1, 112ff. 
970 Unternehmensübernahme-Regelungsgesetz 
971 § 3(3) WpÜG 
972 SIEMS, supra note 711, 185 
973 § 33(a) WpÜG 
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corporate law has not introduced the board neutrality rule; even the Takeover 
Directive was transposed into Dutch law with The Netherlands opting out of 
Art. 9. Nevertheless, case law developments in 2003 and 2007 subjected the 
adoption of post-bid takeover defenses to certain rules that moved Dutch 
corporate law away from a typical ‘just say no’ approach to the target board’s 
post-bid behavior. In 2003 the Dutch Supreme Court introduced some 
requirements for post-bid takeover defenses that if not observed may lead to the 
invalidity of such measures974; the takeover defense should be of temporary 
nature, should be proportional and should not be irreversible. If the board 
observes these traits, then it can still defeat a takeover bid for the sake of the 
continuity of the firm and its stakeholders975; the threshold is not very high, so 
this is why The Netherlands’ score following the issuance of this ruling does not 
amount yet to half a point. In 2007 Amsterdam’s Enterprise Chamber, without 
overturning the general principle of the 2003 ruling, set some guiding principles 
with regard to the most popular Dutch takeover defense, which is the issuance of 
preference shares by the firm to a friendly foundation. In cases where the 
shareholders’ meeting has authorized the board to effectuate a share capital 
increase in the future, the firm has usually granted a call option to the friendly 
foundation, which when it deems it necessary may exercise it and receive new 
stock from the authorized capital. When the option is exercised following a 
hostile bid, this is supposed to dilute the acquiror’s shareholdings and therefore 
reduce her voting power. Before 2007 the foundation would exercise its call 
option in the face of a takeover to ensure the independence of the corporation, 
which was after all the foundation’s formal objective stated in its articles of 
association. In 2007 though the Enterprise Chamber stated that the intended 
effect of the exercise of the call option should be to maintain the status quo 
pending negotiations between the target, the bidder and pending the exploration 
of other options by the board976; this underlined in accordance with the principle 
set forth in 2003 that the most popular Dutch post-bid takeover defense should 
be merely temporary in nature and not prone to defeat the takeover 
determinatively. This is a legal development that deserves to be rated with an 
upgrade in The Netherlands’ score with regard to this variable.   
 
2.7.3.4. United Kingdom 
(xviii) The UK receives one point for the entire post-Bretton Woods 
period. The board neutrality rule is of British origin and exists in the City Code 
on Takeovers and Mergers of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers since its 
inception in 1968977. The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers is an instrument 
of self-regulation, to which British firms adhere overwhelmingly, which is now 
even formally part of the UK corporate regulatory framework978. 
                                                
974 HR 18 April 2003, JOR 2003, 110 m.nt. Blanco Fernandez (RNA) 
975 See HR 13 Juli 2007, NJ 2007, 434 m.nt. Maeijer (ABN AMRO) 
976 OK 17 Januari 2007, JOR 2007/42 (Stork) 
977 Principle 7 and Rule 21 
978 Companies Act 2006, s. 943 
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2.7.3.5. United States 
(xviii) The US receives no points until 1984, 0.25 in 1985, half a point 
from 1986 to 1989, 0.25 from 1990 to 1992, half a point from 1993 to 1994 and 
0.25 from 1995 to 2007. Prior to 1985 the approach to the issue of post-bid 
takeover defenses under Delaware corporate law was the so-called ‘dominant-
motive analysis’979. Under this approach Delaware courts would accept takeover 
defenses if the management would point to a plausible business purpose for the 
defense; in practice, almost any business justification was accepted and 
therefore the board had in essence an unlimited power to defeat hostile bids. In 
1985 the Delaware Supreme Court set some more concrete limits to the board’s 
ability to adopt defensive measures in the face of a takeover. In Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co.980 a two-prong test was introduced to scrutinize the 
adoption of takeover defenses: (i) the board must reasonably perceive the 
bidder’s action as a threat to corporate policy; and (ii) the defensive measure 
adopted must be proportional to the threat posed. While in the Unocal case the 
defensive action under scrutiny was upheld, as was the defense in a subsequent 
case, whose reasoning was based on the Unocal test981, the Unocal test proved 
to be eventually shareholder-friendlier than it first seemed, when the Delaware 
Chancery Court held that under Unocal the board had the fiduciary duty to 
redeem poison pill rights in the face of a non-coercive, any-and-all cash tender 
offer982. This development requires us to award a quarter of a point to the US for 
this variable from the time of the Unocal ruling. To that quarter of a point, with 
which Unocal endows the US in 1985, we add another quarter of a point for the 
Revlon ruling that was issued by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1986983. In 
Revlon the Delaware Supreme Court in a clear turn towards shareholder value 
held that in a takeover context the board ought to conduct a fair and impartial 
auction with bidders in order to maximize returns to shareholders. The high 
standards for conducting an impartial auction, when the firm is up for sale, were 
reiterated in 1989 in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.984, where it was 
stated that when the management has an interest in a bid (e.g. in a management 
buy-out scenario) the auction process must withstand rigorous scrutiny under the 
‘intrinsic fairness’ standard. In 1990 though the Delaware Supreme Court issued 
a ruling that represents a significant retrenchment in the judicial scrutiny of 
takeover defenses. In Time-Warner985 the so-called ‘just say no’ defense was 
introduced, since the court ruled that the target shareholders might have been 
ignorant about the strategic benefit of combinating with management’s 
preferred, but less generous, bidder and that this justified the takeover defenses 
                                                
979 The case credited with originating the dominant-motive analysis is Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 
(Del. 1964) 
980 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) 
981 Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) 
982 City Capital Associates v. Interco, 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
983 Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) 
984 599 A.2d 261 (Del. 1989) 
985 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) 
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adopted by the board against the more generous bidder. In 1993 Delaware made 
the scrutiny of takeover defenses somewhat stricter again by moving away from 
the ‘just say no’ direction, as it prohibited a target board from preferring one 
offer over another without considering the alternative986. In 1995 Delaware 
moved again towards the direction of greater deference to defensive actions by 
allowing the board to defend against a two-step proxy fight and tender offer bid 
on the Time-Warner basis that shareholders might be ignorant987. 
 
 
3. Illustrating corporate law’s orientation towards shareholder value in the 
post-Bretton Woods period 
 
The objective of the PBWSV is to illustrate this study’s argument that 
corporate law in both insider and outsider systems of corporate governance has 
moved in the decades following the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements 
towards the promotion of shareholder value. This corporate law-propelled 
deference to shareholder interests in public corporations has contributed to 
higher equity payout ratios in general and thus to reduced rates of growth in 
business capital accumulation. The PBWSV quantified several arrangements in 
the corporate laws of France, Germany, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and the United States and pledged to produce a trend line that would illustrate 
corporate law’s incremental move in these jurisdictions towards shareholder 
value.  
As it was mentioned in the introductory part of this Chapter only if the 
PBWSV trend line is found to have an upwards direction for these five 
jurisdictions (i.e. a direction towards shareholder value), will there be an 
indication that the Second Hypothesis holds true and the foundations of the 
‘inertia’ or the ‘indifference’ claim regarding corporate law’s role in the Great 
Reversal in Corporate Governance will be shaken. On the basis of the coding 
efforts undertaken under the previous part of this Chapter and the ensuing 
entries in the tables of the Annex Figures 30 and 31 have been produced. The 
two Figures fully back this study’s Second Hypothesis and leaves us with the 
duty of backing the Third Hypothesis to complete this study’s positive analysis. 
                                                
986 Paramount Communications Inc., v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993) 
987 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) 
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Corporations and Shareholder Eugenics: How Corporate Law Sustains the 
Great Reversal in Shareholdership 
 
 
Chapter Three constructed an index that quantified corporate rules with 
regard to their shareholder value-friendliness and was thus able to produce a 
trend line for the post-Bretton Woods development of corporate law (Figure 31) 
that mirrors the trend line for the post-Bretton Woods development of business 
capital accumulation (Figure 13). Thus, it was shown that it is plausible to 
expand the causality chain of the First Hypothesis by adding corporate law as a 
contributing factor to the Great Reversal in Corporate Governance (Figure 29).  
The question, to which we turn in this Chapter, is whether to the array 
of legal and extra-legal institutions of Figure 10 that brought about the Great 
Reversal in Shareholdership corporate law should be added. In other words, is 
corporate law one of the determinant factors of the movement of shareholders’ 
towards shorter holding periods? 
 Ideally, following the example of Chapter Three the current Chapter 
should design an index quantifying the impact that corporate rules have on 
shareholders’ myopia. Nevertheless, such a venture would require an estimate of 
the exact time, by which shareholdership’s horizons are shortened, as a result of 
the introduction, abolishment or amendment of a certain corporate law 
provision; this estimate is practically impossible and would be entirely arbitrary.  
In absence of such an index it would be too risky from a scientific point 
of view to name corporate law as one of the initiating factors of equity’s short-
termism; there just wouldn’t be a great deal of convincing indications, so as to 
contend that corporate law has been one of the initiators of the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership. This is why the Third Hypothesis that this Chapter seeks to 
buttress is more conservative compared to the two first Hypotheses. As 
mentioned in Section 3.4. of the Introduction, the Third Hypothesis claims that 
corporate law reforms in the post-Bretton Woods era that were intended to 
merely help this legal niche adjust to the era of ‘financialization’ have escalated 
the divestment of structurally long-termist institutional investors from equity 
positions and have preserved the trend towards shareholder short-termism that 
other institutions have directly caused. In other words, the Third Hypothesis 
presented here does not contend that corporate law has caused equity’s short-
termism, but that it has made the latter more acute and has prevented a ‘re-
reversal’ in the shareholder composition of listed firms that would bring more 
long-termist investors in the corporate governance game. 
The attempt to back the Third Hypothesis in this Chapter is done by 
‘cherry picking’ legal developments generating bias in favor of short-termism in 
the five jurisdictions (France, Germany, The Netherlands, UK, US), whose 
capital accumulation rates and movement towards shareholder value were 
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studied in Chapters One and Three respectively. As far as the four EU 
jurisdictions of the sample are concerned, this time instead of studying corporate 
law developments that took place at the national level, reforms that took place at 
the EU level are studied. The focus on developments at the EU level also helps 
illustrate better the point that was made in Section 4.2. of Chapter One that the 
European Court of Justice in interpreting the Treaty rules on the free movement 
of capital developed over time a case law that may be construed as preventing 
the engagement by firms in shareholder eugenics that would help them craft 
their shareholder base, so as to include more long-term shareholders. 
The conservative character of the Third Hypothesis that does not 
acknowledge an initiating role for corporate law in the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership, but only an ancillary one, makes one wonder whether 
shareholders’ myopia is eventually a trend that emerged mainly from extra-legal 
institutions or developments outside the sphere of private law. Indeed, a quick 
look at Figure 10 shows that apart from the abolishment of fixed commission 
rates for stock exchange transactions, there weren’t any serious (private) legal 
developments in the post-Bretton Woods era at least in Europe that can be 
viewed independently as contributory factors to the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership. Was there really an impatience gene in investors waiting to be 
unlocked through the mere liberalization of capital movements and the 
deregulation in securities transactions costs? Developments in business law have 
nothing to do with that? 
 For the case of the US an answer to this question has already been 
given in Section 5.5. of Chapter One, where changes in banking regulation 
during the 1980s and the 1990s that indirectly promoted the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership are described. But, for the case of Europe the issue is still 
wanting. Therefore, in Chapter Four before embarking on the effort to back the 
Third Hypothesis and complete this thesis’s triad of arguments some 
developments in non-corporate niches of EU business law are presented that 
have contributed significantly to equity’s increasing short-termism during the 
post-Bretton Woods era. In fact, a discussion of the non-corporate law legal 
constraints to long-term investing may push things faster towards a reform, as 
changes in corporate law traditionally move slower compared to other niches of 
business law, such as financial regulation. Thus, Section 1 below aspires to 
contribute towards this direction. 
 
 
1. Non-corporate law legal constraints to long-term investing: infusing 
pension funds and insurance firms with myopia through financial 
regulation and accounting standards 
 
For the purposes of our analysis we classify institutional investors into 
those, whose liability profile requires them to frequently liquidate a considerable 
percentage of their assets in order to service short-term obligations towards their 
beneficiaries and into those, whose liability structure allows them to defer the 
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distribution of a greater proportion of their current assets for the distant future. 
The former category of investors entails institutions that are structurally short-
termists (mutual funds, private equity funds), while the latter entails those that 
have at least the inner potential of becoming long-termists (sovereign wealth 
funds, university endowments, insurance firms, pension funds)988.  
From the potentially long-termist institutional investors, life insurance 
firms and pension funds stand out, as the systemically most important investors 
with total assets under management close to $11 trillion and $30 trillion 
respectively, as per August 2008, i.e. a month before the financial meltdown that 
led to the ongoing crisis started989. Sovereign wealth funds (‘SWFs’) are 
sizeable only in countries with substantial fiscal surpluses (e.g. Norway)990 and 
financial endowments in countries with big private universities and foundations 
(e.g. US)991; together these two types of institutions have in total around $5 
trillion under management992. 
The influence that pension funds and life insurance companies can have 
as shareholders on corporate governance is substantial, since a great proportion 
of their assets are directed towards equity ownership in listed corporations. For 
instance, before the race to safer assets and the ‘evaporation’ of equity value 
occurred in the post-2008 crisis domestic pension funds and insurance 
companies in the US held together close to 30% of the stock in listed 
corporations993, around 26% in the UK994 and around 28% in Japan995 996. If 
there were adequate data concerning the identity of foreign investors in the stock 
exchanges997, then we would certainly find that the total percentage of stock 
held by pension funds and insurance companies globally would be greater than 
the aforementioned. 
                                                
988 In this I largely follow the classification of the World Economic Forum; see supra note 137 
989 Various IMF publications – Global Financial Stability Report, Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 
Available at http://www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-research/market-comparison-investor-classes-and-
asset-classifications/   
990 SWFs can be further classified into multigenerational, whose purpose is to save the state’s surpluses 
for future generations, and stabilization funds that seek to reduce the volatility in the state’s revenues. It is 
the multigenerational SWFs that have the potential of becoming long-term investors and particularly 
long-term equity investors, as they invest about 50% of their assets in shares, while the stabilization funds 
invest exclusively in cash and fixed-income assets, as they fulfill a different role; see WEF, supra note 
137, 29. For instance, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global (Statens pensjonsfond utland) 
managed by Norway’s central bank invests the surplus generated by the Norwegian petroleum sector in 
8,300 listed companies worldwide; see Het Financieele Dagblad, 8 November 2010. 
991 Endowments of non-profit organizations have a mandate to exist in perpetuity and to provide a steady 
income for their beneficiaries; two of the largest are the Harvard and the Yale University endowments. 
992 See supra note 653 
993 Data source: US Flow of Funds (2006) 
994 Data source: Office for National Statistics (2008) 
995 Fact Book of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (2006) 
996 Percentages include equity holdings of all insurance companies, not only life insurers. 
997 The percentage of foreign investors in EU stock exchanges was 37% at the end of 2007; see 
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Given the liability structure of pension funds and life insurance 
companies these two types of institutions could use their equity positions to 
generate accumulation-friendly long-termist influence on corporations. 
Currently though, they are not given the proper incentives by international 
accounting standards and financial regulation to extend their average holding 
period of stock and exert this positive influence. In fact, as it will be shown 
below, new rules have forced institutions to increase their buffers of liquid 
investments and move away from equity investments and towards liquid debt 
investments. 
 
1.1. Mark-to-market accounting and pension funds 
 
As far as pension funds are concerned, the forces of short-termism have 
been released by the relevant international accounting standards. A fundamental 
issue in pension finance is whether the pension plan’s assets and liabilities have 
to be reported on the financial statements of the company (employer) sponsoring 
the plan or not998. If accounting rules require this reporting on behalf of the 
sponsor company (employer), then the financial interests of the pension fund, to 
which the plan’s assets legally belong, and the interests of the sponsor company 
become interwoven, since the fund’s performance will affect the financial 
position of the company. The interweave becomes more acute in defined benefit 
plans. Pension plans are classified into defined contribution and defined benefit 
plans. Under a defined contribution (‘DC’) plan, the employer promises to pay 
specified contributions to the pension fund without having any further 
obligation to put more in case the fund cannot eventually cover the employee’s 
entitlements upon retirement. Under a defined benefit (‘DB’) plan, the employer 
promises to pay a specified level of pension to the employee, calculated on the 
basis of a formula, whose constituents include the employee’s salary while in 
service and the length of the service999; this promise brings with it a constructive 
obligation on behalf of the employer to make further payments if the fund does 
not have sufficient assets to pay the promised pension. 
Until recently in many OECD countries it was not necessary to report 
the net balance of the pension fund’s assets and liabilities on the sponsor 
company’s financial statements; at best, disclosure was required to be made only 
in the notes to the corporate accounts1000. Nevertheless, things changed during 
the past decade. The EU issued Regulation No. 1606/20021001, by which it 
required the EU listed corporations’ financial statements from 2005 onwards to 
be prepared according to the reporting standards of the International Accounting 
Standards Board (‘IASB’). The IASB had issued since 1985 IAS 19 pertaining 
to the appropriate method of reporting the cost of providing post-employment 
                                                
998 DAVID BLAKE, PENSION FINANCE (2006), 79 
999 Pensioenmonitor, Pensioen & Verzekeringskamer (PVK) (2003), 16 
1000 JUAN YERMO & FIONA STEWART, PROTECTING PENSIONS: POLICY ANALYSIS AND EXAMPLES FROM 
OECD COUNTRIES (2006), 45 
1001 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the 
application of international accounting standards. 
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benefits on the company’s (employer’s) financial statements. The European 
Commission issued Regulation No. 1725/20031002, by which it made the 
adoption of the accounting rules set out in IAS 19 compulsory for listed 
corporations. IAS 19 required the employer in the case of a DB plan to 
recognize in its financial statements the present value of expected future 
payments required to settle the defined benefit obligation, as adjusted for 
unrecognized actuarial gains and losses and as reduced by the fair value of the 
pension plan’s assets (IAS 19.54). Actuarial gain or loss is the one arising from 
the difference between estimates and actual experience in a company’s pension 
plan; actuarial gains and losses are in essence experience adjustments, as they 
show on the corporate financial statements the effects of differences between the 
previous assumptions about the fund’s performance and what has actually 
occurred1003.  
The way actuarial surplus or shortfall is calculated and recognized is 
determinative as to whether the sponsor company will have to unleash short-
termist forces upon the governance of the pension fund. The accounting 
convention that used to prevail was that due to the volatility that exists in 
financial markets, where the pension fund’s assets are invested, the long-term 
actuarial gains and losses may offset one another and therefore the sponsor 
company would not have to recognize these shortfalls or surpluses immediately. 
Accounting conventions used to introduce some temporal smoothing for these 
pension funds’ deficits or surpluses. This approach though has changed recently 
and the accounting convention worldwide has moved towards a more ‘mark-to-
market’ approach1004. 
In the UK the national accounting standards body introduced in 
November 2001 standard FRS17, under which actuarial gains and losses are 
immediately recognized in a Statement of Recognised Gains and Losses that is 
attached to the company’s (employer) P&L account. As a result of this 
approach, the investment results of the pension fund may have a major impact 
on the financial results of the company, whose pension scheme the fund is 
implementing; a shortfall in the pension fund’s results will be reflected 
immediately in the company’s financial statements, indirectly affecting the 
firm’s share price. Thus, the company has a stake in the performance of the 
pension fund’s portfolio and it will thus seek to influence the investment policy 
of the fund, so that the latter does not jeopardize the short-term financial 
position of the firm. As a result, the pension fund will receive pressure to apply 
a short-time investment horizon to minimize the risk of a negative impact of its 
activities on the company running the pension scheme; the long-term policy that 
a pension fund structurally requires, in order to fulfill its objectives, is thus 
watered down by the imminent interests of the employer, as a result of FRS17. 
                                                
1002 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1725/2003 of 29 September 2003 adopting certain international 
accounting standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002. 
1003 See IAS PLUS (prepared by Deloitte), Summaries of International Financial Reporting Standards – 
IAS 19 Employee Benefits, available at: http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias19.htm  
1004 Jaap Winter, Aandeelhouder Engagement en Stewardship, in SAMENWERKEN IN HET 
ONDERNEMINGSRECHT (2011), 47 
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The same short-termist pressure is now applied by sponsor companies 
in the governance of US pension funds, as in September 2006 the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (‘FASB’) reformed the pension accounting 
standard of FAS 87 and required immediate recognition of actuarial gains and 
losses in defined benefit plans1005. 
The IAS 19 currently adopts the so-called ‘corridor approach’ with 
regard to the recognition of actuarial gains and losses allowing companies not to 
recognize gains or losses that do not exceed 10% of the greater of the defined 
benefit obligation or the fair value of plan assets (IAS 19.92-93). Nevertheless, 
the immediate recognition of gains and losses on the employer’s financial 
statements became an option as a result of an amendment to IAS 19 that was 
effectuated in December 2004. That means that companies that have succumbed 
to market pressures to report immediately on their financial statements the 
actuarial gains and losses of the pension funds they are sponsoring are already 
exerting short-termist influence on the governance of EU pension funds even 
under the current regime of IAS 191006. But, the immediate recognition of 
pension fund’s surpluses and deficits might become the norm for everyone in 
the EU shortly under the contemplated IAS 19 reform that seeks to abandon the 
corridor approach altogether; as a result, I would expect pension funds to be 
induced by sponsor companies to de-risk their portfolio and divest from long-
term positions1007 that bring with them the possibility of having to ride out 
periods of short-term volatility1008. All in all, the new accounting standards 
promote the integration of the sponsor’s pension-funding decisions with 
corporate-finance decisions. 
 
1.2. The ‘Prudent Investor Rule’ in pension fund management 
 
As briefly mentioned in Section 3.3. of Chapter One the rise of the 
institutional ownership of stock from the 1970s and onwards was accompanied 
by the rise to dominance of the Modern Portfolio Theory (‘MPT’) in the field of 
asset management. The financial economists that developed the MPT sought 
ways, by which an asset manager can obtain an optimum balance between risk 
and return. The hallmark of the MPT is the ‘total portfolio approach’, which 
means that the manager should not be worried so much for the return on an 
individual investment, but for the return that will be achieved on the whole 
portfolio. Corollary to MPT’s ‘total portfolio approach’ is the principle of 
diversification; managers should invest their funds in a wide array of securities 
and financial products, so as to minimize downsize correlation and contagion 
risks among the portfolio’s assets and to guarantee the portfolio’s liquidity.  
                                                
1005 See YERMO & STEWART, supra note 1000, 49 
1006 RENÉ MAATMAN, DUTCH PENSION FUNDS – FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND INVESTING (2004), 36 
1007 Franco Bassanini & Edoardo Reviglio, Financial Stability, Fiscal Consolidation, and Long-term 
Investment After the Crisis, OECD JOURNAL: FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS (2011), Iss. 1, 45 
1008 See Samuel Sender, IAS 19: Penalising Changes Ahead, EDHEC Position Paper (Sept. 2009). 
Available at: http://docs.edhec-risk.com/mrk/000000/Press/EDHEC_Position_Paper_IAS19.pdf  
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The development of computer technology since the 1970s facilitated 
this diversification effort. The manager sets the annual return that must be 
achieved on the invested capital and a computer-generated mathematical 
formula indicates the optimum asset allocation to obtain this result; to minimize 
the risk the formula indicates how to best allocate the assets to different 
investment categories and different securities, i.e. how to best diversify the 
portfolio’s assets1009. Essentially, this means that very little human energy goes 
to selecting a particular security; pension funds increasingly become 
shareholders by virtue of a mechanical process based on algorithms rather on the 
basis of a flesh-and-bone individual’s hand-selection. As a result, the MPT 
tenets coupled with advanced computer technology and financial valuation have 
disfavored relationship/long-term investing by institutional investors, including 
pension funds. 
To be sure, diversification diverts the investor’s attention away from the 
choice of individual securities and directs it towards the balancing of the 
portfolio as a whole1010. In the case of an investment in shares this approach 
reduces the investor’s commitment to the specific firm, whose equity she is 
holding and requires the fund manager to sell the stock, as soon as an investment 
opportunity in another firm appears, which helps to better balance the portfolio. 
This leads to high frequency trading, which is also essential for the sake of 
liquidity, a favorable portfolio characteristic under MPT. But, liquidity does not 
go hand in hand with long-term investing, since a long-term position in a firm 
by definition means that the institution is willing to sacrifice liquidity1011. 
In essence, MPT reduces equity ownership into a commodity with only 
two dimensions: risk and return1012; this ‘commodification’ of equity is not 
helping funds to become long-termist shareholders, since this would require 
them to view shares as titles of ownership. But, MPT is now well-embedded in 
the way institutional investors and particularly pension funds make their 
investment decisions not only because of its rise to dominance in practice, but 
also because of its institutionalization in the legal sphere through the ‘prudent 
investor (or person) rule’ that governs on both sides of the Atlantic the discharge 
of the fund trustees’ fiduciary duty to the their beneficiaries. To show how MPT 
has entered the legal sphere globally through the regulation of financial 
institutions I am going here to examine the legal regime of pension fund 
investment management in the US, whose pension funds represent 34% of the 
global pension assets and the respective regime in The Netherlands, whose 
pension funds represent 6% of the global pension assets making Holland the 
most important EU jurisdiction, when it comes to pension law and finance1013. 
                                                
1009 MAATMAN, supra note 1006, 230-232 
1010 Winter, supra note 1004, 42 
1011 John Coffee, Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1277 
1012 See MICHAEL JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA – THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR BUSINESS MYOPIA 
(1991) 
1013 Dutch pension funds currently have a total of EUR 567bn under management rendering The 
Netherlands third in the global distribution of pension assets after the US and Japan and ahead of the UK 
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The Netherlands amended recently its pension fund regime in order to 
align the relevant national rules with the EU Pensions Directive1014; the Pensions 
Act of 2007 (Pensioenwet – ‘PW’) replaced the Pension and Savings Fund Act 
of 1952 (Pension-en Spaarfondsenwet – ‘PSW’). The PSW required in Art. 9b 
that the monies of a pension fund be invested ‘in a sound manner’ (‘op solide 
wijze’). The meaning of the soundness requirement was not clear and it was left 
so on purpose by the legislative bodies, as a formal abstract definition could 
prove to be an unnecessary restriction for the investment freedom of the fund; 
the ratio legis was that the soundness criterion would be given content on a 
case-by-case basis against the background of the specific obligations of the in 
casu pension fund1015. In addition to this, it was expected that the (no longer 
existing) Pensions and Insurance Supervisory Authority (Pensioen- & 
Verzekeringskamer), would come to further specify the ‘soundness’ criterion 
within the scope of the exercise of its supervision tasks upon pension funds1016. 
While the issue of pension fund managers’ fiduciary duties was rarely litigated, 
thus not giving the competent courts the opportunity to shape the criterion’s 
content1017, a good part of Dutch literature was in favor of a more restrictive 
interpretation of ‘soundness’ pointing to a more defensive investment 
approach1018. However, the dominant view –perhaps more in line with the 
legislative intent- seemed to be that the criterion gave pension fund managers a 
good deal of investment freedom1019. 
In 2007 Art. 135(1) of the PW in line with Art. 18 of the EU Pensions 
Directive replaced the ‘soundness’ requirement of the PSW with a well-known 
standard deriving from Anglo-American trust law, i.e. the ‘prudent person’ 
rule1020. The ‘prudent person’ standard is globally understood as giving broad 
authority to invest the pension assets and as requiring the fund’s governing body 
to fulfill the investment management function with the skills and knowledge that 
an expert in the asset management industry would bring to the required tasks1021.  
To be sure, in legal methodology the ‘prudent person’ rule would 
qualify as an undefined normative legal concept. When a legal rule that contains 
such a concept is applied in a particular case, its meaning ought to be shaped 
                                                                                                              
and all other EU jurisdictions; see P&I/TW Top 300 Pension Funds – Analysis at 2010 year end 
(prepared by Towers Watson). Available at: http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/5351/TW-PI-
300.pdf  
1014 Directive 2003/41/EC of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational 
retirement provision. 
1015 Kamerstukken II (Dutch Parliamentary Documents of the Second Chamber), 1971-1972, 11529, no.5, 
pg. 3 
1016 Id. 
1017 See MAATMAN, supra note 1006, 211 on the decision of Amsterdam’s Enterprise Chamber of 31 
October 1991 (NJ 1992, 88). 
1018 See MAATMAN, supra note 1006, 216 fn. 23 with references to literature supporting this viewpoint. 
1019 See J.R.Wirschell, Pensioen- en Spaarfondsenwet, in PENSIOENRECHT – TEKST & COMMENTAAR (M. 
DOMMERHOLT ET AL., EDS.) (2004), 63 
1020 W. Brugman, Pensioenwet, in PENSIOENRECHT – TEKST & COMMENTAAR (M. DOMMERHOLT & J. 
WIRSCHELL, EDS.) (2010), 273 
1021 OECD Guidelines on Pension Fund Asset Management, Recommendation of the Council (2006), 9. 
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/53/36316399.pdf 
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with reference to the relevant evaluations of this broader group of people, whose 
behavior is regulated by this rule1022. So, in applying the ‘prudent person’ rule 
the court ought to have recourse to the beliefs and assessments of fund 
managers, as to what prudence means in managing assets on behalf of your 
beneficiaries. Furthermore, the ‘prudent person’ rule should be seen as 
embodying jus aequum, in the sense that its content is not strict and fixed to a 
crystallized set of asset managers’ beliefs, but it evolves over time, so that it can 
be dynamically signified by what managers believe in the era that the rule is 
called to application1023. Therefore, in the era of the dominance of the MPT the 
manager in question will be deemed to have abided by the ‘prudent person’ rule, 
when she has followed the processes and the principles that the MPT dictates. 
Consequently, the ideology of modern financial economics, which, as explained 
above, favors short-termism and reduced commitment to issuers, has entered as 
a Trojan horse inside the EU system of pension fund regulation by means of an 
undefined legal concept. 
In light of this character of the ‘prudent person’ rule, whenever the 
practices of an EU pension fund manager are called into question, it suffices for 
her to show that she has followed a reasonable and accepted investment 
process1024; the test of whether the fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries is 
discharged properly favors process over results1025. Prudently managing the 
pension assets means avoiding undue risk and according to the MPT this is 
procedurally done by diversifying well your portfolio1026; as long as the fund 
manager has followed the principle of diversification she won’t be held liable 
even if the total return on the investments is poor1027. After all, diversification is 
explicitly mentioned as one of the investment rules in Art. 18 of the EU 
Pensions Directive transposed into Dutch law through Art.135(c) PW and Art.13 
of the Decree on the Financial Assessment of Pension Funds1028. Diversification 
with all its consequences is thus a legal institution of the pension world in The 
Netherlands and the EU. 
The situation is exactly the same in the US both for public and for 
private pension funds. The only difference is that the name of the undefined 
legal concept is ‘prudent investor’ rule. With regard to private US pension 
funds, ERISA’s (see Section 4.3.1. of Chapter One) ‘prudent investor’ rule 
                                                
1022 See JOSEF ESSER, VORVERSTÄNDNIS UND METHODENWAHL IN DER RECHTSFINDUNG (1970), 115, 
119; KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, 3. AUFL. (1975), 203, 273; OTTO 
BACHOF, GESETZ UND RICHTERMACHT (1959), 40 
1023 HERMANN SOELL, VERWALTUNGSRECHT, 9. AUFL., 173ff. 
1024 MAATMAN, supra note 1006, 220 
1025 Teresa Ghilarducci, US Pension Investment Policy and Perfect Capital Market Theory, 37 
CHALLENGE 4, 7 
1026 Note by the OECD Secretariat, ‘Prudent Person Rule’ Standard for the Investment of Pension Fund 
Assets, n. 18 
1027 Diversification is Principle No.11 in the OECD Basic Principles of Regulation of Private 
Occupational Funds 
1028 Besluit van 18 december 2006, Stb. 710, houdende regels met betrekking tot het financieele 
toetsingskader op grond van de Pensioenwet en de Wet verplichte beroepspensioenregeling, zoals dit 
besluit is gewijzigd bij het Besluit van 20 december 2007, Stb. 572 
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requires managers to discharge their duties ‘with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence under the circumstances’ prevailing in the managers’ peer group1029. 
Moreover, private pension fund managers are expected to diversify ‘the 
investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under 
the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so’1030. The management of 
public US pension funds is governed by the law of the state, wherein the pension 
fund is located. The vast majority of US states have now adopted the Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act of 1995 (‘UPIA’), which is applicable to all trusts (not 
only pension funds) and requires a trustee, who invests and manages trust assets 
to comply with the ‘prudent investor’ rule [§1(a)]. Just like the EU Pensions 
Directive puts forward some more specific investment principles in an attempt 
to shape the undefined normative legal concept, so does the UPIA state the 
trustee’s investment decisions with respect to individual assets must be 
evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole 
[§2(b)] and that a trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust (§3). The 
application of the MPT tenets is, therefore, unequivocally required in the 
management of US pension funds and what is mentioned above within the scope 
of Dutch pension funds applies here mutatis mutandis. US pension fund 
regulation institutionalizes the MPT and thus hampers pension fund’s structural 
potential of becoming long-term investors. 
 
1.3. ‘Solvency II’ and life insurers 
 
One of the implicit goals of Chapter Four is to show that legal 
institutions have a structural bias in favor of equity’s short-termism. To 
demonstrate this, it is necessary not only to point to pre-2008 legal 
developments that shortened the time-horizons of equityholders, but also to 
explain how the lawmaking path that is followed in the post-2008 world is set to 
produce the same consequences for shareholders’ time-preferences.  
In late 2012 the EU ‘Solvency II’ Directive1031 will enter into force and 
will apply to insurance companies (including life insurers) and possibly pension 
funds as well. This Directive has so far been criticized as doing two things that 
are relevant to our discussion: (i) it introduces solvency constraints for life 
insurers that bias their time-horizons towards short-termism1032; and (ii) it forces 
life insurers to rebalance their portfolio towards safer assets by migrating from 
equity positions to fixed-income securities1033. 
As it was mentioned above, life insurers have a liability structure that 
requires them to make investments in securities that provide long-term cash 
flows, so that the asset side of their balance sheets can match the liability 
                                                
1029 ERISA, 29 USC § 1104(a)(B) 
1030 ERISA, 29 USC § 1104(a)(C)  
1031 Directive 2009/138/EC of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of 
Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) 
1032 Christian Gollier, Assets relative risk for long-term investors, IDEI Working Paper no. 446, 1. 
Available at http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2007/life_and_pensions.pdf  
1033 Winter, supra note 1004, 47 
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side1034. Nevertheless, the Solvency Capital Requirement (‘SCR’) introduced by 
‘Solvency II’ will measure life insurers’ solvency on the basis of short-term 
values, as risks will be controlled with a one-year horizon1035, their 
measurement, thus, becoming much more sensitive to market volatility1036. In 
addition to this, life insurers will be penalized for holding assets with greater 
volatility, such as equity, as they will have to hold greater capital reserves in 
response. The SCR, i.e. the capital that an insurer will need to survive potential 
losses, is given by the combination of the Basic Solvency Capital Requirement 
(‘BSCR’) and the operational risk1037. In measuring the BSCR market risk plays 
a central role; the market risk is the one that derives from the volatility of 
securities’ prices. A component of market risk is naturally equity risk, i.e. the 
risk that shares held by insurers will go down in value. ‘Solvency II’ introduces 
a shock scenario, where the solvency of the insurer is called into question, when 
the market value of the shares it holds plunges by 30% to 40% (depending on 
the country of origin of the issuer) [Art. 105(5)(b) & Annex IV]. This causes 
greater sensitivity on behalf of life insurers to volatility in share prices 
discouraging them from investing in the long-term, as that would require them 
to be prepared to ride out short-term volatility; more generally, this prudential 
regulation is likely to discourage them from investing in equity altogether. As a 
consequence, after the entry into force of ‘Solvency II’ the equity markets will 
most likely see structurally long-termists shareholders reducing their exposure to 
shares, thus leaving behind those that are structurally short-termists to influence 
corporate governance with a negative implication for accumulation dynamics. 
 
 
2. Long-term investors and risk appetite: The lost opportunity of US 
corporate law to introduce effective corporate risk management 
 
2.1. The relationship between corporate risk management and long-term 
investing 
 
What financial regulation and accounting rules that were described in 
the previous section essentially do is that they affect a long-termist institutional 
investors’ risk appetite. It is generally acknowledged that it is not only an 
institution’s liability profile that is crucial for its ability to be a long-term 
investor, but also its investment beliefs, i.e. whether the institution believes 
long-term investing can produce superior returns, its risk appetite, i.e. the ability 
and willingness of the institution to accept potentially sizeable losses, and its 
decision-making structure, i.e. the ability of the investment manager to employ a 
                                                
1034 Bassanini & Reviglio, supra 1007, 37 
1035 René Ricol, Report on the Financial Crisis (to the President of the French Republic), (Sept. 2008), 68. 
Available at http://www.norea.nl/Sites/Files/0000023746_080900_Ricol_Final_Report.pdf  
1036 OECD Discussion Note, Promoting Longer-term Investment by Institutional Investors: Selected 
Issues and Policies, (2011), 8. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/42/48281131.pdf 
1037 DAVID HOWDEN, INSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE RECESSION (2011), 92-
93 
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long-term investment strategy1038. Putting an institution’s risk appetite at the 
heart of its ability to hold on its investments for the long-term makes sense, 
because an institution that is not willing to accept moderate levels of risk, short-
term volatility or potential permanent capital loss will not be able to employ a 
long-term investing strategy1039. When an investor considers making a long-term 
investment, it must have the patience to ride out periods, during which the 
portfolio securities will be producing unrealized capital losses; greater volatility 
must be tolerated and the temptation to divest in order to avoid further short-
term plunges in value must be resisted by the investor. 
The institution’s ability to invest for the long-term may be affected not 
only by rules shaping the risk management framework at the institution’s level, 
but also by the rules shaping the risk management at the level of the issuer of the 
security that is part or that may be part of the institution’s portfolio. That means 
that effective corporate risk management rules may reduce the uncertainties 
associated with certain equity securities and thus induce more institutions to 
invest in them for the long term. In the presence of stricter prudential regulation 
for pension funds and insurance firms the latter can tolerate less risk and the 
period, for which they can ride out volatility in connection with a security 
without divesting from it has shortened; good risk management on behalf of the 
issuer though can decrease the security’s volatility and shorten the potential 
periods, for which its performance brings an unrealized short-term loss to these 
investors. In other words, the assumption here is that good corporate risk 
management can make the issuer’s shares a safer investment and thus make 
them more conducive for long-term investing.  
The assumption that good corporate risk management may extend the 
average holding period of stock is backed by evidence that shows that long-
termist shareholders tend to invest more in acquiring information about the 
effectiveness of risk management in a corporation, whose shares they consider 
investing in or have already invested in1040, and by case studies that show that 
when corporations reduce particularly the risks that are associated with earnings 
management (e.g. by effectively giving up their ability to ‘cook the books’), 
their share’s volatility drops dramatically indicating that a greater number of 
patient investors with low portfolio turnover pick the firm’s stock1041. When 
long-term investors try to assess risk, what matters is not the next quarter’s 
earnings, as is the case for short-termists, but the corporate strategy and the 
policies designed to carry it out, including risk management1042. 
                                                
1038 See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 137, 10 
1039 Id., at 21 
1040 Shanit Borsky et al., International Trends in Socially Responsible Investment: Implications for 
Corporate Managers, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY 
MANAGEMENT (D. MARINOVA ET AL., EDS.) (2006), 344 
1041 Drexel University Center for Corporate Governance Roundtable on Risk Management, Corporate 
Governance and the Search for Long-Term Investors, 22 JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 58, 
68 
1042 Id., at 69 
CORPORATE LAW AND THE GREAT REVERSAL IN SHAREHOLDERSHIP 
 261 
It follows that if corporate law succeeds in introducing an effective 
system of risk management for issuers, then stock, even if it is not blue chip1043, 
may be seen by long-termist institutions as a less risky and volatile asset to 
invest in.  
Corporate law had the opportunity particularly in the aftermath of 
corporate scandals to institutionalize a system of corporate risk management that 
could reverse the trend among long-termist institutions to divest from equity and 
thus relieve firms from the pressure that they were receiving by short-termists to 
downsize and distribute in a way detrimental to the overall business 




2.2. Corporate law as a risk-seeking legal field 
 
The notion of risk is central in corporate law, which in fact is a risk-
seeking field of the law. The mere privilege of limited liability, the ‘bedrock’ of 
corporate law1044, is designed to encourage risk-taking by guaranteeing to 
shareholders the upside benefit of a venture while insulating them from 
downside exposure. The business judgment rule, a standard of review of 
managerial actions that has lately spread from the US to the corporate laws of 
various other jurisdictions (see Section 2.4.2. of Chapter Three), as well as other 
liability standards that grant managers wide business discretion are also 
designed so as to ensure that directors and officers feel free to take risks without 
fearing that their risk-taking actions are likely to cause their personal 
liability1045. Even private ordering corporate governance arrangements, which 
are made possible by enabling corporate law provisions, are focused on inducing 
managers to take more risks. Shareholders, being the residual claimants of the 
corporation want managers to increase the firm’s profitability and since there is 
a positive correlation between risk and return shareholders want to induce 
                                                
1043 Empirical studies have shown that when it comes to equity long-termist investors, such as SWFs, 
prefer blue chip stocks rather than growth stocks; see Christopher Balding, A Portfolio Analysis of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, (2008). Available at SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1141531  
1044 Simon Deakin, The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value, 13 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 11, 
11 
1045 David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb: Corporate Risk-Taking and the Business Judgment Rule, 2. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266723 
Corporate Risk Management and Equity's Time-horizons 
 
Effective corporate risk management on behalf of the issuer has 
the potential to attract more long-termist shareholders. 
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managers to take more risks by tolerating executive compensation schemes that 
promote risk taking. 
   In light of the above, one can easily understand that a certain risk 
culture is inescapably developed within corporations. Insufficient risk-taking on 
behalf of the management would mean low returns for the firm and its investors. 
But, risk is not always beneficial; there is a difference between optimal risk-
taking and excessive risk-taking (see Figure 32). To get higher returns one needs 
to bear higher risks, but higher risks are also associated with a higher probability 
of loss, which is a painful experience for firms and investors alike. Profitability 
can thus be a destructive measure of performance without risk control1046; 
excessive risk taking may result in reduced firm earnings or even 
bankruptcy1047. This is why under modern corporate law firms are supposed to 
be required to install risk management systems, in order ‘to strike an optimal 
balance between growth and return goals and related risks’1048. But, what 
lengths does corporate law really go to in order to ensure that a sound risk 




                                                       
Figure 31 - Relative Risk and Return 
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2.3. Risk management and legislative response to corporate scandals 
 
Risk-taking might have been in the center of corporate functioning and 
in the ratio legis of several corporate law rules for decades, but it was not until 
recently that the notion of risk management as a distinct corporate governance 
device emerged. Shareholders were always thought to constitute a more efficient 
layer of risk management, as they could hedge against risk at a lower cost than 
the issuer by diversifying their portfolio1049. This viewpoint started changing in 
the 1990s, when some severe cases of risk mismanagement shook the corporate 
world in the US, the UK, Germany and Japan with venerable institutions, such 
as Barings Bank, Metalgesellschaft AG and Sumitomo, experiencing billions of 
losses because of inadequate oversight of traders and inadequate understanding 
of trading strategies by firms’ board and senior management1050. Then came the 
corporate scandals of the early 2000s (Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia) that 
revealed that corporations were failing to manage those risks that were 
specifically associated with related-party transactions and earnings 
management1051. 
In response, many firms adopted an enhanced risk management system, 
best practices guides for risk management appeared1052 and credit rating 
agencies announced that they would rate companies’ by also taking under 
account their risk management arrangements1053. Risk management systems 
were emerging as another agency cost control mechanism1054.   
Corporate law and securities regulation, traditional devices for 
providing alleviation to the problems of agency costs and concomitant 
informational asymmetries, followed with a failed attempt to institutionalize risk 
management in listed corporations. The reforms mostly focused on imposing a 
strict environment for managing the operational risks pertaining to self-dealing 
and accounting fraud, i.e. the issues that caught media attention as a result of the 
Enron and WorldCom scandals. A deeper realignment of the way public 
corporations are managing risks was not attempted apparently out of fear of 
creating the impression to managers that risky decisions would be penalized. 
The introduction of specific rules on risk management was believed that it 
would hamper risk-taking altogether1055. Thus, the legal provisions pertaining to 
                                                
1049 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) 
1050 See LAM, supra note 1047, 9ff.; Betty Simkins & Steven Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management 
and Corporate Governance, 39 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL 571, 573ff. 
1051 Harner, supra note 14, 6 
1052 See COSO, supra note 1048 
1053 See e.g. HERVE GENY & JAMES HYDE, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICES – RISK MANAGEMENT 
ASSESSMENTS (2004). Available at 
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/MDCdocs/02/2002900000432768.pdf?search=5&search
Query=Risk+Management+Assessments&click=1 
1054 Bainbridge, supra note 14, 981 
1055 The idea that it is difficult to disentangle risk management from risk-taking was also expressed in a 
different manner in the recent post-crisis Delaware Chancery Court adjudication on the losses incurred by 
Citigroup In re Citigroup Inc. S‘holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
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risk management were more of a scarecrow turned to a perch1056 for 
management rather than a meaningful limitation on excessive risk-taking.  The 
love for risk in corporate law prevailed over the misgivings that negative 
externalities would continue ensuing from the traditional deferential approach to 
the risk culture of the corporate world. The side effect was that corporate law 
missed the opportunity to create a corporate environment that would attract 
long-termist investors after years of steady divestment by the latter from equity 
securities. 
To illustrate the above statement, I focus below on the effect of the 
efforts undertaken in the early 2000s in the framework of US lato sensu 
corporate law (see Section 1.3.2.1. of Chapter Three for the term) with regard to 
the issue of corporate risk management. 
 
2.4. The unfulfilled promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (‘SOX’)1057 in the US in the 
aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals marked another act in that play 
that started with the New Deal where in every small or large-scale Wall Street 
crisis Main Street, i.e. the federal government, attempts to make inroads to the 
corporate governance of public corporations, an area that traditionally is a 
responsibility of the states1058. SOX aspired mainly to tackle the specific risks 
associated with self-dealing, accounting irregularities and inadequate or 
fraudulent financial reporting, but also attempted to indirectly introduce a 
broader system of risk management in public corporations.  
 First of all, SOX directed the SEC, the national securities exchanges 
(e.g. NYSE) and securities associations (NASDAQ) to establish standards 
relating to the independence of audit committees in order to ensure the 
impartiality of the monitoring of the auditing process1059. In response, the 
aforementioned self-regulatory organizations (‘SROs’) submitted, as they were 
required by law1060, their new set of revised listing standards applicable to 
corporations listed on their indexes, which the SEC later approved.  
The NYSE introduced an ‘Audit Committee Charter Provision’1061, 
pursuant to which the audit committee of a corporation has the duty inter alia to 
discuss guidelines and policies with respect to risk assessment and risk 
                                                
1056 The metaphor of the ‘scarecrow of the law’, taken by William Shakespeare’s play Measure for 
Measure (Act 2, Scene 1, Line 1), is ingeniously used by Robert Monks in order to illustrate how 
corporate management manages to co-opt and neutralize all mechanisms of accountability that law tries 
to introduce from time to time; see ROBERT MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
(1992), Ch. 4  
1057 Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002 
1058 Under the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution the Congress does have the authority to legislate 
in the area of corporate law. However, many argue that federalism in corporate law should be constrained 
as it is inefficient for corporate America; see Stephen Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of 
Corporate Law, 26 REGULATION 32 
1059 SOX Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 775 
1060 Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 19b-4 thereunder 
1061 Section 303A of the NYSE’s Listed Company Manual 
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management. However, according to the official commentary to this provision 
the audit committee is not meant to be the sole body responsible for risk 
management, as this is an area that remains within the responsibility of the 
firm’s senior management1062. The audit committee within the scope of the 
support that it provides to the board in the latter’s discharge of its monitoring 
function (‘a monitor within a monitor’1063) should discuss the major financial 
risk exposures and the steps management has taken to control such exposures. In 
its new risk management responsibilities the audit committee should be assisted 
by an internal audit function, which will provide the committee with ongoing 
assessments of the firm’s risk management processes1064. Thus, the NYSE rules 
created in response to SOX a three-layer system of risk management system in 
listed corporations. The board has the ultimate risk authority through its 
specialist arm, the audit committee that, apart from ensuring the integrity of the 
accounting information, becomes a risk watchdog; the senior management is 
responsible for the installment, operation and maintenance of an enterprise-wide 
risk management system that will ensure the flow of risk-related information 
bottom-up; and, finally, the internal auditors are assigned the task of scouring 
and scanning the risk management system in order to report to the audit 
committee. 
 The NYSE institutionalized risk management as a function of the audit 
committee in response to SOX, although it did not provide any guidelines as to 
how this function should be discharged. But, in SOX itself and the thereunder 
promulgated SEC rules the term ‘risk management’ is nowhere to be found. The 
SOX and the SEC rules introduce a series of burdensome obligations on senior 
management –especially the CEO and CFO- but none of them seems to relate to 
the evaluation of risk. Nonetheless, boardroom lawyers stressed that a risk 
management obligation of the senior management is implied by the new 
provisions and thus compliance with SOX obligations should also take into 
account risk management issues1065. Thus, while through the NYSE listing 
standards risk management was institutionalized at the board layer, SOX and the 
SEC rules –albeit indirectly- seem to have institutionalized risk management at 
the senior management level as well. 
 In an attempt to increase corporate responsibility within the scope of 
periodical reports that are filed with the SEC, a firm’s CEO and CFO are under 
SOX required inter alia to certify in each annual report that they have designed 
internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the business is 
made known to them and that they have disclosed to the audit committee any 
material weaknesses in the internal controls1066. Under SOX rules and the 
                                                
1062 Final NYSE Corporate Governance Rules, at 12, available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf 
1063 Douglas Branson, Enron – When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate 
Governance Reform?, 48 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 989, 995 
1064 Commentary to Section 303A(7)(d), id. at 13  
1065 Martin Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Directors, (2008), 4. Available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2008/11/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors.pdf 
1066 SOX Act § 302, 116 Stat at. 777 
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amendments that the SEC made to the reporting requirements1067 the annual 
reports of the listed corporations should be accompanied by a certified CEO and 
CFO internal control report stating the responsibility of management for 
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure, containing 
an assessment of the effectiveness of this structure and identifying the 
framework used to conduct the required evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
internal control1068. 
The breadth of the putative risk management requirement that is 
thought to be indirectly introduced by SOX and SEC rule amendments1069 
depends on the definition of the term ‘internal control’. Is this supposed to mean 
a process leading to the preparation of a financial report that also entails risk 
considerations? 
 In the codified Statements on Auditing Standards (‘SASs’) of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (‘AICPA’), which provide 
guidance to external auditors regarding the auditing of an entity, internal control 
is defined as ‘a process […] designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding 
the […] (a) reliability of financial reporting, (b) effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations, and (c) compliance with applicable laws and regulations’ and 
consisting of five interrelated components: control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communication systems and 
monitoring1070. Although the definition of internal control that the SEC provided 
in the rules that were promulgated pursuant to SOX1071 is based on the 
aforementioned SAS, it consciously omits the part that refers to the five 
components of the process1072. Therefore, at first sight risk assessment seems to 
be intentionally left out of the internal control process that the SEC requires 
from public corporations to implement and refer to in their annual reports. After 
all, the SEC admits to have refused to follow the suggestion of some of the 
commenters that took part in the rulemaking process to construct a broader 
definition of internal control that would incorporate risk management1073. 
In light of the above, one would suggest that boardroom lawyers were 
wrong and that risk management was ruled out of the financial reporting 
procedure that was established by the SOX reforms. But, risk management 
actually managed to enter to the new corporate governance mechanisms through 
the back door.  
The SEC, despite the exhortation of some of the commenters, did not 
provide explicit guidelines regarding the evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
firm’s internal control. In the promulgated rules the SEC merely stressed that 
‘the framework on which management's evaluation of the issuer's internal 
control over financial reporting is based must be a suitable, recognized control 
                                                
1067 See Item 307 of the SEC Regulations S-K and S-B 
1068 SOX Section § 404, 116 Stat. at 789; SEC Rule 13a-15 
1069 See text accompanying fn.149 
1070 SASs AU § 319 
1071 SEC Rule 15d-15 
1072 See SEC Final Rule Release No. 33-8238 
1073 Id. 
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framework that is established by a body or group that has followed due-process 
procedures, including the broad distribution of the framework for public 
comment’1074. In its Final Rule Release Note the SEC expressly mentioned that 
although it does not mandate any specific such framework, the internal control 
framework established by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (‘COSO’) -a private sector organization that publishes 
guidelines on several aspects of corporate governance- satisfies its criteria1075. 
Since the COSO internal control framework is the one, on which the 
aforementioned SAS definition was based, it follows that the SEC in the bottom 
line encourages the adoption of a framework that entails risk assessment as one 
of its inextricable components1076. Thus, companies, whose senior management 
has to abide by SOX, are urged –although not mandated- to adopt an internal 
control framework with a risk management aspect in order to play it safe and be 
sure that they comply. 
Still though, I need to justify why I have characterized the SOX as a 
legislative attempt that failed to introduce an effective system of risk 
management into corporate governance. My critical approach to the direct or 
implied risk management provisions of SOX and its regulatory or self-
regulatory progeny is based on the fact that they are in reality either misapplied 
or underenforced.  
First of all, the business community in the US has since the enactment 
of SOX been complaining about the high costs of compliance with the 
certification requirements that outweigh the benefits that were supposed to 
accrue to investors from more accurate financial reporting1077. It is true that 
management has to expend considerable time in making sure it is compliant 
with the certification requirements of SOX, thus being distracted from its duty to 
focus on operating the business (a.k.a. opportunity costs). At the same time the 
corporation has to pay higher D&O insurance fees, as chances of management 
liability are in the post-SOX deemed to be higher1078. This has led management 
in most US public firms to follow a ‘compliance-by-checklist approach’ to SOX 
that actually results in corporations emphasizing form over substance, thus 
missing the underlying point of the SOX regulation, which was to introduce the 
concept of responsibility into financial reporting and corporate governance in 
general1079. This ‘compliance-by-checklist approach’ cannot be expected to form 
the basis for meaningful risk management within the internal control process 
since, as it was described above, risk management is encouraged but not 
required by the reporting firms. With the compliance costs being so high the 
                                                
1074 SEC Rule 13a-15 
1075 SEC Release, supra note 1072 
1076 See COSO Internal Control – Integrated Framework (1992) 
1077 See Chris Morrison, Challenging the Validity of Sarbanes-Oxley Pt. 1, FINANCIAL WIRE (Feb. 2, 
2007), available at 
http://www.investrend.com/articles/article.asp?analystId=0&id=44365&topicId=160&level=160  
1078 Michael Levitin & Steven Snider, Looking Ahead: The Market for Buyouts of Public Companies, Part 
II, BUYOUTS, Oct. 21 2002 at 28, 28 
1079 Cheryl Wade, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Will Criticism of SOX Undermine Its Benefits?, 39 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL 595, 597 
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CEOs and CFOs have an interest in doing just the minimum they are required to 
do in order to comply. Performing ‘superfluous’ risk assessment within the 
internal control process, as the COSO framework would suggest, is just not 
economically rational for a large number of firms. Therefore, despite what the 
law says or implies, ex ante private control of the risk management function on 
behalf of the managers is ineffective. In other words, the US corporate 
governance regime provides managers with poor incentives to engage in 
meaningful risk management, effectively driving away long-termist 
shareholders from listed corporations. 
However, corporate law is privately enforced not only by the managers, 
but also by the shareholders who are equipped with three default powers: the 
right to vote, the right to sell and the right to sue. I will resist the temptation to 
analyze how the right to vote and the right to sell might help in enforcing the 
risk management requirement upon the firm and I will instead focus on the last 
right to make my case: the right to sue. The right to sue has been very successful 
in functioning as a private enforcement mechanism of corporate law in the US. 
Thus, I am inquiring into whether it can also work as an ex post private control 
of the risk management function within corporations. 
The first theoretical option for shareholders to ex post enforce risk 
management upon the firm would be to initiate litigation against the directors by 
using the NYSE rules that introduce the risk management responsibilities of the 
audit committee as a legal basis. However, US courts have repeatedly 
adjudicated that the listing standards of a securities exchange constitute part of a 
contract between the listed corporation and the exchange, so that rights and 
obligations flow inter partes. Therefore, the listing standard is from the 
shareholder viewpoint a ‘res inter alios acta’ and thus the shareholder has no 
right to enforce it by initiating civil litigation1080. 
The second theoretical option for shareholders to ex post privately 
enforce the risk management requirements upon the firm would be to file a 
direct claim against the firm’s officers in the federal courts by using the relevant 
SOX provisions as a legal basis. Shareholders have in the past been successful 
in bringing either individually or in groups (a.k.a. class actions) direct suits 
against the management based on federal securities laws for injuries they have 
suffered1081. The permissibility of such a suit presupposes either an express right 
of action or an implied right of action in the federal securities laws. SOX does 
not grant an express right of action to shareholders against the officers, so that 
the former can hold the latter accountable in connection with their certification 
and internal control report obligations. Thus, the question is whether an implied 
private cause of action can at least be drawn by the relevant sections of SOX, 
i.e. §§ 302 and 404.  
                                                
1080 See e.g. State Teachers Retirement Bd. V. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 851-853 (2d Cir. 1981); 
Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1002, 1015-1017 (W.D. Pa. 1981); 
Spicer v. Chicago Bd. Of Options Exch., Inc. 977 F.2D 255, 259-261 (7th Cir. 1992) 
1081 Mark Jickling, Barriers to Corporate Fraud: How They Work, Why They Fail, CRS Report for 
Congress (Dec. 27, 2004), CRS-47. Available at 
www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/18578.pdf  
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One could suggest that the doctrine of implied private right of action is 
prominent in federal securities law since the one rule that has been the engine of 
the private securities litigation industry in the US in the last sixty years is SEC 
Rule 10b-5, which does not contain any express cause of action, but was 
judicially diagnosed to confer an implied private right of action upon individual 
investors1082. However, the doctrine of implied private right of action has 
entered an era of contraction mainly as a result of the jurisprudence of the US 
Supreme Court, which has tried to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits in 
the federal courts that aspire to make a case by invoking a putative implied right 
of action1083. The US Supreme Court in an attempt to narrow the circumstances, 
under which an implied private right of action is diagnosed in a statute, has 
established as sole criterion the congressional intent, i.e. whether Congress 
intended to provide beneficiaries of the statute with the possibility or privately 
enforcing their rights1084. In other words, the technique of statutory 
interpretation that the US Supreme Court promotes with respect to the 
ascertainment of whether an implied private cause of action is contained in a 
provision is the legislative historical approach. 
Indeed, shareholders did attempt to hold officers accountable for breach 
of their obligations under SOX § 302, one of the two provisions that relate to the 
certification requirements and the internal control system, which –as discussed 
above- could be construed as indirectly encouraging the adoption of a risk 
management system by a public firm. Unfortunately though, the federal courts 
in two cases denied to acknowledge the existence of an implied private cause of 
action under this provision by arguing that if Congress wanted a right of action 
to exist under § 302, it would provide for it explicitly, as it did in other sections 
of SOX, e.g. in § 3061085. This judicial precedent has effectively extinguished 
any hope there was for holding in the future officers accountable for 
irregularities regarding the risk assessment part of an internal control report by 
means of a direct claim brought under SOX. 
Since SOX does not provide any built-in enforcement mechanisms to 
shareholders1086 regarding corporate risk management, the final option for 
shareholders to ex post privately enforce the SOX putative risk management 
requirements would be to initiate corporate litigation at the state level, so as to 
propose a revised fiduciary duty analysis influenced by the SOX corporate 
                                                
1082 The implied right of action was institutionalized in 1946 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. 
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). It was upheld by the US Supreme Court in 1964 in I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
U.S. 426 (1964) 
1083 Louis Ebinger, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 501(a): No Implied Private Right of Action and a Call to 
Congress for an Express Private Right of Action to Enhance Analyst Disclosure, 93 IOWA LAW REVIEW 
1919, 1925 
1084 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1978); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 174-176 (1994); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 
(2001); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) 
1085 Srebnik v. Dean, No. 05-cv-01086, 2006 WL 2790408, at 5 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2006); In re 
Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 468 F. Supp. 2d 679, 707 (D.N.J. 2006) 
1086 Lyman Johnson & Mark Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WILLIAM 
MITCHELL LAW REVIEW 101, 140 
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governance provisions. At first sight, such an attempt may seem as non-feasible 
from a legal point of view. But a closer look will prove otherwise. 
I am not saying that SOX federalized the corporate law fiduciary duties 
of the senior officers1087. The latter remained an area regulated by state 
corporate law. However, in the political climate, in which SOX was passed, its 
corporate governance provisions pertaining to the new responsibilities of senior 
management were conducive to influence the state corporate law fiduciary duty 
analysis. At least, Delaware judges were willing to be influenced according to 
the statements they made in the post-Enron era1088. This is because Delaware, 
the state where the vast majority of US public corporations is chartered, could 
not afford to show incompetence in regulating corporate America1089. With SOX 
the federal authorities showed their teeth to Delaware by making inroads into 
corporate law and they were threatening to do it again if they felt that state 
corporate law was keeping on supplying insufficient safeguards for the investor 
community1090. Given that federal provisions preempt state law1091, Delaware 
was running the risk of being entirely wiped out by Washington if it continued 
being so deferential to its major interest group, the managers. 
The only option for Delaware judges would be to be tougher on 
management. They could do so by being more willing to interpret the fiduciary 
duty doctrines in light of the heightened responsibility for officers that the SOX 
introduced. This would be the chance for shareholders to litigate for a broadened 
duty of care for corporate officers1092, under which the latter could be held liable 
for not installing an adequate internal control system in the spirit of SOX. 
Especially the installment of a rudimentary internal control system designed to 
ensure just mere formal compliance with the SOX requirements (see 
‘compliance-by-checklist approach’), which would omit the risk assessment 
component that the COSO framework requires could be attacked as a breach of 
the officers’ duty of care. On the other hand, directors by virtue of their role as 
monitors of everything that senior management does or should do could also be 
held liable for not demanding a risk assessment component in the internal 
control report that is submitted to them according to the SOX requirements. 
But did the politics of US corporate law finally helped shareholders in 
recouping some of their losses by holding management accountable for risk 
management failures? Unfortunately, the Citigroup case1093 proved that lax risk 
                                                
1087 However, this argument has also been presented in academic theory. See Robert Thompson & Hillary 
Sale, Securities Fraud As Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VANDERBILT LAW 
REVIEW 859  
1088 See Vice Chancellor Strine’s paper Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation 
Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUSINESS LAWYER 1371, 1373 (stating that the Enron case 
will exert pressure on courts to look more carefully at whether fiduciaries make good faith efforts to 
accomplish their duties) 
1089 Mark Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-life, 62 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 125, 149 
1090 Mark Roe, Regulatory Competition in Making Corporate Law in the United States – And its Limits, 
21 OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY 232, 233 
1091 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) 
1092 Johnson & Sides, supra note 1086, 163 
1093 In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
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management still has a long distance to cover in order to become part of those 
irregularities that according to courts of equity constitute  breach of a fiduciary 
duty.  
Citigroup was one of those corporations, whose shareholders suffered 
immense losses from its risk exposure to the subprime mortgage market. A 
derivative suit was thus filed in the Delaware Chancery Court attempting to hold 
the directors accountable for a breach of the duty of good faith, as they allegedly 
did not ‘make a good faith attempt to follow the procedures put in place […] to 
assure that adequate and proper corporate information and reporting systems 
existed that would enable them to be fully informed regarding Citigroup’s risk 
to the subprime mortgage market’1094. 
 But Delaware judges, despite the pressure that they were supposed to 
feel in light of the circumstances surrounding the crisis and the new threat of 
Washington to take over corporate law, employed an old-fashioned 
argumentation that reconfirmed the deification of risk within the corporate law 
edifice: ‘[W]hat is left appears to be plaintiff shareholders attempting to hold the 
director defendants personally liable for making (or allowing to be made) 
business decisions that, in hindsight, turned out poorly for the Company.’1095  
Thus, to the 2006 question of three prominent US law scholars on 
whether SOX will bring any changes to the fact that state law imposes little risk 
on directorial liability1096, the answer is: it didn’t. At the same time, to the 
question that was posed in Section 2.1. above on whether corporate law has 
succeeded in introducing an effective risk management system capable of 
making equity investments more attractive to long-termist institutional investors 
















                                                
1094 Id., at 123 
1095 Id., at 124 
1096 WILLIAM ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON 
THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2006),  288 




3. More food for short-termist shareholders: The facilitation of share 
repurchases 
 
After examining the failure of corporate law in the US to introduce an 
institution that would reverse the trend of divestment of long-termist investors 
from equity securities, I now turn to an institution of EU corporate law that has 
the effect of attracting short-termist investors to corporations’ shareholder base. 
This is the institution of stock repurchases, which has lately been facilitated by 
national corporate laws and EU corporate law alike. By presenting stock 
buybacks’ effect on shareholder eugenics in this section and by showing how 
The Failed Attempt of SOX to Introduce an Effective System 
of Risk Management 
 
The implicit aspiration of SOX to introduce an effective risk 
management system into US corporate governance did not 
materialize, as the SEC rules that were promulgated in 
accordance with SOX and the listing standards that SROs 
introduced in response to the latter failed to give rise either to 
an effective ex ante or to an ex post private control of the risk 
management function. The ex ante private control of the risk 
management function, which managers of the listed 
corporations were supposed to engage in in connection with 
their new financial reporting obligations, proved ineffective 
because of the adoption of a “compliance-by-checklist 
approach” that emphasized form over substance. The ex post 
private control of risk management function, which 
shareholders could develop on the basis of the SOX 
requirements, proved ineffective because neither SOX provided 
to them an explicit direct cause of action for risk management 
failures nor did the US Supreme Court recognized to their 
benefit an implicit cause of action flowing from the SOX; 
additionally, state courts within the scope of derivative 
litigation failed to reshape the directorial fiduciary duties in a 
way so as to include heightened risk management 
requirements on behalf of the management. Thus, US corporate 
law missed the opportunity to introduce an effective system of 
risk management that would help attract long-termist 
investors back to equity markets; US corporate law has, 
therefore, sustained the effects of the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership. 
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corporate law has promoted stock buybacks’ use I back the Third Hypothesis 
and expose corporate law’s silent bias in favor of short-term shareholdership.  
  
3.1. Share repurchases mechanics and the incentives they create 
  
There are three main share buyback methods: (i) the open market 
repurchase program; (ii) the fixed-price self-tender offer; and (iii) the Dutch 
auction self-tender offer  
In the open market repurchase program a company buys its own shares 
on the exchange by keeping substantial flexibility over the timing, size and 
number of shares it buys1097. Of course the details of the program must be 
disclosed to the public prior to its start, but given that the firm must disclose the 
maximum consideration, the maximum number of shares to be acquired and the 
duration of the buyback period nothing prevents it from buying less than the 
maximum shares, for a smaller consideration or stop the repurchases before the 
program’s stated duration1098. Both in Europe and in the US open market 
repurchases are by far the preferred method of conducting a stock buyback1099.  
Within the scope of a fixed-price self-tender offer the firm offers a 
single price to all shareholders for a specific number of shares1100. The self-
tender offer often involves a significant premium to the traded share price and is 
valid for a specified period of time, during which shareholders may subscribe to 
the offer. A fixed-price self-tender offer may be very alluring even for non-
momentum investors, as the premium offered might represent a value well 
above any increase in the share price that the shareholder was expecting in the 
mid-term. A fixed-price self-tender offer is thus a device at the management’s 
toolbox, by which it may offer to the shareholder a premium to divest from the 
firm; it’s a mechanism that reinforces ‘exit’ over ‘voice’ in shareholder 
governance.  
The Dutch auction self-tender offer is to a certain extent coercive to 
shareholders and thus may result in them divesting from the firm before the 
planned time; although not such a popular method, it still has the potential of 
inducing shareholders to shorten their holding period. In a Dutch auction self-
tender offer the firm establishes the maximum number of shares that will be 
repurchased and a price range. Then shareholders may tender at any price within 
the established range. Once the tendering period is over, the firm counts the 
tendered shares starting from those that were tendered at the lowest price and 
moves upwards until the maximum number of shares is reached. The last price 
observed in the counting process is the clearing price and all shares tendered at 
                                                
1097 See Paul Stonham, A Game Plan for Share Repurchases, 20 EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 37 
1098 For the EU see Art. 4(2) Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003 of 22 December 2003 implementing 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards exemptions for buy-back 
programmes and stabilization of financial instruments. 
1099 See Theo Vermaelen, Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signalling: An Empirical Study, 9 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 138 
1100 Gustavo Grullon & David Ikenberry, What Do We Know About Stock Repurchases?, 13 JOURNAL OF 
APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 31, 31 
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that price or below that are eventually those repurchased by the firm. If the 
maximum price in the price range that the firm sets is well above any increase in 
the share price that the shareholder would expect in the near-term, then she has 
the incentive to tender at a price below the maximum, so as not run the danger to 
liquidate her investment at a lower price later. The Dutch auction self-tender 
offer has the potential of shortening the average holding period of stock in the 
firm’s shareholder base. 
In Section 7.4.2. of Chapter One I pointed to the increasing number of 
share repurchases during the post-Bretton Woods era. I explained this rise by 
stating that stock buybacks are compared to dividends a preferred vehicle of 
distribution for firms, because they serve better both the interests of 
shareholders, as well as the interests of managers.   
In a nutshell, I stated that by initiating a stock buyback the firm is 
signaling to the market that the share price is lower than a valuation of the firm’s 
fundamentals would suggest and is boosting earnings per share. Thus, share 
buybacks are used as signaling devices that help pump the share price up 1101; 
managers benefit because the ensuing higher share price functions as a ‘natural’ 
takeover defense and because it allows them to realize higher capital gains by 
cashing in their stock options, while shareholders benefit by being able to realize 
higher capital gains by selling their stock.  
The above statements are reiterated to show, why firms would prefer to 
distribute free cash flow by engaging in stock buybacks rather than by paying 
dividends. The assumption that share repurchases and dividends are 
substitutable vehicles of distribution is backed by empirical evidence that shows 
that firms buying back shares do it with funds that would have otherwise been 
used to increase the dividend level1102. This assumption coupled with the fore 
stated advantages of equity repurchases suggest that all things being equal firms 
have the tendency to pay out profits to shareholders by buying back stock from 
them, rather than by paying dividends. It follows that the more a legal regime 
facilitates share repurchases, the greater the number of share repurchases will 
be; the more the law facilitates the distribution mechanism that firms prefer, the 
more the latter are going to use it.  
Prima facie, as long as share repurchases stay within the boundaries set 
by securities regulation1103, and they do not result in an unacceptable 
manipulation of the market, there seems to be nothing wrong with them or with 
a legal regime that encourages them. Nevertheless, apart from the remarks made 
right above regarding the divestment incentives stock buybacks create to 
shareholders, in this part I claim further that equity repurchases is food for short-
termist shareholders, so that the more a firm uses them as a vehicle for 
distributions, the greater the number of short-termists gathering in its 
shareholder base is. Thus, if corporate law in the post-Bretton Woods era is 
                                                
1101 See Ofer & Thakor, supra note 548 
1102 See Gustavo Grullon & Roni Michaely, Dividends, Share Repurchases and the Substitution 
Hypothesis, 57 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1649 
1103 e.g. Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003, supra note 1098 
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found to be contributing to the greater use of equity repurchases, then it is 
indirectly contributing to the proliferation of short-termism in corporate 
governance and the increasing abandonment of equity investments by long-
termist investors. In other words, if corporate law is found to be increasingly 
facilitating stock repurchases, then the Third Hypothesis makes a valid point. 
 
3.2. Why short-termists prefer firms that pay with stock buybacks 
 
Momentum investors seek to profit from small differentials in the price 
of the stock. When the share price guarantees a profit to the short-termist 
institutional investor the investment manager puts a sell order. This order is 
often broken into several trades. This sequence of trades (‘sell package’) is 
executed over several days, since not all of the shares that the trading desk has 
received an order to dispose of have found a buyer the very first day of the 
trading sequence. However, this unavoidable delay in the actual execution of 
trades comes at a cost for the selling institution, because as a result of the sell 
order the supply of that specific stock increases with demand for it not 
necessarily changing instantly; therefore, a lower price equilibrium is created for 
the stock. This price impact of multi-day sell packages is documented in 
empirical studies, which identify that the price of the stock declines by several 
basis points between the first and the last day of the execution1104. 
In quantitative finance the actual loss in value caused by the market 
impact of the selling pressure that the institution creates is measured in the 
framework of execution costs. ‘Execution cost’ is the difference between the 
final average trade price, including commissions, fees and all other costs and a 
suitable benchmark price representing a hypothetical perfectly executed 
trade1105. Of course commission, taxes and exchange fees are excluded from the 
quantitative analysis of execution costs because they are predictable; what 
counts to see whether there was loss of value in the sell package is the price 
discrepancy between the benchmark price and the actual price, at which the 
stock was sold. The standard benchmark price in equity trading is the arrival 
price, i.e. the quoted market price in effect at the time the order was released to 
the trading desk1106. Empirical studies have shown that when measured relative 
to this benchmark the principal-weighted average of the market impact cost is 
fairly large for institutions that seek to make a short-term profit by taking 
advantage of small price differentials1107. 
                                                
1104 See Louis Chan & Josef Lakonishok, The Behavior of Stock Prices Around Institutional Trades, 4 
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1147 (22bp for the trades of 37 large investment managers in the US between 
1986 and 1988) 
1105 Robert Almgren, Execution Costs, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE (2009) 
1106 Id. 
1107 Chan & Lakonishok, supra note 1104, 1161 (35bp for the trades of 37 large investment managers in 
the US between 1986 and 1988); Jacob Bikker et al., Market Impact Costs of Institutional Equity Trades, 
26 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE 974 (33bp for the trades of the largest Dutch 
pension fund in the first quarter of 2002); Donald Keim & Ananth Madhavan, Transaction Costs and 
Investment Style: An Inter-Exchange Analysis of Institutional Equity Trades, 46 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL 
ECONOMICS 265 (between 55bp and 143bp for the trades of 21 US institutions in the period between 
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It follows from the above analysis that short-termists fight with 
execution costs and will be tempted to buy stock from an issuer that is likely to 
help them have a smaller loss by the market impact that their selling pressure 
creates when they want to divest from the issuer’s securities. Issuers conducting 
stock buybacks purchase their shares en masse with the result being that the 
orders of their buy package buffer the market impact of the selling pressure of 
shareholders and allow the latter to incur smaller execution costs1108. Therefore, 
short-termists seeking to make a profit by taking advantage of small price 
differentials will rationally prefer to invest in firms that conduct stock buybacks 
regularly; their profit can thus be several basis points higher, if their sell order is 
matched by the firm’s buy order in the framework of a stock buyback. 
 In fact, the connection between stock buybacks and short-termist 
shareholders is so strong that it has led to the construction of the ‘monitoring 
hypothesis’ that suggests that one of the determinants of share repurchases 
decisions is the willingness of the management of the issuer to attract short-
termist shareholders that engage in less active monitoring than long-term 
investors1109. 
 
3.3. Why long-termist shareholders prefer dividend-paying stock 
 
Unlike short-termists, long-termist shareholders prefer investing in 
dividend-paying stock instead of stock issued by firms, whose payout policy 
relies heavily on equity repurchases. The reason for that preference is found in 
tax law. In several jurisdictions a short-term capital gain is taxed unfavorably 
compared to the capital gain realized on stock that was held by the investor for a 
considerable amount of time1110. As a result, investors, who do not seek to make 
                                                                                                              
1991 and 1993); Ian Domowitz et al., Liquidity, Volatility and Equity Trading Costs across Countries and 
over Time, 4 INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 221 (executions costs for 42 countries in the period between 1996 
and 1998: from 30bp average execution costs in France to 138bp average execution costs in Korea); 
Carole Comerton Forde et al., Transaction Costs and Institutional Trading in Small-Cap Equity Funds, 
35 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 313 (32bp for trades of 12 small-cap equity funds active in 
the Australian Stock Exchange in the period 1996 to 2004) 
1108 Jose-Miguel Gaspar et al., Can Buybacks be a Product of Shorter Shareholder Horizons?, AFA 2005 
Philadelphia Meeting Paper, 7. Available at SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649482 ; Franklin Allen et al., A Theory of Dividends 
Based on Tax Clienteles, 55 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2499 (claim that firms pay dividends –instead of 
conducting stock buybacks- to attract institutional investors with monitoring abilities) 
1109 Id. 
1110 Jurisdictions with favorable long-term capital gains tax include: Australia (shares held for more than a 
year means capital gains are calcuclated as discounted (50%) in the assessable income), Austria (capital 
gains realized on shares held for more than a year are tax-exempt), Czech Republic (capital gains realized 
on shares held for more than six months are tax-exempt), France (capital gains realized on shares held for 
more than 3 years in innovative new companies are –under certain conditions- tax-exempt), Germany 
(capital gains on shares held for more than a year and representing less than 1% of the firm’s nominal 
capital are tax-exempt), Greece (no capital gains tax if shares are held for more than a year), Korea 
(capital gains on shares representing more than 3% of the firm’s share capital and held for more than one 
year are taxed 10% less), Luxembourg (capital gains on shares held more than six months are tax-
exempt), US (capital gains on shares held less than a year are taxed at the marginal ordinary PIT rate, 
while the capital gains for shares held for more than one year are taxed at a 15% rate); see OECD TAX 
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a quick profit by taking advantage of small differentials in the stock price, 
effectively defer/’lock in’ their unrealized capital gains, because they expect the 
present value of their after-tax gains from selling in the future to exceed the 
after-tax gains from selling today. This is called a ‘capital gains overhang’ and 
its occurrence among those who seek something more than a mere profit from a 
small price differential is well-documented in empirical literature1111. 
Shareholders deferring the sale of their holdings may well be 
structurally long-termists and as such prepared to make illiquid investments, but 
a long-term equity investment is not supposed to be totally illiquid given the 
possibility of periodical distribution of dividends by the issuer. Therefore, a non-
momentum investor that due to the capital gains overhang defers the divestment 
from the stock she invests in for a certain point in the future will prefer a 
dividend-paying stock because that will allow her to enjoy some liquidity until 
the time of divestment comes. An issuer who distributes a greater part of its free 
cash flow through stock buybacks is making to the non-momentum investor an 
offer that she cannot accept because of the ‘lock-in’ effect; therefore, stock of 
issuers that conduct more share repurchases and thus necessarily distribute 
lower dividends will be avoided by non-momentum investors that with the help 
of tax law become long-term shareholders. 
 
3.4. The corporate law-propelled increase of equity repurchases 
 
Traditionally, the corporate law of co-ordinated market economies 
(‘CMEs’) (see Section 4.1. of the Introduction) views equity repurchases with 
suspicion. At the heart of the capital maintenance system of CMEs’ corporate 
law lies the limitation of the distribution of net assets to shareholders for the 
benefit of creditors1112; a stock repurchase represents a distribution of net assets 
and thus if the capital maintenance system is to function properly, buybacks 
should be controlled. Especially, if the price offered by the firm to repurchase 
the stock is higher than the actual value of the share, then the premium 
                                                                                                              
POLICY STUDIES NO. 14, TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS OF INDIVIDUALS: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND 
APPROACHES (2006), Table 1.1. 
1111 See Martin Feldstein et al., The Effects of Taxation on the Selling of Corporate Stock and the 
Realization of Capital Gains, 94 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 777; Wayne Landsman & 
Douglas Shackelford, The Lock-in Effect of Capital Gains Taxes: Evidence from the RJR Nabisco 
Leveraged Buyout, 48 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL 245; Peter Klein, The Capital Gain Lock-in Effect and 
Long Horizon Return Reversal, 59 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 33; Benjamin Ayers et al., 
Shareholder Taxes in Acquisition Premiums: The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation, 58 JOURNAL OF 
FINANCE 2785; Jennifer Blouin et al., Capital Gains Taxes and Equity Trading: Empirical Evidence, 41 
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 611; Zoran Ivkovic et al., Tax-motivated Trading by Individual 
Investors, 95 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1605; Li Jin, Capital Gains Tax Overhang and Price 
Pressure, 61 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1399; Zhonglan Dai, Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices: 
Capitalization or Lock-in?, 63 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 709  
1112 See Second Council Directive (77/91/EEC) of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of 
companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the 
formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a 
view to making such safeguards equivalent. 
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distributed to the shareholder could result in the net assets of the firm becoming 
lower than the amount of the subscribed capital plus the undistributable 
reserves. In other words, the avoidance of the watering down of the legal capital 
as a result of the stock buyback is the main reason why the CME approach to 
equity repurchases is traditionally so rigid compared e.g. to the US where share 
repurchases were always welcome because of capital maintenance being 
effected through the balance sheet and the equity insolvency tests1113. 
As a result, the general principle in CMEs was the prohibition of share 
repurchases with exceptions permissible under very strict conditions. As far as 
the EU jurisdictions that this study deals with are concerned, the Second 
Directive left them free to decide whether they would allow stock buybacks or 
not; if eventually allowed, the Directive required the Member States to subject 
the buyback to strict conditions that inter alia required the buyback’s 
authorization by the shareholders’ meeting every 18 months and the value of the 
redeemed shares not to exceed 10% of the subscribed capital1114. 
However, the increasing acknowledgment of the benefits of stock 
buybacks prompted EU jurisdictions to follow the example of other CMEs, such 
as Japan1115, and relax their approach towards this vehicle of distribution.  
Following the so-called ‘Esambert report’ that advocated for the 
facilitation of share repurchases on the basis of shareholder value creation1116 
France implemented in 1998 a new legal regime1117 applicable to share 
buybacks that essentially lifted the general principle of prohibition of share 
buybacks that existed under French corporate law previously. Under the pre-
1998 regime French firms could buy back their own shares to annul them and 
reduce their capital, to distribute them to their employees within the scope of a 
stock option scheme and to stabilize their share price in the stock exchange1118.  
Following the liberalization of the French legal regime the shareholders’ 
meeting could authorize –along the lines of the Second Directive- the board to 
conduct a stock buyback in pursuit of several other objectives. Therefore, 
distributions of free cash flow to shareholders through stock buybacks became 
legal in France. After the liberalization of the regime the total value of share 
repurchases in France skyrocketed1119 (Figure 33); this implies according to the 
analysis in Sections 3.2. and 3.3. above that a greater number of short-termist 
                                                
1113 See CLARK, supra note 912, 610ff. 
1114 Art. 19 of the Second Directive, supra note 1112, as it was before its amendment through Directive 
2006/68/EC. 
1115 For the gradual move of Japanese corporate law during the 1990s from the prohibition of share 
repurchases to their permissibility see Zenichi Shishido, The Turnaround of 1997: Changes in Japanese 
Corporate Law and Governance. Available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/Paper_-
_The_Turnaround_of_1997.pdf  
1116 Bernard Esambert, Rapport sur le rachat par les sociétés de leurs propres actions (January 1998). 
Available at: http://www.amf-france.org/documents/general/3269_1.pdf 
1117 Art. 41, Loi 98-536 du 2 juillet 1998 
1118 Art. 217 & 217-2 of Loi no 55-637 du 24 juillet 1966 
1119 See Asma Benltaifa, Corporate Payout Policy in France: Dividends vs. Share Repurchase (2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1836863  
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shareholders gathered around French firms from 1998 onwards and a greater 
number of long-termists divested from French equity. 
In 1998 a similar reform facilitating considerably equity repurchases 
was made in Germany. Before 1998 German corporate law allowed share 
repurchases under exceptional circumstances, such as to prevent an imminent 
damage to the company, to award shares to the employees, to compensate 
shareholders in specific circumstances and to execute a reduction of capital1120. 
From 19941121 onwards only financial institutions had the discretion on the basis 
of an authorization by the shareholders’ meeting to execute stock buybacks for 
purposes of securities trading1122. In 1998 the KonTraG1123 liberalized –along 
the lines of the Second Directive- the legal regime of stock buybacks also for 
non-financial corporations adding another permissible objective for the 
execution of share repurchases. As a result, after 1998 the total value of share 
repurchases in Germany skyrocketed (Figure 33); this implies according to the 
analysis in Sections 3.2. and 3.3. above that a greater number of short-termist 
shareholders gathered around German firms from 1998 onwards and a greater 
number of long-termists divested from German equity. 
Soon after these reforms though the entire legal capital regime of the 
Second Directive came under attack because of its rigidity and the European 
Commission initiated a consultation process to modernize it1124. A working 
group made recommendations on the Simplification of the Legislation on the 
Internal Market (‘SLIM’) and advocated for the further facilitation of equity 
repurchases1125. The recommendations were partially adopted by the European 
Parliament in March 20061126 and thus the amending Directive 2006/68/EC was 
enacted that brought two significant changes to the Second Directive’s legal 
regime governing share repurchases in the Member States. First, national 
corporate laws may provide that the authorization by the shareholders’ meeting 
to the board to execute stock buybacks is valid for a period up to five years, 
rather than 18 months that it was previously1127. Secondly –and most important-, 
national corporate laws are free to provide that the redeemed treasury shares 
may represent more than 10% of the subscribed capital1128, while previously 
10% was the maximum limit. 
Following the transposition of the amended Directive into their national 
laws France and Germany chose not to raise the maximum limit that treasury 
                                                
1120 AktG 71(1) 
1121 Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel und zur Änderung börsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher 
Vorschriften (Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) vom 26.07.1994 
1122 AktG 71(1) no.7 
1123 See supra note 887; AktG 71(1) no.8 
1124 ADRIAAN DORRESTEIJN ET AL., EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW (2ND ED.) (2009), 54 
1125 See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Results of the Fourth 
Phase of SLIM, COM(2000) 56 final; Proposal for a Directive Amending Council Directive 77/91/EEC, 
COM(2004) 730 final 
1126 IP/06/312, Brussels 14 March 2006 
1127 Art. 19(1)(a) Second Directive 
1128 Art. 19(1)(i) Second Directive 
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shares may represent above 10%1129. The Netherlands though dropped the 
maximum entirely and left it up to the general meeting to decide whether there 
are going to be any limits in the authorized stock buybacks1130. As a result the 
total value of share repurchases increased considerably in The Netherlands 
following the transposition of the amendment in May 2007 (Figure 34); even 
before that date the AMF, i.e. the Dutch financial markets supervision authority, 
had approved share repurchases over the 10% limit, when it became clear that 
the new regime would be more enabling. The increase implies according to the 
analysis in Sections 3.2. and 3.3. above that a greater number of short-termist 
shareholders gathered around Dutch firms from 2007 onwards and a greater 
number of long-termists divested from Dutch equity. 
                                                
1129 Art. L.225-210 Code de Commerce; AktG 71(8) 
1130 2:98(4) BW 
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Stock Buybacks and the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership 
 
The price impact of multi-day sell packages drives 
up the execution costs for short-termist traders who want 
to take advantage of small price differentials. Issuers 
conducting stock buybacks purchase their shares en masse 
with the result being that the orders of their buy package 
buffer the market impact of the selling pressure of short-
termist shareholders and allow the latter to incur smaller 
execution costs. It follows that short-termist shareholders 
will prefer to invest in firms that distribute their profits by 
conducting share buybacks. On the contrary, long-termist 
shareholders who want to sell their equity holdings at a 
later stage in order to have a greater after-tax capital gain 
will prefer dividend-paying stock, since that provides them 
with liquidity during the prolonged holding period. It 
follows that long-termist shareholders will prefer to invest 
in firms that distribute their profits through dividends.  
But, managers in the age of financialization have 
the natural tendency to distribute profits through stock 
buybacks rather than through dividends because of 
repurchases’ signaling and EPS boosting effects. Therefore, 
the more corporate law facilitates stock buybacks the more 
firms will naturally take advantage of the opportunity to 
repurchase their stock. 
In the EU stock buybacks were facilitated in two 
waves. First, through a reform in national corporate laws in 
the late 1990s that effectively lifted the legal prohibition on 
distributing profits through stock buybacks and second 
through the amendement of the Second Directive that 
allowed Member States to drop the maximum limit in the 
percentage of shares that can be repurchased. As a result, 
stock buybacks in the EU skyrocketed after these reforms 
effectively attracting more short-termist shareholders into 
EU corporations’ shareholder base and driving away long-
termist investors from EU equity investments. 
Consequently, corporate law in the EU has shown its silent 
bias towards short-termism, thus sustaining the Great 
Reversal in Shareholdership and proving that the Third 
Hypothesis makes a valid point. 
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4. Corporate law as an impediment to the introduction of loyalty structures 
in corporate governance 
 
As mentioned in the introductory part to Chapter Four the Third 
Hypothesis claims that corporate law reforms in the post-Bretton Woods era 
have had two consequences, when it comes to the issue of shareholders’ time-
horizons: (i) they escalated the divestment of structurally long-termist 
institutional investors from equity positions; and (ii) they have preserved the 
trend towards shareholder short-termism that other institutions have directly 
caused. While the corporate law developments regarding risk management and 
equity repurchases presented under Sections 2 and 3 above relate to the former 
ramification, this section deals with corporate legal provisions that relate to the 
latter ramification. To be more precise, the goal of this part is to show that 
certain corporate rules applicable in the four EU jurisdictions scrutinized in this 
study may be functioning as a repellent for loyalty structures, which could foster 
long-term shareholdership. Rules deriving from primary and secondary EU law 
that enjoy primacy over national corporate laws appear to have such a far-
reaching effect, so as to effectively deprive corporations from the tools, which 
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have more long-term shareholders. In other words, EU law indirectly does not 
allow firms to engage in shareholder eugenics and employ ‘shaping’ or 
‘socialization’ strategies, by which their short-termist shareholders would be 
transformed into long-termist shareholders1131. Firms introducing loyalty 
structures risk to be found defendants in lawsuits brought by shareholders, who 
might think they have been treated unfairly compared to the ‘loyalists’.  
The EU rules, whose influence on potential loyalty structures is studied 
in this part, are of two kinds. Firstly, there are the rules deriving from primary 
EU law, i.e. the Treaty provisions, as interpreted by the ECJ, that deal with the 
free movement of capital (Art. 63 TFEU). Secondly, there are the rules deriving 
from secondary EU law; the principle of equal treatment of shareholders with 
regard to distributions (Art. 42 Second Directive) and the rules of the Takeover 
Directive. The Treaty provision on the free movement of capital and the 
principle of equal treatment of shareholders with regard to distributions share 
something in common: they are both ambiguous and susceptible to dynamic 
interpretation1132. These attributes render the issue of whether they impede or 
not shareholder eugenics and the introduction of loyalty structures in corporate 
governance mainly an issue of legal interpretation. This legal interpretation is 
unavoidably affected by the dominant conceptual approaches to European 
integration and to corporate governance. In other words, the structural (legal) 
difficulties that the introduction of loyalty structures into European corporations 
incurs may be nothing more than a mere spillover effect of the way the Member 
States are integrating into an Internal Market with the help of supranational 
agents like the ECJ, as well as of the institutional logics of corporate governance 
and capital markets. 
In the following sub-sections I attempt to make my case by presenting 
the two most popular loyalty structures that authors and policymakers allege 
they can steer long-term shareholdership, i.e. time-phased voting rights and 
loyalty dividends, and then show how primary and secondary EU law may 
actually be preventing their introduction. The ‘anti-loyalty’ direction that the 
interpretation of the rule on the free movement of capital and the principle of 
equal treatment of shareholders may take coupled with the outright effect of the 
Takeover Directive make firms shun using security design (i.e. awarding extra 
voting rights or bonus dividends to loyalists) to craft their shareholder base in a 
way, so as it can feature more long-termists.  
To be sure, I do not agree with the ‘anti-loyalty’ direction that the legal 
interpretation of EU rules might be taking, as I believe that the relevant debate 
must be informed by the First Hypothesis that exposes the damage that short-
termism can do to growth. The purpose of this part though is merely to reveal 
                                                
1131 See Edward Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
INST. FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS, Research Paper No. 11-26 (August 2011). Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910681  
1132 See Giulio Itzcovich, The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice, 10 
GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 537, 555ff. 
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the problem that might exist with the current rules as a positive rather than as a 
normative issue.  
 
4.1. Time-phased voting rights: How they might stumble upon the free 
movement of capital and the Takeover Directive 
 
Time-phased voting rights, more commonly known as ‘loyalty 
shares’1133, are extra voting rights awarded to shareholders, who have registered 
their shares and have held their stock for a specific amount of time determined 
in the corporation’s articles of association1134. This loyalty structure is of course 
out of the question in jurisdictions that have institutionalized the 1S/1V rule or 
that prohibit multiple voting rights. In the US (coercively imposed) time-phased 
voting rights programs are effectively prohibited under SEC Rule 19c-41135, 
while from the EU jurisdictions under scrutiny in this study Germany prohibits 
multiple voting rights and thus German corporations cannot benefit from the 
loyalty benefits that would flow from the introduction of time-phased voting 
rights into corporate governance1136. The other European jurisdictions studied 
here do not have a blanket ban on disproportionate voting, but certain 
(corporate) legal institutions of EU origin that regulate the corporate governance 
of their firms might cumulatively be generating a structural bias against the 
adoption of time-phased voting rights. That is to say that none of the EU legal 
institutions that are presented below may alone have a decisive disincentivizing 
effect on the adoption of this loyalty structure. Nevertheless, these institutions 
taken together might actually be doing the damage and not encouraging firms to 
move towards long-termism through the designing of time-phased voting rights. 
 
4.1.1. How does the mechanism of time-phased voting rights work: The 
example of French double voting rights 
  
The paradigm type of loyalty shares is the one issued by French firms 
pursuant to an enabling provision of French corporate law1137. According to this 
provision a shareholder may receive in connection to her share a double voting 
right, if she has held this share continuously for a period of at least two years. 
The shareholder must have previously registered her shares in the firm’s share 
                                                
1133 Koen Geens & Carl Clottens, One Share – One Vote: Fairness, Efficiency and (the Case for) EU 
Harmonisation Revisited, in THE EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW ACTION PLAN REVISITED – REASSESSMENT 
OF THE 2003 PRIORITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (K. HOPT & K. GEENS, EDS.) (2011), 175-176  
1134 Piet Duffhues, Geen Loyaliteitsdividend voor Langetermijnaandeelhouders, 84 MAANDBLAD VOOR 
ACCOUNTANCY EN BEDRIJFSECONOMIE 303, 312; Matthijs de Jongh, Reactie: Loyaal aan Duurzame 
Waardecreatie, 17 ONDERNEMINGSRECHT  706, 707 
1135 See John Elofson, Lie Back and Think of Europe: American Reflections on the EU Takeover 
Directive, 22 WISCONSIN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 523, 554 (fn. 111) 
1136 AktG §12(2). Apart from Germany a strict prohibition of multiple voting rights is found in the laws of 
Belgium (Art. 541 Code des sociétés), Spain (Art. 50.2 Ley de 1989), Portugal (Art. 384 of the 
Portuguese company law of 1.11.1986) and Italy (Art. 2351, comma 4 Codice Civile). In none of these 
jurisdictions would the introduction of time-phased voting rights be possible. 
1137 Code de Commerce L. 225-123 
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registry. Once awarded, the double voting right cannot be transferred with the 
share, since it is not attached to the latter, but it is awarded to the person holding 
it by virtue of her loyalty. That means that contrary to what happens in 
Scandinavian jurisdictions, where multiple-voting stock belongs to one class of 
shares and common 1S/1V shares to another class1138, in France the loyalty 
shares belong to the same class with the firm’s 1S/1V shares1139. Because of the 
fact that the extra voting right disappears upon the transfer, the French loyalty 
shares are not traded at a premium to the common share, as the Scandinavian 
multiple-voting stock does. 
The mechanism of time-phased voting rights allows long-term 
shareholders to keep control of the firm, even when their shareholdings are 
diluted; it is obviously a control-enhancing mechanism that brings about a 
deviation from the 1S/1V principle in the firm’s shareholder structure. Despite 
the criticism exercised to loyalty shares by the shareholder activists’ 
community1140 the majority of French corporations do make use of time-phased 
voting rights1141, since they view the support that long-termist shareholders offer 
as beneficial to the firm’s value and the increased control that accrues to the 
long-termists as a counterbalancing force to the pressure that is exerted upon the 
firm by speculators, whose short-term objectives may not always be aligned to 
the corporate interest1142.  
Indeed the loyalty share has the potential of inducing shareholders to 
hold on their stock for a greater amount of time in order to acquire more 
influence over the corporate affairs. Moreover, once the extra voting right is 
awarded to a shareholder the increased influence the latter has gained generates 
a kind of ‘lock-in’ effect, given that the double-voter shareholder knows that she 
has over the fate of her investment in that particular firm a far greater degree of 
control than she would have been able to secure on any other equivalent 
investment. As a result, the firm will have got rid of some impatient capital that 
is poorly equipped to finance investment and fixed capital formation. The 
induced long-termist shareholders are more likely to allow the funds they 
                                                
1138 Jesper Lau Hansen, A Scandinavian Approach to Corporate Governance, 50 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES 
IN LAW 125, 137ff. 
1139 Nevertheless, it has been asserted that loyalty shares may effectively constitute a separate class of 
stock; see Michel Storck & Thibault de Ravel d’ Esclapon, Faut-il supprimer les actions à droit de vote 
double en droit français?, BULLETIN JOLY SOCIÉTÉS (Janvier 2009) 90 
1140 See Pierre Henry Leroy, En réponse à Claude Bébéar: Contre le droit de vote double!, LES ECHOS No 
20129 du 12.03.2008, 15: ‘Au nom d’ une fidélisation hypothétique, l’ introduction du droit de vote 
double […] fondé sur le nominatif prive malheuresement tous les actionnaires étrangers qui ne peuvent 
ou ne souhaitent être au nominatif de ce droit…Allons donc! Quel investisseur autre celui qui contrôle 
miroritairement l’ assemblée déciderait de conserver ses actions parce qu’ il a des droits de vote double?’ 
1141 A study conducted among 190 firms included in the SBF 250 (the market index representing the 
French firms with the greatest market capitalization) both in 2005 and in 2008 revealed that 68.4% of 
them make use of time-phased voting rights; see Nicolas Chene, Le droit de vote double en France – 
Panorama de son utilization et impact en termes de valorization des sociétés, Mémoire de Recherche à 
HEC Paris (2008), 27. Available at http://www.vernimmen.net/ftp/Nchene_Memoire_DDVdoubles.pdf  
1142 See Chambre de Commerce et d’ Industrie de Paris (CCIP), ‘Une Action = Une Voix’ – Faut-il 
imposer une égalité entre participation au capital et detention du pouvoir? (Raport Norguet), 24 May 
2007. Available at http://www.etudes.ccip.fr/archrap/rap07/une-action=une-voix-nor0705.htm  
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provide the firm with to be recycled into long-term capital-intensive projects 
before the latter come to fruition and the funds return to them in the form of 
dividends or other transitory distributions. 
The loyalty share has the potential of strengthening tremendously the 
voting power of long-termists. The French case of loyalty shares may allow the 
doubling of the voting right of the loyalists, but in other jurisdictions, where the 
issue of loyalty shares is not regulated, private ordering may in principle create 
time-phased voting rights, in the framework of which the long-term 
shareholders’ voting power would be multiplied by more than two. In the mid-
1990s a Delaware firm had initiated a time-phased voting rights plan, pursuant 
to which shareholders having held the stock for three consecutive years received 
ten votes per share, rather than two1143.  
So far, French firms, required by law not to multiply long-termists’ 
voting power by more than two, have not been dragged to court by non-loyalist 
shareholders because of the issuance of loyalty shares. This is most likely 
because the doubling of voting rights of the loyalists has not caused a major 
degree of decoupling between cash flow and control rights in the shareholder 
structure of French firms, so as to be viewed in all cases as an outright control-
enhancing mechanism. Empirical data have shown that only in one out of ten 
French firms has the institution of loyalty shares allowed the effective 
ownership regime to move from dispersed to concentrated and in only one out of 
five cases has the loyalty structure helped dominant shareholders secure the 
absolute majority of votes1144. Indeed, in French firms of concentrated 
ownership that are using loyalty shares the ratio of the dominant shareholders’ 
voting rights to the dominant shareholders’ share capital is on average 1.21, 
which implies that loyalty shares do not cause a provocative degree of 
disconnection between control and cash flow rights1145.  
But, what happens if private ordering in an EU jurisdiction wants to 
dilute the influence of short-termists over corporate governance by quadrupling 
or sextupling the voting power of long-termists? To this question, the following 
sub-sections will attempt to provide an answer. 
 
4.1.2. The free movement of capital as a potential repellent to the 
introduction of time-phased voting rights 
 
In the case of European integration Ernst Haas, the father of the theory 
of international relations, turned out to be wrong about renouncing the 
conceptual framework of neofunctionalism1146, which he had previously created 
to explain the processes of regional integration in the post-War world1147. The 
neofunctionalist analysis of regional integration posits that in a regional 
                                                
1143 See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) 
1144 Chene, supra note 1141, 38 
1145 Id., at 37 
1146 See Emanuel Adler, Ernst Haas’ Theory of International Politics. Remarks Presented on the 
Occasion of Ernst Haas’ retirement celebration (2000) 
1147 See ERNST HAAS, THE OBSOLESCENCE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION THEORY (1975) 
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organization, such as the EU, the members on the one hand set the initial 
agreement and on the other hand try to restrict its overreaching effects. 
Gradually though the promotor members are faced with a situation, where the 
supranational agents that they had established as guardians of the agreement (in 
the case of the EU: the Commission and the ECJ) seek to address the unintended 
consequences that the application of the agreement eventually had on policy 
areas resting outside its initially planned scope. The result is that promotor 
members cannot de facto control the supranational agents’ authority, which 
unavoidably starts expanding into different policy areas1148. Consequently, 
according to the neofunctionalist spirit integration in one policy area inevitably 
leads to integration in another because of a spillover effect. In the case of the 
European integration neofunctionalists noticed that  
 
‘…once fixed in a given domain, European rules –such as relevant treaty 
provisions, secondary legislation, and the European Court of Justice’s 
(ECJ’s) case law- generate a self-sustaining dynamic that leads to the 
gradual deepening of integration in that sector and, not uncommonly, to 
spillovers into other sectors […] these processes gradually, but 
inevitably, reduce the capacity of the member states to control 
outcomes.’1149 
 
Indeed, the Commission and the ECJ evolved into the engines of 
European integration1150 and contributed in leaving behind the vision for the 
creation of a Ricardian free trade zone, where Member States would get to 
capitalize on their comparative advantages and preserve their different 
institutional settings1151.  
At the early phase of European economic integration, which started in 
the 1970s and was consummated in the early 1990s, the ECJ sought through its 
case law to complete product market integration1152. In this phase the ECJ’s 
rulings did not yet put transformative pressure on supply-side institutions, but 
sought to foster competition between the Member States’ different institutional 
settings; this had in principle the potential of reinforcing differences between 
countries, as each one of them would seek to build on its respective strengths 
                                                
1148 John Gerard Ruggie et al., Transformations in World Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst 
B. Haas, 8 ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 271, 279 
1149 Alec Stone Sweet & Wayne Sandholtz, European Integration and Supranational Governance, 4 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 297, 299-300 
1150 See MARK POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND 
AGENDA SETTING IN THE EU (2003) 
1151 Robert Franzese, Comparative Institutional and Policy Advantage: The Scope for Divergence within 
European Economic Integration, 3 EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS 177, 184ff. 
1152 See Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 837; Case 120/78 
Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649; 
Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 
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and capitalize on its comparative advantage, so as to survive the competition in 
the free trade zone1153.  
The forces exerted on the supply-side institutions of the Member States 
appeared, as the European economic integration was entering its next phase. In 
Section 4.2.1. of Chapter One it was explained how the effort to promote the 
EMU gathered steam in the late 1980s with the Single European Act that pushed 
towards complete harmonization pertaining to the issue of free movement of 
capital. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 unequivocally prohibited the restrictions 
on the free movement of capital both between Member States and between the 
latter and third countries (Art. 73b(1) EC Treaty; now Art. 63 TFEU). Following 
the enactment of this provision the ECJ undertook the task of turning it to the 
vehicle, by which European economic integration would enter in its post-
Ricardian phase. The Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital would 
become the force behind the strive towards the creation of a level playing field 
between Member States, where institutional differences would be seen as an 
element of distortion of competition and would thus have to be eliminated1154.  
In 2002 the ECJ delivered three rulings on the issue of golden shares, 
through which it provided an authoritative interpretation of the Treaty 
provisions on the free movement of capital and paved the way for the 
elimination of institutional differences in corporate governance between 
Member States1155. ‘Golden shares’ is an umbrella-term for various forms and 
ways, by which the State may be granted special rights to intervene in the share 
structure and the management of privatized firms1156. In these joined cases the 
Court viewed the French and Portuguese legislation subjecting the acquisition of 
substantial shareholdings in privatized companies to the requirement of prior 
approval as a clear and direct access restriction. This was an unsurprising ruling 
given the ordoliberal approach that the Court had adopted over the years vis-à-
vis public intervention in the economy1157. Nevertheless, in this line of cases the 
Court was faced in respect with the free movement of capital with the 
fundamental question that had previously arisen with regard to all the other 
fundamental freedoms of the Internal Market: only measures, which 
discriminate against the foreign should be caught or any measure restricting 
cross-border movement regardless of whether it has an equivalent domestic 
effect or not? The Court’s view expectedly tilted towards the latter opinion: 
 
‘Even though the rules in issue may not give rise to unequal treatment 
they are liable to impede the acquisition of shares in the undertaking 
                                                
1153 Martin Höpner & Armin Schäfer, A New Phase of European Integration – Organized Capitalisms in 
Post-Ricardian Europe, MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/4, 8 
1154 See Miguel Maduro, Reforming the Market or the State? Article 30 and the European Constitution: 
Economic Freedom and Political Rights, 3 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 55, 61 
1155 Case C-503/1999 Commission v. Belgium, [2002] ECR I-4809; Case C-483/99 Commission v. 
France, [2002] ECR I-4781; Case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal, [2002] ECR I-4731 
1156 Holger Fleischer, Comments on Cases C-367/98, C-483/99 and C-503/99, 40 COMMON MARKET 
LAW REVIEW 493, 493 
1157 See Maduro, supra note 1154, 61-62 
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concerned and to dissuade investors in other Member States from 
investing in the capital of those undertakings.’1158  
 
Therefore, the ECJ adhered to the view that the fact that a Member 
State imposes similar restrictions on domestic transactions is simply 
irrelevant1159; a view, which essentially turns the Treaty provisions on free 
movement into a general proportionality review of national law affecting 
economic activity1160. The implications of this approach can be far-reaching, as 
it paves the way for a broader ‘quality control’ review of national corporate law 
by the ECJ1161. Thus, already since the three golden share cases of 2002 there 
were commentators that shared the view that Art. 63 TFEU ran the same danger 
of overreach as the other freedoms1162.  
This view was further reinforced after the issuance of the 2006 
Volkswagen ruling1163 that consummated a second wave of golden share cases, 
in the framework of which structures that limited one’s control over the 
investment were acknowledged as non-permissible under the Treaty provisions 
on the free movement of capital1164. Following the Volkswagen case 
commentators noted that ‘the Court is in fact creating a set of EU-based values 
on regulating companies, rather than purely safeguarding the interests of market 
integration’1165. This is because in the Volkswagen case the Court moved one 
step further and sought to put under the test corporate law rules, given that the 
voting cap and the supermajority requirement under scrutiny were provided for 
by a special statute regulating Volkswagen AG and did not directly favor the 
state authorities, as in previous golden share cases1166. 
The Court’s approach in Volkswagen has made commentators wonder 
whether, in the aftermath of the failed effort by the Commission to harmonize 
corporate law with regard to the issue of the 1S/1V principle through measures 
of secondary EU law1167, the Court is flirting with the idea of turning primary 
EU law into the vehicle of institutionalization of the 1S/1V principle at the EU 
                                                
1158 Case C-367/98, supra note 1175, paras. 44-45; Case C-483/99, supra note 1175, paras. 40-41. 
1159 See Case C-412/93 Société d’ Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité SA and M6 
Publicité SA, [1995] ECR I-179, Opinion of AG Jacobs 
1160 Eleanor Spaventa, From Gebhard to Carpenter – Towards a (Non)economic European Constitution, 
41 CMLR 743 
1161 Wolf-Georg Ringe, Company Law and Free Movement of Capital, 69 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 
378, 379 
1162 Leo Flynn, Coming of Age: The Free Movement of Capital Case Law 1993-2002, 39 COMMON 
MARKET LAW REVIEW  773, 783-4 
1163 Case C-112/05, Commission v. Germany, [2007] ECR I-8995 
1164 See Joined Cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v. Netherlands, [2006] ECR I-9141; Case C-
326/07 Commission v. Italy, Judgment of 26 March 2009 
1165 Ringe, supra note 1161, 379 
1166 Jonathan Rickford, Free Movement of Capital and Protectionism after Volkswagen and Viking Line, 
in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (M. TISON ET AL., EDS.) (2009), 61 
1167 See Commissioner McCreevy, Speech at the European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee, 3 
October 2007, Sppech/07/592 
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level1168. In such a case structures that disentangle ownership and control, such 
as time-phased voting rights, would be running the risk of being found 
incompatible with Art. 63 TFEU. But, this would require the Court to recognize 
that the Treaty provision on the free movement of capital has horizontal direct 
effect, so that control-enhancing mechanisms will be problematic not only if 
they favor the State, but also if they favor private shareholders1169. Only then 
could Art. 63 TFEU be interpreted as creating individual rights, which national 
courts must protect1170 and only then could time-phased voting rights, provided 
that they are recognized as falling within the ambit of the prohibition of Art. 63 
TFEU, be challenged in court by non-loyalist shareholders. 
While there is no doubt that Art. 63 TFEU generates a vertical direct 
effect, it seems that the golden shares line of cases carries in it the seed of a 
future recognition of horizontal direct effect, since in these cases the Court did 
not distinguish between statutory law and provisions that are featured in the 
firm’s articles of association1171. Therefore, one cannot exclude that the Court 
might employ a similar analysis even when the benefit from the deviation from 
the 1S/1V principle flows to private parties1172. Indeed, it has indeed been 
suggested that  
 
‘one cannot easily justify scrutinizing rules which only restrict specific 
investment possibilities under the fundamental freedoms, just because 
they favour public entities and, on the other hand, not scrutinizing rules 
that have the same effect, but affect the market as a whole (i.e. rules with 
structural effect) only because they favour private law entities as 
founders or majority shareholders.’1173  
 
In light of the above, the scheme of time-phased voting rights, 
introduced into a firm’s corporate governance structure on the basis of an 
enabling provision in the state’s corporate law, might be seen on the basis of the 
reasoning of the Court as a governance arrangement impeding the free 
movement of capital, since as a potential control-enhancing mechanism it might 
be disincentivizing investors from other Member States to buy shares in the firm 
that has adopted the time-phased voting rights program1174. It is possible then 
that in the future private firms will be thought of on the basis of Art. 63 TFEU 
                                                
1168 Wolf-Georg Ringe, Deviations from Ownership-Control Proportionality – Economic Protectionism 
Revisited, in COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM (U. BERNITZ & WG RINGE, EDS.) (2010), 
213 
1169 Ringe, supra note 1178, 389 
1170 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 
1171 Ringe, supra note 1161, 215 
1172 Wolf-Georg Ringe, Case C-112/05, Commission v. Germany (‘VW law’), Judgment of the Grand 
Chamber of 23 October 2007, 45 CMLR 537 
1173Stefan Grundmann & Florian Möslein, Golden Shares – State Control in Privatised Companies: 
Comparative Law, European Law and Policy Aspects (Working Paper, April 2003),, 24 
1174 Walter Bayer, Zulässige und unzulässige Einschränkungen der europäischen Grundfreiheiten im 
Gesellschaftsrecht, BETRIEBS-BERATER (2002), 2289, 2290 
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as having the obligation to approximate the 1S/1V structure and if they violate it 
they might be held liable in national courts1175.  
The possibility of recognizing Art. 63 TFEU as having a horizontal 
direct effect, particularly when this effect would help to capture deviations from 
the 1S/1V, becomes even greater, when considering that among the Treaty 
provisions that have in the past been acknowledged as horizontally directly 
effective were those that mandated the abstention on behalf of individuals from 
discriminatory behavior vis-à-vis their counterparties1176. Accordingly, the Court 
may be tempted to apply Art. 63 TFEU horizontally in a way that prohibits time-
phased voting rights by asserting that through this loyalty structure a firm 
exhibits a discriminatory behavior against the short-termist shareholders without 
an objective justification1177.  
In light of the above, the dynamic interpretation of Art. 63 TFEU by the 
ECJ might, particularly in this post-Ricardian phase of European integration, be 
generating a structural bias against time-phased voting rights that coupled with 
the provisions of the Takeover Directive that are examined below jointly act in a 
disincentivizing way for the adoption of this loyalty structure that has the 
potential of stimulating long-term shareholdership. 
 
4.1.3. The mandatory bid rule as a potential repellent to the introduction of 
time-phased voting rights      
 
Many might not perceive the Treaty provisions on the free movement of 
capital as a potent threat for a firm adopting a time-phased voting rights 
program, but there can be little doubt regarding the impact that the mandatory 
bid rule of the Takeover Directive1178 will have on the proper functioning of this 
loyalty device in the EU jurisdictions that are studied here.  
Commentators have indeed noted that time-phased voting rights may 
lead to unpleasant surprises for loyal shareholders because of the mandatory bid 
rule (Art. 5 Takeover Directive)1179. The completion of a loyalty period on 
behalf of the shareholder, which according to the time-phased voting rights 
program brings automatically the doubling (or greater multiplication) of the 
loyalist’s voting rights, may result in the loyalist crossing the mandatory bid 
threshold and thus be obliged to make a bid to the minority shareholders. 
Negative implications for the shareholders in connection with the mandatory bid 
rule derive not only from the award of extra voting rights to a shareholder, but 
                                                
1175 CHALMERS, supra note 346, 274; Case 36/74 Walrave, [1974] ECR, 1405, 1419ff; Case 13-76 Donά, 
[1976] ECR, 1333, 1340ff.; Case C-415/93 Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921, 5065-5067; Case 58/80 Dansk 
Supermarked, [1981] ECR, 181, 195 
1176 See Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 2) [1976] ECR 455 that recognized that to regulate the issue 
of equal pay for men and women Art. 157(1) TFEU should be generating a horizontal direct effect; Case 
C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR I-4139 recognizing a 
horizontal effect to the discrimination ban in Art. 45 TFEU 
1177 See Ringe, supra note 1161, 393 
1178 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover 
bids. 
1179 Geens & Clottens, supra note 1133, 176 
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also from the fact that the extra voting right disappears, when the stock is 
transferred. Thus, a shareholder with a substantial shareholding in a firm can be 
suddenly found to have crossed the mandatory bid threshold, when another 
loyalist shareholder, who had previously been awarded multiple voting rights, 
transfers her shares with the result being that the voting power of the former 
shareholder concentrates again and is automatically recalculated at a greater 
percentage. The effects that the mandatory bid rule can have for potentially 
loyalist shareholders, but also for shareholders with potentially substantial 
shareholdings in a firm that has adopted a time-phased voting rights plan is by 
itself an adequate disincentive for the adoption of such schemes by corporations. 
Therefore, the fact that loyalty shares, contrary to other types of 
multiple-voting shares that are classified into a separate class, would continue 
according to the Takeover Directive to carry their extra voting rights in the 
general meeting deciding on the adoption of takeover defenses, as well as in the 
first post-bid general meeting1180, is eventually of little significance given the 






4.2. Loyalty dividends: How they might stumble upon the principle of equal 
treatment of shareholders 
 
4.2.1. The mechanics of a loyalty dividend plan: The example of 
Koninklijke DSM N.V.  
 
The loyalty dividend has been described as the most interesting 
proposal for redressing the balance between short-termism and long-run 
value1182. It is a mechanism, by which the firm can engage in shareholder 
eugenics and craft its shareholder base, so as to induce more of its shareholders 
to stay committed in the firm. The loyalty dividend gives shareholders, who 
have registered their shares in the firm’s registry and hold on to them for a 
specified amount of time, a dividend premium, a bonus dividend1183. This 
                                                
1180 According to Art. 11(3) & (4) of the Takeover Directive multiple-voting securities carry only one 
vote at the general meeting deciding the adoption of post-bid defensive measures and at the first post-bid 
meeting. But, in Art. 1(1)(g) ‘multiple-voting securities’ are only those that belong to a separate class of 
shares, so that loyalty shares that belong to the same class with common shares are excluded from this 
definition. 
1181 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the breakthrough rule would disable the enhanced voting 
rights that long-term shareholders enjoy under a time-phased voting rights plan, but in this suggestion 
probably lies the implicit assumption that once awarded extra voting rights the loyalists’ shares enter into 
a separate class. See Elofson, supra note 1135, 533 (fn. 32) 
1182 Peter Butler, Address to the ICGN Annual Conference in Washington, (July 2006). Available at 
http://www.governanceforowners.com/images/_upload/_pdf/12_comment_44_0.pdf  
1183 However, in the 4th Conference of the Centre of European Company Law in September 2011, where I 
had the opportunity to present the mechanism of the loyalty dividend, Prof. Jaap Winter expressed the 
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dividend premium is a reward for the fact that the shareholder is willing to 
temporarily sacrifice the liquidity of the share1184 and to deal with the additional 
costs that the ‘voice’ route has over the ‘exit’ one1185. In addition to this, 
because of the fact that the shareholder will have to register its share in the share 
registry, in order to be eligible to receive the loyalty dividend upon the 
completion of the loyalty period, the bonus dividend that she receives is also 
viewed as compensation for the depreciation of the share, since it is commonly 
believed that –in jurisdictions where bearer shares are allowed- a registered 
share has reduced tradability compared to a bearer share, because the former’s 
transfer is subject to additional delays1186.  
Apart from the incentive a dividend premium provides to shareholders 
to extend their time-horizons with regard to their equity investment, the loyalty 
dividend is also seen as a tool that can improve investor relations, since the 
shareholder is induced in the framework of this loyalty mechanism to register 
her share and thus a channel of direct communication between her and the firm’s 
management is created1187. 
The loyalty dividend is allowed under French corporate law1188, which 
thus emerges as the champion jurisdiction for the application of loyalty 
structures, while its introduction was recently considered by the German 
legislator as well1189. Nevertheless, to understand how the loyalty dividend 
works in practice I choose here the case of a Dutch listed firm, Koninklijke 
DSM N.V., which sought to introduce the loyalty dividend back in 2006-7, 
despite the absence of any enabling provision in Dutch corporate law. The 
choice to illustrate the loyalty dividend mechanism through the DSM example is 
not arbitrary, since it was in the DSM case, where the loyalty dividend structure 
was challenged by non-loyalist shareholders as infringing the principle of equal 
treatment of shareholders. 
In September 2006 DSM’s board announced that shareholders, who 
according to the register, will have kept their DSM shares for a period of at least 
three years will be entitled, on top of the regular dividend, to a non-recurring 
loyalty dividend amounting to 30% of the average annual dividend paid on 
                                                                                                              
opinion that the loyalty dividend would be a poor incentive for shareholders to extend the time-horizon of 
their equity investment (see also Duffhues, supra note 1134, 311). Instead, he suggested that it would be 
more effective if the firm would place shares privately with investors, agree with them that they won’t 
dispose of the stock before a specified amount of time and in return for their commitment pay them 
upfront the sum that would constitute the bonus dividend. 
1184 Duffhues, supra note 1134, 312 
1185 Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-termism and Managerial Myopia, Working Paper 
(April 2011), 37, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1802840   
1186 Duffhues, supra note 1134, 312 
1187 See Triodos Bank, Proxy Voting Guidelines, (Apr. 2010), 3. Available at 
http://www.triodos.com/com/static/pdf/proxy_voting_guidelines_2010 ; Hermes Investment Management 
Limited, Position Paper: Hermes’ Approach to Loyalty Dividends. Available at 
http://www.hermes.co.uk/files/pdfs/Hermes_position_on_loyalty_dividends_230307.pdf  
1188 Art. L. 232-14 Code de Commerce 
1189 Bundesministerium der Justiz, Bericht über die Entwicklung der Stimmrechtsausübung in 
börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften in Deutschland seit Inkrafttreten des Namensaktiengesetzes, 24, 
available at http://www.bdi-online.de/de/fachabteilungen/7469.htm  
CORPORATE LAW AND THE GREAT REVERSAL IN SHAREHOLDERSHIP 
 295 
common shares in the three previous financial years. For each subsequent 
consecutive year that the shareholder will keep on holding her share, she will be 
receiving an extra loyalty dividend of 10% per year1190 (Figure 35).  
 
 
Figure 34 - DSM’s Loyalty Dividend Structure 
Source: Jos Op Heij, Loyalty Dividend – A Boost for Investor Relations, (14 Nov. 2006)  
 
Technically, DSM planned to introduce the loyalty dividend plan in the 
fore stated way by amending its articles of association, so that they would 
provide that the amount of dividend paid on a common share would no longer 
be determined by the class of the share, but by circumstances concerning the 
owner of the share1191. Just like the time-phased voting rights mechanism, the 
loyalty dividend device would thus become a route towards the ‘personification’ 
of the share. The circumstances though, according to which the dividend paid to 
the shareholder would be calculated, were not to be provided for in DSM’s 
articles of association, but in an ‘extra-charter’ private agreement between the 
firm and those shareholders, who would opt to register their shares in the firm’s 
share registry1192. In other words, the articles of association would be amended –
after a shareholder vote- to include limited provisions, referring to a separate 
regulation that would in essence be the one containing the loyalty dividend 
scheme. According to this regulation the directors would have the power to deny 
                                                
1190 DSM Press Release, DSM Opens Pre-registration for Novel Loyalty Dividend Program, 19 December 
2006. Available at http://www.dsm.com/en_US/cworld/public/media/pages/press-
releases/63_06_dsm_opens_pre_registration.jsp#   
1191 Marie-Louise Lennarts & Monique Suzanne Koppert-Van Beek, Loyalty Dividend and the EC 
Principle of Equal Treatment of Shareholders, 5 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 173, 174 
1192 This agreement was named ‘Rules for register I of holders of ordinary shares Koninklijke DSM 
N.V.’. 
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the loyalty dividend to the shareholder on discretionary grounds listed in that 
separate regulation1193. 
 
4.2.2. The loyalty dividend and its potential clash with the principle of equal 
treatment of shareholders 
 
After a recommendation by the proxy voting agent Institutional 
Shareholders Services (ISS) to DSM shareholders to vote against the 
management’s proposal to amend the articles of association, so as to (indirectly) 
introduce a loyalty dividend plan, the investment management firm, Franklin 
Mutual Advisors, that was managing several funds, which appeared formally as 
shareholders of DSM, communicated an objection to DSM’s management 
regarding the introduction of the loyalty dividend and urged the board to 
withdraw the request for approval of this new loyalty structure from the 
shareholders’ meeting agenda1194. DSM’s management refused to comply with 
Franklin’s request and therefore the latter initiated inquiry proceedings before 
Amsterdam’s Enterprise Chamber (see Section 2.4.1. of Chapter Three for the 
Dutch legal remedy of ‘enquêterecht’) and sought the suspension of the 
introduction of the mechanism of the loyalty dividend by the firm. 
Franklin’s complaint was substantiated on the alleged clash of the 
loyalty dividend plan with the Dutch principle of equal treatment of 
shareholders, according to which ‘save as is otherwise provided in the articles, 
all shares shall rank pari passu in proportion to their amount’1195. Franklin’s 
plea was that DSM by not creating a separate class of shares for loyal 
shareholders was proposing the ‘personification’ of the equity security by 
choosing to award more cash flow rights to some shareholders compared to 
other shareholders of the same class. 
The Enterprise Chamber agreed with the insurgent shareholder’s 
arguments and ordered –as a provisional measure- the suspension of the relevant 
amendment of the articles of association, as there were valid reasons to doubt 
the correctness of DSM’s policy1196. The Chamber ruled that the Dutch rule on 
the equal treatment of shareholders prohibits a diversification of rights on the 
basis of the identity or other qualifications of a shareholder1197. It follows that 
the only way, by which a Dutch firm would be able to legitimately differentiate 
the rights awarded to shareholders would be by amending the articles of 
association, so as to introduce separate classes of shares1198. 
In response DSM withdrew the plan to introduce a loyalty dividend 
altogether and decided not to file a cassation against the Enterprise Chamber’s 
                                                
1193 Art. 17.3.2 of the ‘Rules for register I of holders of ordinary shares Koninklijke DSM N.V.’; See 
Ferdinand Mason & Tim Carapiet, Loyalty Dividends: DSM and the Legal Debate over Shareholder 
Incentives, THE IN-HOUSE LAWYER (May 2008) 80, 80   
1194 Id., at 173 
1195 BW 2:92(1) 
1196 Lennarts & Kopper-Van Beek, supra note 1191, 174 
1197 No. 3.12, OK 28.03.2007, JOR 2007/118 (DSM) 
1198 Mason & Carapiet, supra note 1192, 80 
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ruling. Nevertheless, the Dutch Supreme Court’s Advocate General decided that 
the case merited an appeal in cassation in the interest of the law and therefore 
the legal debate on the loyalty dividend under Dutch law continued. The 
Advocate General substantiated his cassation on the argument that Dutch 
corporate law (BW 2:92 lid 1) does not imply that a differentiation in cash flow 
rights is legitimate only if the shares are classified into separate classes. 
Pursuant to his argumentation the law (BW 2:92 lid 3) requires explicitly the 
creation of a separate class of shares only if the differentiation concerns the 
control rights attached to the share; a contrario the creation of a separate class is 
not necessary in case there is a differentiation in cash flow rights, as in the case 
of a loyalty dividend1199. The Dutch Supreme Court agreed with the Advocate 
General’s arguments and issued a ruling, pursuant to which a loyalty dividend 
plan in The Netherlands is legitimate, as long as it is set out clearly in the 
articles of association, and does not constitute a breach of the principle of equal 
treatment of shareholders, which has been transposed into Dutch corporate law 
(BW 2:92 lid 2) from Art. 42 of the Second Directive1200.  
The DSM ruling indicates that the issue of whether a loyalty dividend 
plan, as a tool that a firm may use to engage in shareholder eugenics and craft its 
shareholder base, is permissible in EU jurisdictions or not depends on whether it 
is in conformity with the principle of equal treatment of shareholders with 
regard to distributions. At this point it must be noted that conformity with the 
principle of equal treatment of shareholders with regard to distributions is a 
precondition for the legality of a loyalty dividend plan not only in jurisdictions, 
such as The Netherlands, where there is no provision in the national corporate 
law enabling this mechanism, but also in jurisdictions, such as France, where the 
loyalty dividend is allowed explicitly by law. This is because the principle of 
equal treatment of shareholders with regard to distributions derives from 
(secondary) EU law1201 and as such enjoys primacy over any conflicting 
provision found in national law1202. Therefore, if eventually a loyalty dividend 
plan is found to be by its nature incompatible with the principle of equal 
treatment of shareholders, then any national rule allowing its introduction is 
inapplicable and any future adoption of such a rule would be invalid1203. The 
fact that the amendment to the articles of association introducing the loyalty 
dividend plan will necessarily have been voted by the shareholders’ meeting 
might not be enough to bring the security design in conformity with the 
principle of equal treatment of shareholders, because –at least under the 
                                                
1199 No. 3.28, Conclusie, LJN BB3523, Hoge Raad, 07/11510 (CW 2516). On the fact that the law of most 
EU Member States tends to be more flexible as to differentiation in relation to dividend rights compared 
to voting rights see Geens & Clottens, supra note 1133, 176 
1200 Mason & Carapiet, supra note 1192, 81 
1201 To be sure, the discussion is about the principle of equal treatment of shareholders with regard to 
distributions found in Art. 42 of the Second Directive; the principle of equal treatment of shareholders is 
not a general principle of EU law, see Case C-101/08, Audiolux SA e.a. v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA 
(GBL) and Others and Bertelsmann AG and Others, [2009] ECR I-9823 
1202 See Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel, [1970] ECR 1125 
1203 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, [1978] ECR 629 
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continental legal doctrine- the principle of equal treatment binds corporate 
organs and consent of individual shareholders affected by the decision is 
required1204. 
As mentioned in the introductory part to the current section, the 
principle of equal treatment of shareholders is an ambiguous concept and 
whether it will be interpreted as allowing a loyalty dividend plan or not depends 
on the dominant institutional logics of corporate governance. The ambiguity of 
the principle and the fact that different presuppositions vis-à-vis corporate 
governance can lead to different outcomes as to the legality of loyalty dividends 
were apparent in the framework of the debate that the Advocate General’s 
opinion in the DSM case triggered in Dutch literature. 
The Advocate General recognized that he was dealing with a principle 
of EU origin and thus had recourse to ECJ’s case law1205. Since there is no ECJ 
ruling, in which the interpretation of Art. 42 of the Second Directive is called 
into question, the Advocate General tried to distill from the line of ECJ cases 
that dealt with the equal pay of men and women (Art. 157 TFEU) how the 
provision on the equal treatment of shareholders should be interpreted1206. This 
body of case law indicates that whenever there is a scheme that features the 
unequal treatment of persons that should normally be treated equally, there must 
be a reasonable and objective justification for this unequal treatment. This 
reasonable and objective justification exists when the measure at hand survives 
the tests of proportionality and subsidiarity1207. Therefore, the bottom line is that 
whether the loyalty dividend is permissible under EU law depends on the 
interpretation of these vague notions, whose shaping may be influenced strongly 
–in the case of a loyalty dividend plan- by the dominant institutional logics of 
corporate governance. 
The Advocate General viewed the loyalty dividend proportional and 
objectively justified in the light of the envisaged aim of promoting long-term 
shareholdership. But, the majority of Dutch commentators disagreed with this 
view following a consequentialist approach largely influenced by the 
fundamental tenets of the agency theory (see Section 6.2.2. of Chapter One). 
The common line in the dissenters’ argumentation was that shareholder eugenics 
through mechanisms, such as the loyalty dividend, result in higher agency costs 
and in compromising the disciplining function of the market for corporate 
control. 
The dissenters to the Advocate General’s opinion start from the 
assumption that the probability that the voicing of discontent by a shareholder 
will lead to improvement in the board’s performance is directly proportional to 
the credibility of the shareholders’ threat that she will subsequently ‘vote with 
her feet’ by selling her stock1208. The existence of a loyalty dividend ‘carrot’ in 
                                                
1204 See UWE HÜFFER, AKTIENGESETZ (2002), §179 Rn 21 
1205 See Art. 267 TFEU 
1206 Lennarts & Kopper-Van Beek, supra note 1191, 175 
1207 See Case C-170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, [1986] ECR 1607 
1208 Michael Schouten, Loyaal aan het eigen belang, 14 ONDERNEMINGSRECHT 579, 579 
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the firm’s corporate governance structure reduces the credibility of this threat, 
because the directors know that if the shareholder sells her stock –as she 
implicitly threatens to do when expressing dissatisfaction- she will loose the 
opportunity to receive a bonus dividend. In essence, the argument is that, when 
the board ‘poisons’ the shareholders with the temptation of receiving a bonus 
dividend if they remain loyal to the firm, the board is effectively stripping 
shareholdership from its monitoring power and its ability to reduce residual loss 
by influencing the management’s decision-making. In Hirschman’s words, 
whose seminal work on corporate governance in the 1970s the dissenters invoke 
to make their case: ‘Loyalty-promoting institutions and devices are not only 
uninterested in stimulating voice at the expense of exit: indeed they are often 
meant to repress voice alongside exit’1209. All in all, this viewpoint sees the 
loyalty dividend as an entrenchment device for management and therefore the 
unequal treatment that it introduces between short- and long-term shareholders 
cannot be objectively justified. 
In addition to this, the opponents to the Advocate General’s opinion 
introduce the argument that there cannot be a quality difference between a long-
term shareholder and a short-term one that would justify their unequal 
treatment1210. In their view it is highly questionable whether it is correct to view 
an investment as of high quality, just because the investor is loyal to the board, 
since there is no empirical evidence that shows why it is in the interest of firms 
to have loyal long-term shareholders. In fact, the dissenters posit that if one 
group of shareholders is of lower quality, it is the loyalists because their loyalty 
does not allow them to act as a counterbalancing force to the board’s erroneous 
decisions1211. In other words, the agency institutional logics of corporate 
governance would suggest that loyal shareholders are bad monitors for 
management and therefore their favorable treatment through mechanisms, such 
as loyalty dividends, cannot be objectively justified and thus permissible under 
Art. 42 of the Second Directive. 
All in all, it seems that –despite the DSM ruling in The Netherlands- the 
agency theory’s institutional logics of corporate governance are strong enough 
to result in the loyalty dividend device not necessarily qualifying as a 
permissible exception to the principle of equal treatment of shareholders in other 
EU jurisdictions. As an agency cost-increasing device, the loyalty dividend 
might be seen by national courts in the EU as missing the characteristics of 
subsidiarity and proportionality that would render it objectively justified and 
thus legitimate under secondary EU law.  
                                                
1209 ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970), 92 
1210 Duffhues, supra note 1152, 307; HR 14 Dec. 2007, JOR 2008/11 annotated by Doorman (DSM) 
1211 Id., at 308 
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EU Primary and Secondary Law and the Great Reversal in 
Shareholdership 
 
Corporate governance structures that would allow 
firms to engage in shareholder eugenics and to attract more 
long-termist investors to their shareholder base might stumble 
upon rules of primary and secondary EU law. 
Time-phased voting rights, designed to allow the 
increase in the voting power of loyal shareholders, might be 
found in the future by the ECJ to be violating the Treaty 
provisions on the free movement of capital. Obiter dicta in the 
ECJ’s rulings on golden shares, particularly in the Volkswagen 
case, indicate that ECJ is on its way to acknowledge to the free 
movement of capital the effect of horizontally prohibiting 
structures that introduce deviations from the 1S/1V principle. 
Indeed, the post-Ricardian phase, into which European 
integration has entered, and the pressure on behalf of EU’s 
supranational agents on supply-side national institutions are 
capable of inspiring the ECJ to render invalid loyalty 
structures, such as time-phased voting rights. Apart from this, 
the mandatory bid rule of the Takeover Directive may also be 
functioning as an impediment for the adoption of time-phased 
voting rights. 
The mechanism of loyalty dividends might be running 
afoul to the principle of equal treatment of shareholders with 
regard to distributions, particularly if interpreted in light of the 
agency theory’s institutional logics of corporate governance. 
The recent DSM case discussed before the Dutch Supreme 
Court and the discussion ensued on the loyalty dividend device 
in literature show that loyalty dividends may constitute an 









The Path Towards Long Governance 
 
‘The spectacle of modern 
investment markets has sometimes 
moved me towards the conclusion 
that to make the purchase of an 
investment permanent and 
indissoluble, like marriage (sic!), 
except by reason of death or other 
grave cause, might be a useful 
remedy.’ 
John Maynard Keynes1212 
 
Although this study’s three hypotheses do not submit in a 
straightforward manner any policy or regulatory proposals, they carry an 
intrinsic normative value, since they can function as the ratio legis for the 
promotion of a new doctrine in corporate governance: Long Governance. 
The process of structuring the normative doctrine of Long Governance 
starts from the tenet of the First Hypothesis that shareholder value coupled with 
shareholdership’s short-termism has a negative impact on business capital 
accumulation dynamics and ultimately on economic growth. Therefore, given 
that the joint effect of two factors is responsible for this negative 
macroeconomic trend, the normative proposal emerging from the First 
Hypothesis would be to eliminate any of the two. The foundational question 
then that emerges in the framework of structuring this study’s normative 
conclusion is: the potency of which of the two factors should we seek to 
mitigate?  
If we choose to target shareholder value rather than short-term 
shareholdership, then first this study would be no different than numerous others 
that praise the stakeholder value approach and additionally it would risk 
upsetting the status quo in various jurisdictions, where corporate governance is 
de facto or de jure oriented to shareholder value. The normative doctrine 
emanating from this study would meet backlash by groups with vested interests 
in the shareholder value approach and in essence this study would be seeking to 
attain the unrealistic goal of reversing the ‘natural’ trend of the corporate legal 
systems of the major Western economies, which, as shown in the PBWSV index 
of Chapter Three, is persistently moving towards shareholder empowerment. 
                                                
1212 KEYNES, supra note 145, 160 
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Consequently, it seems that of the two ‘stagnation-generating’ factors of the 
First Hypothesis, it is the short-termism of shareholders that must be overturned, 
if any meaningful and realistic normative proposal is to flow from this study.  
   Thus, this study’s normative conclusion, Long Governance, aspires, 
rather than to support one approach over the other in the fundamental debate of 
corporate governance, i.e. the shareholder value vs. stakeholder value debate, to 
represent an intermediate ‘third way’.  
As it will be shown in this final chapter, Long Governance rests on the 
assumption that if shareholders were infused with incentives that would allow 
them to develop long-term horizons then their interests could be to a significant 
extent aligned with those of the various stakeholders and predominantly of the 
employees. Put differently, in a world where an increasing percentage of a 
public firm’s shareholder base would be long-termist the de facto or de jure 
orientation of modern corporate governance towards shareholder value would 
not necessarily be at odds with the interests of the other stakeholders.  
Consequently, despite its heterodox economic roots the current study 
does not come with any implicit aspirations of providing simply another ratio 
legis for supporting the strengthening of the stakeholder value system; however, 
it is expected that in case the regulatory effort to promote Long Governance 
fails, then the three hypotheses of the current study may indeed be used by many 
as ratio legis for the promotion of stakeholderist institutions of corporate 
governance. However, given that the benefits of patient equity capital have also 
been acknowledged recently by corporate governance intellectuals1213, Wall 
Street managers1214, major think-tanks1215 and by the European Commission1216, 
the normative concept of Long Governance cannot be deemed doomed to fail 
and is a cause that might well gain momentum shortly. 
                                                
1213 See e.g. the paper authored by the Honorable Jack Jacobs, Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware, 
Patient Capital: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive it?, 68 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW  
1645. A book, whose essence is also very close to the criticism this study launches against the fact that 
modern shareholders are speculating rather than actually investing and which also looks at the historical 
roots of this problem is LAWRENCE MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE 
TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY (2007) 
1214 John Bogle, Restoring Faith in Financial Markets, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2010). Available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703436504574640523013840290.html  
1215 See The Aspen Institute, Business & Society Program, Overcoming Short-termism: A Call for More 
Responsible Approach to Investment and Business Management, (Sept. 9, 2009). Available at 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/overcome_short_state0909.pdf ; The 
Aspen Institute, Business & Society Program, Long-term Value Creation: Guiding Principles for 
Corporations and Investors. Available at 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/bsp/FinalPrinciples.pdf ; The Brookings 
Institution, Corporate Governance and Long-term, ‘Patient’ Capital, (March 14, 2012), (uncorrected 
transcript of conference). Available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/3/14%20patient%20capital/20120314_patient_capital.pd
f  






1. An overview of the shareholder value/stakeholder value dichotomy 
 
Many of the normative discussions over corporate law and governance 
during the past two decades have developed around the shareholder value vs. 
stakeholder value debate. The debate’s anatomy is of course reflected in the 
comparative corporate governance literature with insider/CMEs viewed upon as 
standing on the stakeholder value edge of the spectrum and outsider/LMEs on 
the shareholder value edge (see Section 4.1. of the Introduction for the 
taxonomy). 
Shareholder value and stakeholder value can be viewed as alternate 
management theories, i.e. as legally non-binding interchanging processes or 
analytical frameworks that managers can opt for using when conducting the 
affairs of the company1217. Corporate officials may view their responsibility –to 
put it in Milton Friedman’s words1218- to be no other than to make as much 
money for their stockholders as possible1219 or by taking a more ‘pluralist’ 
approach and viewing the firm as a bundle of human assets and relationships1220 
they may perceive themselves as the agents of all stakeholders, i.e. shareholders, 
creditors, employees, customers, consumers etc.1221.  
Shareholder value and stakeholder value can also be viewed as alternate 
orientations of a given corporate legal system, i.e. as legal concepts. The 
shareholder value or stakeholder value orientation of a country’s corporate law 
can be deducted for instance from: (i) whether it allows or mandates the 
representation of employees on the board; (ii) the corporate constituent(s), to 
whom management is accountable when discharging its corporate duties and 
exercising its corporate powers; and (iii) whether stakeholders other than the 
shareholder are permitted private enforcement of corporate law either through 
liability suits (derivative or direct) or legal actions seeking non-monetary 
remedies.  
Stakeholder-oriented corporate legal systems do provide for employee 
involvement in the firm’s management (see Section 4.2.2. of the Introduction for 
German and Dutch corporate law), while shareholder-oriented systems take a 
‘monistic’ view in this respect by enfranchising only the shareholders in boards’ 
elections. As far as the question of who is the corporate constituent, to whom 
directors owe their duties, it is fair to say that in principle in all corporate legal 
systems these duties are owed to the corporation as a separate legal entity. 
However, since the corporation has multiple constituencies with conflicting 
                                                
1217 See Edward Freeman & David Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on 
Corporate Governance, XXV CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 88 
1218 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962), 113 
1219 The neoclassical theory of the firm, out of which the shareholder primacy approach emerged, is 
presented in Section 6.2. of Chapter One.  
1220 See EDITH PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (1959) 
1221 See Charles Hill & Thomas Jones, Stakeholder-agency Theory, 29 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 
STUDIES 131 
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interests, to say that management owes its duties to the corporation ‘masks 
conflicts among these constituencies’1222. With regard to ordinary business 
decisions and especially when the firm is solvent, it makes no difference 
whether managers see themselves as furthering the interests of one constituency 
or of the corporation as a whole. But, when managers have to deal with out of 
ordinary transactions, as it happens in the takeover context, then conflicts among 
constituencies become more acute and whose interests ultimately count is of 
paramount importance for the firm. In these conflicting ‘influx’ moments of 
corporate life shareholder value-oriented corporate laws view the shareholder as 
the foremost corporate constituent, to the benefit of which the management 
should discharge its duties, while stakeholder-oriented corporate legal systems 
endow management with the discretion to take under account the interests of 
other stakeholders (see Introduction, 4.2.2 on how Delaware’s approach 
contrasts to the Dutch approach1223).  
‘Shareholderist’ legal systems do not provide corporate constituencies 
other than the formal shareholder with legal standing for initiating corporate 
litigation1224, while more stakeholder-oriented corporate laws may provide 
employees with such standing1225. For instance, while in the UK the law 
explicitly states that the directors ought to consider the interests of the 
employees alongside those of the shareholders1226, employee representatives are 
not provided with standing to enforce this duty. To the contrary, in The 
Netherlands the right of initiating inquiry proceedings (‘enquêterecht’), an 
idiosyncratic non-derivative suit, by which corporate actions can be put under 
judicial scrutiny and evaluated as to whether they give rise to a case of 
misconduct and as to whether they can justify the imposition of a series of 
specific non-monetary remedies1227 (see Section 2.4.1. of Chapter Three), is also 
granted to trade unions1228. 
 
2. An emerging ‘Third Way’: Long Governance 
 
As mentioned several times, this study views the structural pathology of 
‘financialized’ capitalism, i.e. economic stagnation, as emanating from the joint 
                                                
1222 WILLIAM ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON 
THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2006),  294 
1223 To be sure, referring particularly to Delaware (which hosts over half of the S&P 500 corporations in 
the US) rather than to the US as a whole pertaining to directors’ duties in the context of takeovers is 
necessary given the fact that not all US States take a shareholderist stance in the framework of takeover 
law. At least 28 States have enacted so-called ‘corporate constituency statutes’ that explicitly authorize 
directors to take under account nonshareholder interests in takeover situations; see Lawrence Mitchell, A 
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEXAS LAW 
REVIEW 578, 587-88 
1224 Masouros, supra note 663, 201 
1225 Providing employees with standing to sue the directors is a core normative aspect of the stakeholder 
value approach; see Marleen O’ Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to 
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 899, 936-65 
1226 s. 172(1)(b) of the UK Companies Act 2006 
1227 Timmerman & Doorman, supra note 735, 195ff.  
1228 BW 2:347 
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effect that the shareholder value orientation in corporate decision-making and 
shareholder short-termism has over the business accumulation dynamics. 
Therefore, prima facie one would expect that this study would side with the 
stakeholderist approach to corporate governance. Nevertheless, as suggested in 
the introductory lines to this Chapter, the normative doctrine of Long 
Governance aspires to represent a ‘third way’ between the two main corporate 
governance approaches. 
This aspiration of Long Governance is not dictated merely by the goal 
of not causing backlash by groups with vested interests in the one approach or 
the other, but it is also underpinned by the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm 
presented in Chapter Two. The Post-Keynesian approach shows that catering for 
shareholder interests in abstracto is not capable of having a negative impact on 
physical capital accumulation. In the relevant discussion in Section 3.4. of 
Chapter Two it is stated that shareholder value orientation has a derivative 
content; the influence that it generates depends on something exogenous: on the 
character of shareholdership. The content of the preferences of the shareholders 
makes a big difference for the results that the orientation towards the satisfaction 
of those preferences will produce. The simplified model presented in Chapter 
Two shows us indeed that it is only if shareholders are short-termists that the 
shareholder value approach to corporate governance can have a negative 
influence on the firm’s accumulation dynamics. Therefore, the relevant analysis 
shows that if corporate law is to be calculable and restore trust in the economy 
by stop being ‘stagnation-generating’ (see Section 4.2.4.1 of the Introduction), a 
move towards pure stakeholder orientation won’t be necessary. Further, as it 
will be shown below, if the concept of Long Governance is adopted over the 
shareholder value or the stakeholder value approach, then to a significant extent 
there can be alignment and reconciliation of the interests of the (long-term) 
shareholders and the interests of the other stakeholders (particularly the 
employees). This is what turns the doctrine of Long Governance into a real 
‘third’ intermediate way that merges elements of the shareholder primacy 
approach and the stakeholder model. 
 
2.1. Long Governance as management theory  
 
Long Governance, the normative concept that is eventually promoted 
by this study, can be conceived both as an alternative management theory and as 
a possible formal orientation of a corporate legal system.  
As a management theory, Long Governance, in order to be a genuine 
‘third way’ approach, must be compatible with both the shareholderist and the 
stakeholderist legal systems; it must be practical for the manager, regardless the 
firm’s jurisdiction, to adopt it, without assuming the risk to run into problems, if 
managerial decisions ever get challenged before the court. Thus, the benchmark 
that Long Governance will set for the actions of the management must balance 
between the two approaches without clearly favoring the one over the other. 
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With these in mind Long Governance calls management to set as a 
benchmark for its actions the long-run interests of all the shareholders who hold, 
have held, or will hold stock in the firm. At first sight one would say that this is 
closer to the shareholder value approach. But a closer look indicates that Long 
Governance does not disregard the virtues of the stakeholder value approach, 
since benefiting the class of the shareholders in the long run requires 
management to take under account the competing interests of the different 
stakeholders1229. This is because the interests of other stakeholders are to a large 
extent aligned to the long-run interests of the class of shareholders1230.  
For instance, suppose that a corporation’s management is faced with the 
dilemma of choosing between the relocation of the firm’s manufacturing plants 
to a low labor cost jurisdiction and the continuation of the operations in the 
current location. If management chooses the relocation, it opportunistically 
exploits the firm-specific investment of the employees and of other stakeholders, 
such as suppliers, which have acquired skills and developed processes 
specifically deployable within the scope of their contractual relationship with 
the corporation at hand. But, if management eventually decides to relocate, then 
it can deliver more profits to the firm’s existing shareholders through the 
reduction of the cost of operations. However, shareholders as a class are in the 
aggregate worse off through such decisions. This kind of decisions on behalf of 
the management discourages stakeholders altogether, such as employees and 
suppliers, to make firm-specific investments on the first place, since they fear 
that they will also be subject to the same holdup problem1231. This means that 
shareholders as a class in the future will be deprived from enjoying the surplus 
generated by a firm, which is competitive because it has a great number of 
committed stakeholders that have made firm-specific investments. Thus, the 
long-run interest of ‘all the shareholders who hold, have held, or will hold stock 
in the firm’ is better served when managers cater for the interests of other 
stakeholders too1232. 
 To be sure though, Long Governance is not an entirely novel 
management concept, as its tenets have more or less been advocated by others in 
the past1233. Nevertheless, in past studies the relevant arguments for a long-term 
orientation of management have been laid down with reference to the 
microeconomic factor of long-term firm value maximization rather than by 
                                                
1229 John Armour et al., Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 
BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 531, 537; Gelter, supra note 86, 131; Thomas Clarke, The 
Stakeholder Corporation: A Business Philosophy for the Information Age, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (T. CLARKE, ED.) 
(2004), 193 
1230 Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VIRGINIA LAW 
REVIEW 247, 304-305 
1231 Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE 
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (A. AUERBACH, ED.) (1988), 46 
1232 The phrase and the concept ‘all the shareholders who hold, have held, or will hold stock in the firm’ 
belongs to Blair & Stout, supra note 1230, 304 
1233 See ROBERT MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 4TH ED. (2008), 51 
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2.2. Long Governance as a legal concept 
 
As a legal concept, Long Governance is at first sight also not entirely 
novel. Its prescriptions for directors’ duties are very similar, and perhaps even 
‘observationally equivalent’ in practice to the prescriptions that advocates of 
long-term share value maximization would make1234 and therefore Long 
Governance’s tenets can be thought of as resembling to those of the so-called 
‘team production theory of corporate law’. As well as this, Long Governance as 
a legal concept is also close to bedrock Delaware case law that states that 
‘directors, when acting deliberately, in an informed way, and in the good faith 
pursuit of corporate interests, may follow a course designed to achieve long-
term value even at the cost of immediate value maximization’1235 or that ‘the 
directors of a Delaware corporation have the prerogative to determine that the 
market undervalues its stock and to protect its stockholders from offers that do 
not reflect the long-term value of the corporation under its present management 
plans’1236. Furthermore, the Long Governance concept resembles to the 
‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach that is formally adopted by s.172 of 
the UK Companies Act of 2006. The enlightened shareholder value approach 
emphasizes the benefits to shareholders that can result from focusing 
management on areas of stakeholder concern1237 and requires directors to assess 
the likely consequences for the corporation of any decision in the long term1238. 
                                                
1234  Margaret Blair, Directors’ Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38 WAKE FOREST 
LAW REVIEW 886, 890-891 
1235 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.Supr. 1989); for an analysis 
of the long-term/short-term distinction in Delaware case law see MARGARET BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND 
CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995), 222-223 
1236 Unitrin v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995) 
1237 Virginia Harper Ho, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value’: Corporate Governance Beyond the 
Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 THE JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW 60, 62 
1238 s.172(1)(a) of the UK Companies Act 2006 
Long Governance as Management Theory 
 
Long Governance as a management theory calls management to 
set as a benchmark for its actions the long-run interests of all the 
shareholders who hold, have held, or will hold stock in the firm; 
this requires management to take at the same time under 
account the competing interests of the different stakeholders, 
because in the long-run shareholders as a class benefit from the 
protection and encouragement of the firm-specific investments 
that other stakeholders make. 
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Therefore, in the UK directors are theoretically in breach of their duties if they 
do not adopt long-term horizons regarding the benefit of the corporation (not 
only of the shareholders) when managing the firm. 
Nevertheless, the following two sub-sections lay down the details of 
Long Governance as a legal concept that allow us to see how this normative 
concept is distinctive from the team production theory of corporate law, 
Delaware approach and the UK enlightened shareholder value. 
 
2.2.1. A duty to whom? 
 
The main issue when structuring Long Governance as a legal concept is 
the corporate constituency, to whom management ought, as a matter of law, to 
owe its duties.  When Long Governance calls for a reorientation of management 
towards long-term horizons, it requires managers to discharge their duties in a 
non-myopic way not to some specific corporate constituency, but to the 
corporation as such; in other words, the content Long Governance lends to 
directors’ duties is the maximization of long-term corporate welfare, which is 
most diligently achieved through the pursuance of growth, i.e. business capital 
accumulation through the reinvestment of profits (see Section 1 of Chapter 
Two). Long-term corporate welfare, i.e. Long Governance’s desideratum as a 
legal concept, is in line with what Long Governance as a management theory 
advocates, since the firm’s long-term growth will simultaneously serve the long-
run interests of shareholders as a class.  
Fairly enough though, one could claim that the direction of 
management’s accountability is still not different under Long Governance 
compared to what it would be under some variation of the shareholder value or 
the stakeholder value approach and especially under Delaware’s approach.  
The novelty that Long Governance adds in respect of the issue of 
directors’ duties becomes evident –as it happens with every foundational 
corporate governance approach- in the framework of out of ordinary 
transactions, such as change-of-control transactions. In these situations conflicts 
between the multiple corporate constituencies become acute and one of them has 
to be prioritized. In all corporate legal systems the firm’s board is given some 
role -bigger or smaller- to play in these change-of-control transactions. For 
instance, in Delaware the board is required to approve a statutory merger1239 or a 
sale of assets1240 and under certain circumstances framed by case law it may 
adopt a takeover defense in the face of a hostile tender offer. In insider systems 
shareholders are usually vested with the exclusive authority to decide on a 
statutory merger or a sale of substantially all assets1241, but boards may be left 
with the decision-making authority for taking defensive actions against hostile 
                                                
1239 Delaware General Corporation Law (‘DGCL’) §251. 
1240 DGCL §271 




takeovers without a shareholder vote1242. Long Governance recommends that 
when boards exercise one of these powers they should first constructively 
classify shareholders into two classes based on the latter’s time horizons: (i) the 
short-term, deal-driven merger arbitrageurs, who bought stock in the corporation 
in anticipation of the change-in-control transaction in order to profit by realizing 
the spread between the price they paid for the share and the deal price; and (ii) 
the shareholders, who have been holding stock in the corporation since before 
rumors about the deal started spreading. When the board decides on whether it 
will approve the transaction or adopt a takeover defense, it should take 
reasonable steps to ensure that its powers are exercised for the benefit of the 
latter class of shareholders. In other words, in the face of takeovers Long 
Governance advances the discharge of directorial duties to the benefit of the 
corporation’s existing non-arbitrageur shareholders. 
In a recent decision on one of the broadest challenges to a takeover 
defense in decades, i.e. in the Airgas case, the Delaware Chancery Court1243 -
although it did not use the expression ‘classes of stock’ anywhere- clearly 
differentiated between shareholders that are arbitrageurs and those that take 
relatively longer-term stances. The court identified the former’s overwhelming 
presence in the target’s shareholder structure as posing a threat to the firm that 
could amount to ‘substantive coercion’, a situation, which if identified, allows 
management to legally adopt takeover defenses. While the court eventually 
concluded that the board owes its duties to all shareholders, both short-termist 
arbitrageurs and long-term shareholders, it resolved the case in favor of the 
target’s board and the Chancellor’s constructive classification of shareholders 
into two classes on the basis of their investment time-horizons was instrumental 
in reaching that decision. Therefore, the Airgas decision, firstly by reinforcing 
that a steadfast board, confident in a long-term business plan, can block a tender 
offer and secondly by identifying the coercion to the firm as partially flowing 
from the willingness of arbitrageur short-termist shareholders to tender their 
stock even at a price that does not reflect the long-term prospects of the firm, 
implicitly upholds the foundations of Long Governance’s recommendation for 
directorial duties.  
As opposed to what Long Governance as a management theory dictates 
(see Section 2.1), the long-termist class of shareholders, who in the context of 
takeovers –pursuant to Long Governance as a legal concept- ought to serve as 
the benchmark for directors, is not hypothetical, but identifiable. While 
according to Long Governance as a management theory the interests of all 
shareholders who held, hold or will hold stock in the firm may be an appropriate 
yardstick for management in the ordinary course of business, in change-in-
control transactions the difficulty in measuring and verifying the interests of an 
                                                
1242 That would be the case in Germany and The Netherlands that have opted out of Article 9 of the 
Takeover Directive that prohibits target companies from taking defensive actions to defeat hostile bids 
without a shareholder vote. 
1243 Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., CIV.A. Nos. 5249-CC, 5256-CC, 2011 WL 806411 
(Del. Ch. February 15, 2011). 
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abstract class of shareholders would endow management with an unchecked 
power to look after its own interest within takeover situations. An entirely 
fictitious constituency serving as a benchmark for the discharge of directorial 
duties would effectively make managers’ power uncontrollable in the face of 
takeovers and they could arbitrarily conceal their own entrenchment interest 
behind their fiduciary duties1244.  
 
 
2.2.2. Long Governance and the distribution of powers inside the 
corporation  
 
 Corporate law and governance is not all about fiduciary duties or 
managerial standards of conduct. One of the fundamental choices of a corporate 
legal system is how powers inside the corporation are distributed among 
corporate organs and constituencies1245. There are explicit and implicit rules and 
structures affecting the final distribution. A new model of corporate governance, 
such as Long Governance, which views the increase of the influence of long-
termist shareholders in the corporate affairs as a means to attain the goal of the 
pursuance of long-term corporate welfare, can make inroads into corporate law 
either by introducing an outright redistribution of powers (explicit distribution) 
or by introducing new structures that would encourage the proliferation of the 
proper incentives inside the corporation, so that corporate constituents through 
their ordinary activities de facto change the rules of the game (implicit 
                                                
1244 By using this argumentation for the setting of an identifiable group of shareholders as the 
constituency of reference in takeover situations Long Governance as a legal concept comes closer to the 
basic tenets of the agency theory of the firm, which forms the intellectual basis of the shareholder value 
approach and whose analysis is carried out in Section 6.2.2. of Chapter One. The kinship of Long 
Governance to the agency theory may seem paradoxical for a normative legal concept that emanates from 
a heterodox economic analysis of the institutions of corporate governance, but this is exactly why Long 
Governance is a ‘third way’ concept; it adopts an eclectic approach and combines elements from both 
sides of the shareholder vs. stakeholder spectrum. 
1245 Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental 
Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW 697, 703 
Long Governance as a Legal Concept 
 
The content that Long Governance, as a legal concept, lends to 
directors’ duties in the framework of the ordinary course of 
business is the maximization of long-term corporate welfare, 
which is most diligently achieved through the pursuance of 
growth (: business capital accumulation through the 
reinvestment of profits). But, in the framework of change-in-
control transactions Long Governance advances the discharge 






In its mission to affect the distribution of powers inside the corporation 
Long Governance should start by rebutting a common assumption of the 
mainstream corporate law-and-economics literature: shareholder homogeneity. 
The argument that shareholders as a class have relatively homogeneous 
preferences with respect to profit maximization was plugged in the corporate 
theory edifice -by reference to Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem1246- in 
order to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise1247. When voters hold 
dissimilar preferences, Arrow’s theorem and its corporate law equivalent goes, it 
is not possible to aggregate their preferences into a consistent system of choices; 
consistency is possible, however, when voters commonly hold the same ranking 
of choices and thus the corporate franchise is correctly limited to this particular 
class of like-minded participants (i.e. the shareholders)1248. 
 Long Governance claims though that shareholders are heterogeneous, 
at least in respect to their investment time-horizons1249. It is thus possible to 
distinguish between the shareholders and classify them into classes and then 
choose to distribute more powers to the one that serves better the concept’s 
overriding goal of macroeconomic growth, i.e. to the long-termists. This policy 
espoused by the doctrine of Long Governance rests on an idea that has been 
expressed lately in corporate governance literature that calls for the introduction 
of multiple classes of equity in public corporations that will come to represent 
different levels of shareholder commitment1250. 
However, given the aforementioned desideratum of Long Governance, 
it should be reminded that currently publicly traded non-controlling stock 
around the world is predominantly short-termist (see Section 4.2.1. of the 
Introduction). That means that in order for Long Governance to be able to 
empower the class of (non-controlling) long-termist shareholders, such a class 
has to be created first. Therefore, a comprehensive approach to the normative 
legal concept of Long Governance would require not only to distribute more 
powers to long-termist shareholders, but also to devise steps, so as to actually 
encourage investors that are currently short-termists to become long-termists. 
Long Governance’s regulatory agenda would suggest that before the formal 
increase in the powers of long-termists inside the corporation, incentives should 
be provided to the non-controlling shareholders of listed corporations, so that 
they abandon their myopic investment horizons, while tools should be provided 
to listed corporations, so that they can shape their shareholder base in a way that 
will allow the latter to feature a greater percentage of long-termist investors. Put 
                                                
1246 See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963) 
1247 Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS 
395, 405 
1248 Id. 
1249 See also Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW 
REVIEW 775, 492-494 
1250 See Robert Monks, Governance at Crossroads: A Personal Perspective, 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF DISCLOSURE AND GOVERNANCE 62; Robert Monks, The Return of the Shareholder, (2009), 27. 
Available at http://www.ragm.com/libraryFiles/81.pdf  
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differently, the first mission of the regulatory agenda of Long Governance 
should be to actually create a new shareholder group of non-controlling long-
termist stock by introducing those corporate governance structures that would 
provide non-controlling shareholders with the incentive to hold on to their stock 
for longer than they currently on average do and only once this goal has been 




3. A primer on Long Governance structures 
 
Attempting to reverse the trend of short-term shareholdership would 
involve swimming upstream against a very strong current. It is already shown by 
means of the Third Hypothesis how corporate law (and financial regulation) has 
–undeliberately- sustained short-termism in the corporate system and how 
various legal rules that primarily serve other goals have the side-effect of 
shortening the time-horizons of shareholders or preventing the adoption by firms 
of corporate structures that would provide incentives to shareholders to extend 
their holding time. 
Reforms in several fields of business law could bring about the result 
that Long Governance envisions. In fact, amendments in accounting regulation, 
regulation of financial institutions and tax law might prove much more potent in 
causing an abrupt ‘re-reversal’ of the trend towards short-termism, compared to 
changes in the corporate rules, whose effect may take a while before it is 




Long Governance and the Distribution of Powers Inside the 
Corporation 
 
Long Governance rebuts the assumption of shareholder 
homogeneity and claims that shareholders should be classified 
into groups, so that more powers are distributed to the group of 
long-termist shareholders. Nevertheless, because of the fact 
that the vast majority of non-controlling shareholders of listed 
corporations are currently short-termists, Long Governance 
should first set the goal to provide incentives to the investor 
community, so that the pool of long-termist shareholders, which 
will be empowered, is actually enlarged. 
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3.1. The Third Hypothesis as a blueprint for Long Governance’s regulatory 
agenda 
 
The presentation in the framework of the Third Hypothesis (see Chapter 
Four) of the various legal rules that sustain short-termism in modern corporate 
governance, as well as of the loyalty structures that fail to be adopted by firms 
because of legal hurdles, can serve as a blueprint for the formation of the Long 
Governance regulatory agenda. Put differently, business law rules that have 
been identified in the framework of the Third Hypothesis as promoting short-
termism or preventing long-termism should be viewed as candidates for change, 
in order to move towards Long Governance. 
First of all, accounting rules that impose ‘mark-to-market’ reporting of 
the actuarial gains and losses of a firm’s pension plan can be changed, so that 
the pension plan’s shortfalls and surpluses are not recognized immediately on 
the pension plan’s sponsoring firm’s financial statements. Thus, the sponsoring 
firm’s management will lose the incentive to try to influence the pension fund’s 
investment policy, so that the latter does not jeopardize the short-term financial 
position of the firm. Such an amendment will result in returning to the 
accounting convention of the early 2000s regarding the reporting of a pension 
plan’s actuarial gains or losses and will allow pension fund managers to follow 
long-term investment policies that are the only conducive means, by which the 
fund can serve its liability structure (see Section 1.1. of Chapter Four). 
In addition to this, further reflection should be made before the 
‘Solvency II’ Directive is eventually transposed into the laws of the EU Member 
States, as the solvency capital requirements for life insurers will require them to 
focus on the value at risk over a one-year period with the result being that 
liquidity will become more important for them than the capital at risk. In 
essence, life insurers will be penalized if they hold assets with greater volatility, 
such as equity, and thus these structurally long-termist investors will be 
acquiring the incentive to divest from equity positions (see Section 1.3. of 
Chapter Four). 
Furthermore, corporate legal systems should ensure, particularly 
through the shaping of managerial fiduciary duties, that the managers have 
strong incentives to install an effective corporate risk management system, since 
the latter has the potential to attract more long-termist investors to equity 
investments (see Section 2 of Chapter Four).  
As well as this, corporate law reforms should be introduced, so that the 
number of shares that may be repurchased by a firm is scaled down, since short-
termist investors tend to gather around equity that is issued by corporations that 
conduct stock buybacks regularly. This is because the buy package of a stock 
buyback program buffers the market impact of the selling pressure of 
momentum shareholders and therefore allows the latter to realize higher capital 
gains; on the contrary, long-termist shareholders prefer dividend-paying stock, 
so the more the corporate legal system promotes dividend distributions over 
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distributions through share repurchases, the more long-termist investors will be 
investing in equity (see Section 3 of Chapter Four).  
In order to serve Long Governance’s policy objective to create a new 
class of non-controlling long-termist shareholders that will be able to generate 
beneficial influence over the corporate affairs, the adoption of the loyalty 
governance structure of time-phased voting rights in the EU must be 
encouraged. This can be done: (a) by promoting the adoption of enabling 
provisions in national corporate laws, along the lines of French corporate law, 
for the introduction of time-phased voting rights by firms; and (b) by making 
concrete amendments to the Takeover Directive, which currently has the 
potential of frustrating the introduction of time-phased voting rights (see Section 
4.1. of Chapter Four). To be sure, an explicit provision must be added to the 
mandatory bid rule (Art. 5 of the Takeover Directive) that the crossing of the 
mandatory bid threshold by a shareholder, because of the extra voting rights she 
has been awarded on the basis of her loyalty, will not trigger an obligation of 
that shareholder to launch a mandatory bid for the acquisition of the stock of the 
minority shareholders. 
Finally, in the pursuit of Long Governance’s objective of creating a 
new class of non-controlling long-termist shareholders enabling provisions for 
the establishment of loyalty dividends must be introduced in national corporate 
laws. The loyalty dividend’s potential clash with the principle of equal treatment 
of shareholders can be addressed only by the proliferation of the theory that 
long-term shareholdership is beneficial for corporations, so that the deviation 
from the principle of equal treatment of shareholders –if applicable- that the 
loyalty dividend structure seems to introduce can be objectively justified (see 
Section 4.2.2. of Chapter Four). Of course this is more an issue of shaping new 
institutional logics in corporate governance, rather than a purely legal issue. 
 
3.2. Tax regulation and Long Governance 
 
While this study has by no means the aspiration to discuss in depth 
potential changes in tax regulation that could promote Long Governance, it 
acknowledges the potency that amendments in tax rules can have with regard to 
the attainment of the goal of promoting long-term shareholdership. After all, it 
has been noted that most of the policies influencing the behavior of institutional 
investors rest outside corporate law itself with the tax rules controlling a good 
deal of their incentives1251. 
There are mainly two tax strategies, which, if introduced, could have 
the potential of lengthening the average holding period of stock.  
                                                
1251 Leo Strine, One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be 
Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Think and Act and Think Long 
Term?, 66 The Business Lawyer 1, 18 
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The first one is to eliminate the built-in short-term bias of capital gains 
taxation1252. In Section 3.3. of Chapter Four it was mentioned inter alia that in 
many jurisdictions a short-term capital gain is taxed unfavorably compared to 
the capital gain realized on stock that was held by the seller for a considerable 
amount of time. Nevertheless, a closer look at the various jurisdictions’ tax laws 
reveals that in the vast majority of cases the tax treatment of capital gains 
becomes considerably more favorable if the stock has been held by the seller 
merely for a year (see fn 1110). That means that it makes no difference from a 
tax perspective whether the shareholder sells her stock after holding it for one 
year or after holding it for five years. But, while five years might be sufficient 
time for physical capital accumulation to take place inside the firm that has 
issued the stock, one year is probably not sufficient and it is actually a holding 
period that is close to the one that was identified in Chapter One as being 
recently the average in the major Western stock exchanges (see Figures 25, 26, 
27). Therefore, to incentivize the shareholders to hold on to their stock for more 
than one year, it would be advisable to introduce a sliding scale for capital gains 
tax rate, so that the latter gradually drops over a five-year period1253.  
The second tax strategy that is taken into consideration when measures 
are sought in order to promote long-term shareholdership is the securities 
transaction tax (‘STT’)1254. The STT was first pronounced by Keynes during the 
Great Depression: ‘The introduction of a substantial government transfer tax on 
all transactions might prove the most serviceable reform available with a view to 
mitigating the predominance of speculation over enterprise’1255. The imposition 
of STT on secondary equity sales can indeed throw some sand in the gears of 
momentum investors. Firstly, it has the potential of widening the so-called ‘no 
trade zone’, inside which a shareholder won’t be incentivized to sell her stock 
given that the expected net gain would be less than the cost incurred by the 
STT1256. Secondly, it can lengthen the average holding period of stock, 
particularly for shares with initially narrow bid-ask spreads, such as those issued 
by firms with large capitalization1257. 
However, with regard to any tax reform, such as the above, a myriad of 
issues should be addressed and this study is not the proper forum to enter into 
this analysis. The two ‘long-termist’ tax strategies are merely mentioned for the 
                                                
1252 Malcolm Salter, How Short-Termism Invites Corruption…And What To Do About It, Harvard 
Business School Research Paper Series, No. 12-094 (April 12, 2012), 23. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045522  
1253 Id., at 26 
1254 See Joseph Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 JOURNAL OF 
FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH 101; Lawrence Summers & Victoria Summers, When Financial Markets 
Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transaction Tax, 3 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
RESEARCH 261 
1255 Keynes, supra note 145, 159 
1256 On the concept of the ‘no trade zone’ see George Constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium with 
Transaction Costs, 94 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 842 
1257 Thornton Matheson, Taxing Financial Transactions: Issues and Evidence, IMF Working Paper 11/54 
(March 2011), 14. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1784582  
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sake of profiling in a comprehensive manner the contours of Long Governance’s 
regulatory agenda. 
 
3.3. The L-Share 
 
 As academics and market participants are becoming increasingly aware 
of the benefits that an orientation towards Long Governance could bring, 
relevant innovative suggestions to policymakers and listed corporations’ 
management teams alike have popped up recently. As shown in Section 3.1.1. –
and more analytically in the discussion on the Third Hypothesis in Chapter 
Four- the recommended loyalty governance structures originate mainly in the 
niche of security design. The underlying philosophy of security design is that 
with the income stream and the control rights attached to a security we can 
provide specific incentives to the securityholder that will in turn be generated by 
her upon the firm and eventually affect the latter’s corporate governance1258. 
Securities can thus be designed in such a way, so as to achieve specific pre-
determined governance goals. 
A loyalty structure that can contribute to the creation of a new class of 
non-controlling long-termist shareholders and that can also surpass many of the 
legal hurdles, on which other similar structures might stumble upon (see Section 
4 of Chapter Four), is the so-called ‘L-Share’1259. The L-Share is a type of 
loyalty share that is inspired by the design of loyalty equity securities, which a 
handful of entities have issued during the past two decades (Michelin, L’Oreal, 
Air Liquide, Standard Life)1260 and by the design of stock options that are a 
standard feature of executive compensation packages (see Section 2.5. of 
Chapter Three). 
The L-Share is an equity security, on which a call warrant is attached 
that is exercisable at a fixed time and at a fixed exercise price. The idea is that if 
a shareholder holds on her stock for a pre-determined, fixed amount of time 
(‘loyalty period’), then she may –as a reward for her loyalty- exercise the call 
option to receive additional stock in the corporation at a fixed price1261. The 
warrant to purchase additional stock for a fixed price cannot be transferred with 
the stock before the lapse of the loyalty period, but is separately transferable 
once the loyalty period lapses and the warrant becomes exercisable. Of course, 
what will eventually make the difference in whether the L-Share will provide a 
strong incentive to the shareholder to stay invested in the firm for the long-term 
is the strike price. If the strike price is favorable enough for the shareholder and 
allows her to make a profit by trading the stock she receives following the 
exercise of the call, then the L-Share structure indeed provides an incentive to 
                                                
1258 Pavlos Masouros, Private Ordering and Corporate Governance: The Case of Venture Capital, 
Working Paper (2009), 69. Available at http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3450554/  
1259 Patrick Bolton & Frederic Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-term Investors, Preliminary Draft, 
(August 2010). Available at http://cgt.columbia.edu/files/papers/Bolton_Samama_L-Shares-
Rewarding_Long-Term_Investors.pdf  
1260 Id, at 9 
1261 Id., at 11 
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the shareholder to hold on her stock for the entirety of the loyalty period and 
resist the temptation of exiting during volatility periods. 
The advantage of the L-Share compared to the other loyalty structures, 
which were presented in Section 4 of Chapter Four and have accordingly been 
pronounced as candidates for inclusion in Long Governance’s agenda, is that it 
does not stumble upon the legal hurdles of corporate law, particularly in those 
EU jurisdictions that are of interest in this study. First of all, the L-Share does 
not award extra control rights to loyal shareholders and therefore it doesn’t run 
the risk of stumbling upon the mandatory bid rule or any directly or indirectly 
imposed one-share/one-vote rule (see Section 4.1. of Chapter Four). In addition 
to this, it seems that the L-Share avoids the risk of incompatibility with the 
principle of equal treatment of shareholders, wherever the latter is applicable. 
Firstly, the call warrant is not a distribution and therefore there is no risk of 
conflict with Art. 42 of the Second Directive, which explicitly provides for 
equal treatment of the shareholders with regard to distributions. Secondly, even 
in those jurisdictions, where there is a general principle of equal treatment of 
shareholders, the L-Share won’t be running into problems since it treats all 
shareholders equally at the time of the offer –by providing the conditional 
warrant to all of them- and subjects their ex post different treatment to the 
shareholders’ own trading behavior and choices (see Section 4.2. of Chapter 
Four)1262. 
The L-Share, as all other loyalty structures analyzed in this study, can 
be adopted on a corporation’s private initiative or its adoption can be 
encouraged by policymakers through the introduction of enabling provisions in 
corporate laws or favorable tax treatment of the capital gains that ensue from the 
exercise of the loyalty warrants 
 
 
                                                
1262 Id., at 12 
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Long Governance's regulatory agenda 
 
The goals of Long Governance can in practice be 
attained by the introduction of inter alia the following 
legal reforms: 
• Amendment of the accounting rules that 
impose 'mark-to-market' reporting of the 
actuarial gains and losses of a firm's pension 
plan (see Section 1.1. of Chapter Four). 
• Amendment of the ‘Solvency II’ capital 
requirements for life insurers (see Section 
1.3. of Chapter Four). 
• Shaping of managerial fiduciary duties in 
such a way, so that managers have strong 
incentives to install effective corporate risk 
management systems (see Section 2 of 
Chapter Four). 
• Reduction of the number of shares that a 
firm may repurchase (see Section 3 of 
Chapter Four). 
• Introduction of enabling provisions for the 
adoption of time-phased voting rights; 
amendment of Art. 5 of the Takeover 
Directive, so that the mandatory bid rule 
does not cover shareholders who crossed 
the bid threshold on the basis of award of 
time-phased voting rights (see Section 4.1. 
of Chapter Four). 
• Introduction of enabling provisions for the 
adoption of loyalty dividend structures (see 
Section 4.2.2. of Chapter Four). 
• Introduction of a sliding scale for capital 
gains tax rate, so that it gradually drops 
over a five-year period. 
• Introduction of a securities transaction tax 
(‘STT’). 
• Introduction of (tax) incentives for the 
adoption of the L-Share structure (see 





This thesis introduces three hypotheses and a normative legal concept. 
First Hypothesis: The shift in the institutional logics of corporate 
governance towards shareholder value (‘Great Reversal in Corporate 
Governance’) coupled with shareholdership’s increasing short-termism (‘Great 
Reversal in Shareholdership’) have cumulatively contributed to the low rates 
of GDP growth that are observed in five major Western economies (France, 
Germany, The Netherlands, UK, US) since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system of monetary arrangements in the early 1970s. 
Second Hypothesis: Corporate law has been an accomplice for the 
reorientation of corporate governance towards shareholder value, i.e. for the 
Great Reversal in Corporate Governance, and thus it indirectly shares the blame 
for the low rates of capital accumulation that have thrown the five major 
Western economies in a stagnation mode over the past four decades. 
Third Hypothesis: Corporate law rules have escalated the divestment 
of structurally long-termist institutional investors from equity positions and 
have preserved the trend towards shareholder short-termism that other legal and 
extra-legal institutions have directly caused. Corporate law has thus sustained 
the Great Reversal in Shareholdership and hence it has contributed to the 
maintenance of the second factor that brought about the observed low rates of 
growth in the five major Western economics over the past four decades. 
The thesis espouses the concept of institutional complementarity and 
therefore before attempting to back the three hypotheses it embarks on an 
analytical study of the post-Bretton Woods international political economy in an 
attempt to identify the extra-legal institutions that contributed to the advent of 
the two Great Reversals (for an overview see Figures 9-10). 
The First Hypothesis implies the existence of a historical causality 
chain (Figure 2). The two Great Reversals led to higher equity payout ratios and 
lower retention ratios in the Western public corporations that in turn caused 
lower rates of growth of (business) capital accumulation overall that in turn 
caused lower rates of GDP growth. A series of empirical data (Figures 11-27) 
back the existence of the trends that constitute the assumed causality chain, 
while the tenets of the post- Keynesian theory of the firm are used in order to 
model the alleged negative influence that shareholder value and shareholder 
short-termism can have upon the accumulation dynamics within a public firm. 
The Second Hypothesis is backed by the construction of the post-
Bretton Woods shareholder value index; a numerical legal index that shows the 
progress that the corporate laws of the five major Western economies covered 
by the thesis have made at the shareholder value level during the post-Bretton 
Woods era. The index shows how each jurisdiction’s corporate law scored from 
a shareholder value perspective at the time of the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
arrangements in 1973 and then how this score changed over the years until 
2007, the year before the ongoing crisis officially started. This index is 
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‘dynamic’, in the sense that it identifies what the relevant scores were for each 
jurisdiction every single year from 1973 to 2007. Eventually, out of the index a 
trend line emerges illustrating the incremental move of each jurisdiction’s 
corporate law towards shareholder value (Figures 30-31). 
The attempt to back the Third Hypothesis is done by ‘cherry picking’ 
developments in the field of corporate law generating bias in favor of short-
termism in the five major Western economies covered by the thesis. Corporate 
law reforms in the post-Bretton Woods era that were intended to merely help 
this legal niche adjust to the era of financialization have escalated the 
divestment of structurally long-termist institutional investors from equity 
positions and continue to prevent corporations from engaging in shareholder 
eugenics, so that they can attract more shareholder to their shareholder base. 
Thus, it is shown how corporate law sustains the ever-decreasing average 
holding period of stock (Figures 25-27). 
The study closes with the presentation of the normative doctrine of 
Long Governance, which represents a ‘third way’ in the fundamental debate of 
corporate governance between shareholder value and stakeholder value. Firstly, 
Long Governance can be viewed as a management theory that calls management 
to set as a benchmark for its actions the long-run interests of all the shareholders 
who hold, have held, or will hold stock in the firm; this requires management to 
take at the same time under account the competing interests of the different 
stakeholders, because in the long-run shareholders as a class benefit from the 
protection and encouragement of the firm-specific investments that other 
stakeholders make. Secondly, Long Governance can be viewed as a legal 
concept requiring directors’ duties in the framework of the ordinary course of 
business to be discharged with a view towards the maximization of long-term 
corporate welfare, which is most diligently achieved through the pursuance of 
growth. But, in the framework of change-in-control transactions Long 
Governance as a legal concept advances the discharge of directorial duties to the 
benefit of the corporation’s existing non-arbitrageur shareholders. 
Finally, the regulatory agenda of Long Governance is outlined resting 
largely on rules and structures presented in the framework of the Third 
Hypothesis. Long Governance rebuts the assumption of shareholder 
homogeneity and claims that shareholders should be classified into groups, so 
that more powers are distributed to the long-termist shareholders. Nevertheless, 
because of the fact that the vast majority of non-controlling shareholders of 
listed corporations are short-termists, one of the foremost regulatory goals of 
Long Governance should be to provide incentives to the investor community, so 
that the pool of long-termist shareholders, which will be empowered, is actually 
increased. In light of this objective, some additional policy proposals are laid 
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